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I. STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
The Utah Court of Appeals has jurisdiction over this matter 
pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3(2)(k) (1995). 
II. STATEMENT OP ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 
1. Did the trial court err in ruling that the doctrine of 
promissory estoppel can be used in Utah to enforce a contract 
barred by the Statute of Frauds? This issue was preserved at 
R. 1096-154, 1388-91. 
2. Did the trial court err in finding that Stangl had 
established the elements of promissory estoppel? This issue was 
preserved at R. 1906-20, 1921-37, 2213-34. 
3. Did the trial court err in adopting a measure of 
damages which went beyond the period of reliance to reward 
Stangl for money he expended during the two-and-a-half years 
after the parties' lease negotiations terminated? This issue 
was preserved at R. 1921-37, 2017-27. 
4. Did the trial court err in repeatedly allowing Stangl 
to submit damages evidence which he failed to produce in 
discovery? This issue was preserved at R. 2039-2083, 2991-98, 
3190-241, 3335, 4309-17, 4410-12, 4461-63, 4636-40, 4646-47, 
4835-907. 
5. Did the trial court err in its calculation of damages? 
This issue was preserved at R. 2137-45, 4955-56. 
III. STANDARDS OF APPELLATE REVIEW 
1. The trial court's decision regarding the use of 
promissory estoppel as a defense to the Statute of Frauds was a 
-1-
legal conclusion based on the interpretation of a statute. On 
review, the trial court's interpretation is accorded no 
deference and the court's determination of law is reviewed for 
correctness. Bonham v. Morgan, 788 P.2d 497, 499 (Utah 1989); 
Asav v. Watkins, 751 P.2d 1135 (Utah 1988). 
2. The trial court's decision regarding the existence of 
promissory estoppel involves issues regarding the existence of 
a cause of action, and the application of existing law to the 
facts of this case. Whether a cause of action exists is a 
question of law, and the trial court's decision is accorded no 
deference and the court's determination of law is reviewed for 
correctness. Bailev-Allen Co., Inc. v. Kurzet. 876 P. 2d 421, 
424 (Utah App. 1994) . The application of existing law to the 
facts of this case is reviewed as a mixed question of law and 
fact; the appellate court reviews findings of fact using a 
clearly erroneous standard, and reviews the trial court's legal 
conclusions for correctness. Trolley Square Assoc, v. Nielson, 
886 P.2d 61 (Utah App. 1994); State v. Vigil, 815 P.2d 1296, 
1300 (Utah App. 1991). 
3. The trial court's decision regarding the proper 
measure of damages for promissory estoppel is a question of law 
that is reviewed for correctness. Bailey-Allen, supra. 
Alternatively, the decision is reviewed as a mixed question of 
law and fact. State v. Vigil, supra; Klinger v. Kightly, 889 
P.2d 1372, 1381 (Utah App.1995). 
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4. The trial court's decision regarding the admissibility 
of evidence despite the violation of discovery rules is reviewed 
under an abuse of discretion or "reasonability" standard. Utah 
D.O.T. v. 6200 South Associates. 872 P.2d 462, 465 (Utah App. 
1994) . 
5. The trial court's calculation of damages is a question 
of fact which is reviewed using a clearly erroneous standard. 
Klinaer v. Kiqhtlv, supra. 
IV. STATUTORY PROVISIONS 
Utah Code Ann. § 25-5-3 (1953): 
Every contract for the leasing for a longer 
period than one year, or for the sale, of any lands, 
or any interest in lands, shall be void unless the 
contract, or some note or memorandum thereof, is in 
writing subscribed by the party to whom the lease or 
sale is to be made, or by his lawful agent thereunto 
authorized in writing. 
Utah Code Ann. § 25-5-4 (1989): 
The following agreements are void unless the 
agreement, or some note or memorandum of the 
agreement, is in writing, signed by the party to be 
charged with the agreement: 
(1) every agreement that by its terms is not to 
be performed within one year from the making of the 
agreement[.] 
V, STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
A* Nature of Case, course of Proceedings, and Disposition in 
the Court Below. 
This action involves a dispute between F.C. Stangl, III 
("Stangl") and Ernst Home Center, Inc. ("Ernst") over lease 
negotiations between the parties from June to September 1988, 
and Ernst's ultimate decision not to lease space from Stangl at 
the Jordan Valley Plaza shopping center ("the Plaza"). 
-3-
Stangl brought suit against Ernst on May 2, 1989, alleging 
that Ernst had breached an agreement to enter into a 2 5-year 
lease at the Plaza, or alternatively, that he was entitled to 
recover damages under promissory estoppel because he purchased 
the Plaza in reliance on Ernst. (R. 1-11). 
The non-jury trial in this matter commenced February 11, 
1993. (R. 2214). During trial, Stangl sought to use numerous 
exhibits that had not been provided to Ernst in response to pre-
trial discovery requests, and continually changed his theory and 
method of calculating damages. (R. 2991-98, 3190-241, 3335; 
Exs. 65A-C). After Ernst's strenuous objections and motions to 
exclude evidence, the trial court bifurcated the trial into 
"liability" and "damages" phases. (R. 2000). 
The "liability" phase was tried from February 11 to 19, 
1993. (R. 2214). On April 20, 1993, the trial court issued a 
Memorandum Decision which held that Ernst and Stangl had not 
entered into a written or oral contract, but left open the issue 
of whether Stangl could recover under the theory of promissory 
estoppel for events after August 2, 1988. The court reiterated 
its pre-trial ruling that the doctrine of promissory estoppel 
could be invoked to bar the application of the Statute of Frauds 
under Utah law, relying on Medesco, Inc. v. LNS International, 
Inc., 762 F. Supp. 920 (D. Utah 1991). (R. 2000-14). 
The "damages" phase of the trial convened on Tuesday, 
February 22, 1994. (R. 2214). On Saturday, February 19th, 
Stangl again revised his damages calculation and provided Ernst 
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with additional damages documents. (R. 2039-41). For example, 
Stangl claimed he incurred an additional cost of $48,333.43 for 
interest paid on a loan for the Plaza, and produced checks from 
1989 and 1990 which, he insisted, substantiated his claim. 
(Exs. 88, 66C). Despite discovery from Ernst dating back to 
1989, and a request for supplementation made over a month before 
the "damages" phase of trial, none of these documents had ever 
been previously furnished to Ernst. (R. 2039-2083). 
Stangl continued to change his damages calculation 
throughout the "damages" phase. Over Ernst's repeated 
objections, the trial court admitted Stangl's damages evidence. 
(R. 2039-2083, 2229, 4309-17, 4410-12, 4461-63, 4636-40, 4646-
47, 4835-907; Exs. 88, 88A, 89, 404). 
The "damages" phase was tried from February 22 to 24, 1994. 
(R. 2214). The court subsequently ruled that Stangl had 
established promissory estoppel, and awarded Stangl $331,391 in 
damages. (R. 2229) . To arrive at this figure, the trial court 
started with the purchase price of the Plaza in August 1988, 
added over $1 million in costs Stangl claimed he had incurred 
during the next two-and-a-half years, and then subtracted rents 
Stangl received during that time and the funds he received when 
he sold the Plaza in March 1991. (R. 2228-29/ Ex. 88A) . 
The court entered Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law 
and a Judgment on December 27, 1994. (R. 2213-37) (attached as 
Addendum A). Ernst timely filed Defendant's Notice of Appeal on 
January 20, 1995. (R. 2243-44). 
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B. Statement of Facts. 
1. Stangl's Background, and Acquisition of Brockbank 
Property. 
Stangl is an experienced, sophisticated businessman who has 
been involved in real estate development and construction for 
over thirty years, and who has experience with all types of 
developments, including industrial, apartment complexes and 
shopping centers. As of 1988, Stangl owned over 1.5 million 
square feet of property in Utah, and had bought and sold 500 to 
1,000 pieces of property. (R. 3274-76). As of 1988, his net 
worth was approximately $24 million. (R. 3374-75). 
From 1979 to 1981, Stangl owned the Plaza property, which 
consists of various building "pads" and parking areas. 
(R. 2215; Ex. 339). In 1981, Stangl sold the majority of the 
Plaza to Roger Brockbank ("Brockbank") and several of his 
relatives, but remained a guarantor of the Brockbanks' loan for 
the purchase. (R. 2921-23; Ex. 81). The lender's interest in 
the Brockbanks' loan was subsequently assigned to Aetna. 
(R. 2215). In September 1987, Aetna formally notified Stangl 
that Brockbank, the remaining borrower on the loan, had 
defaulted. (R. 2215, 2923). Aetna initiated a nonjudicial 
foreclosure on the Plaza property owned by Brockbank ("the 
Brockbank property"), and Brockbank filed for Chapter 11 
bankruptcy. (R. 2215-16). 
The Aetna foreclosure and Brockbank bankruptcy required 
Stangl to consider his alternatives. Stangl was aware that the 
Brockbank property had been appraised at $1,800,000 in March 
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1988. (R. 3764-66; Ex. 15). Stangl was also interested in 
maximizing the values of the Plaza pads he had retained, and 
understood that those pads would be affected by what happened 
with the Brockbank property. (R. 3750, 3763) . In addition, 
Stangl had been unsuccessful in his attempts to negotiate 
easement rights across the Plaza with Aetna. (R. 3753, 3758-61; 
Ex. 394). 
On June 29, 1988, Stangl and Brockbank entered into an 
option agreement for Stangl to purchase the Brockbank property, 
conditioned on Bankruptcy Court release of the property and 
satisfactory title. (Ex. 3). On July 1, 1988, Stangl made an 
offer to purchase Aetna's note on the property for $900,000, 
conditioned on satisfactory title and, if necessary, Bankruptcy 
Court approval. (Ex. 315). Aetna accepted Stangl's offer on 
July 14, 1988. (Ex. 11). 
By letter dated July 28, 1988, Stangl exercised his option 
to purchase the Brockbank property, and indicated that the sale 
could close after the property could be transferred free and 
clear of all liens. (Ex. 66F) . That same day, Stangl also 
closed on a $3.6 million loan from Valley Mortgage Corporation 
("Valley Mortgage") to purchase the Brockbank property and 
develop the Plaza. (Ex. 19B). According to the July 18, 1988 
Loan Submission to Valley Mortgage, a portion of the loan was to 
be used to pay off tax liens on the Brockbank property. 
(Ex. 16, p. 6) . 
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As of August 1, 1988, all of the interested parties in 
Brockbank's bankruptcy had agreed to the terms of a Bankruptcy 
Court Order Approving Sale of the Brockbank property, 
(Ex. 322). The Bankruptcy Court Order also removed all 
remaining liens and encumbrances on the property. (R. 3958-60). 
Stangl's purchase of the property closed on August 9, 1988. 
(Ex. 66A). 
2. Lease negotiations. 
In late May 1988, Steve Pruitt ("Pruitt"), acting on behalf 
of Stangl, called Ernst's Vice President in charge of real 
estate, Mack DuBose ("DuBose"), to see if Ernst was interested 
in leasing space at the Plaza. (R. 2216, 4125) . DuBose 
indicated some interest, and on June 3, 1988, Pruitt sent DuBose 
a letter and some materials on the Plaza. (R. 2216). Pruitt's 
June 3rd letter explained that Stangl was repurchasing the Plaza 
and "should have possession of the property by the end of this 
month." (Ex. 2) (attached as Addendum B). 
At no time did Stangl or anyone representing him correct 
the information conveyed to Ernst in the June 3rd letter 
regarding his ownership of the Plaza property. Stangl admitted 
at trial that he: 
• never corrected the June 3rd letter's timeline for his 
acquisition of the property (R. 3778) ; 
• never told Ernst about the acts he was taking to 
reacquire title to the property (R. 3780-85); 
• never told Ernst he had an option agreement with 
Brockbank (R. 3780-83); 
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• never told Ernst he agreed to purchase Aetna's note 
(R. 3783-84); 
• never told Ernst he borrowed money from Valley 
Mortgage for the property (R. 3 784-85); and 
• never told Ernst when he closed on his purchase 
(R. 3785). 
Based on Pruitt's letter and the subsequent lease 
negotiations, Ernst reached the inescapable conclusion that 
Stangl owned the Plaza property. (R. 3498-500). Ernst's 
conclusion was further reinforced by zoning documents Stangl 
submitted to the City of West Jordan in July 1988 in which he 
listed himself as owner. (R. 3789-90; Exs. 7, 19). Stangl 
never corrected Ernst's conclusion that he owned the property. 
On June 23, 1988, Pruitt sent a second letter to DuBose 
which set forth the general terms of a lease which would be 
acceptable to Stangl. The letter included a signature line for 
Ernst to indicate its acceptance, and asked DuBose to return a 
signed copy if the terms were acceptable. Ernst never signed 
Pruitt's June 23rd letter. (R. 3505-06; Ex. 3) (Ex. 3 attached 
as Addendum C). 
DuBose responded by letter dated June 29, 1988. DuBose's 
letter identified twelve disagreements with the general terms 
proposed by Pruitt, including a substantially lower percentage 
rent and a substantially lower percentage of base rent increase. 
(Ex. 6) (attached as Addendum D). 
On July 8, 1988, DuBose sent Pruitt a formal Offer to 
Lease. The Offer went into considerable detail about Ernst's 
requirements, and repeated the terms previously set forth in 
-9-
DuBose's June 29, 1988 letter. The Offer also included the 
following provision: 
DOCUMENTATION AND APPROVAL - Finalization of the 
agreement contemplated by this letter is subject to 
the preparation of and execution of a Lease Agreement 
in form and content acceptable to Ernst Home Center, 
Inc., a Washington Corporation, and Valley Indoor 
Marketplace, Inc., a Utah Corporation, and their 
respective counsel. 
The Offer ended by stating "If you agree with this proposal, 
please acknowledge by returning a signed original of this 
letter. We will then instruct our attorneys to proceed with the 
preparation of the Lease." (Ex. 9A) (attached as Addendum E). 
Stangl never signed the Offer. (R. 3520). 
Stangl countered DuBose's Offer to Lease by letter dated 
July 14, 1988. Stangl's counteroffer proposed numerous changes. 
Stangl's counteroffer also included the same "DOCUMENTATION & 
APPROVAL" provision as Ernst's Offer, except that "F.C. Stangl 
III" was substituted for "Valley Indoor Marketplace." Stangl's 
letter closed by stating: 
If you agree with this proposal, please 
acknowledge by returning a signed original of this 
letter. This letter is offered for your acceptance, 
but the offer will be withdrawn if not accepted as 
offered and returned to me prior to July 20, 1988, at 
5:00 P.M. 
(Ex. 12) (attached as Addendum F) . Ernst never returned a 
signed copy of Stangl's July 14, 1988 letter. (R. 3532). 
On July 15, 1995, DuBose sent Stangl a copy of Ernst's form 
lease. (Ex. 13). Despite the fact that neither party had 
signed and returned the other's Offer to Lease, negotiations 
continued. On August 2, 1988, DuBose called Pruitt and told him 
-10-
that Ernst management had approved the project and that another 
offer to lease would be forthcoming. (R. 3543-45). 
On August 3, 1988, DuBose sent Stangl a second Offer to 
Lease. (Ex. 22) (attached as Addendum G) . On August 5th, 
Stangl sent DuBose the Ernst form lease with substantial 
changes. (Ex. 24) (attached as Addendum H) . On August 23rd, 
DuBose returned a revised lease to Stangl. (Ex. 26) (first page 
attached as Addendum I). Although DuBose indicated that Ernst 
was ready to execute the August 23rd lease as written, Stangl 
responded by proposing further substantial changes by letter 
dated August 29th. (Ex. 27) (attached as Addendum J). 
The exchange of lease drafts culminated in a letter from 
DuBose to Stangl on September 12, 1988. The letter specifically 
addressed each of Stangl's most recent proposed changes. DuBose 
concluded the letter by stating there was a risk that 
negotiations would terminate absent resolution of the 
significant remaining issues, and asked for a meeting on 
September 14, 1988. (Ex. 31) (attached as Addendum K). After 
the September 14, 1988 meeting, at least five issues were left 
unresolved between the parties. (R. 3562-74; Ex. 30). 
The parties never signed a lease agreement, a letter, a 
memorandum, or any other document indicating they had reached an 
agreement. (R. 3574-77). On September 29, 1988, Ernst formally 
notified Stangl that it had elected not to continue negotiations 
and would not be a tenant in the Jordan Valley Plaza. (Ex. 35) 
(attached as Addendum L). 
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VI. INTRODUCTION AND SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
The judgment against Ernst in this case is contrary to Utah 
law and must be reversed. The judgment is premised on the 
doctrine of promissory estoppel, but promissory estoppel cannot 
be utilized in this case. The "promise" relied upon by the 
trial court is an alleged agreement by Ernst to enter into a 25-
year lease with Stangl, a promise which is subject to the 
Statute of Frauds. Utah law does not, however, recognize a 
promissory estoppel exception to the Statute of Frauds. The 
exception to the Statute of Frauds relied upon by the trial 
court is contrary to Utah law regarding the Statute as well as 
contracts, and has been rejected in a number of other states. 
Even if promissory estoppel applies in this case, the 
judgment must be reversed because the evidence does not support 
application of the doctrine. Ernst did not have the requisite 
awareness that Stangl was purchasing the Brockbank property in 
reliance on its alleged "promise" to lease, nor did Ernst make 
a definite and certain "promise" to enter into a lease agreement 
with Stangl regardless of the circumstances. Moreover, Stangl 
did not purchase the Brockbank property in reasonable reliance 
on Ernst's alleged promise, and did not suffer any detriment as 
a result of his alleged reliance because the Brockbank property 
he purchased had a positive value when Ernst ended lease 
negotiations. 
And even if promissory estoppel applies in this case, and 
its requirements have been satisfied, the trial court judgment 
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must still be reversed. The court employed an incorrect measure 
of damages, and erred in repeatedly allowing Stangl to submit 
damages evidence he failed to produce in discovery. 
Beyond legal arguments, the judgment against Ernst must 
also be reversed because it is contrary to equity and common 
sense. The judgment allows Stangl to recover for Ernst's 
alleged "promise" to enter into a lease agreement, despite the 
fact that the parties never agreed on the terms of a lease, and 
the fact that Stangl repeatedly rejected the terms offered by 
Ernst. 
Moreover, the judgment holds Ernst liable for an oral 
agreement when both Ernst and Stangl specifically conditioned 
their negotiations on the requirement that any final agreement 
must be in writing and signed. Employing promissory estoppel in 
these circumstances effectively eliminates the ability of 
commercially sophisticated businesses to allocate risk by 
setting the parameters for their negotiations. 
The judgment also holds Ernst liable for Stangl's purchase 
of the Brockbank property even though Stangl told Ernst prior to 
negotiations that he was already in the process of repurchasing 
the property, and that he would own it by the end of June 1988. 
Promissory estoppel requires awareness of all material facts and 
knowing inducement, neither of which existed at the time of the 
"promise" relied upon by the court because Ernst thought Stangl 
already owned the property, and Stangl never corrected that 
impression. 
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Finally, the judgment below must be reversed because of its 
affect on the ability of people to conduct orderly business 
negotiations in Utah. By enforcing the "promise" alleged by 
Stangl, the court allowed him to rewrite the parties' 
negotiations. Even though Stangl rejected two different lease 
offers by Ernst after August 2nd, the court enforced his 
promissory estoppel claim based on an August 2nd "promise." 
The trial court's use of promissory estoppel cannot be 
upheld by this Court. Promissory estoppel cannot be utilized to 
enforce an "agreement" arbitrarily located at some mid-point in 
failed contract negotiations, nor can it be used as a cure-all 
for unsuccessful negotiators who desperately want a second 
chance. Neither law nor equity supports a judgment against 
Ernst based on promissory estoppel. 
VII. ARGUMENT 
A. Promissory estoppel cannot be utilized in this case. 
The trial court correctly concluded that Ernst never 
entered into a written or oral contract with Stangl to lease 
space at the Plaza. Nevertheless, the court relied upon the 
doctrine of promissory estoppel to conclude that Ernst could be 
held liable in this case. The trial court's reliance on 
promissory estoppel was directly contrary to Utah law. 
1. The "promise" relied upon by the trial court is an 
alleged agreement by Ernst to enter into a 25-year 
lease with Stangl which is subject to the Statute of 
Frauds. 
To establish promissory estoppel under Utah law, a party 
must prove: 
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(1) a promise the promisor reasonably expects will 
induce reliance; (2) reasonable reliance inducing 
action or forbearance by the promisee or a third 
person; and (3) detriment to the promisee or third 
person. 
Prows v. State, 823 P.2d 764, 768-69 (Utah 1991). 
The trial court premised its finding of liability on 
Ernst's alleged "promise to lease the anchor space" in the 
Plaza. (R. 2232 - Conclusion No. 10). According to the court: 
Ernst through its words and conduct represented 
to Stangl that it would enter into an agreement with 
Stangl to lease the anchor space at the Plaza with 
remodeling to be done and possession to be taken on a 
"fast track" basis. 
(R. 2230 - Conclusion No. 4) . The trial court based its 
decision on two other conclusions: 
2. Beginning with its June 29 letter, Ernst set 
negotiations on a course such that any reasonable 
lessor should reasonably expect Ernst to be bound by 
a mutually acceptable "Offer to Lease" containing the 
significant business points. . . . 
3. It was not unreasonable for Stangl to 
believe that the project would proceed following 
DuBose's phone calls of August 2. . . . 
(R. 2230). 
Whether the "promise" found by the court is characterized 
as a 2 5-year lease agreement or an agreement to enter into such 
a lease, it is governed by the Utah Statute of Frauds. As the 
court noted in S.C.M. Land Co. v. Watkins & Faber. 732 P.2d 105 
(Utah 1986): 
The contract to extend or renew the written lease for 
five years, was oral. It was tantamount to an oral 
contract to make a lease . . . [and] is governed by 
the statute of frauds the same as if an oral lease was 
made. An oral agreement to make a contract which must 
itself be in writing is itself within the statute of 
frauds. 
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S.C.M. Land, at 107, quoting Utah Mercur Goldmining Co. v, 
Herschel Goldmining Co. , 103 Utah 249, 134 P.2d 1094, 1096 (Utah 
1943). See also Zeese v. Estate of Siegel, 534 P.2d 85, 88 
(Utah 1975) (lease agreements are subject to the section of the 
Statute of Frauds covering contracts, Utah Code Ann. 
§ 25-5-4(1), as well as Utah Code Ann. § 25-5-3, the section 
covering interests in real property). 
Under the Utah Statute of Frauds, Ernst's alleged oral 
promise to enter into a 25-year lease with Stangl cannot be 
enforced. According to the Statute, an agreement to lease an 
interest in land, or an agreement which by its terms cannot be 
completed in one year, cannot be enforced unless it is in 
writing. See Utah Code Ann. §§ 25-5-3, 25-5-4(1). 
2. Utah law does not recognize a promise to execute a 
contract governed by the Statute of Frauds as grounds 
for promissory estoppel. 
To avoid the consequences of the Statute of Frauds, the 
trial court relied upon the doctrine of promissory estoppel. 
Under Utah law, however, Ernst's alleged oral promise to enter 
into a 25-year lease with Stangl cannot form the basis for 
promissory estoppel. Utah courts have consistently refused to 
employ promissory estoppel to enforce a promise to execute a 
contract barred by the Statute of Frauds. 
In McKinnon v. The Corporation of the President of the 
Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-Day Saints, 529 P.2d 434 (Utah 
1974), the plaintiff claimed the defendant had breached an oral 
agreement to enter into a contract granting him a haulage right-
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of-way over certain federal lands. The defendant denied the 
existence of a contract, and asserted the Utah Statute of Frauds 
in its defense. At summary judgment, the plaintiff argued that 
the defendant was estopped from asserting the Statute of Frauds. 
Although the parties had conducted negotiations for the 
right-of-way, and the plaintiff had withdrawn his application to 
lease an adjoining piece of property, the Utah Supreme Court 
determined that promissory estoppel could not be used by the 
plaintiff to establish liability. According to the court: 
In Easton v. Wvcoff, this court stated that the 
doctrine of promissory estoppel had been extended, in 
a limited form, to those cases concerned with the 
Statute of Limitations or the Statute of Frauds, where 
the promise as to future conduct constituted an 
intended abandonment of an existing right of the 
promisor. However, a mere promise to execute a 
written contract and a subsequent refusal to do so is 
insufficient to create an estoppel, although reliance 
is placed on such a promise and damage is sustained as 
a consequence of the refusal. 
McKinnon, 529 P.2d at 436-437 (footnote omitted). 
Although the plaintiff "marshalled a plethora of factual 
issues which he urges must be resolved at trial," the Supreme 
Court affirmed the summary judgment dismissal of his action 
because there was no evidence of "conduct on the part of the 
defendant that is tantamount to a representation that it would 
not avail itself of the Statute of Frauds." McKinnon, at 437. 
McKinnon relied on two prior Utah cases, Easton v. Wycoff, 
4 Utah 2d 386, 295 P.2d 332 (Utah 1956), and Ravarino v. Price, 
123 Utah 559, 260 P.2d 570 (Utah 1953). In Easton, the 
plaintiff claimed the defendant had orally agreed to the terms 
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of a lease and had promised to prepare a written lease, but that 
no lease was ever prepared or executed. To overcome a Statute 
of Frauds defense, the plaintiff relied on promissory estoppel. 
The Utah Supreme Court in Easton upheld the dismissal of 
the plaintiff's claim. According to the court: 
In most instances of negotiations for transactions 
included within the Statute, a reduction of the 
contract to writing is contemplated and, in all 
probability, the parties will discuss who will draw 
the instrument and where and when it will be signed. 
The mere refusal to execute a written contract as 
agreed does not constitute 'fraud' within the rule 
that the Statute of Frauds will not be enforced where 
the effect would be to perpetrate a fraud, and to hold 
otherwise would, in effect, completely nullify the 
Statute of Frauds. 
Easton, 295 P.2d at 333 (citation omitted). 
In Ravarino, the plaintiff sought to enforce the 
defendants7 oral agreement to convey two tracts of land. The 
Utah Supreme Court ruled the plaintiff could not use promissory 
estoppel to enforce a contract barred by the Statute of Frauds: 
[W]e conclude the general rule applies that an 
estoppel will not arise simply because of a breach of 
a promise as to future conduct or because of a 
disappointment of expectations on an executory 
agreement. In Elliot v. Whitmore, supra, this court 
announced the same doctrine: 'Even taking these 
conversations in the most favorable view for the 
appellant, there was absolutely no statement upon the 
part of the defendants of an intended abandonment of 
an existing right. It was merely an acquiescence in 
the plaintiff's proposition.' 
Ravarino, 260 P.2d at 577 (citations omitted). 
Under Utah law, therefore, the doctrine of promissory 
estoppel cannot be utilized in this case. Ernst began its lease 
negotiations with Stangl by clearly stating that any agreement 
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would have to be in writing and signed by the parties (Ex. 9A), 
and there is no evidence Ernst ever abandoned that requirement 
or its rights under the Statute of Frauds. Accordingly, the 
trial court erred as a matter of law in allowing Stangl to 
recover based on promissory estoppel. 
3. The trial court's reliance on Medesco v. LNS 
International was contrary to Utah law regarding the 
Statute of Frauds. 
Despite the clear language in the decisions cited above, 
the trial court ignored Utah precedent and relied on the U.S 
District Court's decision in Medesco v. LNS International. 
supra, to conclude that "promissory estoppel may be invoked to 
bar the application of the Statute of Frauds." (R. 2012). The 
trial court's conclusion was contrary to Utah law. 
The District Court in Medesco ruled that the formulations 
of promissory estoppel in McKinnon, Easton, and Ravarino were 
"dated" by the Utah Supreme Court's subsequent adoption of the 
formulation of promissory estoppel in § 90 of the Restatement 
(Second) of Contracts. Medesco, 762 F. Supp. at 925 (case 
attached at Addendum M, together with all other cases not 
reported in West's Pacific 2d Reporter). The District Court 
therefore concluded that the prior Utah decisions were of 
"dubious precedential value,11 and instead adopted the exception 
to the Statute of Frauds in Restatement (Second) of Contracts 
§ 139. Medesco, at 925 n.8, 926. Section 139 provides that a 
promise which the promisor should reasonably expect to induce 
action or forbearance on the part of the promisee is enforceable 
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notwithstanding the Statute of Frauds if injustice can be 
avoided only be enforcement of the promise. 
The trial court's reliance on Medesco was erroneous. 
Although Utah courts have adopted § 9 0 of the Restatement 
(Second) of Contracts, see, e.g., Rose v. Allied Development 
Co., 719 P.2d 83, 87 (Utah 1986), they have never rejected the 
rule in McKinnon, and have never adopted the exception to the 
Statute of Frauds in Restatement § 13 9. 
In fact, the exception in § 13 9 is contrary to Utah's 
strict application of the Statute of Frauds. In Machan 
Hampshire Properties, Inc. v. Western Real Estate & Development 
Co. , 779 P.2d 230 (Utah App. 1989), the court held that even 
construing various writings together did not satisfy the Statute 
of Frauds because they did not show a consummated agreement was 
entered into, only a willingness to enter into one. Machan, at 
235. The court cited 2A Corbin, Corbin on Contracts, § 516 at 
547 (1950), for the proposition that "writings must so clearly 
evidence the fact that a contract was made, and what its terms 
are, 'that there is no serious possibility that the assertion of 
the contract is false'.11 Machan, supra. 
The Statute of Frauds was also strictly enforced in 
Birdzell v. Utah Oil Refining Co., 121 Utah 412, 242 P.2d 578 
(Utah 1952). In Birdzell, the Utah Supreme Court held that a 
writing or memorandum sufficient to satisfy the Statute of 
Frauds must contain all the essential terms and provisions of 
the contract. The court held that a letter relied upon by the 
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plaintiff was not sufficient to form a contract because it 
lacked "an acknowledgment or recognition that a contract has 
been entered into by the parties.11 Birdzell, 242 P. 2d at 580. 
By its very language, the letter purports to be 
nothing more than an expression of willingness on the 
part of respondent, if it is successful in obtaining 
a renewal of its lease with the railroad, to sublease 
the premises to the appellant upon certain terms and 
conditions. The letter contains no allusion to even 
any previous negotiations between the parties. In 
fact, the letter implies that no agreement has been 
therefore reached since it sets forth the terms upon 
which the respondent would be willing to sublease to 
the appellant. 
Birdzell. supra. 
The application of the Statute of Frauds in Machan and 
Birdzell is inconsistent with the notion that a mere "promise" 
to enter into a contract covered by the Statute would be 
sufficient to establish liability. 
The exception in § 139 is also contrary to the purpose and 
intent of Utah's Statute of Frauds. According to English v. 
Standard Optical Co. , 814 P.2d 613 (Utah App. 1991), the purpose 
of the Statute is "that in important matters such as the demise 
of a ten-year leasehold in real property the parties should be 
protected against frauds and perjuries." Standard Optical, at 
616; see also Guinand v. Walton. 22 Utah 2d 196, 450 P.2d 467, 
469 (Utah 1969). "Statute of Frauds are intended to bar 
enforcement of certain agreements that the law requires to be 
memorialized in writing." Colonial Leasing Co. of New England. 
Inc. v. Larsen Bros. Constr. Co.. 731 P.2d 483, 486 (Utah 1986). 
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The Statute of Frauds recognizes that certain types of 
agreements are so important, or will affect the parties for such 
a significant length of time, that they must be in writing in 
order to be enforceable• Adopting the exception in § 13 9 would 
allow the enforcement of oral contracts which the Statute 
specifically requires to be in writing, and would effectively 
render the Statute meaningless. The exception in § 13 9 is 
directly contrary to the purpose and intent of Utah's Statute of 
Frauds. The trial court's reliance on Medesco and § 139 was 
therefore erroneous. 
4. The exception in Medesco is also contrary to Utah 
contract law. 
The § 139 exception adopted in Medesco is also contrary to 
Utah contract law. Utah courts recognize that when a party 
specifically conditions its obligation on the execution of a 
signed, written contract, that condition must be met before an 
agreement will be enforced. 
In Engineering Association. Inc. v. Irving Place 
Association, Inc., 622 P.2d 784 (Utah 1980), the court held 
there was no contract because of a clause in a letter which 
stated: "Upon our timely receipt of the foregoing and our 
execution of both copies of this letter by the chairman of the 
board or and [sic] executive officer, this shall become a 
binding agreement between us." According to the court: 
If the parties make it clear that they do not intend 
that there should be legal consequences unless and 
until a form of writing is executed, there is no 
contract until that time. 
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Engineering Association, at 787. 
A similar conclusion was reached in Harmen v. Greenwood, 
596 P.2d 636 (Utah 1979), where the court held that a letter of 
intent was not an enforceable contract. 
In Valcarce v. Bitters, 12 Utah 2d 61, 362 P.2d 427, 
428 (1961), this court stated: 
A condition precedent to the enforcement 
of any contract is that there be a meeting 
of the minds of the parties which must be 
spelled out, either expressly or impliedly, 
with sufficient definiteness to be enforced. 
This basic principle of contract law, when 
applied to the circumstances of the negotiations 
between the parties, requires the conclusion made by 
the district court. The Letter of Intent, quoted 
above, is not by itself an enforceable contract. 
Nowhere in its forms are any binding promises even 
made; it is precisely what it purports to be, a letter 
indicating the intention of the parties to enter into, 
at a later time, a binding agreement. The letter is 
a variation of what is often called an "agreement to 
agree". Such "agreements to agree" are generally 
unenforceable because they leave open material terms 
for future consideration, and the courts cannot create 
these terms for the parties. Here, the parties simply 
committed themselves to the intention of entering into 
an agreement at a later time. . . . As we stated in 
Valcarce, " . . . where there was simply some nebulous 
notion in the air that a contract might be entered in 
the future, the court cannot fabricate the kind of 
contract the parties ought to have made and enforce 
it." 
Harmen. at 638-39. 
In this case, DuBose's July 8th Offer and Stangl's 
July 14th Offer both specifically stated that "[f]inalization of 
the agreement contemplated by this letter is subject to the 
preparation of and execution of a Lease Agreement in form and 
content acceptable" to both parties. (Exs. 9A, 12) . Neither of 
these letters was ever signed and no final written agreement was 
ever prepared or executed by the parties. 
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Under Utah contract law, Stangl cannot enforce the alleged 
oral "promise" to contract in this case. Enforcing such an 
agreement would be directly contrary to the parameters set out 
by the parties in their respective Offers to Lease. The trial 
court therefore erred in using § 139 to enforce a "promise" the 
parties themselves intended to be unenforceable. 
5. Other states have rejected the exception to the 
Statute of Frauds adopted in Medesco. 
Contrary to the reasoning in Medesco, the mere fact that 
Utah courts have adopted the definition of promissory estoppel 
in § 90 of the Restatement (Second) does not mean that the 
exception to the Statute of Frauds in § 139 must also be 
adopted. A number of states which utilize the definition of 
promissory estoppel from § 90 have refused to adopt the 
exception in § 139. See, e.g.. Greaves v. Medical Imaging 
Systems, Inc., 124 Wash.2d 389, 879 P.2d 276 (1994); Stearns v. 
Emery-Waterhouse Co., 596 A.2d 72 (Maine 1991); Farmland Service 
COOP., Inc. v. Klein. 196 Neb. 538, 244 N.W.2d 86 (1976); see 
generally Comment Note, Promissory Estoppel as Basis for 
Avoidance of Statute of Frauds, 56 A.L.R.3d 1037 §§ 4(a), 4(b); 
see also Collier v. Brooks, 632 So.2d 149 (Fla. App. 1994). 
The philosophy of those jurisdictions was succinctly stated 
in Schwedes v. Romain, 179 Montana 466, 587 P.2d 388 (1978), 
which also rejected a promissory estoppel exception to the 
Statute of Frauds: 
Where a case is clearly within the statute of frauds, 
promissory estoppel is inapplicable, for the net 
effect would be to repeal the statute completely . . . 
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[T]he breach of a promise which the law does not 
regard as binding is not a fraud. 
Schwedes. 587 P.2d at 392. 
If this Court decides to overrule McKinnon and permit a 
promissory estoppel exception to the Statute of Frauds, Ernst 
submits that the limited exceptions recognized under Texas law, 
or the limited exceptions recognized in other states, are more 
consistent with Utah law than Restatement § 139. As detailed 
below, these exceptions would preserve the Utah Statute of 
Frauds, and would apply only in circumstances where interposing 
the Statute of Frauds would itself perpetuate a fraud. 
Texas recognizes a limited promissory estoppel exception to 
the Statute of Frauds when the promise at issue is one to 
execute an agreed upon written contract. In Beta Drilling, Inc. 
v. Durkee. 821 S.W.2d 739 (Tex. App.—Houston 1992), the court 
summarized Texas law as follows: 
For promissory estoppel to create an exception to 
the statute of frauds, there must have been a promise 
to sign a written contract which had been prepared and 
which would satisfy the requirements of the statute of 
frauds. A promise to prepare a written contract is 
not sufficient. The defendant must have promised to 
sign a particular agreement which was in writing at 
the time. 
Beta Drilling, 821 S.W.2d at 741 (citations omitted). 
Texas law bars the use of promissory estoppel in cases 
significantly similar to this one. In H. Molsen & Co, Inc. v. 
Hicks. 550 S.W.2d 354 (Tex. App.—El Paso 1977), the parties 
conducted negotiations and prepared a written document, but 
changes still needed to be made and the sellers' attorney had to 
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approve the contract before it could be executed. The court 
held that under the circumstances, "there was no meeting of the 
minds as to the final terms and no acceptance by the [sellers] 
of the writings.11 H. Molsen, 550 S.W.2d at 356. Accordingly, 
the court refused to apply promissory estoppel to bar the 
application of the Statute of Frauds. Id. 
In Southmark Corp. v. Life Investors, Inc. , 851 F.2d 763 
(5th Cir. 1988) , Southmark contended that it had an oral 
agreement with Life Investors to purchase some $63 million worth 
of stock. Life Investors countered with a Statute of Frauds 
defense, and Southmark replied that promissory estoppel barred 
the use of that defense. To support its claim, Southmark 
introduced affidavits from two of its vice-presidents, who 
stated that Life Investors representatives told them an 
agreement had been reached and that Life Investors would execute 
final documents evidencing the agreement. Southmark argued that 
the affidavits raised fact issued regarding promissory estoppel. 
Relying on Texas law, the Fifth Circuit refused to find 
promissory estoppel applicable: 
[A]t most the parties contemplated final documents 
that were to be prepared and approved sometime in the 
future. But in a transaction involving the sale of a 
controlling share of the stock of an ongoing business 
at a purchase price in the tens of millions of dollars 
. . . there is certainly an expectation on both sides 
that documents will be prepared once the parties reach 
an agreement. We cannot say that . . . justice 
requires the enforcement of an oral promise to reduce 
the agreement to writing or to execute final documents 
at a later time, especially where, as here, it does 
not appear that the parties had even worked out the 
final details of the alleged transaction. 
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Southmark. 851 F.2d at 769. 
The Fifth Circuit found that the Statute of Frauds would be 
rendered meaningless if promissory estoppel were applied to 
situations in which parties acknowledge agreement and the need 
to convert that agreement into writing, especially when the 
wording of the document has yet to be agreed upon. The court 
concluded by finding, pursuant to Texas law, that proof of 
either an existing written document, or an agreement on the 
wording of that document, is required to raise a fact issue of 
promissory estoppel. Id. See also Coastal Corp. v. Atlantic 
Richfield Co., 852 S.W.2d 714 (Tex. App.—Corpus Christi 1993). 
Other states hold that promissory estoppel may be used to 
preclude the Statute of Frauds only when there has been (1) a 
misrepresentation that the Statute's requirements have been 
complied with, or (2) a promise to make a memorandum of an 
otherwise complete oral agreement. See, e.g., MH Investment Co. 
v. Transamerica Title Ins. Co., 162 Ariz. 569, 785 P.2d 89 
(Ariz. App. 1989); Chapman v. Bomann. 381 A.2d 1123 (Maine 
1978); Del Haves & Sons v. Mitchell, 304 Minn. 275, 283, 230 
N.W.2d 588, 593-94 (1975); see generally 56 A.L.R.3d 1037 
§§ 4(c), 5. 
In adopting the foregoing exception, the Ohio Court of 
Appeals in McCarthy, Lebit, Crystal & Haiman Co., L.P.A., v. 
First Union Management, Inc., 87 Ohio App. 3d 613, 622 N.E.2d 
1093 (1993), explained its decision as follows: 
[T]his court adopts the approach taken by those 
courts which hold that the doctrine of promissory 
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estoppel may be used to preclude a defense of statute 
of frauds, but only when there has been (1) a 
misrepresentation that the statute's requirements have 
been complied with or (2) a promise to make a 
memorandum of the agreement. This approach adheres to 
the equitable doctrine of promissory estoppel as 
adopted by the Ohio Supreme Court and stated in 
Restatement 2d of Contracts, Section 90. 
Additionally, it promotes a balanced approach to 
encouraging those in business to reduce their 
agreements to writing and thereby adhering to the 
policy considerations behind the statute of frauds 
while at the same time providing a mitigating effect 
to the harsh application of the statute of frauds and 
assures fairness in business relationships by 
protecting one who relies to his detriment on the 
promise of another. 
McCarthy, 622 N.E.2d at 1102. 
Under either the Texas exception or the exceptions 
recognized in McCarthy, promissory estoppel could not be used to 
impose liability in this case. The trial court determined that 
no written or oral contract existed. Thus, there was no 
"promise to sign a written contract which had been prepared and 
which would satisfy the requirements of the statute of frauds," 
Beta Drilling, supra. nor was there any misrepresentation that 
the Statute's requirements have been complied with, or a promise 
to make a memorandum of an otherwise complete oral agreement. 
B. Even if promissory estoppel applies in this case, the 
evidence does not support a finding of promissory estoppel. 
Even if this Court agrees with Medesco and permits 
promissory estoppel to be used to defeat the Statute of Frauds 
in this case, the evidence at trial was not sufficient to meet 
the requirements of promissory estoppel under Utah law or under 
Restatement § 139: 
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• Ernst did not have the requisite awareness that Stangl 
was purchasing the Brockbank property in alleged 
reliance on a lease agreement; 
• Ernst did not make a definite and certain "promise" to 
enter into a lease agreement with Stangl regardless of 
the circumstances; 
• Stangl did not purchase the Brockbank property in 
reasonable reliance on Ernst's alleged promise; and 
• Stangl did not suffer any detriment as a result of his 
alleged reliance because the Brockbank property had a 
positive value when Ernst ended lease negotiations. 
Under the facts of this case, the trial court's judgment must be 
reversed. 
1. Restatement (Second) of Contracts S 139. 
Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 139 provides as 
follows: 
(1) A promise which the promisor should 
reasonably expect to induce action or forbearance on 
the part of the promisee or a third person and which 
does induce the action or forbearance is enforceable 
notwithstanding the Statute of Frauds if injustice can 
be avoided only by enforcement of the promise. The 
remedy for breach is limited as justice requires. 
(2) In determining whether injustice can be 
avoided only by enforcement of the promise, the 
following circumstances are significant: 
(a) the availability and adequacy of other 
remedies, particularly cancellation 
and restitution; 
(b) the definite and substantial character 
of the action or forbearance in 
relation to the remedy sought; 
(c) the extent to which the action or 
forbearance corroborates evidence of 
the making and terms of the promise, 
or the making and terms are otherwise 
established by clear and convincing 
evidence; 
(d) the reasonableness of the action or 
forbearance; 
(e) the extent to which the action or 
forbearance was foreseeable by the 
promisor. 
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2. Ernst was not aware of all material facts. 
Under Utah law, the factual prerequisites for promissory 
estoppel are that the defendant was "aware of all the material 
facts11 and "that in such awareness [the defendant] made the 
promise when [the defendant] knew that the plaintiff was acting 
in reliance on it." Andreason v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 848 
P.2d 171 (Utah App. 1993), quoting Union Tank Car Co. v. Wheat 
Bros. . 15 Utah 2d 101, 387 P.2d 1000, 1003 (Utah 1964). 
Restatement § 139(1) also mandates that the promisee's actions 
be foreseeable by the promisor, and that the promisor knowingly 
induced the promisee to act. 
In this case, "all the material facts" must include an 
awareness by Ernst that Stangl was purchasing the Brockbank 
property based on his belief that Ernst had promised to enter 
into a lease agreement. As noted above, the "promise" 
identified by the trial court was Ernst's alleged promise to 
lease space at the Plaza. Based on that "promise," the court 
concluded that it was reasonable for Stangl to "incur 
obligations and proceed with the project bv acquiring and 
renovating the property." (R. 2231, Finding No. 5) (emphasis 
added). 
Notwithstanding the court's conclusion, there is no finding 
that Ernst had any understanding that Stangl was purchasing the 
Brockbank property based on a lease with Ernst, nor is there any 
evidence to support such a finding. Stangl solicited Ernst's 
business, and his June 3, 1988 letter informed Ernst that he was 
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already repurchasing the property and expected to have 
possession by the end of the month. Stangl admitted he never 
corrected the June 3rd letter, and never told Ernst about the 
acts he was taking to reacquire title to the property. 
The only "material facts" Ernst possessed, therefore, were 
that Stangl had taken steps to reacquire the Plaza before lease 
negotiations had even begun, and that Stangl owned the property 
well before Ernst's July 8th Offer to Lease. Accordingly, Ernst 
lacked the awareness necessary to knowingly induce Stangl to 
purchase the Brockbank property. Promissory estoppel cannot, 
therefore, be invoked in this case. 
3. No "promise11 to enter into a lease agreement 
regardless of the terms was ever made by Ernst. 
To support a finding of promissory estoppel, Utah law 
requires the following type of promise: 
[T]he promise or representation must be sufficiently 
definite and certain that the plaintiff acting as a 
reasonable and prudent person under the circumstances 
would be justified in placing reliance upon it; and in 
case of uncertainty or doubt the responsibility is 
upon the plaintiff to ascertain the facts before 
acting upon it. 
Petty v. Gindv Manuf. Corp., 17 Utah 2d 32, 404 P.2d 30, 35-36 
(Utah 1965). Moreover, under Restatement § 139(1), the promise 
must be one "which the promisor should reasonably expect to 
induce action or forbearance on the part of the promisee." 
Utah law also recognizes that unaccepted offers made in 
contract negotiations do not constitute promises sufficient to 
support a finding of estoppel. In R.J. Daum Constr. Co. v. 
Child, 122 Utah 194, 247 P.2d 817 (Utah 1952), for example, the 
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Utah Supreme Court affirmed the trial court's rejection of a 
promissory estoppel claim based on an unaccepted offer. Thomas 
B. Child & Company ("Child") had submitted a bid to do masonry 
work to R.J. Daum Construction Company ("R.J. Daum"), which R.J. 
Daum used in making a successful bid for a construction job. 
Prior to the award of the contract, R.J. Daum and Child had 
engaged in contract negotiations and exchanged proposals, but 
had not reached an agreement. After the government contract was 
awarded, R.J. Daum sent Child a proposed subcontract. Child 
objected to some of the terms of the subcontract, and refused to 
do any masonry work. R.J. Daum, 247 P.2d at 197-99. 
R.J. Daum subsequently sued, alleging breach of contract 
and promissory estoppel. The court rejected the contract claim, 
ruling that no contract had been made because R.J. Damn's 
proposed subcontract was not an unconditional acceptance of 
Child's bid, but a counteroffer. R.J. Daum, at 2 02. The court 
also rejected R.J. Daum's promissory estoppel claim: 
The contention that [Child is] estopped from 
denying that there was a contract needs little 
consideration. Here, as we have shown, [R.J. Daum] 
did not accept [Child's] offer but submitted a 
counter-offer. Under such circumstances it did not 
rely on the offer but was seeking to get a better one. 
There is a recognized doctrine of promissory estoppel 
usually involving offers to make a gift, where 
although accepted, no binding contract results because 
there was no consideration. We know of no case where 
an offeror has been held to be bound by estoppel 
without an acceptance of his offer. 
R.J. Daum, at 207-08. 
In the present case, a binding promise by Ernst was never 
made. Despite the trial court's conclusion that Ernst had 
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promised to enter into a lease agreement, there is no finding of 
fact which identifies a "definite and certain" promise to that 
effect by Ernst, and no evidence which would support such a 
finding. Instead, the parties merely expressed optimism that 
they "could" reach a mutually acceptable agreement. (R. 2219 -
Finding No. 18) . The court specifically found that there was 
"insufficient credible evidence" to establish that the parties 
had ever agreed on all significant lease points. (R. 2220-21, 
2223 - Findings Nos. 21, 22, 27). 
In the context of ongoing lease negotiations which never 
resulted in an agreed-upon lease, the lack of such a promise is 
understandable. See R.J. Daum, supra. Moreover, given the 
mutual requirement that there would be no binding agreement 
until "the preparation of and execution of a Lease Agreement in 
form and content acceptable" to both parties, a mere promise to 
enter into a lease could not possibly be binding. 
The closest the trial court comes to finding a "promise" is 
Finding of Fact No. 26: "On August 2, 1988, DuBose generated 
two telephone calls to Pruitt indicating that the project had 
been approved by Ernst's management and that a letter of intent 
would be forthcoming." (R. 2223). In its Memorandum Decision, 
the court determined that the "promises" made on August 2nd were 
the starting point for promissory analysis. (R. 2 011-13). 
The telephone calls referenced by the court fail to rise to 
the level of a "definite and certain" promise to enter into a 
lease agreement; at best, the messages simply indicate Ernst's 
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desire to continue lease negotiations by sending a letter of 
intent. Given Stangl's and Ernst's continued negotiations over 
a proposed lease after August 2nd, no other conclusion makes 
sense. See R.J. Daum. supra. 
In order to find a promise sufficient to bind Ernst under 
the trial court's reasoning, the court would have had to find 
(1) Ernst made a definite and certain promise that it would 
lease space at the Plaza regardless of the terms of a 
subsequently negotiated lease agreement, (2) Ernst made a 
definite and certain promise that it would no longer require the 
preparation and execution of an acceptable written agreement 
before making that commitment, and (3) Ernst intended its 
promise to induce Stangl into purchasing the Brockbank property. 
No such finding was made, nor does the evidence support such a 
finding. Even if Ernst was aware of all material facts, 
therefore, it did not make a promise sufficient to invoke 
promissory estoppel. 
4. Stangl did not purchase the Brockbank property in 
reasonable reliance on Ernst's alleged promise. 
To recover under promissory estoppel, a plaintiff must show 
he observed "reasonable care and prudence" in acting in reliance 
on the alleged promise. Union Tank Car, 387 P.2d at 1003; see 
also Restatement § 139(2) (d). Moreover, a plaintiff may not 
claim he reasonably relied on a promise if he attempted to 
modify the terms of that promise; an attempt to modify an offer 
is inconsistent with a belief that an agreement has been reached 
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which would justify reasonable reliance. Crismon v. Western Co. 
of North America, 742 P.2d 1219, 1223 (Utah App. 1987). 
Even assuming Finding of Fact No. 2 6 constitutes an 
enforceable promise, Stangl did not purchase the property in 
reasonable reliance on Ernst's alleged August 2nd promise. 
Stangl was legally obligated to purchase the property prior to 
August 2nd. By August 1st, Stangl had agreed to purchase 
Aetna's note on the property, exercised his option with 
Brockbank to purchase the property, and obtained a loan to 
finance his purchase. Moreover, Aetna's agreement to the 
Bankruptcy Court Order approving the sale meant that as of 
August 1st, all of the conditions in Stangl's agreement with 
Aetna and his option with Brockbank had been satisfied.1 
Although Stangl's purchase actually closed on August 9, 
1988, every step necessary to purchase the Brockbank property 
occurred before Ernst's alleged promise. The mere fact Stangl 
followed through on his obligation to purchase the property does 
not demonstrate an action of "definite and substantial 
character" as required under Restatement § 139. 
lThe trial court's Finding of Fact No. 3 0 implies that 
Stangl agreed to pay off the tax liens on Brockbank's property 
in reliance on Ernst's alleged August 2nd promise. Although 
Stangl made that claim during the "damages" phase of the trial 
(R. 4358-59), his testimony was a complete fabrication. 
According to the July 18th Loan Submission to Valley Mortgage 
for the Plaza project, the money Stangl borrowed included 
$85,000 for payment of the back tax liens on the Brockbank 
property. (Ex. 16, p. 6). 
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In addition, given both parties7 insistence on a written 
and executed lease agreement, Stangl's purported reliance on the 
August 2nd "promise" cannot be considered reasonable. To 
justify a $1.2 million purchase, a developer as sophisticated 
and experienced as Stangl would presumably require something 
more than a nebulous promise that a letter of intent would be 
forthcoming. At the very least, if Stangl truly believed the 
August 2nd message somehow meant Ernst would lease space at the 
Plaza no matter what the terms of a subsequently negotiated 
lease, he was obligated to verify that belief and "ascertain the 
facts before acting upon it." Petty v. Gindy Manuf., supra. 
In addition, Stangl sought to modify the terms of Ernst's 
proposed lease on at least two occasions after August 2nd. 
Pursuant to the decision in Crismon, Stangl's actions are 
inconsistent with the actions of someone who was sure the 
parties would enter into a binding agreement. Each draft 
constituted a counteroffer which began contract negotiations 
anew. See Cal Wadsworth Constr. v. City of St. George, 898 P.2d 
1372, 1378 (Utah 1995). 
Accordingly, even if Ernst had sufficient awareness and 
made a binding promise, promissory estoppel is inappropriate in 
this case because Stangl did not reasonably rely on Ernst's 
alleged promise when he purchased the Brockbank property. 
5. Stangl did not suffer any detriment as a result of his 
alleged reliance. 
The final requirement of promissory estoppel is that the 
promisee suffer some detriment as a result of his reliance. See 
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Prows, supra. Restatement § 139(1) similarly permits promissory 
estoppel "if injustice can be avoided only by enforcement of the 
promise." 
Even assuming Ernst made a binding promise on August 2nd, 
the evidence at trial demonstrated that Stangl did not in fact 
suffer any detriment as a result of his alleged reliance on that 
promise. The period of Stangl's "reliance" ran from August 2nd 
to September 29, 1988, the date Ernst informed Stangl that it 
had decided not to lease space in the Plaza. After 
September 29th, Stangl can no longer claim to be acting in 
reliance on Ernst's promise. 
As of September 29th, however, Stangl had suffered no 
detriment whatsoever; at the time, the value of the BrockbanJc 
property itself was $1,506,000 (R. 4711-12; Ex. 339), but Stangl 
had incurred costs of no more than $1,328,930 attributable to 
the property.2 On September 29th, the Brockbank property had a 
positive value of $177,070. 
Based on the foregoing, Stangl did not meet the "detriment" 
requirement for promissory estoppel under Utah law or 
Restatement § 13 9. Accordingly, the trial court's judgment in 
favor of Stangl must be reversed. 
2Costs attributable to Brockbank property as of September 
29, 1988 were taken from Stangl's Exhibit 88A, p. 3 (Detailed 
Costs Before and After 9/30/88), and calculated as follows: 
Total Costs Before 9/30/88 ($1,903,728) less Item 9 (Firestone 
Land, $193,829) less Item 10 (Emission Testing/Fastech Land, 
$129,518) less Item 17 (Firestone hard costs ($251,451). 
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C. The trial court employed an incorrect measure of damages 
for Stangl's promissory estoppel claim. 
Assuming this Court determines that (1) promissory estoppel 
can be used in this case to enforce an agreement barred by the 
Statute of Frauds, and (2) Stangl met the criteria for 
promissory estoppel, the trial court's decision must 
nevertheless be reversed because the court employed an improper 
measure of damages. 
Under Utah law, damages in a promissory estoppel case are 
intended to be "remedies consistent with 'the extent of the 
reliance."1 Andreason. 848 P.2d at 175, quoting Calamari & 
Perillo, Contracts. § 6-1 at 273 (3d Ed. 1987) (discussing 
Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 90) . The court in Andreason 
approved the following jury instruction: 
Damages in promissory estoppel are limited to those 
which are sustained because the plaintiffs have 
changed their position to their detriment in 
reasonable reliance upon the defendant's 
representations. They must have done some act which 
they otherwise would not have done. Only acts done in 
detrimental reliance are compensable. 
Andreason, at 175-76. 
The scope of reliance damages was addressed in a case 
similar to this one, Trollope v. Koerner. 21 Ariz. App. 43, 515 
P.2d 340 (1973). According to the court in Trollope, reliance 
damages involving purported lease agreements cover only those 
expenses incurred for "significant improvements to suit the 
potential lessee in anticipation of the lease," and only to the 
extent those improvements "are or were intended to be 
exclusively beneficial to the potential lessee." Trollope, 515 
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P.2d at 341, quoting Trollope v. Koerner, 106 Ariz. 10, 470 P.2d 
91, 99 (1970). 
In a lease situation, "reliance" cannot unreasonably extend 
past the time a party receives notice that a lease will not be 
executed. The extent of such reliance was addressed by the 
Eighth Circuit in Mahonev v. Delaware McDonald's Corp., 770 F.2d 
123 (8th Cir. 1985). Dr. John Mahoney ("Mahoney") and Delaware 
McDonald's Corporation ("McDonald's") engaged in lease 
negotiations for a new McDonald's restaurant. When it became 
clear that the property which Mahoney owned would not be large 
enough for McDonald's, Mahoney purchased an adjoining parcel 
under a contract which gave him sixty days until July 2, 1979 to 
terminate the contract and receive a refund of his earnest money 
deposit. Mahoney specifically advised McDonald's of his sixty-
day option contract. Mahoney, 770 F.2d at 124. 
Shortly after Mahoney entered into the option contract, he 
and McDonald's orally agreed to lease terms, and McDonald's 
agreed to prepare a final lease document. Three days before his 
option was set to expire, Mahoney had yet to receive a lease 
from McDonald's. Mahoney called McDonald's, explained that the 
option was about to expire, and asked if the parties still had 
a deal. Mahoney was told that the deal was still set and a 
lease was on its way. Mahoney therefore exercised his option to 
purchase the adjoining property. Mahoney, 770 F.2d at 125. 
Approximately three weeks later, McDonald's forwarded a 
slightly altered lease to Mahoney, who signed and returned it to 
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McDonald's on July 25, 1979. Mahoney's purchase closed on July 
31st. In late August, however, McDonald's expressed second 
thoughts about the lease, and on October 12th, it formally 
terminated negotiations and returned the lease Mahoney had 
signed. Mahoney, supra. 
Mahoney obtained a judgment against McDonald's based on 
promissory estoppel, and on appeal, the Eighth circuit affirmed 
the finding of liability. The court reversed the finding of 
damages, however, ruling that the court had improperly allowed 
Mahoney to recover damages incurred following his decision to 
hold onto the property rather than sell it: 
Under the doctrine of promissory estoppel, 
damages may be measured by the extent of the 
promisee's reliance. Restatement (Second) of 
Contracts § 90 comment d (1979). In other words, our 
objective in this case is to reimburse Mahoney for the 
expenses he incurred in reliance on McDonald's promise 
to lease the 109 building. 
Mahoney borrowed the entire $300,000 used to 
purchase the 109 building. From July 1979 to November 
1983, he claims that he paid $404,342.83 in interest 
on that loan. During this period, he also paid 
$31,828.99 for taxes, insurance, etc. on the building. 
. . . McDonald's contends that the magistrate erred in 
awarding 100% of the expenses. It argues that 
Mahoney's damages should be limited to exclude the 
amount he could have avoided by acting prudently when 
he learned that McDonald's had repudiated the lease. 
We think McDonald's contention has merit. Under 
section 90 of the Restatement (Second) of Contracts, 
the remedy in promissory estoppel cases "may be 
limited as justice requires." It would be unjust for 
Mahoney to hold the 109 building indefinitely while 
McDonald's paid interest on the purchase price. 
Instead, Mahoney was entitled to a reasonable time to 
sell the building or make alternative disposition of 
it. His expenses during this time, plus any loss 
sustained on the disposition of the building, would 
constitute his just reliance damages. 
The record does not indicate that Mahoney ever 
made any attempt to sell the 109 building after 
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McDonald's breached the lease. There is no indication 
that the building was not marketable; in fact, the 
magistrate found that it had a fair market value of 
$300,000. If Mahoney could have sold the building for 
$300,000 in 1979, we must conclude that his failure to 
do so was based on his decision that he could do 
better for himself by making an alternative 
disposition of the building. Therefore, once Mahoney 
decided to keep the building, he was no longer acting 
in reliance on McDonald's promise, he was acting on 
the basis of his own decision. 
Mahoney, 770 F.2d at 127-28 (footnote omitted). 
As in Mahoney, the damages awarded by the trial court were 
not based on Stangl's "reliance," i.e., they were not incurred 
because Stangl changed his position in reliance on Ernst. When 
Ernst notified Stangl that it was not interested in the Plaza on 
September 29, 1988, the Brockbank property had a positive value 
of at least $177,070. As of that date, Stangl had spent only 
$7,380.59 in on-site improvements. (Ex. 88A, Sub. A). 
Instead, Stangl's "damages" were incurred because he 
decided to hold onto the property for another two-and-a-half 
years in the hopes that it would be more "marketable." 
(R. 4389-90). Stangl testified that he made no effort to sell 
the property after Ernst broke off negotiations; he made no 
market inquiries, but simply concluded that because the property 
had not sold in the three preceding years, "[t]here [was] no 
reason to expect it would work good now." (R. 4390). 
By the time Stangl sold the property in March 1991, 
however, he had incurred significant additional costs but had 
only marginally increased the value of the property. As of 
March 1991, Stangl claimed the property cost $2,217,817, but it 
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sold for only $1,688,447. (Ex. 88A) . Stangl's figures indicate 
that by holding onto the property, he incurred additional costs 
of $888,887, consisting primarily of interest payments and 
taxes, but only increased the value of the property by $182,447 
over its value as of September 1988. 
By gambling that the property would be worth more in the 
future, Stangl incurred additional costs which produced a net 
loss on the property. As in Mahoney, Stangl suffered a loss not 
because he purchased the property, but because he chose to keep 
the property after Ernst ended lease negotiations, and to incur 
interest and other expenses in the hope of a higher sale price. 
By awarding Stangl damages based on his decision to hold the 
property, the court enabled Stangl to create a loss which would 
not have existed otherwise. Contrary to Mahoney and Restatement 
§ 139(1), the court's award does not avoid an injustice by 
enforcing Ernst's alleged promise, nor does it serve as a remedy 
that "justice requires." 
If promissory estoppel is applied in this case, the only 
appropriate damage award is one consistent with Andreason. In 
Andreason, a fire damaged the plaintiffs' kitchen and garage, 
and caused smoke, electrical and water damage throughout their 
home. Pursuant to the instructions of their insurance adjuster, 
who assured the plaintiffs they were covered, the plaintiffs 
purchased new living room carpet, a kitchen range and kitchen 
cabinets, a cedar wall, and floor tile. After their purchases 
had been made, the adjuster informed the plaintiffs that their 
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fire coverage had in fact been cancelled. Andreason, 848 P.2d 
at 173. On appeal, the Utah Court of Appeals affirmed the jury 
award of 90% of the expenses incurred by the plaintiffs during 
the three week period the adjuster led them to believe coverage 
existed. Andreason, at 176-77. 
As in Andreason, Stangl should only be allowed to recover 
for the hard costs he incurred during the period he relied on 
Ernst's alleged promise, from August 2nd, the date of the 
alleged promise, to September 29th, the date Ernst ended 
negotiations. See also Trollope, supra. According to Stangl's 
own records, those costs total $7,380.59. 
Allowing Stangl to recover costs incurred for reasons other 
than reliance, or costs incurred after the reliance period 
expired would be akin to allowing the plaintiffs in Andreason to 
recover the cost of replacing carpet in their cars as well as 
their house, or the cost of painting their kitchen cabinets two-
years after they were replaced. Because the Brockbank property 
had a positive value as of September 2 9th, any award to Stangl 
based on the value of the property two-and-a-half years later 
would not serve the ends of justice. 
D. The trial court erred in repeatedly allowing Stangl to 
submit damages evidence which he failed to produce in 
discovery. 
If this Court determines that the trial court's finding of 
liability for promissory estoppel was correct and its reliance 
on Stangl's damages methodology was appropriate, the judgment in 
this case must be reversed and the matter remanded for retrial 
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on the issue of damages because the trial court erred in 
allowing Stangl to submit damages evidence which he failed to 
produce in discovery. 
Prior to the "liability" phase of trial, Ernst served 
Stangl with three different sets of discovery requests asking 
for information and documents regarding the nature and amount of 
his damages claim. (R. 2039-2048). Notwithstanding those 
requests, and over Ernst's objections, the court allowed Stangl 
to submit three different versions of the exhibit which 
summarized his damages claim during the "liability" trial. The 
first version calculated damages of $430,533.34, the second 
calculated damages of $431,77 6.99, and the third calculated 
damages of $534,342.53. (Exs. 65A-C). Because the court 
continued to admit the evidence, Ernst moved in desperation for 
a bifurcated trial. 
Concerned that Stangl might again attempt to introduce 
last-minute damages evidence, Ernst served Stangl with a fourth 
set of discovery requests regarding damages prior to the 
"damages" phase of the trial. (R. 2041-42). Stangl responded 
on January 13, 1994 by claiming Ernst had already received his 
damage exhibit and all underlying documentation, and that if any 
additional evidence was discovered, he would "seasonably so 
inform" Ernst. (R. 2039-83, Tab D). The following day, Ernst 
wrote to Stangl to stress that the time to "seasonably so 
inform" was now. (R. 2043). 
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Despite Ernst's efforts, Stangl hand-delivered to counsel 
for Ernst a revised damages summary and additional damages 
documentation on the evening of Saturday, February 19, 1994, 
just three days before trial. Stangl's new damage calculation 
set his damages at $494,741.10. (R. 2043, 4312-13). During the 
course of the "damages" trial, Stangl revised his damages 
exhibit three more times, recalculating his damages to 
$491,932.99, then to $508,058.27, and finally to $407,308.60. 
(EXS. 88, 88A, 404). 
In all, Stangl changed his damages exhibit seven times just 
prior to or during the course of trial in this case. Stangl's 
changes resulted in a series of complex damages calculations 
which varied from version to version not only in their 
calculation of total damages, but in their component 
calculations. Exhibit 88, for example, includes an additional 
cost of $48,3 3 3.4 3 for interest payments made in 1989 and 1990 
on Stangl's note to Brockbank. The additional item inflated 
Stangl's damages by offsetting corrections which would have 
otherwise lowered the cost of the Plaza property. Despite the 
date of the interest payments, however, they never appeared in 
any of the versions of Exhibit 65. 
Stangl's tria1-by-ambush tactic prevented Ernst from ever 
having the opportunity to fairly analyze the damages aspect of 
this case. Nevertheless, the court allowed Stangl's damages 
evidence over Ernst's objections, and ultimately based its 
damages award on Stangl's calculation. (R. 2039-2083, 2229, 
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2991-98, 3190-241, 3335, 4309-17, 4410-12, 4461-63, 4636-40, 
4646-47, 4835-907; Exs. 65A-C, 88A, 89, 404), 
The trial court's acceptance of Stangl's damages evidence 
without any sanctions was an abuse of discretion. A trial court 
may refuse to admit evidence that is not provided to the 
opposing party in a timely manner. Hardy v. Hardy, 776 P.2d 
917, 925 (Utah App. 1989); Varhol v. Nat'l R.R. Passenger Corp., 
909 F.2d 1557, 1566 (7th Cir. 1990) (trial court did not abuse 
its discretion in refusing to admit a document that a party did 
not submit to the opposition before trial even where the 
document was omitted by mistake). 
Moreover, Utah courts recognize that violations of the 
discovery rules should not go unpunished. In Darrington v. 
Wade, 812 P.2d 452 (Utah App. 1991), for example, the defendants 
initially refused to answer interrogatories or to appear for 
depositions. The trial court entered a default judgment against 
them, but subsequently withdrew the default and allowed the case 
to proceed. In commenting on discovery sanctions, the court in 
Darrington observed: 
It is clear from the record that Wades were 
elusive and uncooperative defendants. Consequently, 
imposing some sort of Rule 3 7 discovery sanction on 
them was certainly justified, and under all the 
circumstances, we probably would not have found entry 
of a default judgment to be so harsh as to be an abuse 
of discretion had the court chosen to leave that 
judgment in place. Moreover, if the court had failed 
to impose any kind of discovery sanction we probably 
would have found an abuse of discretion. But default 
judgment is an unusually harsh sanction that should be 
meted out with caution, and because the court imposed 
other appropriate discovery sanctions by awarding 
costs and attorney fees on several occasions, this is 
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not a case where inappropriate discovery conduct went 
wholly unpunished. 
Darrington, at 456 (citation, footnote omitted, emphasis added). 
While discovery sanctions are ordinarily conditioned on the 
refusal to cooperate with an order compelling discovery under 
Rule 37, such orders are not prerequisites to sanctions. In 
certain circumstances, such as where the failure to participate 
in discovery takes place after the trial court's discovery 
cutoff, sanctions are appropriate without an order to compel. 
In DeBry v. Cascade Enterprises, 879 P.2d 1353 (Utah 1994), the 
court determined that the trial court had not abused its 
discretion in barring four of plaintiffs' expert witnesses from 
testifying where the plaintiffs failed to designate the experts 
as witnesses by the deadline set by the court, but had instead 
waited to designate them until after the discovery cutoff. 
Under the circumstances, the trial court abused its 
discretion in failing to impose any sanctions on Stangl for his 
failure to comply with Ernst's discovery requests and his 
constant revisions to his damages evidence. By admitting 
inappropriate evidence into trial, and allowing its use it 
without any limitations, the trial, court rewarded Stangl's 
failure to comply with the discovery rules, and punished Ernst 
by admitting evidence it had no opportunity to prepare for. 
Regardless of whether the changes in the evidence were favorable 
to Ernst or not, the trial court should have sanctioned Stangl 
by excluding the evidence. 
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By allowing Stangl to continually change his damages 
evidence, the trial court affected the trial in such a way that 
the same judgment would not have been rendered had the revisions 
been excluded. Ernst had no ability to prepare for Stangl's 
revised damage calculations, no way to consult or call its own 
witness or prepare for cross-examination of Stangl's witnesses 
regarding the evidence, and no ability to make informed 
arguments to the court. By admitting the evidence, the court 
defeated the rights the discovery rules are intended to protect. 
If this Court finds that liability was correctly 
established, this Court should nevertheless reverse the judgment 
below, and remand for retrial on the issue of damages. See Utah 
D.O.T. v. 6200 South Associates, 872 P. 2d at 465 (reversal is 
appropriate in cases where evidence is erroneously admitted if, 
absent the error, there is a reasonable likelihood that a 
different result would have been reached). 
E. The trial court's calculation of Stangl's damages was 
erroneous. 
Even if the trial court's reliance on Stangl's damages 
methodology was appropriate, and all the damages evidence 
admitted by the trial court is accepted, the court's calculation 
of damages in this case was erroneous. 
The court based its calculation on Stangl's Exhibit 88A. 
In that Exhibit, however, Stangl under-reported the amount 
received for the Brockbank property. According to Subpart D of 
the Exhibit, Stangl reported the total amount paid for all the 
property sold to Green Isle in 1991 as $2,350,000. Exhibit 48, 
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however, indicates that the Green Isle purchase, like Stangl's 
original purchase (Ex. 66A), included payment for back taxes. 
According to Stangl, all $92,355.52 in taxes paid in the Green 
Isle purchase were attributable to the Brockbank property. 
(R. 4506). Given that the original purchase price for the 
Brockbank property included taxes paid, the credit for the 
Brockbank property sale should also have included a similar 
credit. In Exhibit 88A, therefore, the credit for the Brockbank 
property sale should be increased by $92,355.52, and Stangl's 
"out-of-pocket" damages should be reduced by that same amount. 
Similarly, Stangl's original damage exhibit, Exhibit 65, 
included an adjustment to the valuation of two Plaza properties 
which were deducted from the 1991 Plaza sale price to determine 
the value of the Brockbank property. The value of the two 
properties, designated Firestone and Independent Emissions 
Testing ("IET"), included an allowance for a 5% vacancy rate on 
the IET property. (Ex. 65, Sub. D) . This adjustment was 
consistent with the testimony of Stangl's appraiser, who stated 
that vacancy rates in the area were high, and who used a 10% 
vacancy rate in his valuation of the Plaza with Ernst, and a 15% 
vacancy rate in his valuation of the Plaza without Ernst. 
(R. 4658-59, 4670; Ex. 51). The vacancy rate in Exhibit 65 
increased the valuation of the Firestone and IET properties by 
$11,700, and reduced Stangl's damages by the same amount. 
Without explanation, however, Stangl's final versions of his 
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damage exhibit did not include the adjustment. (Exs. 88, 88A, 
Sub. D). 
The trial court's errors in calculating damages are not 
surprising given the flurry of last-minute revisions Stangl was 
allowed to inject into these proceedings. Accordingly, even if 
the court's reliance on Stangl's damages methodology was 
appropriate, and all the damages evidence admitted by the trial 
court is accepted, the damages awarded to Stangl must be reduced 
by $104,055.52; $92,355.52 for the uncredited taxes, and $11,700 
for the uncredited vacancy rate adjustment. 
VIII. CONCLUSION 
For the reasons stated above, Ernst respectfully requests 
that this Court reverse the judgment below, and remand for entry 
of judgment in favor of Ernst dismissing Stangl's complaint in 
its entirety. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this )Z4r\ day of April, 1996. 
RYAN, SWANSON & CLEVELAND SNOW CHRISTENSEN & MARTINEAU 
Rbger J. Kindley (WSBA 11875) A;fae Swenseri (A42 52 
John P. Mele (WSBA 16381) f 
Attorneys for Defendant-Appellant 
Ernst Home Center, Inc. 
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IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
FRANZ C. STANGL, III, an 
individual, dba F.C. STANGL 
CONSTRUCTION COMPANY, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
ERNST HOME CENTER, INC., 
a Washington corporation, 
Defendant. 
FINDINGS OF FACT AND 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
Civil No. 89-090-2771-CN 
(Hon. Michael Murphy) 
This suit was brought by F.C. Stangl, III ("Stangl") 
who alleged that defendant Ernst Home Centers, Inc. ("Ernst") had 
breached an agreement to enter into a five-year lease at the 
Jordan Valley Plaza or alternatively that he had detrimentally 
relied upon representations and conduct of Ernst and that he was 
entitled to recover damages based upon a theory of promissory 
estoppel. Liability issues were tried before the Court, without 
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jury from approximately February 11, 1993 to February 19, 1993. 
In its Memorandum Decision, dated April 20, 1994, the Court ruled 
that there was insufficient evidence to establish a contract, but 
that Ernst may be liable to Stangl under the theory of promissory 
estoppel. The Memorandum Decision is attached to these Findings 
of Facts and Conclusions of Law as Exhibit "A" and are 
incorporated herein by reference. The remaining issues were 
tried before the Court from February 22, 1994 to February 24, 
1994. 
At all phases of the trials, plaintiff F.C. Stangl, 
III. was represented by Stephen G. Crockett and Stephen T. Hard. 
Defendant Ernst Home Centers, Inc. was represented by Roger J. 
Kindley. Ernst was also represented by David A, Greenwood and 
Patrick J* O'Hara during the first phase and by Elizabeth Dolan 
Winter during the second phase. 
Having examined the admissible evidence presented at 
both phases of trial and-having heard the arguments of counsel, 
the Court enters the following Findings of Fact and Conclusions 
of Law. 
FINDINGS OF FACT 
1. Plaintiff F.C. Stangl, III ("Stangl") has been in 
the business of real estate development and construction for many 
years. 
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2. Defendant Ernst Home Centers, Inc. ("Ernst") is a 
Washington corporation in the business of retail sales of home-
improvement materials, tools, plant nursery items, and other 
consumer products and services. 
3. This lawsuit concerns the Jordan Valley Plaza 
("Plaza") located at 9000 South Redwood Road, West Valley City, 
Utah. 
4. From sometime in 1979 through the fall of 1981, 
Stangl had an ownership interest in the Plaza at which time his 
interest in the Plaza was transferred to the Brockbanks with the 
exception of two small contiguous parcels of land which Stangl 
retained to develop. The Brockbanks assumed the indebtedness 
secured by the Plaza. Stangl remained a guarantor of Brockbanks' 
obligation to the lender. The lender's interest was subsequently 
assigned to Aetna. 
5. In September 1987, Aetna formally notified Stangl 
that the Brockbanks had defaulted on the loan secured by the 
Plaza. Aetna, however, never made a demand for payment on Stangl 
as a guarantor of the Brockbanks' obligation. 
6. Both Aetna and Stangl believed that the value of 
the Plaza would exceed the value of the amounts due on the loan, 
i.e. that there would be no deficiency for which Stangl would be 
liable. Accordingly, Aetna initiated a nonjudicial foreclosure 
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of the property. The Brockbanks then filed for relief under 
Chapter 11 of the Bankruptcy Code. 
7. In the first five months of 1987, Ernst had become 
aware of the availability of space in the Plaza which had 
formerly been occupied by Gibson Discount, an anchor tenant. As 
a consequence, Ernst caused a site feasibility study to be 
completed in May, 1987. At that time, Ernst interpreted this 
study to indicate that an Ernst store at the site would be 
economically marginal. 
8. Given the Brockbanks' default and bankruptcy, and 
Aetna's anticipated foreclosure of the Plaza, Stangl saw a 
business opportunity with respect to the property. In late May, 
1988, Mr. Steve Pruitt, acting on behalf of Stangl, generated a 
call to Ernst to determine whether it had any interest in leasing 
the anchor space at the Plaza. 
9. Pruittfs call was forwarded to Mr. Mack DuBose, 
Ernst's Vice-President in charge of real estate planning and 
development. DuBose indicated that Ernst had some interest in 
the property as a site for an Ernst store. 
10. On June 3, 1988, Pruitt forwarded to DuBose 
documents relating to the Plaza. In his June 3, 1988 letter, 
Pruitt erroneously indicated that Aetna would be enforcing 
Stangl1s guarantee and that Stangl would have possession of the 
property by the end of June. In the same correspondence, 
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however, Pruitt also suggested that Stangl would refinance the 
Plaza with Aetna. 
11. Between June 4 and June 23, 1988, DuBose and two 
other Ernst employees met with Pruitt and inspected the anchor 
space in particular and the Plaza generally. The day following 
the site visit, DuBose and Pruitt met. During this meeting, 
DuBose expressed a desire to proceed further with negotiations 
whereby Ernst would lease the anchor tenant site at the Plaza. 
12. On June 23, 1988, Pruitt sent a letter to DuBose 
outlining some very basic terms of a proposed lease including the 
initial period of the lease, option periods, base rent and 
percentage rent. Pruitt1s letter specifically referenced 
requests by Ernst that Stangl be able to provide a turnkey 
building to Ernst which would be ready for installment of 
fixtures by October 1, 1988. 
13. There were a number of matters that were not 
addressed in Pruitt1s June 23, 1988 letter, including: whether 
Ernst would be obligated to continuously operate on the premises 
or would it have the right to vacate and merely pay the base 
rent; whether and under what conditions Ernst could sublet or 
assign its interest; and whether Stangl?s failure to meet his 
continuing duties would cause an abatement of rent. 
14. On June 29, 1988, Stangl took steps to obtain the 
right but not the obligation to acquire the Plaza if Ernst 
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expressed further interest in entering into a lease• On that 
date, Stangl executed an Option agreement with the Brockbanks and 
paid the Brockbanks $1,000.00. The Option had an exercise price 
of $1,150,000. The Option also required the Brockbanks to: (1) 
require the Bankruptcy Court to release the property; (2) cure 
all defects in title to the property; and (3) convey the property 
by warranty deed. 
15. Also on June 29, 1988, Stangl instructed his 
counsel to offer to purchase Aetna's interest in the trust deed 
on the Brockbank property. Stanglfs initial offer to purchase 
Aetna's interest in the trust deed was rejected. On July 1, 
1988, Stangl offered to purchase Aetna's interest in the trust 
deed for $900,000.00. The offer was subject to title to the 
property satisfactory to Stangl and bankruptcy court approval. 
This offer was accepted by Aetna on July 14, 1988. 
16. Stangl had no need or desire to acquire the Plaza 
property unless Ernst would lease the anchor space. If Stangl 
had wanted to acquire the property for his own account or for 
speculative purposes, he would have waited to acquire the Plaza 
at the foreclosure of the trust deed. The reason that Stangl 
acquired an option to purchase the Plaza from the Brockbanks and 
simultaneously made an offer to purchase the trust deed from 
Aetna was to facilitate the speedy acquisition of the property to 
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enable Stangl to meet Ernstfs intended fixturing date of October 
1, 1988. 
17. In late afternoon on June 29, 1988, DuBose faxed a 
response to Pruitt's June 23 letter. With one exception, DuBose 
responded to each specific item proposed by Pruitt. DuBose 
specifically agreed that Stangl should provide a turnkey 
operation with the October 1, 1988 fixturing date. DuBose also 
indicated that Stangl should absorb parking lot resurfacing costs 
and proposed the commencement of rent sixty days after the 
premises were turned over to Ernst for fixturing. The one item 
to which DuBose did not respond was entitled "Occupancy Expenses" 
which included a Pruitt proposal for a triple net lease with 
Ernst paying all occupancy costs including insurance. DuBose 
made no reference to issues involving continuous use, subletting 
and assignment or abatement. 
18. DuBose indicated that an agreement could be 
reached with Stangl regarding the terms of the lease. He stated 
that the next step would be to complete a "binding Offer to 
Lease" and the final step was to draft the actual lease which 
would take three to five weeks. 
19. Although at trial DuBose testified that he 
believed there were no legal consequences which would flow from a 
"binding Offer to Lease" and that items in such a document would 
ultimately be contained in the final lease agreement, DuBose 
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never communicated to Pruitt or to Stangl his perceived 
limitations on the "binding Offer to Lease." 
20. On July 12, 1988, Stangl received a letter from 
DuBose dated July 8, 1988 wherein DuBose specified the "terms 
acceptable to [Ernst] relative to the Leasing [sic] of space in 
the Plaza." He further stated that "[t]he lease contemplated by 
this proposal shall be based on the . . . terms and conditions" 
specified in the letter. While not expressly so described, the 
proposal in the July 8 letter was a proposed "binding Offer to 
Lease" as DuBose had previously used that phrase. 
21. Shortly after Stangl's receipt of the July 8 
letter, Stangl and DuBose had a telephone conversation. Stangl 
claims that during the conversation he and DuBose reached 
agreement on all significant lease points and that he expressed 
that agreement in a letter to DuBose dated July 14, 1988. There 
is insufficient credible evidence to establish the claimed oral 
agreement preceding the July 14 letter. Consequently, Stangl*s 
July 14 letter at that time constituted a mere counteroffer to 
DuBose1s July 8 letter. 
22. On July 15, 1988, DuBose authored a letter to 
Stangl which Stangl claims constitutes a signed acceptance of the 
proposal in Stanglfs letter of July 14. There is insufficient 
credible evidence to establish that the July 15 letter is an 
acceptance or a verification of an acceptance of the proposal in 
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Stanglfs July 14 letter. Instead, the July 15 letter anticipated 
an "Offer to Lease" which was yet to be "completed." That letter 
contained a form lease for discussion of additional items which 
would have to be resolved. DuBose, however, did not have any 
strong objections to the proposal contained in Stanglfs July 14 
letter. DuBose forwarded that letter or an adaptation "thereof 
for approval as an "Offer to Lease" to Ernst's President. In the 
submission to Ernst's president, DuBose indicated that 
construction "must begin by 8/15/88." 
23. On or about July 16, 1988, Stangl took steps to 
obtain financing from Valley Bank and Trust for the acquisition 
of the Plaza, for construction of improvements requested by 
Ernst, and for development of other portions of the Plaza. Among 
other things, Stangl sought approximately $1.1 million to acquire 
the Plaza; $655,000 to remodel the anchor site for Ernst; and 
$131,000 to remodel other shop space at the Plaza. He also 
proposed rolling into the^  new loan package two loans previously 
approved by Valley Bank for development of the two properties 
adjacent to the Plaza which Stangl owned. To improve the overall 
security for the loan package, Stangl's two adjacent properties, 
both of which had tenants committed for leases on buildings which 
Stangl would build, would also act as collateral for the other 
Plaza-related indebtedness. Stangl's loan request was approved 
by Valley Bank on or about July 19, 1988. 
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24. The loan agreement with Valley Bank was closed on 
July 28, 1988. No funds were disbursed at that time, and the 
Loan Agreement did not provide for disbursement of funds until 
Stangl acquired title to the Plaza. 
25. Although there was some indication that Ernst had 
internally placed the project on hold during the latter part of 
July, Ernst did not inform Stangl that the project was in 
jeopardy or would be delayed. All outward appearances were that 
the project would proceed. Throughout the month of July, 1988, 
Ernst's architects (Dykeman and Associates) referred written 
materials and communicated with Stangl's employees regarding 
construction. On July 8, 1988, Stangl had applied to the West 
Jordan City Planning Commission for a conditional use permit, a 
site plan review and permission to locate a sign. The 
application indicated that it was for an Ernst store and a 
hearing date was set for July 20, 1988. On July 12, 1988, DuBose 
wrote to the City Manager of West Jordan indicating Ernst's 
intent to consummate a lease at the Plaza. On July 18, DuBose, 
through his secretary, referred Ernst's financial statements to 
Pruitt requesting discrete treatment of the financials. On July 
20, Ernst's Director of Construction, Rob King, attended a 
meeting of the West Jordan Planning and Zoning Commission to 
explain Ernst's intentions with respect to the Plaza. 
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26. On August 2, 1988, DuBose generated two telephone 
calls to Pruitt indicating that the project had been approved by 
Ernst's management and that a letter of intent would be 
forthcoming. 
27. The evidence does not support a finding that in 
the August 2 phone conversations DuBose led anyone to believe 
that the July 14 letter, or for that matter the July 8 letter, 
would be the operative document. A reasonable inference is that 
DuBose did not have reference to either but merely indicated that 
the project would proceed. DuBose then apparently set about 
editing the July 14 letter as a means of preparing the promised 
letter of intent or Offer to Lease. 
28. On August 5, 1988 Stangl sent to DuBose the Ernst 
form lease with substantial changes apparently proposed by 
Stangl's counsel. As a consequence, DuBose determined not to 
forward an Offer to Lease and did not further communicate with 
Stangl until August 23, 1988. 
29. On August 9, 1988, Stangl closed on the purchase 
of the Plaza property from the Brockbanks. In light of the 
August 2 calls from DuBose to Pruitt and all that had proceeded 
before that time, this was a reasonable step in furtherance of 
what DuBose had signaled and represented, i.e., that Ernst would 
be the anchor tenant at the Plaza. While DuBose could not have 
anticipated this precise step, he could have and should have 
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reasonably anticipated that Stangl would make legal and economic 
commitments in furtherance of the project to accommodate an 
October 1 possession date. DuBose himself testified that 
normally the question of risk bearing for pre-lease expenditures 
is addressed during negotiations. That was not the case here. 
30. In order to close on the purchase of the' Plaza, 
Stangl waived certain conditions contained in the Option 
agreement and the offer to purchase the trust deed from Aetna. 
More specifically, the Brockbanks had several tax liens on the 
property and thus could not deliver satisfactory title or a 
warranty deed to Stangl. Based on the assurances from Ernst that 
a lease would be entered into, Stangl agreed to pay additional 
amounts to pay off the tax liens. Had Stangl known that Ernst 
would not lease the anchor space at the Plaza, he could have 
declined to purchase the Plaza property and the Aetna trust deed, 
and he could have aborted the financing package obtained from 
Valley Bank. 
31. As indicated above, since sometime in June, the 
parties treated the project as an expedited one with delivery of 
the premises to Ernst for fixturing on October 1, 1988. DuBose 
acknowledged that approximately sixty days were needed to 
complete construction prior to delivery for fixturing. 
32. Following the August 2 phone calls, it was 
approximately three weeks before DuBose next communicated with 
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Stangl. On August 23, 1988 he sent to Stangl a copy of a lease 
which he indicated Ernst was prepared to sign. In his testimony, 
DuBose admitted that this commitment was not entirely correct for 
Ernst was not yet convinced the project was economically 
feasible. DuBose further testified that before Ernst would 
commit to the project, a feasibility analysis would have to be 
completed. Ernst did not ever explain this to Stangl. Had 
Stangl known that Ernst's leasing of the anchor space was 
contingent upon an economic feasibility study, he would not have 
acquired the Plaza. 
33. DuBose's hesitation between August 5 and August 23 
in finalizing lease terms did not retard the speed with which 
other aspects of the project proceeded. The Ernst architects 
continued to refer written construction materials to Stangl. On 
or about August 17, Stangl sought bids on the asphalt work in 
accordance with specifications received from Ernst on August 12, 
1988. 
34. On August 29, 1988, Stangl responded to DuBose1s 
August 23 letter with proposed changes. Stangl did not 
anticipate that any of his proposed changes would be sufficiently 
problematic to jeopardize the project. Based on previous 
communications and dealings with DuBose, this conclusion was 
entirely and reasonably justified. 
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35. DuBose responded on September 12, 1988, with a 
letter specifically addressing each of Stangl!s proposed changes 
of August 29. DuBose stated that several issues were unresolved 
and there was a risk negotiations would terminate absent 
resolution of the significant issues. DuBose then scheduled or 
confirmed a meeting with Stangl in Salt Lake City on September 
14. This was the first indication from Ernst that the project 
was in jeopardy. 
36. Just before his trip to Salt Lake City, DuBose 
tendered his resignation to Ernst. Nevertheless, DuBose and 
Ellis Kantor, both representing Ernst, met with Stangl in Salt 
Lake City on September 14. Contrary to the testimony of DuBose 
and Kantor, they did not inform Stangl that DuBose was leaving 
Ernst. 
37. At this September 14 meeting there were five 
primary matters to be resolved: abatement of rent; subletting; 
responsibility of providing and paying for insurance; percentage 
rent in the option period; and, whether Ernst could cease 
operations or be required to continuously operate. These open 
issues had not previously risen to the level of significance that 
they acquired for the September 14 meeting. 
38. At the September 14 meeting Stangl indicated his 
preference on these five issues but stated that, if Ernst 
insisted, each of the issues would be resolved in accordance with 
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Ernst's preference. Based on the meeting, Stangl reasonably 
expected to receive from Ernst an acceptable lease by September 
23. 
39. The day following the Salt Lake City meeting was 
DuBose's last day with Ernst. On or about that same day, Thomas 
Stanton, Ernst's Senior Vice-President of Operations, told Kantor 
the Jordan Valley Plaza project was on hold. 
40. On September 23, Stangl generated a call to Ernst 
inquiring about the lease. He was then informed that DuBose was 
no longer employed by Ernst. Both Kantor and Stanton further 
informed Stangl that DuBose's projects were on hold. Stanton 
also alluded to an economic study. This was the first indication 
Stangl had of Ernst's need for such a study before leasing the 
anchor space at the Plaza. 
41. In a letter dated September 29, 1988, Stanton 
formally notified Stangl that Ernst would not be a tenant in the 
Plaza. 
42. Upon receipt of that letter, Stangl found himself 
in a position whereby he had purchased the Plaza, taken out 
substantial loans to purchase that property, had pledged his 
properties and leases adjacent to the Plaza, and had begun 
construction consistent with Ernst's stated desires. 
43. At that point, Stangl could have chosen to stop 
further activity with respect to the refurbishment of the Plaza, 
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or he could continue to improve the Plaza in the hopes that Ernst 
would become a tenant, that it would be attractive to another 
anchor tenant or that it would interest a potential purchaser. 
Stangl, with Valley Bank's agreement, continued to renovate the 
Plaza. This was a reasonable course of action because, among 
other things, the Brockbanks had been unable to sell the property 
for several years given its deteriorating condition, there were 
two new shopping centers established in the near vicinity with 
which the Plaza had to compete for new tenants, and Stangl had 
pledged his other properties and leases as security for the loan 
to acquire the Plaza. 
44. Stangl spent over $2.2 million in purchasing and 
renovating the Plaza. Stangl engaged in substantial and 
reasonable efforts to find a new anchor tenant or to find a 
purchaser for the Plaza. 
45. On March 8, 1991, Stangl was finally able to sell 
the Plaza and the two adjacent properties which he owned (upon 
which a Firestone store and emissions inspection store were built 
and leased) to Green Isle Development Corp. 
46. The Court determines that Stangl is entitled to 
recover his out-of-pocket expenses incurred in the acquisition 
and refurbishment of the Plaza less rental income he received 
from other tenants and less amounts allocable to the Plaza when 
it and Stanglfs two other properties (upon which a Jiffy Lube 
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store and a Firestone store had been built and leased) were sold 
to Green Isle. 
47. Except for certain adjustments described below, 
Plaintiff's Exhibit 88A, fairly and appropriately sets forth 
Stanglfs damages. 
48. Stanglfs damages, based upon his reasonable 
reliance upon Ernst's representations that it would enter into a 
lease to become the anchor tenant at the Plaza, are $331,391.00. 
That amount is determined from plaintiff's Exhibit 88A showing 
damages of $407,309, less the following deductions: 
(a) $27,851 for escrow adjustments which were counted 
twice in the calculation of damages; 
(b) $433 in legal fees which were incurred prior to 
reliance upon Ernst's representations; 
(c) $7,404 in loan origination fees which were 
incurred prior to August 2, 1988; 
(d) $40,230 which represents selling costs for 
properties other than the Plaza. 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
1. Ernst and Stangl did not enter into a contract 
whether written or oral. There was no acceptance by Ernst of the 
counteroffer specified in Stangl*s July 14 letter. While Ernst's 
July 15 letter anticipated that an "Offer to Lease" would be 
completed, the parties did not complete an offer to lease. 
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2. Beginning with its June 29 letter, Ernst set the 
negotiations on a course such that any reasonable lessor should 
reasonably expect Ernst to be bound by a mutually acceptable 
"Offer to Lease" containing the significant business points. 
Even though Ernst's form of an "Offer to Lease" expressly 
contemplated a subsequent, written lease, Ernst's language and 
conduct indicated that the subsequent lease would resolve only 
the less significant matters not addressed in the "Offer to 
Lease." Furthermore, it was reasonable to conclude that any 
items not raised in Ernst's June 29 or July 8 letters were not 
significant. Ernst should have reasonably anticipated that 
Stangl would draw these same conclusions. There is no reason to 
believe that Stangl and Ernst would not have reached agreement on 
all lease points. 
3. It was not unreasonable for Stangl to believe that 
the project would proceed following DuBose's phone calls of 
August 2. Those phone calls suggest at that time DuBose 
attributed no particular significance to the differences between 
his letter of July 8 and Stangl•s letter of July 14. 
4. Ernst through its words and conduct represented to 
Stangl that it would enter into an agreement with Stangl to lease 
the anchor space at the Plaza with remodeling to be done and 
possession to be taken on a "fast track" basis. 
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5. With DuBose's promises and representations through 
August 2 in hand, it was reasonable for Stangl to make 
commitments, incur obligations and proceed with the project by 
acquiring and renovating the property in order to deliver 
possession as close to October 1 as possible. DuBose should have 
expected Stangl to undertake such actions following his oral 
commitments of August 2 and before a formal lease was executed. 
6. Stangl reasonably relied upon such representations 
to his detriment, and took definite and substantial actions in 
reliance upon those representations. Most significantly, he 
acquired the Plaza which he had no reason to do, he incurred over 
$1.1 million in debt which he otherwise would not have incurred, 
and he pledged other assets to secure that note which he 
otherwise would not have encumbered. 
7. Stangl had no obligation to purchase the Plaza 
property from the Brockbanks, acquire the trust deed from Aetna, 
or have the July 19, 1988 loan package funded by Valley Bank, 
prior to date of the actual closing of the purchase of the 
property on August 9, 1988. 
8. Ernst should have reasonably expected that its 
representations would induce Stangl to take dramatic action or 
forbearance in order to meet the "fast track" possession date. 
9. After learning that Ernst did not intend to enter 
into a lease, Stangl reasonably and in good faith expended funds 
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to complete renovation of the property in order to entice Ernst 
to lease the property, attract a new anchor tenant, or find a new 
purchaser of the property. 
10. Injustice can only be avoided in this case by 
enforcing Ernst's promise to lease the anchor space under 
promissory estoppel. 
11. Under the theory of promissory estoppel, this 
Court has authority to do "what justice requires11 and award 
damages ranging from out-of-pocket costs to full contract 
damages. This Court determines that justice does not require 
that Stangl receive contract damages, i.e. the minimum amount to 
which Ernst had agreed to pay as rent for the term of the lease. 
This Court determines that justice requires that Ernst pay Stangl 
his out-of-pocket costs of $331,391.00. 
12• Stangl is the prevailing party in this action and 
is awarded his costs. 
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GIAUQUEf CROCKETT 
BENDINGER & PETERSON 
170 S. Main, Suite 400 
Salt Lake City, UT 84101 
Telephone: (801) 533-8383 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
F. C. STANGL, III, an 
individual, dba F. C. STANGL 
CONSTRUCTION COMPANY, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
ERNST HOME CENTER, INC., a 
Washington corporation, 
Defendant. 
This suit was brought by F.C. Stangl, III ("Stangl") 
who alleged that defendant Ernst Home Centers, Inc. ("Ernst") 
had breached an agreement to enter into a five-year lease at 
the Jordan Valley Plaza or alternatively that he had 
detrimentally relied upon representations and conduct of Ernst 
and that he was entitled to recover damages based upon a theory 
of promissory estoppel. Liability issues were tried before the 
Court, without jury from approximately February 11, 1993 to 
February 19, 1993. In its Memorandum Decision, dated April 20, 
Third Judicial Cisinct 
DEC 2 7 m 
JUDGMENT 
Civil No. 89-090-2771-CN 
Honorable Michael Murphy 
•3\CH iidb 
199\63320.1 
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1994, the Court ruled that there was insufficient evidence to 
establish a contract, but that Ernst may be liable to Stangl 
under the theory of promissory estoppel. The Memorandum 
Decision is attached to the Findings of Facts and Conclusions 
of Law as Exhibit "A" and are incorporated therein by 
reference. The remaining issues were tried before the Court 
from February 22, 1994 to February 24, 1994. 
At all phases of the trials, plaintiff F.C. Stangl, 
III. was represented by Stephen G. Crockett and Stephen T. 
Hard. Defendant Ernst Home Centers, Inc. was represented by 
Roger J. Kindley. Ernst was also represented by David A. 
Greenwood and Patrick J. O'Hara during the first phase and by 
Elizabeth Dolan Winter during the second phase. Having entered 
its findings of fact and conclusions of law: 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED that: 
Judgment is entered in favor of Stangl j^ aet—against 
Ernst in the amount of $331,391.00. 
l:1„J-^( 
Honorable Michael 
District Judge 
199\«3320.1 
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ADDENDUM B 
SPA PROPERTIES 
P.O. BOX 1922 
PARK CXTY. UTAH 84060 
801-649-0206 
Mr- Mack DuBose June 3, 1988 
Vice President, Real Estate & Planning 
Ernst Home Centers 
1511 6th Avenue 
Seattle, Washington 98101 
Re: SVC 90th South/Redwood Road 
Dear Mr. DuBose: 
Pursuant to our telephone conversation earlier this week, I 
am enclosing per your request the following information: 
1. Survey of the shopping center 
2. Site plan of new Firestone store 
3. As-bujlts of the building 
4. CC6R9s of the shopping center 
5. Typical lease form 
7 
As I indicated to you, stangl was one of the original 
partners in the venture that developed the center. The 
development was involved in a trade with the Brockbanks that 
included a wrap-around contract back to Stangl. In addition 
to this, the mortgage that was taken out on the property for 
the Brockbanks with Aetna included a guarantee from Stangl. 
Aetna Is now calling on Stanglfs guarantee as the Brockbanks 
have defaulted and Stangl, as a result, is-- perfecting his 
position under the guarantee and contract and should have 
possession of the property by the end of this month. 
As this relates to a time schedule by which you could have 
occupancy, depending on the level of remodeling you wish to 
spec, it would appear that you could have occupancy within 
sixty days after the execution of a lease agreement and 15 
the lease can be completed by the end of the month, you 
could conceivably be open by the first of September. 
Relative to Giant's occupancy, there were no major items of 
remodeling other than cosmetic that were completed for their 
occupancy. As a result, the building can adequately 
accomodate your needs and if additional property is required 
to accomodate you* garden/outside selling area needs, the 
property can be expanded to the south. 
S001073 
Mr. Mack OuQosc 
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With regard to the lease terms, Stangl has Indicated that 
the base rent factor of $2.50 per square foot would most 
probably be acceptable and that the amortization of the 
remodeling improvements can be handled as well but the 
timing of Stangl1s negotiations with Aetna and having an 
executed lease with Ernst are important relative to the 
resulting cost of remodeling as the plan would be to have 
these funds included in the mortgage as it is renegotiated 
with Aetna* As you can see, although not essential, the 
timing could be quite cost effective. With regard to other 
lease terms, the base'rent would have to be subject to some 
method of increase at reasonable periods during the lease 
term based either on a CPI or percentage rent basis* The 
length of term can be accomodated as would be acceptable to 
you but will have to be of sufficient length to amortize the 
excess improvement allowance to be provided. 
Th> lease form enclosed can be utilized however if you ha<re 
a standard form that you prefer, Stangl would like to use 
the form that will enable the most timely execution of the 
lease as it relates not only to acceptability but to 
execution relative to his other negotiations• 
If these general terms and conditions are acceptable, please 
submit a letter of intent as to these and any other terms 
and conditions which you would deem necessary for this 
location and I will, present them to Stangl immediately so 
that we can determine if there is a deal to be made. Should-' 
you have any questions regaring the enclosed information or 
need other information, please call. 
SOO10739 
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TROHSMISSI0 N REPORT 
PRIME SALT LAKE CV 
1 T I M E 
D U R fl T I 0 N 
D E S T I N fl T I 0 N 
M O D E j 
| P fl G E S 
[_RESULT j 
6.23. 193 3 13: 20 ' | 
2 ' 2 7'" 1 
1 206 62 1 6999 | 
'..
 G 3 
5 1 
O.K. 1 
SCO10868 
-***A 5<u,th .TXJ !.». : 
*"" '••'>" <.<<v. uZn 
Prime 
DATE: 
FROM: 
TO: 
F a c i o t i l e Mo. ( 3 0 1 ) 2 6 3 - 9 3 2 9 
FAX COVER SHgFT 
MATI/ 
4 
Mr- Mack DuBose 
Vice President, Real Estate 
Ernst Home Centers 
1511 Sixth Avenue 
Seattle,. Washington 98101 
June 23, 1988 
Re: Jordan Valley Plaza Shopping Center 
Dear Mack: 
It was a pleasure to get the opportunity to meet you and to 
discuss the opportunity that exists at the above refetenced 
center relative to a» remodel of the existing improvements for an 
Ernst Home Center. After discussions with F.C. Stangl, a lease 
with Srnst can be consumated based on the following general terms 
and conditions: 
Location: Jordan Valley Plaza Shopping Center 
SVC 900a South Redwood Road 
South Jordan, Utah 
Building Size: Existing 46,050 square feet to be 
remodeled and expanded by "approximately 
15,000 square feet to the south of the 
existing improvements 
Primary Lease Term: 25 years 
Options To Renew: Four (4) terms of Five (5) years each 
Plans and 
Specifications: 
Lessor shall expand as well as remodel 
the existing Improvements to Ernst's 
specifications. Ernst shall provide 
Lessor with Its plans and specifications 
as Ernst desires them to be constructed 
in the remodel of the improvements* 
Lessor will have said plans and 
specifications reviewed by the 
appropriate governing agencies and 
SCO10970 
Mr. Hack DuBose 
June 23, 1988 
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Inform Brnst of any changes that will 
be required in order to obtaia a 
building permit. The installation of 
ell fixtures and inventory shall be 
excluded front said plans and specifi-
cations except where the installation 
of sane by Brnst oust be coordinated 
with the work of Lessor. 
Construction Costs: Lessor will provide a turnkey 
building pursuant to the above 
referenced plans and specifications. 
Lessor's contribution hereunder shall 
be limited to Pour Hundred Thousand 
Dollars ($400,000.00) including any 
related site development work 
exclusive of the Lessor's requirements 
mm set forth; herein. 
Base Rent: $167,289.Off annually payable in equal 
monthly installments of $13,940.75. 
Percentage Rent: Two Percent (2%) of all gross sales In 
excess of the base rent paid in any 
calendar year. 
Increases in Base Rent: The base rent shall be subject to aa 
Increase of Fifteen Percent (19%) in 
the sixth (6th), eleventh (11th), 
sixteenth (16th), and twentieth (20th) 
years of the primary tera and at the 
beginning of any option tera. 
Cost Overruns: In the event that the cost of 
remodeling the building shall exceed 
Pour Hundred Thousand Dollars 
($400,000.00), as bid by Lessor, Lessor 
shall so notify Lessee of the amount 
of excess and Lessee shall have the * ^ 
option of: 
•4 
1) Revising the plans and specifications 
to bring the costs to within the 
prescribed budget; or, 
y 
„w 
S
°OlOS7i 
Mr. Mack DuBose 
June 23, 198* 
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2) Paying £or such excess in cash upon 
Lessor's receipt of a certificate 
of occupancy; or, 
3) Amortizing; such/ excess construction 
costs over\the primary term of the 
lease, at an amortized rate of Eleven 
Percent (11V) 
Occupancy expenses: The lease shall be triple net with 
Brnst paying for ail taxes, Insurance, 
utilities and all other costs related 
to its occupancy of the premises, 
Including its prorata share of all 
common area maintenance of the shopping 
center of which the building is a part* 
Ernst's Maintenance 
and repairs: 
Ernst shall be responsible for the 
maintenance and repair of the premises 
throughout the term of the lease 
including all exterior areas utilized 
as sales or storage areas, the 
roof and all plumbing systems. 
Lessor's Maintenance: 
Additional Lessor 
Obligations! 
Lessor shall be responsible for the 
maintenance of all structural portions 
of the premises. 
Lessor, prior to Ernst's occupancy of 
the premises, shall Install a new roof 
on the premises and resurface and 
otherwise rehabilitate the parking 
lot including the addition of parking 
to the south of the existing parking. 
As soon as is practical after Ernst's 
occupancy of the premises. Lessor 
agrees to rehabilitate and remodel 
the exterior portions of the shops 
that are a part of the shopping center 
of which the premises are a part. 
Flxturing Date: Subject to no unusual requirements 
in the Plans and Specifications and the 
timely execution of a lease agreement, 
October 1, 1988. 
SCO10872 
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The lease shall contain such other terms and conditions as are 
mutually acceptable to Ernst and Lessor. 
If the above terms and conditions are acceptable to you, please 
acknowledge so in the space provided below and return an 
acknowledged copy to m& together with the standard form lease 
agreement that you propose to use and we will have it reviewed by 
counsel, insert the applicable terms and conditions from this 
letter, and forward execution copies of the lease to you. Should 
you have any questions, please call me at 801*649-4644. 
rfc'Pruitt 
cc: 7.C* Stangl 
ACCEPTED: 
By 
Its 
Date _ 
SOO10873 
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June 29 , 1988 
Mr. Steve Pruitt 
Mr. F.C. Standi 
P.O. Box 1922 
Park City, UT 840 
RE: JORDAN 
Gentlemen: 
Thank you f o^yourcpjpr^spondence outlining the general terms 
and conditions tK&t you propose as the basis for leasing the 
building located in the above mentioned center. I will respond 
in order of your June 23, 1988 correspondence* 
1. Location Agreed 
2. Building Size - Agreed, with the provisions that CAiM and 
triple net charges are calculated on the 46,050 square feet 
of building only. 
3. Primary Lease Term - Agreed 
4. Options to Renew - Agreed 
5. Plans and Specifications - Agreed, with the provision that 
Ernst review ail schedule of costs and bids, and reserves 
the right to re-bid any element of the project that is out-
side normal ranges of costs for similar work/products in 
other markets. 
6. Construction Costs - Agreed, provided Ernst review all 
construction costs and overhead elements related to the 
construction projects and review ail change orders prior to 
release. In addition, the 3400,000 does not include the 
costs of roof replacement, parking lot rehabilitation and 
pylon sign. 
7. Base Rent - Agreed 
8. Percentage Rent - We will pay one percent (IX) on gross 
sales in excess of 38,000,000. 
Mr. Steve Pruitt 
Mr. F-C. Standi 
June 29, 1988 
Page Two 
9. Increase m Base Rent - Vot Agreed. We will pay an 
increase in rent of 5£ in the sixth (6th), eleventh (11th) 
sixteenth (16th) and twenty-first (21st) years of the pri-
mary term and at the beginning of any option term. 
10. Cost Overruns - We are agreed, except item #3, should be 
prime rate plus one-half percent (1/2%) at the time Ernst 
accepts the store for fixturing. 
11. Ernst Maintenance and Repair - Agreed, with the provision 
Landlord maintains the roof covering. 
12. Lessor's Maintenance - Agreed, with the provision Landlord 
maintains the roof covering. 
13. Additional Lessor Obligations - Agreed, with the provision 
that Ernst remodeling costs do not include roof replace-
ment, parking addition and rehabilitation of the adjacent 
tenant space, and the parking lot. It is further stipu-
lated that tenant space rehabilitation shall be completed 
within one (1) year from execution of the Ernst Lease. The 
lessor will provide at his expense a pylon sign on 9400 
South street entrance for Ernst identification. 
14. Fixturing Date - Agreed, with the provision that if the 
facilities are not substantially complete (roof replaced, 
construction elements completed for Ernst building, outside 
nursery complete, pylon sign installed, parking lot reha-
bilitated), the fixturing date will be on, but not before 
January 1, 1989. 
15. Commencement of Term - Upon full execution of the Lease. 
16. Commencement of Rent - Sixty (60) days after the building 
is turned over to Ernst for fixturing and stocking. 
•2* *—.-/*«-» v@g) 
V 
Mr. Steve Pruitt 
Mr. F.C. Stangl 
June 29. 1988 
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Steve, I believe we can reach substantial agreement. Our next 
step is to complete a binding Offer to Lease and then draft the 
Lease document. It usually takes 3-5 weeks for this process 
(the Lease draft), but we are proceeding in advance of the Lease 
by having our architectural work and construction planning 
completed prior to the Lease document. I will forward to you, 
after I have your response, our typical Lease for your review. 
I believe we can speed up the process this way. 
Sincerely, 
Mack OuBose 
Vice President-Real Estate, 
Planning and Development 
MD: mb 
JORDAN 
ADDENDUM E 
HOME&NURSEXY 
Corporate Officii 
15H Sixth Av*. 
Sftattft. WA 96101 
(206)621-6700 
EMERY EXPRESS 
July 8, 1988 
Mr* F.C. Stangl 
Mr. Steve Pruitt 
P.O. Box 1922 
Park City, UT 84060 
RE: OFFER TO LEASE - JORDAN VALLEY PLAZA SHOPPING .CBffFBg 
Gentlemen: 
The following will^serve as.our proposal of termsiacceptabl 
us relative .^ to.ithe Leasing of space in the rjJordai^"^^^^ 
Shopping ^ C^nter i^ ffereaf ter ureferred «[to 'as^Landl—^ 
Home if Center* ZnoS^hezteafterpreferredftoSSs^e 
pbntempiate'd by "th'is^ propqaal "shall ,be: basecT on 
terms and conditions* ng^ 
1. TENANT - Ernst'Home Center, Inc., a Washington ^ Corporation. 
2. LOCATION - The Premises shall be located as outlinfcdjon^the 
attached plan, identified as Exhibit (A). 
3. SIZE OP PREMISES - The total building shall consistrafc frhe 
existing 46,050 square feet of the former.OiTbso^OliHount 
Center Building and the addition of 15,000 square £&feet ts to 
the south of the existing improvement. The leasable area 
for the calculation of CAM, taxes, and insurance shall be 
46,050 square feet and excludes nursery, mezzanine and 
loading dock. 
4. TERMS AND COMMENCEMENT - The initial term of the Lease 
shall be for twenty-five (25) years commencing the .later of 
60 days from notic 3 by Landlord that the Premises are sub-
stantially complete and ready for fixturing. The Landlord 
agrees to deliver the Premises ready for fixturing on or 
before October 1, 1988, and if Landlord is unable to do so, 
the Tenant will not be required to accept the Premises for 
fixturing before January 1, 1989. Tenant may, at its sole 
option, accept the Premises after October 1, 1988 for fix-
turing. merchandising and opening prior to January 1, 1989. 
If tenant chooses to open the Premises for business between 
November 1, 1988 and January 1, 1989, the rent shall be 
abated to March 1, 1989. 
0020537 
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5. OPTIONS TO RENEW - Provided Tenant is not in default under 
the terms of the Leas* or has not terminated the Lease 
pursuant to the terms of **id Lease, Tenant shall have the 
right to renew the Le*»« for "P to four (4) consecutive 
terms of five years each tfPon expiration of the initial 
term. In any renewal period, all terms and conditions of 
the Lease shall remain in effect except as to rent, Land-
lords work, and fixturin* period. Any option can only be 
exercised by the Tenant providing written noticei$to4 Land-
lord of not less than ,180ydays prior<to/the •xpi£ing^)r.>hen 
immediately preceding 'terai* 
6. BASE RENT - Tenant shall pay to , 'LgpgLXdrd S^SfS^SSS^ 
amounts as minimum rental for the Leased Premise!? 
Lease-Tears 
LejjsjyjCe&L^ &**& 
#167,289 annually,.. 
184,0 It- i?«RBmV!J 
222,662 
244,928: ^asaK&K* 
Lease Years 26 - 30 - option period SI: . "26£{?tUgmnus&^ 
Lease Years 31 - 45 - option period 2,3,4 270,032i_annually.s 
Said rental shall be paid in equal;monthly installments,1 in 
advance, without prior notic« o p demand.* 
7. PERCENTAGE RENT - In addition to the £minimu« rental .-Tenant 
will pay to the Landl0rd a t the «nd of each year of the 
Lease Term and options, a* additional rental, an amount 
equal to one percent (J*» °* the annual gross sales over 
$8,000,000 generated in t»« Leased Premises. 
8. USE OP PREMISES - The Tenant shall use the Premises for the 
conduct of a lumber, hardware and nursery business and 
allied lines, as operated or the Tenant in its stores in 
the State of Utah. 
0020S *"i 
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9. REPAIRS AND MAINTENANCE 
A. Premises - The Landlord shall keep in good order, 
condition and repair, the structural portion of the build-
ing including, but not limited to, the foundation, exterior 
walla, structural portion of the roof, and all utilities to 
point of connection to the building. The Tenant shall be 
responsible for the maintenance of all heating and .cooling 
equipment, interior lighting, plumbing and utilities,from 
the point of connection to the building, floor 
plate glass (unless damaged as' result of 
defeots), .door systems, in^rior^ painting anc 
and the roof covering.
 ; Landlord swill repair!?* 
and warrant» the existing heating and cooling e< 
be in good operating condition'at the time the 
turned over to the Tenant for" fixturing. 
aaxerings, 
B., Parkin* "frnfl ffowinon Are 
s h a l l 
in ' paragraph 
'Mx& 
access 
outline 
basii^J 
designate 
maintenance (CAM). Tenants Jshare*of said Si 
not exceed one-half (1/2)'of?1% of its anniiarfirSM^ales 
as reported to Landlord* 
10. CONSTRUCTION OP THE LEASED PREMISES 
A. Landlords Work - Landlord - shall expand as well as 
remodel the existing improvements to Tenants specifica-
tions. Tenant shall provide Landlord with its plan and 
specifications, within 30 days or sooner from the date of 
this agreement, as it desires them to be constructed. 
Landlord will have said plans and specifications reviewed 
by the appropriate governing agencies and secure, supervise 
and complete, said plans and specifications with good mate-
rials and workmanship. 
B. Construction Costs - Landlord will provide a turnkey 
building pursuant to the plans and specifications referred 
to in paragraph 10A. Landlord's contribution hereunder 
shall be Pour Hundred Thousand Dollars ($400,000.00), 
including any related site work. Site work related to the 
refurbishment and rehabilitation of the common area ahall 
not be included as building costs. Ln addition, the con-
structioh allowance shall not include the costs of roof 
replacement, parking lot rehabilitation and pylon signs. 
0020333 
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C. Coat Overrun - In the event the cost of remodeling the 
building exceeda Four Hundred Thousand Dollars 
($400,000.00), as the bid by Landlord, Landlord shall 
notify the Tenant of the amount in excess and Tenant shall 
have the option of: 
1. Revising the plans and specifications to bring the 
costs to within the prescribed budget; or 
2« Paying for such excess in cash upon Tenants opening for 
business; or 
3. Amortizing suon excess construction c?*t* 
primary term at an amortized rate of prime', 
half percentage (1/2%) points at the time'the 
is ready for fixturing. 
itiMftplansJg|^^ imaj 
ousiwooi 
orders i 
U . PARKING. ADJACHNT SHOPS AND ROOF - Landlord, prlOtV^O 
Premises, shall re-surface£and 
.including - the ^ additl1 
Tenants occupanoy of# the 
rehabilitate the parkins .lot 
parking to the south of the existing parking^per^a^^ 
Exhibit <B). Within one year after Tenants occup^cy fvof 
the Premises, Landlord agrees to rehabilitate andWibdel 
the exterior portion of the shops that are a part of the 
shopping center of which the Premises are a part. The 
rehabilitation of the parking lot, the additional parking 
to south, and the remodel of the shop space shall be at 
Landlords sole expense. In addition, Landlord shall remove 
and replace the existing roof and decking (if required) of 
the 46,050 square foot building. The materials and con-
struction of the new roof will be of such quality that it 
is warrantable for at least ten years from the date of 
application. 
12. UTILITIES - Tenant shall pay for all water, heat and 
electricity, natural gas, telephone, trash removal, and 
other services and utilities supplied to the Premises for 
its exclusive use in the operation of its business. 
Mr* F.C. Stangl 
Mr. Steve Pruitt 
July 8, 1988 
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13. TAXES AND INSURANCE - Tenant shall pay to the Landlord its 
pro-rata share based on square footage as outlined in para-
graph 3 of all real estate taxes levied and assessed 
against the Premisesf and its pro-rata share of the fire 
and extended coverage insurance required to be maintained 
by Landlord on said Premises. Tenant shall pay all taxes 
on its trade fixtures, leasehold improvements! merchandise 
and other personal property. 
14. PYLON SIGN - Landlordt at his expense, will ._ ... 
sign for Tenants identification on'.the access ^t^tkMogn^e'r^ 
on 9400 South. Tenant shall
 %j»yP#fpr s I t j i a K S m ^ s ^ 
installation; and maintenance. Landlord maytf:pi 
space for additional tenants, but fin no instaSoj 
design allow for other tenant signage that is grea«rJ 
50X o'f Xhe size of the Ernst sign* 
makin-gWf/^ 
men tsfWa %$aiabovery^ \ is made^nat£hazardous» 
used j5Ln the construction vofvthe?existing ^ mpr 
governmental ^ authority requires*the^removal a3 
such elements; the costs of removal, disposal^and 
ment shall be at the Landlords expense. 
16. OTHBR TBttH A W gQHPITIQNS - Tenant and L^^MW^iJ^ 
cooperate in all matters relating to and di 1 igentl^Bpursue 
the preparation of documents • execution of the^LeaseT'and" 
construction of the improvements and addition to allow for 
the opening to the public of Tenants business no later than 
March 1, 1989. 
17. DOCUMENTATION AND APPROVAL - Finalization of the agreement 
contemplated by this letter is subject to the preparation 
and execution of a Lea ;e Agreement in form 'and content 
acceptable to Ernst Home Center9 Inc., a Washington Corpo-
ration, and Valley Indoor Marketplace, Inc., a Utah Corpo-
ration, and their respective legal counsel. 
00203^0 
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If you agree with this proposalf please acknowledge by returning 
a signed original of this letter. We will then instruct our 
attorneys to proceed with the preparation of the Lease. We look 
forward to a mutually successful project. 
Ypurs Truly, 
r/]c^2^-
Mack Dufloae 
Vice President of Real Estate 
MD:mb 
JORDAN1 
Enclosures-Exhibits 
Agreed and Accepted this day of , 1988.-
VALLBY INDOOR MARKETPLACE INC. 
By 
Its 
By 
Its 
\J \ * fi~ K/ J>- '-' 
ADDENDUM F 
F. C. STANGL CONSTRUCTION CO. 
4455 SOUTH 700 EAST • SUITE 300 • SALT LAKE CITY, UTAH 84107 3092 • PHONE (801) 262 0331 
SPECIALISTS >N COMMERCIAL AND INDUSTRIAL PLANNING ANQ DPVFl np*jcyr 
J u l y 1 4 , 1988 
in EXHIBIT NO. 
Mr . Mack DuBose |
 p GROVER 
c / o ERNST HOME & NURSERY 
C o r p o r a t e O f f i c e s 
1511 S i x t h Avenue 
S e a t t l e , WA 9 8 1 0 1 PLAINTIFF'S 
EXHIBIT 
Re: Offer to Lease 
Jordan Valley Plaza | ]? 
West Jordan, UT 
'•&iii:i**viz& 
Dear Mr. DuBose: 
The following will serve as my proposal to lease 
space in the above-captioned shopping center to Ernst Home 
Center Inc., hereafter referred to as Tenant. The lease 
offered is based on the following terms and conditions: 
1. TENANT. Ernst Home Center Inc., a Washington 
Corporation. 
2. LOCATION. The premises shall be located as 
outlined on the attached plan, identified as Exhibit "A". 
3. SIZE OF PREMISES. The total building shall 
consist of the existing 46,050 square feet "of the former 
Gibson Discount Center Building, and the addition of approx-
imately 15,000 square feet to the south of the existing 
improvement. The leaseable area for the calculation of CAM 
(Common Area Maintenance) shall be 46,050 square feet. The 
nursery, mezzanine and loading dock shall be excluded from 
this calculation. Tenant may self insure, provided Lender 
approval is obtained. If Lender will not grant the approval, 
Landlord will provide insurance in amounts acceptable to 
Lender, and Tenant will reimburse Landlord for the cost of 
this insurance. Tenant shall pay its proportionate share of 
real estate taxes upon presentation of a proper tax bill, 
assessment, etc. 
4. TERMS & CONDITIONS. The initial term of the 
lease shall be for twenty-five (25) years commencing the 
later of 60 days from notice by Landlord that the Premises 
are substantially complete and ready for fixturing, provided 
said notice is given by October 1, 1988 or January 1, 1989. 
A Certificate of Occupancy, when properly obtained, shall 
fix the date of substantial completion. Landlord agrees to 
deliver the Premises to Tenant for fixturing on or before 
October 1, 1988, and if the Premises are not substantially 
Mack DuBose 
ERNST HOME & NURSERY 
July 14, 1988 
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complete, with Certificate of Occupancy issued, the Tenant 
will not be required to accept the Premises for fixturing 
before January 1, 1989. Tenant may, at its sole option, 
accept the Premises after October 1, 1988 for fixturinq, 
merchandising, and opening prior to January 1, 1989. fff 
Tenant chooses to open the Premises for business between 
November 1, 1988, and January 1, 1989, Tenant shall pay rent 
in the sum of 2% of gross sales generated during this interim 
period, rather than the base rent set forth in Section 6. 
5. OPTION TO RENEW. Provided Tenant is not in 
default under the terms of the lease, and is in occupancy of 
the Premises, and has not terminated the lease pursuant to 
the terms of said lease, Tenant shall have the right to 
renew the lease for up to four (4) consecutive terms of five 
years, each upon expiration of the initial term. During any 
renewal period, all terms and conditions of the lease shall 
remain in effect, except as to rent, Landlords work, and 
fixturing period. Any option can only be exercised by Tenant 
providing written notice to Landlord of not less than 180 
days prior to the expiring of the immediately preceding 
term. 
6. BASE MINIMUM RENT. Tenant shall pay to Landlord 
the following minimum rental for the Leased Premi?*:^: 
Lease Years 1-5 $167,289.00 Annually 
Lease Years 6-10 $184,017.00 Annually 
Lease Years 11-15 $202,420.00 Annually 
Lease Years 16-20 $222,662.00 Annually 
Lease Years 21-25 $244,928.00 Annually 
Option Periods 
Lease Years 26-30 $269,420.00 Annually 
Lease Years 31-35 $296,362.00 Annually 
Lease Years 36-40 $325,998.00 Annually 
Lease Years 41-45 $358,598.00 Annually 
Said rental shall be paid in equal monthly install-
ments, in advance, without prior notice or demand or offset. 
7. PERCENTAGE RENT. In addition to the minimum 
rental, Tenant will pay to the Landlord, at the end of each 
year of the lease term and options, as additional rental, an 
amount equal to one percent (1%) o- the annual gross sales 
over $8,000,000.00 generated in the Leased Premises. Landlord 
reserves the right to renegotiate the percentage rent clause 
if the premises are subleased to a tenant whose use is not 
substantially the same as the use set forth in the lease. 
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8. USE OF PREMISES. The Tenant shall use the Premises 
for the conduct of a lumber, hardware and nursery business, 
and Allied Lines, as operated by the Tenant, in its stores 
in the State of Utah. 
9. REPAIRS & MAINTENANCE. 
A. PREMISES. The Landlord shall keep in good order, 
condition and repair, the structural portion of the building, 
including, but not limited to, the foundation, exterior 
walls, structural portion of the roof, and all utilities to 
point of connection to the building. The Tenant shall be 
responsible for the maintenance of all heating and cooling 
equipment, interior lighting, plumbing and utilities from 
the point of connection to the building, floor coverings, 
plate glass (unless damaged as a result of structural defect), 
door systems, interior and exterior painting and plaster, 
and the roof covering. Landlord will repair or replace and 
warrant, the existing heating and cooling equipment to be in 
good operating condition at the time the building is turned 
over to the Tenant for fixturing. 
B. PARKING & COMMON AREAS. In general, the Landlord 
shall keep in good order and repair the parking, striping, 
access, lighting, landscaping, and other common areas as set 
forth on Exhibit "A", and the Tenant shall pay, on a monthly 
basis, its prorata share of the costs for this common area 
maintenance based on square footage designated in Section 3. 
10. CONSTRUCTION OF THE LEASED PREMISES. 
A. LANDLORDS WORK. Landlord shall expand, as well 
as remodel, the existing improvement to Tenant's specifications. 
Tenant shall provide Landlord with its plan and specifications 
within 30 days or sooner from the date of this agreement, as 
it desires them to be constructed. Landlord will have said 
plans and specifications reviewed by the appropriate governing 
agencies and secure, supervise and complete the work set 
forth in said plans and specifications, with good materials 
and workmanship. 
B. CONSTRUCTION COSTS. Landlord will provide a 
turnkey building pursuant to the plans and specifications 
referred to in Paragraph 10A. Landlord's construction here-
under shall be Four Hundred Thousand Dollars ($400,000.00), 
including any related site work. Site work related to the 
refurbishment and rehabilitation of the common area shall 
not be included as building costs. In addition, the const-
ruction allowance shall not include the costs of roof replace-
ment or parking lot rehabilitation. 
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C. COST OVERRUN. In the event the cost of remodeling 
the building exceeds Four Hundred Thousand Dollars ($400,000.00^, 
as bid by Landlord, Landlord shall notify the Tenant of the 
amount in excess and Tenant shall have the option of: 
1. Revising the plans and specifications to within 
the prescribed budget; or 
2. Paying for such excess in cash upon Tenant's 
opening for business; or 
3. Amortizing such excess construction cost :ver 
the primary term. The rental for this period will be cal-
culated by multiplying the constant .0109 x the total of the 
costs in excess of $400,000.00 = Additional Monthly Rent. 
Example: Total Costs $435,000 
-400,000 
35,000 
x.0109 
$381.50/mo. 
NOTE: This is the same constant used in arriving at the 
rent for the $400,000.00 construction allowance. Cost Over-
runs will be extended exactly as the original construction 
allowance. 
D. TENANT PARTICIPATION. Tenant will provide, at 
its expense, architectural and engineering support to develop 
its plans and specifications. Tenant may review all const-
ruction costs and overhead elements related to the various 
construction projects, as well as review all change orders 
in excess of $1,000.00 prior to release. 
11. PARKING, ADJACENT SHOPS & ROOF. Landlord, 
prior to Tenant's occupancy of the Premises, shall resurface 
and rehabilitate the parking lot, including the addition of 
parking to the south of the existing parking per attached 
Exhibit "A". Within one year after Tenant's occupancy of 
the Premises, Landlord agrees to rehabilitate and remodel 
the extension portion of the shops that are a part of the 
shopping center of which the Premises are a part. The rehab-
ilitation of the parking lot, the additional parking to the 
south, and the remodel of the shop space shall be at Landlord 
sole expense. 
In addition, Landlord shall remove and replace the 
existing roof and decking (if required) of the 46,050 square 
foot building. The materials and construction of the new 
roof will be of such a quality that it is warrantable for at 
least ten years from the date of application. 
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12. UTILITIES. Tenant shall pay for all s^u^r, 
water, heat and electricity, natural gas, telephone, trash 
removal, and other services and utilities supplied to the 
Premises for its exclusive use in the operation of its business. 
13. TAXES & INSURANCE, Tenant shall pay to the 
Landlord as additional rent, its pro rata share, based on 
the space leased by Tenant, for all real estate taxes levied 
and assessed against the Premises and its pro rata share of 
the fire and extended coverage insurance required to b-=» 
maintained by Landlord on said Premises. Tenant shall pay 
all taxes on its trade fixtures, leasehold improvements, 
merchandise and other personal property. 
14. PYLON SIGN. Landlord, at his expense, may 
erect a pylon sign for Tenant's identification beside the 
access to the Center from 90th South Street. If said tenant 
identification on pylon is erected, Tenant shall pay for its 
sign facia, installation, utilities, and maintenance. Land-
lord may provide facia space for additional tenants, but in 
no instance will the design allow for other tenant signage 
that is greater than 50% of the size of the Ernst sign. Any 
signage currently permitted and existing may remain as-is, 
except the sign previously allocated for Gibsons/GGGiant 
will be removed. 
1 5 . HAZARDOUS MATERIAL/GOVERNMENT REQUIREMENTS. I f 
in the making of repairs and remodeling of the existing 
improvements, a discovery is made that hazardous materials 
were used in the construction of the existing improvements, 
and governmental authority requires the removal and disposal 
of such elements, the cost of removal, disposal and replace-
ment shall be at Landlord's expense, but only if said discovery, 
removal, disposal and replacement shall be complete prior to 
Tenant's occupancy, but in ho case later than March 1, 1989. 
16. OTHEft TgftKS & COKPITIOKS. Tenant and Landlord 
agree to cooperate in all matters relating to and diligently 
pursue the preparation of documents, execution of the lease, 
and construction of the improvements and addition to allow 
for the opening to the public of Tenant's business no later 
than March 1, 1989. 
17. DOCUMENTATION & APPROVAL. Finalization of the 
agreement contemplated by this lette • is subject to the 
preparation and execution of a lease agreement in form and 
content acceptable to Ernst Home Center, Inc., a Washington 
Corporation, and F.C. Stangl III and their respective legal 
counsel. 
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If you agree with this proposal, please acknowledge 
by returning a signed original of this letter. This letter 
is offered for your acceptance, but the offer will be with-
drawn if not accepted as offered and returned to me prior to 
July 20, 1988, at 5:00 P.M. 
Upon your acceptance, please indicate your preference 
as the responsibility to initiate the drafting of the lease. 
I'll await your reply 
FCS:cj 
enclosure: Exhibit MA' 
cc: Mr• Steve Pruitt 
Agreed and accepted this 
ERNST HOME CENTER, INC. 
day of 1988, 
By. 
Its 
F.C. Stangl III initiate the drafting of the lease, 
Ernst Home Center, Inc. initiate the drafting of 
the lease. 
YOUR SUGGESTED SCHEDULE MY SUGGESTED SCHEDULE 
Begin/End Begin/End 
Documentation 
Approval 
Signatures 
Begin Const. 
Fixture Install. 
Rent Commence. 
(Please fill in your 
suggested schedule.) 
Documentation 
Approval 
Signatures 
Begin Const. 
Fix. Install. 
Rent Commence, 
7/19 
7/29 
8/15 
a/ij 
10/1 
12/1 
7/29 
8/15 
10/1 
12/1 
ADDENDUM G 
HOME&MJBSERY 
COQQritt OfftCM 
iSU Sotn Av». 
S4IKH. WA 96101 (206)621-6700 
^ 
ii inij I ii ji I i in, 3 8 8 
Mr. F. C. Stangl 
F. C. Stangl construction Co. 
4455 South 700 East - Suits 300 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84107-3092 
Ra: Offar to Laasa —- Jordan Valley Plaza, Wast Jordar 
Daar Mr. Stangl: 
Tha following will serve as our proposal of tins acceptable 
for tha laasa of spaca in tha above-captioned shopping canter. 
1 • Tanant. Ernst Ho»i 
Corporation. 
Washington 
?•• Location, 'Tha premises shal 
11 Ltached plan, identified aa Exhibi 
3. Size of Premises. Tha total building shall consist of 
the existing 46,050 squara faat of tha former Gibson Discount 
Center Building, and tha addition of approximately 15,000 square 
faat to tha south of tha axiatlng improvement for a nursary. The 
leasable area for tha calculation of CAM (Common Area Maintenance) 
shall ba 46,050 squara faat exclusive of nursary, mezzanine and 
loading dock. Landlord agrees to maintain all risk property 
insuranca insuring tha building in an amount equal to tha full 
replacamant coat thereof. Tanant shall have tha right, at each 
annual anniversary date for any all risk proparty insurance, to 
supply such all risk property insuranca with such deductible as 
Tanant daass appropriate, including tha option of self insurance, 
provided Lander grants its approval. In tha event Landlord 
supplias tha all risk proparty insuranca, it shall giva Tanant 
vrittan notice of tha full particulars thereof and If Tenant 
providas a quota from a qualified insuranca company in a lassar 
amount, Landlord shall either place such insuranca with said 
company or reduce the amount r»* premium attributed to Tanant to 
, ,.", 
itntSS:
 —
 I *>
 |V public 
cntfY* MicOoAtW. Notify 
j t (;:„Y • ,'."> 
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tha amount of tha premium quoted by the insurance company supplied 
by Tenant. 
4. Terms and Commencement. Tha initial term of the lease 
shall ba for twenty-five (25) years commencing sixty (60) days 
from notice by Landlord that tha Premises and tha common areas are 
substantially complete ("Substantial Completion4'). Substantial 
Completion will not occur until a Certificate of Occupancy has 
baan properly obtained by Landlord, Landlord has completed all of 
tha common areas so as to allow Tenant in an exercise of its -
reasonable judgment to begin its work, and Landlord has completed 
its obligations as sat forth in Sections 10 and 11 balov. 
Landlord agraas to deliver tha Premises to Tenant for fixturing on 
or before Octobar 1, 1988. However, if Substantial Completion has 
not occurred by Octobar 1, 1988, tha Tenant will not ba required 
to accept tha Premises for fixturing bafora January 1, 1989, 
Still, Tenant may, at its sola option, accept tha Premises after 
Octobar 1, 1988 for fixturing, merchandising, and opaning prior to 
January 1, 1989. If Tenant chooses to opan tha Premises for 
businass batwaan November 1, 1988, and January 1, 1989, Tenant 
jhall pay rant in tha sum of two parcant (2%) of gross sales 
generated during this interim pariod, rather thaji tha base rent 
sat forth in Section e ^ w M - ^ * ^ - * " ^ i{j0L* ^^^ ^urii naJTLd ~ 
* 5. Option to Renew. P»e*ided Tenant ia act im delimit in-L 
filll pijiiiiiiit if HI i Milium rental -r irtrlif 1 rrnal Ttan^ il inrl M * »^ * ^ 
-terminated %he ""tease. pmwiaj»* to fcha teems uf juid leaae^ Tenant Q 
shall hava tha right to ranaw tha lease for up to four (4) 
consecutive terms of five (5) yaars each. During any renewal 
pariod, all terms and conditions of tha laasa shall remain in 
effect, axcapt as to rant, Landlord's work, and fixturing pariod. 
Any option can only ba exercised by Tenant providing written 
notice to Landlord of not lass than ona hundred eighty (180) days 
prior to tha expiring of tha immediately preceding term. 
6. Base Minimum Rant. Tanant shall pay to Landlord tha 
following minimum rental for tha Laased Premises: 
4 
Laasa Yaars 1*5 
Laasa Yaars 6-10 
Laasa Yaars 11-15 
Laasa Yaars 16-20 
Laasa Yaars 21-25 
$167,289.00 Annually 
$184,017.00 Annually 
$202,420.00 Annually 
$222,662.00 Annually 
$244,928.00 Annually 
0 
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Option Perm us 
Lease Years 26-30 
Lease Ysars 31-3 5 
Lease Ysars 3 6-4 0 
Lsass Ysars 41-45 
$ 2 6 9,4 2 0.00 Annua11y 
$296,362.00 Annually 
$325,998.00 Annually 
$358,598.00 Annually 
Said rental shall be paid in equal 
adva ncs , i ri thout pri or notice or demand. 
i nstallaents, in 
7. Percentage Rent. In addition to the ainiaua rental, 
Tenant will pay to the Landlord, at the end of each year of the 
lease term, as additional rental, an amount equal to one percent 
(1%) of Tenant's gross sales exceeding Eight Million Dollars 
($8,000,000), and one percent (1%) of Tenant's gross sales 
exceeding Fifteen Million Dollars ($15,000,000) each year of any 
option period. Landlord reserves the right to renegotiate the 
percentage rent clause if the premises are subleased to a tenant 
whose use is not substantially the same as the use sat forth in 
the lease. 
3. Ose of Premises. The Tenant shall use thm Premises for 
the conduct of a general super lumbar, hardware, building 
materials, sporting goods and nursery business, and Allied Lines, 
as operated by Tenant, in a majority of its stores in the State of 
Utah. During the term of the Lease, Landlord agrees not to permit 
any other portion of the shopping center to be used for the sale 
of hardware (except for normal hardware sold by food and variety 
storss), building materials, plants, nursery stock and other 
garden supplies (except for plants, nursery stock and garden 
supplies sold, stored or displayed by retail food stores only 
within the confines of the food store building or on the sidewalks 
immediately adjacent to the front of the store), and no portion of 
the building immediately south of the Leased Premises shall be 
used for or am a restaurant unless Landlord has the prior written 
approval of Tenant. 
S • Rmpairs ai id Maintei lai tea. 
*• Premises. The Landlord shall keep in good order, 
condition and repair, the structural portions of the building, 
including, but not limited to, the foundation, exterior walls, 
structural portions of the roof, and all utilities to point of 
connection to the building. The Tenant shall be responsible for 
the maintenance of all heating and cooling equipment, interior 
lighting, plumbing and utilities from the point of connection to 
the building, floor coverings, plate glass (unless damaged as a 
Cii^li' ? :-
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result of structural defect), door systems, interior and exterior 
painting and plaster, and the roof covering. Landlord will repair 
or replace and warrant, the existing heating and cooling equipment 
to be in good operating condition at the time the building is 
turned over to the Tenant for fixturing. 
b. Parking and Common Areas. In general, the Landlord 
shall keep in good order and repair the parking, striping, access, 
lighting, landscaping, and other common areas as set forth on 
Exhibit A, and the Tenant shall pay, on a monthly basis, its 
pro rata share of the costs for this common area maintenance based 
on the square footage designated in Section 3 compared to the 
total square footage of all buildings in the shopping center. 
10. Construction of the Leased Premises. 
a. Landlord's Work. Landlord shall expand, as veil as 
remodel, the existing building to Tenant's specifications. Tenant 
shall provide Landlord with its plan and specifications within 
thirty (30) days or sooner from the date of this agreement. 
Xandlord will have said plans and specifications reviewed by the 
appropriate governing agencies and secure all necessary permits, 
supervise and complete the work set forth in said plans and 
specifications, with good materials and workmanship. 
b. Construction Costs. Landlord will provide a 
turnkey building pursuant to the plans and specifications referred 
to in Section 10.a. Landlord's construction costs hereunder shall 
be Four Hundred Thousand Dollars ($400,000), including any related 
site work. Site work related to the refurbishment and 
rehabilitation of the common areas and the costs of roof 
replacement and parking lot rehabilitation shall not be included 
as construction allowance costs and shall be at the sols expense 
of Landlord. 
c. Cost Overrun. In the event the cost of remodeling 
the building exceeds Pour Hundred Thousand Dollars ($400,000), 
Landlord shall notify the Tenant of the amount in excess and 
Tenant shall have the option of: 
(1) Revising the plans and specifications to 
within the prescribed budget; or 
(2) Paying for such excess in cash upon Tenant's 
opening for business; or 
0v2Q^ ^ 
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(3) Amortizing 3uch axcass construction cost over 
ths primary tsrm. Ths rsntal for this psriod will bs calculated 
by multiplying the constant .0109 x ths total -~ ths costs in 
sxcsss of $400,000.00 » Additional Monthly Rant. 
Exampls; $435,000 
-400,000 
35,000 
X .0109 
$381.50/mo. 
« Tsnant Participation, Tsnant will provida, at its 
sxpsnss, architsctural and snginssring support to dsvslop its 
plans and spscifications. Landlord and Tsnant shall agrss on ths 
cost of ths ramodsling of ths building, sxcluding changs ordars, 
prior to sxscution of ths Lsasit ~*~ may rsvisw all 
construction costs and ovsrhsad sl*k —.— rslatsd to ths 
construction, as wall as rsvisw and approvs all changs ordars in 
sxcsss of 0ns Thousand Dollars ($1,000) prior to rslsass. 
11. Parking, Adlscant Shops and Roof, Landlord,, at its 
sxpsnss, prior to Substantial Complstion, shall rssurfacs and 
rshabilitats ths parking lot, including ths addition of parking to 
ths south of ths sxisting parking par attachsd Exhibit A. In 
addition, prior to Substantial Complstion Landlord, at its-
sxpsnss, shall, in accordancs with spscifications approvsd by 
Tsnant, rsaovs and rsplacs ths sxisting roof and dscking (if 
rsquirsd) of ths sxisting building. Ths matsriala and 
construction of ths nsw roof shall bs warrantsd for at laast tsn 
(10) yssrs from ths data of application. 
Within ons (1) yaar aftsr Tsnant #s occupancy of ths Prsmisss, 
Landlord agrsss, at its sxpsnss, to rshabilitats and rsmodsl ths 
sxtsnslon portion of ths shops that ars a paart of ths shopping 
csntsr of which ths Prsmisss ars a part. If ths rshabilitation 
and rsmodsl of said shop spacs is not complstsd within ths 
aforamantionsd ons (1) ysar psriod, Tsnant shall bs sntitlsd to 
suspsnd ths payment of minimum and additional rsntal until such 
rshabilitation and rsmodsling is complsts. 
Otilltlss. Tsnant shsll pay for ax A sswsr, watsr, hsat 
and slsctricity, natural gas, tslsphons, trssh rsmovsl, and othsr 
ssrvicss and utilitiss supplisd to ths- Prsmisss for its sxcl i isivs 
us* in ths opsration of its businsss. 
13. Taxss arid mmranct, Subj set tu . abova, Tsnant 
shall pay to ths Landlord as additional , its pro rata 
( ; - ; : : , : "1 
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share, based on the square footage designated in Section 3 
compared with the total square footage of all buildings in the 
shopping center, for all real estate taxes levied and assessed 
against the Premises and its pro rata share of the all risk 
insurance referred to in Section 3 required to be maintained by 
Landlord on said Premises. Tenant shall pay all taxes on its 
trade fixtures, leasehold improvements, merchandise and other 
personal property. 
14. Pylon Sign. Landlord, at his expense, may erect a pylon 
sign for Tenant's identification beside the access to the shopping 
center from 90th South Street. If said tenant identification on 
pylon is erected, Tenant shall pay for its sign facia, 
installation, utilities, and maintenance. Landlord may provide 
facia space for additional tenants, but in no instance will the 
design allow for other tenant signage that is greater than fifty 
percent (50%) of the size of the Ernst sign. If any of the 
tenants are provided space on a pylon sign, all tenants shall pay 
a pro rata share of the costs and maintenance thereof. Any 
signage currently permitted and existing shall remain as*is, 
except for the addition of Tenant's sign and except for removal of 
the sign previously allocated for Gibson/Giant; provided, in all 
events, a pylon sign shall be available, at Landlord's expense, 
for Tenant's sign by the access to the shopping center from 
Redvood Road. 
15. Hazardous Material/Government Requirements. If in the 
making of repairs and remodeling of the existing improvements, a 
discovery is made that hazardous materials were used in the 
construction of the existing improvements, and governmental 
authority requires the removal and disposal of such elements, the 
cost of removal, disposal and replacement shall bo at Landlord's 
expense, and said removal, disposal and replacement shall be 
complete prior to Tenant's occupancy, but in no case later than 
March 1, 1989. 
Landlord represents and warrants to Tenant that, to the best 
of Landlord's knowledge, hazardous substances are not a part of or 
located in the Premises or adjoining property owned by Landlord 
and have not been generated, stored or disposed of on the Premises 
or adjoining property owned by Landlord, nor have the same been 
transported to or over the Premises. 'Hazardous substance* shall 
be interpreted broadly to mean any substance or material defined 
or designated as hazardous or toxic waste, hazardous or toxic 
material, hazardous or toxic or radioactive substance, or other 
similar term by any federal, state or local environmental law, 
regulation or rule presently in effect or promulgated in the 
Mr. F. C. Stangl 
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future, as such laws, r ag ulations or rules may ba amended form 
time to time, and it shall ba interpreted to include, but not be 
limited to, asbestos and any substance which after release into 
tha environment and upon exposure, ingestion, inhalation or 
assimilation, either directly from the environment or indirectly 
by ingestion through food chains or otherwise, will or may 
reasonably ba anticipated to causa sickness, death, disease, 
behavior abnormalities, cancer or genetic abnormalities. Landlord 
will hold Tenant harmless from and indemnify and defend Tenant 
against and from any damage, loss, expanses or liability resulting 
from any breach of this representation and warranty, including all 
attorneys' fees and costs incurred as a result thereof. 
'•• xs. Other Terms and conditions. Tenant and Landlord agree 
to cooperate in all matters relating to and diligently pursue the 
preparation of documents, execution of tha lease, and construction 
of tha improvements and addition to allow for tha opening to the 
public of Tenant's business no later than March 1, 1989. 
j Documentation and Approval. Finalisation of :n i • 
agreement contemplated by this letter is subject to the 
preparation and execution of a lease agreement in form and content 
acceptable to Ernst Home Center, Inc., a Washington Corporation, 
and F. C. Stangl III and their respective legal counsel. 
18. Automotive standards. Landlord agrees that It shall 
impose tha following standards on any occupants of the shopping 
canter which either sell automotive parts and supplies or provide 
automobile service: 
a. The parking lots and other common areas o*. _ue 
shopping center shall not be utilized by automobiles awaiting 
service or repair, or the installation of parts, or pick-up by 
customers. 
b. Customers shall be prohibited from making repairs to 
automobiles in the parking lot and other common areas of i he 
shopping center. 
e# ftiii parking lots and other common areas surrounding 
said occupant shall not be used for storage of automotive parts 
and/or supplies, shall be kept free of petroleum products and 
hazardous substances, and shall be kept in a neat and orderly 
condition so as to not detract from the appearance of the shopping 
center. 
Mr. F. C. stangl 
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d. The premises, outside any building, shall not be 
used for storage of any automotive parts and/or supplies, unless 
the same are fully screened from view in a manner so as to not 
detract from the appearance of the shopping center. 
If you agree with this proposal, please ac)cnovledge by 
returning a signed original of this letter. This letter is 
offered for your acceptance, but the offer will be vithdravn if 
not accepted as offered and returned to me prior to August 5, 
1988, at 5:00 p.m. 
If you agree with this proposal, please indicate your 
acceptance by signing on the appropriate space and returning to me 
a copy with an original signature. Upon receipt of this 
eement, ve vill direct our legal counsel to prepare the lease. 
Sincerely, 
Hack DuBoee 
Vice President/Reel Estate 
Planning and Development 
Attachment: Exhibit A . ..... 
Agreed and accepted this 
day of , 1988. 
F. C. Stangl III 
d216e 
'.. *,V i" 
ADDENDUM H 
HCMZ&NUXSZZY 
Coroo< ate Oftce* 
tSU SutnAv«. EMERY EXPRESS 
S«attl«. WA 96101 
(206)621-6700 
August 
i! I F.C . Stanscl 
F.C. Stansl Construction Co. 
4455 South 700 East - Suite 300 
Salt Lake City, I IT 84107-3092 
R* : OFFER TO LEASE - JORDAN VALLEY PLAZA 
D < !! v ^ 1! I Z '> St II 1 " If I 
Enclosed are two binding "Offers to Lease" for the above men-
tioned location. Please execute and return one original to mr 
attention. It Is ay expectation that the final Lease document 
will be approved and ready for signatures on September 1. 1988. 
Ve have instructed our attorney to begin Lease preparations in 
advance of your signature on the offer. At this point, it ii 
difficult for me to determine the construction schedule and a 
subsequent turnover date. We will await your estimate of the 
schedule based on t he current;, conditions. 
The determination of the store open! ng will be made aftex tlie 
receipt of jour revised schedule. 
Sincerely • 
>\A a c ft. ij *J£r**' 
Mack Dufiose 
Vice President of Reai Estate 
MD:mb 
JOROAN6 
Enclosures 
n: * w ;:-i* 
ADDENDUM I 
HOME&MmSEBY 
Corporate Offices 
15M Sixth Ave. 
Seattle, WA 98101 
(206)621-6700 
D M I t d ' R I H l i II I III III I l l i I M l h i P R L i 1 
August 23 „ 1 inn 
ill! I II: • C. Stand • III 
F. C. Stangle Contatructioii Company 
4455 South 700 Bast, Suite 300 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84107-3092 
liii! B i E S E J" :: it ::  i i ii: i: ill i i i i ZA 
Dear Mr Stangl: 
Enclosed is : liii x J e a se " We fc- ~ r -epared to execute as sub-
mitted. We have made every effort address those issues I:bat 
we-have discussed. 
EUeascr rev lew and rtturn with jwuv ^omikents and/ or notif 7 ne 
that you find the terns acceptable and I will forward execution 
documents for your signature. 
Aftex j oux • aignaturef 1 1 e 1 1 il I thei 1 execute and record the 
lease* 
Co t d i a 1 1 3 , 
Mack Oufiose 
Vice President of Rea 1 Bs t: 1 t • • 
MB:san 
ADDENDUM J 
F. C. STANGL CONSTRUCTION CO. 
4465 SOUTH 700 EAST • SUITE 300 • SALT LAKE CITY, UTAH 84107-3092 • PHONE (801) 262-0381 
SPECIAUSTS IN COMMERCIAL ANO INDUSTRIAL PLANNING ANO DEVELOPMENT 
August 29, 1988 
VIA TELECOPIER 
Mr* Mack OuBose 
c/o ERNST HOME 6 NURSERY 
Corporate Offices 
1511 Sixth Avenue 
Seattle, WA 98101 
Re: * Lease of premises in Jordan Valley Plaza, Met 
Jordan City, Utah 
Dear Mr. OuBose s 
I have carefully reviewed the revised lease sent by you to me 
and I appreciate your making the revisions that were made in this 
latest draft. Although this letter contains a number of comments, 
at this point I think (and hope) that ve are very close to being 
finished. Please make the changes set forth below in this letter 
and then forward revised copies of the lease to ma for my 
execution. Pleasa also forward with such execution copies a draft 
C
°PY/ "blacklined" to show the changes made in accordance with this 
letter. 
I will send via Federal Express multiple copies of the legal 
description to be attached as Exhibit A to the lease, and the site 
plan to b» attached as Exhibit B to the lease* If these are 
acceptable to you, please attach them to the execution copies you 
send to me. I will also send via Federal Express for your 
information a photocopy of our policy of title insurance for the 
shopping center. The leased premises will remain subject to all 
of the matters set forth on Schedule B thereof. Pursuant to your 
language in Paragraph First of the lease, I will require that Ernst 
approve all such matters concurrently with the execution of the 
lease. 
Mr. Mack DuBose 
August 29, 1988 
Page -2-
Please make the following changes to the lease: 
1. Delete the phrase beginning on the fifth line from the 
\/ bottom of page l, which reads as follows: "Including additional 
n\L^areas, if any, abutting the Shopping Center and to be used as a 
\^ part of or in connection with the Shopping Center,...." 
,// 
2. Add to the second line of subparagraph 1 in Paragraph 
"Second after tha word "without" the phrase "abatement (except as 
expressly provided in Paragraphs Seventh and Eighth), deduction, 
offset,...." 
3. Add to tha paragraph ending on tha fourth line from tha 
bottom of page 5 tha following: "Tenant covenants to pay said 
-, amount ta Landlord without abatement (except as expressly provided 
*£> in Paragraphs Seventh and Eighth) , deduction, offset, prior notice 
X or demand on or before February 1, 1989."' 
4. Tha blank on tha fourth line from tha bottom of page 7 
should ba competed as follows: "as shown in Landlord's policy of 
•Y/title insurance for tha Shopping Center, a copy of which has been 
provided to, and reviewed by, Tenant-" 
5* Oalata tha word "initial." on tha first line on page 10, 
add "(as tha same may ba extended)9 after tha word "Lease" on said 
first, line, and delete the first: full sentence on page 10, which 
reads as follows: "During each of tha option terms of this Lease 
the percentage rental shall be an amount equal to one percent (1*) 
of all gross sales in excess of Fifteen Million Dollars 
($15,000,000) for amy year in tha option term."' 
P 
6. After tha word "without:9 on tha ninth line of page 10, 
add tha phrase "abatement (except as expressly provided in 
^\ Paragraphs Seventh and Eighth), deduction, offset,...." 
ttj. After tha paragraph ending on page 11, add the following: 
^&\,' 6+ Nat Lease. It is the intent of Landlord and 
\**yjC Tenant that .the minimum rent,. percentage rental and all 
\lf> \%\ other amoqpts payable by Tenant to Landlord be absolutely 
x ' \ * net to T&ndlord and that Tenant shall, except as V w
 expresslyVjflhreinafter provided, pay (either directly or 
by paytnen^ of Tenant's share of such amounts pursuant to 
the provisions of this Lease) for all insurance, taxes, 
\.v Assessments, utilities, repairs, maintenance and all 
L j^* ^  otf|L&£j services and costs relating to the Premises and to 
\ 
j 
s 
( ^ 1 rarayit's use thereof. 
S0010583 
^ 
Mr. Macfc DuBose 
August 29, 1988 
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8. Replace the first sentence in Paragraph Fourth with the 
following: 
During the full term of the Lease and any renewals 
thereof, Landlord agrees, with respect to the Premises, 
to keep in good condition and repair, tha structural 
portions of the roof, the structural portions of the 
exterior walls, the foundation and all other structural 
portions of the Premises, and plate glass (but only when 
the plate glass is damaged due to structural building 
defects or events included in the all risk property 
insurance policy insuring the Premises, provided that any 
deductible portion of such insurance is paid by Tenant), 
and, provided that Tenant reimburses Landlord for its 
pro rata portion of the cost thereof, all paricing areas, 
common areas, sidewalks and access areas of the Shopping 
Center. 
go AT 9* Delete the sentence beginning on the fourth line of page 
y % 13 which reads as follows: "If Landlord fails to promptly reimburse 
Tenant for such, repairs, Tenant may deduct the expenses of the same 
from the rent next accruing*" 
* & 
tf^^^ 10. Delete the phrase "ordinary wear and tear," on the third 
of Paragraph Fifth* 
_ 11. Add to the sentence ending on the fifth line from the 
bottom of page 13 the following: ", except as provided below in 
this Paragraph Fifth in the event that Tenant elects to provide 
insurance or to self insure." 
,c SS 12. Add to the sentence ending on the fourth line on page 15 
^•^the following: ", and Tenant shall do any or all of the foregoing 
~ ^ if requested by Landlord." 
13. Add to the paragraph ending on the ninth line of page 15 
the following: ^ ^ ^ -
Tenant shall leave the^remises ("broom clean" and in good 
order and condition,'exceptingvthe damages referred to 
in the last paragraph of this Paragraph Fifth concerning 
waiver of subrogation and other matters as to which 
provision is made herein for Landlord's responsibility, 
and except for damage caused by fire, however caused, or 
by earthquake, tornado, the elements, act of God and 
other casualty, except as provided below in this 
Paragraph Fifth in the event that Tenant elects to 
provide insurance or to self insure. 
SCO10566 
' • & 
Mr. Mack DuBose 
August 29, 1988 
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v^ X. 14. Add to the eleventh line of page 15, after tha/itordl 
^agrees" the phrase "9 provided that Tenant reimburses LahdlWd u V ^ f o r its pro rata portion of the cost thereof,...." O ^ 
\^ 15. Add to the paragraph ending on the eighth line from the 
bottom of page 17 the following: 
Such property insurance shall name Landlord as a loss 
payee as its interests may appear, and shall be with 
companies reasonably acceptable to Landlord. Tenant 
7N shall furnish Landlord a certificate of coverage. Such 
*-** insurance shall not be cancelable or subject to reduction \ 
41 tf 
^ 
* • 
of coverage or other modification except after thirty iy 
(30) days' prior written notice to Landlord by the t \ 
insurer. All such policies shall be written as primary , Of*. L, 
policies, not contributing with and not. in excess of they {
 v JT 
coverage which Landlord may carry, and shall only be^\ A ^ f 
subject to such deductibles as may be reasonably approvedrV^ K j/N 
in writing in advance by Landlord. Tenant shall, at\J i ^ S l 
least: ten (10) days prior to the expiration of such /v -** 
policies, furnish Landlord with renewals or binders 
therefor. Any mortgage lender interested in amy part of 
the Premises may, at Landlord's option, be afforded 
coverage under any policy required to be secured by 
Tenant under this Lease, by use of a mortgagee's 
endorsement, to the policy concerned. 
16. Add to the paragraph ending on the eleventh line of page 
18 the following: *; provided, however, that if Tenant has elected 
to supply such insurance, such release shall apply to the extent, 
but: only to the extent, to which such loss or damage is actually 
covered by such insurance and Tenant either restores such damage 
or delivers the proceeds to Landlord, as contemplated by Paragraph 
Seventh." 
17. Delete the first: two paragraphs of Paragraph Sixth and 
insert in their place the following: 
Landlord agrees not to permit any person other than 
Tenantr or its subtenants, to place or maintain any sign 
on or above the Building. Tenant may, subject to 
applicable governmental regulations, utilize its standard 
sign on the outside of the Building, provided that it is 
not an intermittent flashing off-and-on sign, and 
provided that such sign shall not extend above the roof 
line of the Building. Multiple signs on the exterior of 
the Building must be approved by Landlord prior to 
installation, which approval shall not be unreasonably 
withheld. 
SOO10587 
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Landlord shall provide a pylon sign beside the 
access to the Shopping Canter on Redwood Road. Tenant ^ 
shall have the right to have its sign facia on said pylon -f'jfri 
sign- Tenant shall pay for its sign facia and its / j£K^ ' 
installation on said pylon, as well a3 $ ( ^ 
toward Landlord's cost of the initial installation ^  \* ^ r 
of said pylon sign. Tenant shall pay for the cost of all 
utilities for, and maintenance of, said pylon sign. <>A 
18. Add to the sentence ending on the third line from the 
^\>/ bottom of page 20 the following; ", but subject to the provisions 
(\f /3^n relating to the renegotiation of this Lease set forth in Paragraph 
* Eleventh.* 
19. Add to the paragraph ending on the sixth line of page 21 ft\ the phrase ", which approval shall not be unreasonably withheld.' 
20. Add to the ninth line from the bottom of page 21 after 
the word "damage,* the phrase "and in such event Tenant may not 
terminate this Lease,...." 
^ 
<P 
oV 
y 21* Delete the sentence beginning on the second line of page 
23, which reads- "If during the making of such repairs Tenant 
continues* to sell merchandise on the Premises, Tenant shall pay 
•minimum rent, percentage rent: and a proportionate share of the 
taxes, insurance and common area maintenance costs based on the 
portion of the Premises actually utilized by Tenant." (This is 
inconsistent with the preceding sentence.) 
22. Delete the. balance of the paragraph beginning on the 
sixth line from the bottom of page 25 after the first sentence 
thereof, amd substitute therefor the following: 
•> 
Within thirty (30) days after the date the short form of 
lease is filed for record, Landlord shall, at Landlord's 
expense, provide Tenant with an American Land Title 
Association Leasehold Policy, providing standard 
coverage, insuring Tenant's leasehold interest in the 
Premises* Such policy shall reflect the same condition 
of Landlord's title to the Premises as that shown by 
Landlord's policy of title insurance, a copy of which has 
been provided to, and reviewed by, Tenant. 
23. Add the word "reasonably" before the word "satisfactory" 
^l* on the tenth line and on the seventh line from the bottom of page 
^ 27, and add the phrase "exercise reasonable effort to..." after the 
V/^ word "shall" on the ninth line from the bottom of page 27. 
^
1* 
S0010588 
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24. Add to the beginning of Paragraph Tenth the following: 
^O-N^Provided that Tenant timely pays its pro rata share of the same-pY *^ 
" • — - - kj\ 
Delete from the fifth and sixth lines in Paragraph 4 
^e phrase "liable as surety to Landlord for the full 
e minimum rent, taxes, Assessments and insurance 
ording to the terms hereof;* and substitute therefor 
jointly and severally primarily liable with such 
or subtenant: for the timely payment: and performance of 
arifc obligation of Tenant under this Lease;...." 
Delete the balance of the second paragraph in Paragraph 
<^/ L, Eleventh after the first sentence thereof, and substitute t^herefor 
J*y Landlord shall then have the r^Tv*""lrlrT r^+'r at its 
V\</ optionr after its receipt of such notice, from time to 
*• time or at any time, to terminate this Lease upon written 
notice to Tenant. If Landlord has not elected to so 
terminate this Leas* as provided hereinabove, Tenant may 
sublet the- Premises or assign this Leas* in accordance 
with the foregoing paragraph* Notwithstanding the 
foregoing portion of this paragraph, if Tenant gives 
notice of such, intent prior to the end of the fifth (5th) 
year of this Lease, the same will constitute a default 
hereunder* 
If Tenant proposes to sublet the Premises or to 
assign this Lease to a Landlord approved tenant whose use 
is not substantially the same as that of Tenant, Tenant 
shall in good faith renegotiate with Landlord the 
percentage rent provision contained in this Lease, as 
well as any other provision of this Lease that in 
Landlord's sole judgment requires modification to conform 
this Lease and the provisions hereof to the nature of 
such subtenant's or assignee's use. 
The following provisions of this subparagraph shall 
apply only during the first five (5) years after the 
Commencement Date. Tenant shall operate Tenant's 
business in the Premises so as to maximize the gross 
sales produced by such operation, and shall carry in the 
Premises at all times a stock of merchandise of such 
size, character and quality as is reasonably designed to 
produce the greatest possible amount of percentage 
rental. Tenant shall carry on its business diligently 
and continuously at the Premises and shall )ceep the 
Premises open for business on all business days in 
%> 
y t>v 
SCO10589 
Mr. Mack DuBose 
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accordance with normal business practices for retail 
operations, in Salt Lake County. 
, 27. After the word "rent" on the second line of Paragraph 
fVThirteenth add the phrase: "or any other amounts due hereunder...." 
28. Delete the balance of the paragraph following the end of 
'\N\ the sentence ending on the fifth line of page 30, and substitute 
\^y therefor the following: 
/g' \ X , and all other amounts payable hereunder, including, 
X * ^ t^ without limitation, percentage rental, taxes, insurance 
/u* *A and common area maintenance expenses. In addition, 
<rf ^T 1 Landlord may perform in Tenant's stead any obligation 
\T that Tenant has failed to perform, and landlord shall be 
reimbursed promptly for amy cost reasonably incurred by 
Landlord in connection therewith with interest thereon 
from the date of such expenditure until paid in full at 
the rate of fifteen percent (15%) per annum, or exercise 
-any other right or remedy at law or in equity. Tenant 
shall pay to Landlord the cost of recovering possession 
of the Premises, all costs of reletting, including 
reasonable renovation, remodeling and alteration of the 
Premises, the amount of any commissions paid by Landlord 
in connection with such reletting, and all other costs 
and damages, arising out of Tenant's default, including 
attorneys' fees and costs. Landlord shall not be in 
default under this Leas* unless Landlord or the holder 
of any mortgage or deed of trust covering the Shopping 
Center whose name- and address have been furnished to 
Tenant in writing fails to perform an obligation required 
of Landlord under this Lease within thirty (30) days 
after written notice by Tenant to Landlord and to such 
holder, specifying the respects in which Landlord has 
failed to perform such obligation. If the nature of 
Landlord's obligation is such that more than thirty (30) 
day* ar* reasonably required for performance or cure, 
Landlord shall not be in defaultSif Landlord or such 
holder commences performance witn^uch thirty (30) day 
period and after such commencement-^ailigently prosecutes 
the seme to completion. In no event shall Tenant have 
the right, to terminate this Lease or to withhold the 
payment of rent or other charges provided for in this 
Lease as a result of Landlord's default. Tenant may, 
however, at its option, at any time during the 
continuance of such default after the expiration of said 
twenty (20) days' notice, pay any sum reasonably 
necessary to perform any obligation of Landlord hereunder 
which Landlord has not performed and of which Landlord 
has been given said twenty (20) days' written notice. 
SCO10590 
Mr. Mack DuBose 
August 29, 1988 
Page -8-
Landlord shall promptly pay to Tenant any such sum upon 
receipt from Tenant of an invoice therefor. If either 
party shall default in the fulfillment of any of the 
covenants or conditions of this Lease, other than the 
covenant of Tenant to pay rent, and the same cannot be 
remedied within the time herein provided by the use of 
reasonable diligence, then such additional time shall be 
granted, without penalty or other imposition, as may be 
reasonably necessary; and provided the party in default 
takes immediate steps on receipt of the notice to remedy 
the default and has proceeded diligently. v^ 
Af, 29. The blank on the second line of Paragraph FourteenthJfr*^ \% 
VJshould be completed with the date "'October 1, 1988." I 0**^ V* 
v/ 30 • After the word "and" and before the word "decking" on the
 m^ 
'py^intk line from the bottom of page 32, add the words "amy damaged." 
31. Delete the words "ten (10)" at the end of the eighth line 
\i from the bottom of page 32, and substitute therefor the words "two 
^ A 2 ) . * ^ 
I ?2. Delete the text: of Paragraph Fifteenth and insert in its J* 
^/place the following: v/Ji* 
|i>) Provided that Tenant is not in default in amy H^vO 
^**' material respect under this Lease, within one (1) year \ i\ C 
I 
VVHC * — - ~rx 
\^i «g5^ -* after Tenant's occupancy of the Premises, Landlord shall, \xv^ - \ 
[\^ /> J? a t ^ ^ sole expense, rehabilitate and remodel the f i jO^V/ 
vJS A } fp/C- extension portion of the retail shop space lying North C «>V*> 
*"* Y// v of the Building in the Shopping Center. Such \- / ^ ) v// * rehabilitation and remodel shall be such as to make the <SL 
* / retail space ecrual in quality to other first class retail iT^ 
retail space equal in quality to other first class retail 
space in the same geographic area. 
33. Add to the sentence beginning on the sixth line from the 
bottom of page 35 the following "Provided that Tenant timely pays 
J 
v^ its pro rata share of the cost of maintenance thereof when 
*' " 
y \fi^\<&T 34# Delate subparagraph (a) on page 36 and re*let$&H tfl^ u v (JJ\ 
ediately following subparagraphs accordingly. lljJ^ }±*sf'^f**\ 
J^ 35. Add to the beginning of the first sentence of Paragraph yffi**^Eighteenth the following: "Provided that Tenant timely pays its pro 
q A ^ rata share of the cost thereof,...." 
\> 
oU^T 
X^J ./ 36. Replace "five percent (5*)" on the first line of page 38 
r ^V*ith "ten percent (10%)." 
SOO10391 
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37. Add after the sentence ending on tha seventh line of page 
3> the following: 
Tha Estimate for the first year of this Lease is Thirteen 
Thousand Eight Hundred Dollars ($13,800.00), which shall 
be paid by Tenant to Landlord with each payment: of 
minimus rent on the first day of each month during such 
first: year in equal installments of One Thousand one 
Hundred Fifty Dollars ($1,150.00) each. Such amount 
shall ba prorated for any partial calendar month. 
38. Delate tha parenthetical phrase on the tenth and eleventh 
\/ lines of Paragraph Nineteen, which reads as follows: '(excluding 
-hvthe presence of any asbestos in tha tila covering the floor of tha 
Building) ..*.* We are having the tiles in the Building tested, 
and if the tests indicate that such tiles contain asbestos, we will 
remove all of them. We will provide to you any written rasults of 
such tests. 
LU. 39. Delete the text of paragraph 4 on page 41 and substitute 
^^^A'therefor the following: 
J* 
x /l\ Landlord agrees to keep and save Tenant: harmless . ^ r> I 
\ \ i from any obligation, liability, cost, or expense i ^  4^Jk i / 
V~ (including attorneys' fees), suit or claim for damage or lAv^ jfi* \jj 
injury caused by the gross negligence or willful ^f ^ 
misconduct of Landlord or Landlord's employees or agents. / 
/ 40* Delete two amounts of "$3,000,000* on the seventh line 
rvwof page 42, and the amount of "$500,000* on the eighth line on page 
^ 42, and substitute therefor the amounts of "$1,000,000," 
*$2,000,000* and *$200,000,* respectively. 
41. Add to the sentence ending on the third line on page 43 
\f the following: ", and Tenant is not in default in any material 
"DV-respect hereunder either on the data any such notice of extension 
is given or* on the data on which any such extension begins' • 
$? 42* Delate the first two sentences in the first full paragraph on page 46, which read as follows: 
Landlord and Tenant acknowledge that the tila covering 
the floor of the Building may contain asbestos. Landlord 
will hold Tenant harmless from and indemnify and defend 
Tenant against and from any damage, loss, expanse or 
liability resulting from as asbestos in tha Building 
floor tile. 
43. Add to the end of paragraph 4 on page 48 the following: 
except as expressly set forth herein." 
SCO1059? 
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\i 44. I note the following typographical errors in the Lease: 
r\Jfr) insert the word "as* after the word "Tenant* on the sixth line 
vj of page 2; (b) replace the semicolon with a colon on the last line 
of page 3? (c) delete the word "that* on the eighth line of page 
12; (d) "flush* is misspelled on the sixth line of page 14; (e) the 
word should be *charge£* on the thirteenth line of page 16; (f) 
"Building* should be capitalized on the third line from the bottom 
on page 16; (g) add a closed parentheses * ) * before the comma on 
the fifteenth line of page 22; (h) the word should be *charges" on 
the fifth line from the bottom of page 38; and (i) change the word 
"renewal* on the second line from the bottom of page 42 and 
substitute the word "extension* therefor. 
I appreciate your cooperation in connection with this matter. 
If you are unable to maJcs^any^of the changes requested above, if 
either of the exhibits encISvia herewith is unacceptable, or if you 
have any questions with respect to this letter, please call me so 
that we can discuss and resolve your concerns prior to sending more 
drafts of the lease. 
S0010593 
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HOME&NVRSZ3Y 
Coroorait Officii tSlt Sutn Av# 
Seiuit. WA 98101 
(206)621-6700 
September 12, 1988 
Mr. F. C. Stangl 
F. C. Stangl Construction 
4455 South 700 East, Suite 300 
Salt Lake Cit7» Utah 84107-3092 
RE: West Jordan 
Your Letter of 8-29-88 
Dear Mr. Stangl: 
We have reviewed your letter concerning our lease, which out-
lined outstanding issues to be resolved. I am responding to 
you in the order of your comments: 
Item 1. This change is acceptable 
Item 2. We do not agree to this change. 
Item 3. Again* we do not agree to the phrase "without abate-
ment, deduction or offset." Also, since the period 
during which this rent would be in effect runs 
through February 28, 1989, we should revise the sen-
tence to read: "on or before February It 1989 and 
March 1, 1989 as applicable." 
Item 4. This change is acceptable providing we find no excep-
tions in the title policy prior to the execution of 
the lease. We should list assessments for purposes 
of clarity. 
item 5. 
ute 
We do not agree to this point. The 38,000,000 break-
point for percentage net during the initial term and 
the 315,000,000 breakpoint for percentage rent during 
each option period was previously agreed in return 
for increases in the base rents during the option 
periods. 
-/; ij 
.Vitncss: .. 
CHiryi MacOonald. Notary Public 
PLAINTIFFS 
EXHIBIT 
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Item 6. We do not agree to this change. 
Item 7. We do not agree. This provision is not necessary. 
The terms of the lease are expressly outlined in 
various paragraphs. 
Item 8. We are in agreement on a change of the first sentence 
of Paragraph Fourth as follows: 
"During the full term of the lease and any renewals 
thereof* Landlord agrees, with respect to the Build-
ing and Premises, to keep in good condition and 
repair, the structural portions of the roof, exterior 
walls* foundations* but not floor covering, plate 
glass (if damaged as a result of structural defects 
or events included in the all risk insurance policy 
insuring the Premises), Plumbing to point of connec-
tion to the Building and all other portions of the 
Building except as specified in Paragraph Fifth 
hereof, all parking areas, common areas, sidewalks 
and access areas of the Shopping Center. 
Item 9. We do not agree to changes in the offset provi-
sions. 
Item 10. We do not agree to this change. 
Item 11. We agree this change is acceptable. 
Item 12. We do not agree to this change. 
Item 13. The phrase "ordinary wear and tear** should be 
inserted in this paragraph after the word "excepting ' 
on Line 2. With this revision, this change is 
acceptable. 
Item 14. This change is not acceptable. 
item 15. We are not in agreement. Our Risk Management 
Department is drafting alternate language. 
Item 16. This change is acceptable. 
Item 17. Beginning with the sentence ending with "withheld," 
amend the language as follows: 
0 0 « f "* / % -- •-* 1 
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"Landlord shall provide, at Landlord's expense, a 
pylon sign beside the access to Shopping Center on 
Redwood Road. Tenant shall have the right to have 
its sign facia on said pylon sign. Tenant shall be 
permitted a sign facia in size that is not smaller 
tion on said pylon, as well as S10,000 toward Land-
lord's cost of the initial installation of said pylon 
sign. Tenant shall pay the cost of its pro rata 
share of utilities for, and maintenance of, said 
pylon sign. 
Item 18. We do not agree to this change. 
Item 19. We do not agree to this change. 
Item 20. We agree to this change. 
Item 21. Rather than delete the paragraph that we have 
requested* we suggest that the sentence end on the 
sixth line from the bottom of page 22 after the word 
"completion.* The remainder of the paragraph would 
then be retained. 
Item 22. We agree to this change based on the assumption that 
the title policy is reviewed and approved prior to 
the execution of the lease. 
Item 23. The additional word "reasonably'* is acceptable. We 
do not agree to other changes to this language. 
Item 24. We do not agree to this change. 
Item 25. We are not in agreement. 
Item 26. We do not agree with the change. We will not accept 
any language that requires continuous operation, nor 
will we agree to negotiations for a new lease. 
Item 27. This change is acceptable. 
Item 28. We are not in agreement. 
Item 29. We are in agreement. 
item 30. We are in agreement. 
G * * * . • • 
Mr. F. C. Stangl 
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Item 31. We are in agreement provided Ernst approves the spe-
cifications and ail warranties by installer and manu-
facturer are assigned to Ernst. 
item 32. We are not in agreement. We will agree to provisions 
that provide that Ernst is in occupancy of the Pre-
mises
 f and is paying minimum rents per the terms of 
the lease. 
Item 33. We do not agree with this change. 
Item 34. We do not agree to the elimination of provision (a) 
but will agree to a "designated area" of common area 
on the Site Plan that can be used to automobiles 
awaiting service or repair, or pickup by customers. 
Item 35. We do not agree to this change. 
Item 36. We do not agree, but will accept a compromise of 7% 
for management fees. 
Item 37. We agree to this change. 
Item 38. This change is acceptable. 
Item 39. We do not agVee with this change. 
Item 40. We agree to this change. 
Item 41. We are in agreement. 
Item 42. We agree, if the tile is replaced this language will 
be deleted, including the last sentence of Paragraph 
Twenty Sixth on page 46. 
Item 43. This change is not acceptable. 
Item 44. These changes are acceptable. 
Since we have several issues unresolved and have the possibil-
ity of terminating the negotiations ?f the significant issues 
can not be settled, we have not redrafted the Lease as you 
requested. We hope that we can reach agreement on the signifi-
cant issues and continue to the opening of an Ernst Store in 
your Center. 
0; ' * ' • ; • " . ' * 
Mr. F. C. Stangi 
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I expect to be in Salt Lake City on the 14th of September and 
look forward to meeting with you and discussing the remaining 
issues. 
Sincerely, 
Mack Dufiose 
Vice President of Real Estate 
MO:san 
O 
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HOME&NUSSESY 
Corporate Offices 
1511 Sixth Ave. 
Seattle. WA 96X31 
(206) 621 -6700 
2 DEPOSITION 
EXHIBIT 
±2^ 
September 29/ 1988 
Mr. P. C. Stangl 
P. C. Stangl Construction 
4455 South 700 Bast 
Suite 300 
Salt Lake City/ Utah 84107-3092 
RE; Ernst Home Center/ Inc. 
Jordan Valley Plaza 
West Jordan/ Utah 
Dear Mr. Stangl: 
This will confirm our telephone conversation of Friday/ 
during which we indicated that the Company has made a 
decision not to open an Ernst Home Center store at the above 
location at this time. 
/While this decision is final as regards entering into a lease 
and opening a store on the time table comtemplated by our 
recent discussions/ the Company may be interested in talking 
with you again on the subject in the future.' 
Thank you for your courtesies extended our staff and we wish 
you the best with Jordan Valley Plaza. 
Very truly yours# 
ERNST HOME CENTER/ INC. 
>/Tfi 
X. Se 
omA«^Stanton 
ilor V Senior ice-President Operations 
TCS:ajt 
PLAINTIFFS 
EXHIBIT 
WffiUmblZiLr 
JOO10785 
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BETA DRILLING, INC, RIO COLORADO DRILLING CQ, ALEJANDRO PEDRO BULGHERONI 
and CARLOS ALBERTO BULGHERONI, AppeUants v. WILLARD EUGENE DURKEE, AppeUee 
NO. B14-91-00071-CV 
COURT OF APPEALS OF TEXAS, FOURTEENTH DISTRICT, HOUSTON 
821 S.W.2d 739; 1992 Tex. App. LEXIS 4; 17 U.CCR. Serv. 2d(CaUaghan) 208 
January 2, 1992, Rendered 
January 2, 1992, Filed 
SUBSEQUENT HISTORY: AppeUanfs Motion for 
Rehearing is Denied February 6, 1992. Application 
for Writ of Error Denied May 6, 1992. Motion for 
Rehearing of Appucation for Writ of Error Overruled 
June 10, 1992. 
PRIOR HISTORY: [**1] On Appeal from the 152nd 
District Court. Harris County, Texas. Trial Court Cause 
No. 81-25157 
DISPOSITION: Reversed and Rendered 
COUNSEL: Ben Taylor of Houston, Texas, Thomas R. 
McDade of Houston, Texas, Lee HunneU of Houston, 
Texas, for appeUant 
John L. McConn, Jr. of Houston, Texas. Gregory T. 
FarreU of Houston, Texas 
JUDGES: Panel consists of Justices Pressler, JuneU and 
Ellis. 
OPINIONBY: PAUL PRESSLER 
OPINION: [*739] OPINION 
Durkee sued appellants (referred to coUectively as Beta 
Drilling) alleging breach of an alleged oral agreement. 
FoUowing a jury trial, the trial court awarded Durkee 
damages of $ 1,058,116 plus prejudgment interest. The 
judgment of the trial court is reversed and judgment is 
rendered in favor of appellants. 
Durkee filed this suit in 1981 alleging an oral agree-
ment under which appellants would give him 25% own-
ership of the stock in a new company (which later became 
Beta [*740] Drilling, Inc.), and he would be its chief 
executive officer and president. The appellants filed a 
general denial and also affirmatively pled the statute of 
frauds as barring Durkee* s claim. 
In their first point of error, appellants allege that 
Durkee proved no exception to the Uniform Commercial 
Code statute of frauds requirement that "a [**2] contract 
for the sale of securities" be in writing and signed for it 
to be enforceable, and, therefore, the trial court erred in 
granting judgment for Durkee. 
The applicable statute of frauds states: 
A contract for the sale of securities is not enforceable by 
way of action or defense unless: 
(1) there is some writing signed by the party against 
whom enforcement is sought or by his authorized agent 
or broker, sufficient to indicate that a contract has been 
made for sale of a stated quantity of described securities 
at a defined or stated price; 
(2) delivery of a certificated security or transfer in-
struction has been accepted, or transfer of an uncertifi-
cated security has been registered and the transferee has 
failed to send written objection to the issuer within 10 
days after receipt of the initial transaction statement con-
firming the registration, or payment has been made, but 
the contract is enforceable under this provision only to 
the extent of the delivery, registration, or payment; 
(3) within a reasonable time a writing in confirmation 
of the sale or purchase and sufficient against the sender 
under Subdivision (1) has been received by the party 
against whom enforcement is sought [**3] and he has 
failed to send written objection to its contents within 10 
days after its receipt; or 
(4) the party against whom enforcement is sought ad-
mits in his pleading, testimony, or otherwise in court 
that a contract was made for sale of a stated quantity of 
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described securities at a defined or stated price. existence of an exception under Section 8.319. 
Tex. Bus. & Com. Code Ann. § 8.319 (Tex. UCQ 
(Vernon 1968). The official commentary under this sec-
tion states that it is intended to conform the statute of 
frauds provisions with regard to securities to the pol-
icy of the like provisions in Section 2-201 of the Texas 
Uniform Commercial Code (statute of frauds for the sale 
of goods). 
The threshold issue is whether the alleged agreement 
constituted a "sale of securities" under the Uniform 
Commercial Code statute of frauds. While neither party 
expressly argues that the sale was not one of securities, 
appellee implies such. The claim is that his interest in the 
company was consideration for organizing the company 
and accepting employment, and therefore not subject to 
the statute of frauds. A plain reading of the questions 
posed to the jury shows that the alleged agreement re-
quired Durkee to organize the company, act as its chief 
[**4] executive officer and president, and pay $ 25,000 
out of his personal funds. He would be paid $ 80,000 
per year and given 25% of the Beta Drilling stock. A 
"sale" consists in the passing of title of an item from the 
seller to the buyer for a price. Tex. Bus. &Com. Code 
Ann. § 2.106(a) (Tex. UCQ (Vernon 1968). Here, title 
of the stock was to pass from appellants to Durkee for a 
price of $25,000. 
In Bowers Steel, Inc. v. DeBrooke, 557 S. W.2d 369 
(Tex. Civ. App.-San Antonio 1977, no writ), the ap-
pellate court held that oral employment contracts, for 
which the consideration is to be corporate stock, are not 
prohibited by Tex. Bus. & Com. Code Ann. § 8.319 
where the only consideration for the stock was accep-
tance of employment. Here the payment of $ 25,000 
was also required. This transaction is a sale of securi-
ties and is under the statute of frauds. 
It is undisputed that none of the appellants signed any 
written document which would comply with the require-
ments of Tex. Bus. & Com. Code Ann. § 8.319 (Tex. 
UCC) (Vernon 1968). Thus, the statute of frauds pre-
cludes enforcement of the alleged agreement as a matter 
of law unless Durkee proved an exception to the statute 
[**5] of frauds. 
Section 8.319 contains only four exceptions to the 
statute of frauds governing the sale of securities. At ap-
pellee's request, over appellants' objections, jury ques-
tions [*741] C and D, were submitted. They asked 
whether Durkee had "partially performed" the alleged 
agreement, and whether Carlos Alberto Bulgheroni and 
Alejandro Pedro Bulgheroni promised to sign a written 
document evidencing the agreement. The jury answered 
"yes" to both questions. These answers do not show the 
The only exception in Section 8.319 to which partial 
performance could apply is Section (2) which provides 
that an oral agreement for the sale of securities is en-
forceable where delivery of the security or transfer in-
structions have been accepted, transfer of the security has 
been registered without objection, or payment has been 
made. Durkee never paid any money for Beta Drilling 
stock, never accepted delivery of the stock or a trans-
fer instruction, and never registered the stock. Durkee's 
employment services to appellants was the only evidence 
the jury could have relied upon in support of its answer. 
Such does not circumvent the statute of frauds. 
In Wiley v. Bert els en, 770 S.W2d 878 [**6] (Tex. 
App.-Texarkana 1989, no writ), the plaintiff alleged 
that he had an oral employment contract for which he 
was to receive a monthly salary plus a percentage of cer-
tain profits. The plaintiff sued for breach of contract. 
The defendants claimed the statute of frauds barred the 
suit. The plaintiff argued that his employment services 
were "partial performance" of the contract, and there-
fore the statute of frauds was inapplicable. The court 
held: 
Performance of an alleged oral agreement in order to re-
move the agreement from the operation of the statute of 
frauds, must be unequivocally referable to the agreement 
and corroborative of the fact that a contract actually was 
made. What is done must itself supply the key to what 
is promised. Rendition of services for which a person 
receives a monthly salary is insufficient to take the al-
leged agreement out of the statute of frauds because the 
services were fully explained by the salary without sup-
posing any additional consideration. We hold that the 
services performed by Wiley did not take the alleged 
agreement out of the operation of the statute of frauds. 
Wiley, 770 S.W.2d at 882. Durkee's claims are nearly 
identical [**7] to those made by the plaintiff in Wiley. 
Durkee received a regular salary. To invoke the excep-
tion of Section 8.319(2), Durkee had to perform an act 
directly related to the stock, such as accepting delivery 
of the stock, registering the stock, or partially paying 
for it. Since Durkee did none of these, the jury's find-
ing on partial performance was irrelevant and must be 
disregarded. 
Question D asked whether the Bulgheroni brothers 
had promised to sign a written document evidencing the 
agreement. By this Durkee appears to try to invoke the 
promissory estoppel exception. 
For promissory estoppel to create an exception to the 
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statute of frauds, there must have been a promise to sign 
a written contract which had been prepared and which 
would satisfy the requirements of the statute of frauds. 
See Nagle v. Nagle, 633 S.W2d 796, 800 (Tex. 1982); 
Consolidated Petroleum Indus., Inc. v. Jacobs, 648 
S.W2d363, 367(Tex. App.-Eastland 1983, writrefd 
n.r.e.). A promise to prepare a written contract is not 
sufficient. The defendant must have promised to sign a 
particular agreement which was in writing at the time. 
Southmark Corp. v. Life Investors, Inc., 851 F.2d 763, 
766 (5th Cir. 1988) [**8] (applying Texas law). The 
Fifth Circuit stated in Southmark that it would follow 
the rule set forth in Consolidated Petroleum and held: 
. . . the defendant should ordinarily not be promis-
sorily estopped from asserting a section 8.319 statute 
of frauds defense unless there is proof that he at least 
expressly promised to sign documents that had already 
been prepared or whose working had been agreed on and 
that satisfy the requirement of section 8.139. 
Southmark, 851 F.2dat 769-70. 
never promised to sign a written document which was in 
existence. Durkee admitted that there was no document 
in [*742] existence at the time any alleged promise to 
sign was made to him. The jury's answer to Question 
D is immaterial and must be disregarded. 
Since the statute of frauds applied and Durkee failed 
to prove any exception, the trial court erred in entering 
judgment for Durkee. Appellants were entitled to judg-
ment as a matter of law based upon the statute of frauds. 
Appellants' first point of error is sustained. 
Because appellants' first point of error has been sus-
tained, it is unnecessary to review their second point of 
error. [*+9] The judgment of the trial court is reversed 
and judgment is rendered for appellants. 
/s/ Paul Pressler 
Justice 
Judgment rendered and Opinion filed January 2, 1992. 
Panel consists of Justices Pressler, Junell and Ellis. 
The evidence is uncontradicted that the appellants Publish - Tex. R. App. P. 90. 
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John W. CHAPMAN, Jr. and Margaret Chapman and Chapman-Hall Realty v. George A. BOMANN, HI 
[NO NUMBER IN ORIGINAL] 
Supreme Judicial Court of Maine 
381 A.2d 1123 
January 24, 1978 
COUNSEL: Wstcott & Lynch, P. A. by John J. Lynch, 
Damariscotta (orally), for John and Margaret Chapman. 
Clayton N. Howard, Damariscotta (orally), for defen-
dant. 
JUDGES: Dufresne, C.J., and Pomeroy, Wemick, 
Archibald, Delahanty and Godfrey, J J. Wfemick, J. wrote 
the opinion. Delahanty, J., sat at argument and confer-
ence but did not otherwise participate. Dufresne, A. 
R. J., sat at oral argument as Chief Justice, but retired 
prior to the preparation of the opinion. He has joined 
the opinion as Active Retired Justice. 
OPINIONBY: WERNICK 
OPINION: [*1124] On September 13, 1974 John 
W. Chapman, Jr., his wife Margaret Chapman and 
Chapman-Hall Realty, as plaintiffs, brought a civil ac-
tion in the Superior Court (Lincoln County) against 
George A. Bomann, m as [*1125] defendant. Plaintiffs 
sought specific performance, or alternatively damages 
for breach, of a contract allegedly made between plain-
tiffs and defendant for the sale and purchase of real prop-
erty in New Harbor, Maine owned by defendant and his 
wife Betsy as joint tenants and used by them as a summer 
residence. Defendant's answer included the affirmative 
defense that the agreement plaintiffs were seeking to en-
force was unenforceable for failure to meet particular re-
quirements of the Maine Statute of Frauds, 33 M.R.S. A. 
§51(4). 
Ruling on a motion by defendant asking that summary 
judgment be awarded in his favor, the presiding Justice 
on May 27, 1975, ordered entry of summary judg-
ment for the defendant. Plaintiffs John and Margaret 
Chapman have appealed from this judgment, nl 
nl Chapman-Hall Realty initially participated as a 
plaintiff, but it is not a party to the appeal. 
Wfe sustain the appeal. n2 
n2 It should here be noted that defendant had filed 
a counterclaim. This Court twice remanded the 
case because the present appellants had purported 
to appeal from the judgment deciding the merits of 
the complaint against them before a disposition had 
been made of other aspects of the case (Rule 54(b) 
M.R.Civ.P.). Subsequently, by stipulation, judg-
ments were entered dismissing the complaint as to 
Chapman-Hall Realty as well as the counterclaim of 
the defendant. Thereafter, defendant claimed that 
plaintiffs had still failed to take a proper appeal. 
Defendant's contention was that plaintiffs had failed 
to comply with a provision of the order of remand 
specifying the manner in which the appeal was to be 
returned to this Court. This continuing controversy 
as to the propriety of the appeal was not resolved un-
til November 21, 1977 when the parties ultimately 
stipulated that the instant appeal was to be heard on 
the record originally before this Court, a supplemen-
tal record and the briefs originally submitted. 
On June 8,1974 plaintiffs signed a document, not yet 
signed by defendant, the contents of which set forth an 
agreement that, through Chapman-Hall Realty, defen-
dant Bomann would sell, the plaintiffs would purchase 
the Bomann summer residence at New Harbor. 
The presiding Justice ordered summary judgment for 
defendant on the rationale that since defendant had never 
signed the above-described document, the agreement 
contained in it was unenforceable for failure to com-
ply with the writing requirement of the Maine Statute of 
Frauds. 33 M.R.S.A. § 51(4). 
The presiding Justice had before him for considera-
tion facts stated in sworn answers to interrogatories and 
in various affidavits submitted in connection with the 
motion for summary judgment. 
381 A.2d 1123, *1125 
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The affidavit of Joan E. Simonds, a Chapman-Hall 
Realty broker, disclosed that plaintiffs rejected an ini-
tial offer made by defendant and defendant then sub-
mitted a counter-proposal for a sale and purchase agree-
ment. Plaintiffs accepted it and signed the document 
setting forth the agreement. Thereafter, on June 14, 
1974, Chapman-Hall Realty received from plaintiff John 
Chapman a check for $4,000.00 which, as added to an 
earlier down payment of $500.00, completed a 10% 
down payment to be deposited in an escrow account 
for the benefit of defendant. On the same day that the 
plaintiffs signed the document containing defendant's 
proposal for a purchase sale contract the document was 
returned to the office of Chapman-Hall Realty. It was 
then forwarded to the defendant to be signed on his part. 
On July 2, 1974 another person associated with 
Chapman-Hall Realty arranged for Joan Simonds to 
communicate with defendant regarding the document al-
ready signed by plaintiffs and forwarded to defendant 
for signature. This was done because plaintiffs had ar-
ranged, and were scheduled that same day to complete, 
a refinancing of their home in Massachusetts in anticipa-
tion of their purchase of defendant's summer residence in 
New Harbor. Joan Simonds reached defendant's wife by 
telephone and explained these circumstances to her and 
the consequent need for confirmation that the Bomanns 
would sign the document which had been forwarded 
for signature. Defendant's wife told Joan Simonds that 
she and her husband would sign the contract and return 
it to the office of Chapman-Hall Realty the following 
Saturday. Joan Simonds then called plaintiff Margaret 
[*1126] Chapman and told her exactly what defendant's 
wife had said. The Chapmans then refinanced their 
Massachusetts house that same day. n3 
n3 Although Joan Simonds did not have personal 
knowledge that the refinancing had occurred, her 
lack of such knowledge would not bear upon the de-
cision made by the presiding Justice. Defendant's 
brief seems to admit that such was the fact, at least 
for the purposes of the disposition of the present ap-
peal. 
Defendant filed an affidavit stating that he had not 
signed the purchase-sale document and had not signed 
either a note or memorandum as to it, and he had never 
received any portion of the purchase price and, further, 
plaintiffs never took possession of the premises or made 
any repairs to them. Defendant's affidavit also said that 
defendant lacked authority to bind his wife to a contract 
for the sale of their summer residence and that defendant 
had no knowledge that plaintiffs were refinancing their 
home on the basis of any oral negotiations. 
A separate affidavit of defendant's wife stated that she 
had not authorized defendant to make an agreement to 
sell the Bomann residence in New Harbor. 
To avoid applicability of the Statute of Frauds to the 
document signed by them and which they seek to en-
force against defendant plaintiffs invoke the equitable 
principles of estoppel in pais and part performance. 
While we conclude that plaintiffs' appeal must be sus-
tained, we reach this decision on grounds other than 
those asserted by plaintiffs. We find it unnecessary to 
reach the question whether in the instant circumstances 
the document signed by plaintiffs, but not signed by de-
fendant, should as such be directly enforceable as a con-
tract binding on defendant, despite applicability of the 
Statute of Frauds. Rather, as more fully explained here-
inafter, we decide this case by holding that the doctrine 
of promissory estoppel (as distinguished from estoppel 
in pais) applies, here, to raise genuine issues of mate-
rial fact concerning (1) whether the separate ancillary 
promise made by defendant's wife, as attributable also 
to defendant, that she and her husband would sign, and 
return, the document signed by plaintiffs became a con-
tract binding on defendant, and (2) whether, further, 
with the promise of defendant's wife being deemed a 
promise binding on defendant's wife and also defendant, 
defendant should be barred from asserting the Statute of 
Frauds to deny its enforceability. 
The doctrine currently formulated and identified by 
the label "promissory estoppel" has substantive roots in 
the law which long antecede the use of the label. It has 
often been said that promissory estoppel is the principle 
by which contract law avoids injustice through recog-
nition of a substitute for traditional consideration. See 
Williston on Contracts §§ 116, 139; Allegheny College 
v. National Chautauqua County Bank of Jamestown, 
246 N.Y. 369, 159 N.E. 173 (1927) (Cardozo, C J.). 
Another approach views promissory estoppel as a par-
ticularized formulation of estoppel functioning generally 
as an instrument utilized by equity to prevent injustice. 
Professor Ames observed that even before 1500, equity 
gave relief to a plaintiff who had incurred detriment 
on the faith of a defendant's promise. Ames, Lectures 
on Legal History at 143 (1913). See also Pomeroy's, 
Equity Jurisprudence § 808b (5th Ed. 1941). 
Several Maine cases mention that reasonable and detri-
mental reliance on the promise of another may act as a 
substitute for consideration. Although charitable sub-
scriptions have been upheld on a variety of theories, in 
Central Maine General Hospital v. Carter, 125 Me. 
381 A.2d 1123, *1126 
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191,195, 132 A. 417, 418 (1926) this Court noted: 
"It may also be true that in strict theory the sustaining 
of such promises to give cannot be upheld as a contract 
based on a valid consideration. . . However, the courts 
have sustained them as contracts in numerous instances . 
. . where the performance in part at least of the purpose 
for which the funds were subscribed or promised were 
shown, or where liabilities were incurred on the [*1127] 
strength of such promise . . . " (emphasis supplied) 
See also Can v. Bartlett, 72 Me. 120 (1881). 
In Colbath v. H. B. Stebbins Lumber Company, 127 
Me. 406, 415, 144 A. 1 (1929) this Court referred to 
promissory estoppel as distinguishable from the more 
traditionally recognized equitable doctrine of estoppel 
in pais on the ground that estoppel in pais involves the 
misrepresentation of an existing fact. Simultaneously, 
however, in Colbath the Court suggested that, absent 
traditional consideration to make a promise binding as a 
contract, promissory estoppel can serve to excuse future 
performance of a condition or obligation. 
In LaGrange v. Datsis, 142 Me. 48, 46 A. 2d 408 
(1946) this Court mentioned promissory estoppel as a 
particularized form of estoppel conceived broadly as a 
doctrine to do equity. Moreover, further language in 
LaGrange purporting to limit promissory estoppel to cir-
cumstances in which the promise involves a representa-
tion concerning the intent to abandon existing rights n4 
is only dictum. The actual decision of the case is that 
defendant in fact made no promise; hence, there was 
nothing to generate at all the applicability of promissory 
estoppel, however broadly or narrowly conceived. 
n4 Courts in other jurisdictions initially limited ap-
plication of promissory estoppel to cases involving 
promises as to the abandonment of existing rights. 
Now, however, the doctrine has become generally 
recognized as having applicability, comprehensively, 
to promises relating to the future, provided the other 
requirements of the doctrine are satisfied. See, e. g., 
Peoples National Bank v. Linebarger Construction 
Company, 219Ark. 11, 240S.W2d 12 (1951), and 
appropriate cases collected in Annots., 48A.L.R.2d 
1069 and 56A.L.R.3d 1037. 
Wfe are satisfied that the formulation of the principle 
of promissory estoppel in the Restatement of Contracts, 
§ 90, as refined in Restatement (Second) of Contracts, § 
90 (Tentative Drafts Nos. 1-7, 1973) to authorize limi-
tation of the remedy and thus acknowledge the possibil-
ity of partial enforcement, is fundamentally in harmony 
with the principles already acknowledged in the law of 
Maine. Moreover, we find compelling the reasoning in 
support of the Restatement's formulation of promissory 
estoppel and are impressed by the widespread accep-
tance of that formulation in the case law of this coun-
try. See generally, 1A Corbin, Contracts §§ 193-209 
(1963); 1 WiUiston, Contracts §§ 138-140 (3rd Ed. 
1957); Annots., 48 A.L.R.2d 1069; 115 A.LR 152; 
Boyer, Promissory Estoppel: Principle from Precedents, 
50 MiduLRev. 639, 873 (1952). 
Accordingly, we now adopt as the law of Maine the 
comprehensive formulation of the doctrine of promis-
sory estoppel set forth in § 90 of the Restatement 
(Second) of Contracts (Tentative Drafts Nos. 1-7, 
1973), reading as follows: 
"A promise which the promisor should reasonably ex-
pect to induce action or forbearance on the part of 
the promisee or a third person and which does induce 
such action or forbearance is binding if injustice can 
be avoided only by enforcement of the promise. The 
remedy granted for breach may be limited as justice re-
quires." 
With the law of Maine thus declared, it is appar-
ent that the circumstances set forth in the record raise 
several genuine issues of fact material to the question 
whether the promise made by Betsy Bomann should 
be attributable to her husband, and if so, whether that 
promise should be held binding by virtue of promissory 
estoppel. 
The affidavit of Joan Simonds discloses sufficient 
information warranting factual conclusions that when 
Betsy Bomann made her promise that she and defendant 
would sign and return the document forwarded to them, 
she should reasonably have expected that her promise 
would induce plaintiffs to act in reliance on it Betsy 
Bomann gave the promise in direct response to what 
she had been told was an inquiry being specially made 
because plaintiffs were about to undertake a substantial 
financial commitment to refinance their Massachusetts 
home in connection with their undertaking to purchase 
the Bomann's summer residence. The "substantial fi-
nancial commitment" language appearing in the affidavit 
also indicates a factual issue concerning [*1128] whether 
plaintiffs had suffered harm or detriment by relying on 
the promise. 
Despite the conclusory statement in defendant's affi-
davit concerning his wife's lack of authority to act on his 
behalf, the record reveals a genuine issue of fact on this 
question. The document containing the sale-purchase 
agreement identifies not only defendant but also his wife 
as a "seller." In his sworn answer to interrogatories John 
381 A.2d 1123, *1128 
Page 10 
LEXSEE 
C Chapman, President of Chapman-Hall Realty, stated 
that Defendant had suggested various changes to be made 
in the drafting of the document setting forth defendant's 
counter-proposal for a sale-purchase agreement with the 
plaintiffs. These circumstances would warrant a find-
ing that by participating in the drafting of the document 
defendant knew its contents, and the designation of de-
fendant's wife as well as defendant as a "seller" was 
holding out by defendant that defendant and his wife 
were acting together in selling their summer residence 
and, therefore, defendant's wife was authorized to act 
for defendant in relation to the sale. n5 
n5 It may also be noted that there is likewise a gen-
uine issue of fact as to whether there was actual, or 
apparent, authority for defendant to act on behalf of 
his wife Betsy. By her making the promise described 
in the affidavits, defendant's wife could be taken to 
have known the contents of the document she was 
promising to sign. This being so, her promise to sign 
a document designating her, as well as her husband, 
as a "seller" could be a ratification by her of her hus-
band's prior undertaking to act for her in arranging 
a contract of sale. Moreover, defendant's wife could 
be taken as acknowledging a continuing authority in 
her husband to act on her behalf in relation to selling 
their summer residence in light of one of the sworn 
answers to interrogatories in which it was asserted 
that when defendant's wife made the promise that 
she and her husband would sign the document con-
taining the sale-purchase agreement, she also stated 
that she was ". . . waiting to have Mr. Bomann 
bring the contract up to Damariscotta [the location 
of the Chapman-Hall Realty office]." 
The question remaining to be discussed, then, is 
whether, in addition to making Betsy Bomann's sepa-
rate ancillary promise binding as a contract capable of 
being attributed to defendant, promissory estoppel will 
bar defendant from asserting the Statute of Frauds to 
deny enforceability of that otherwise binding promise. 
In Lawrence v. Chase, 54 Me. 196, 200 (1866) this 
Court acknowledged, as generally accepted, the princi-
ple that a separate oral 
". . . agreement on the part of the defendant to execute 
and deliver . . . his writing obligatory to convey . . . 
certain real estate, upon certain terms and conditions . . 
. named [in said writing]", 
though not itself within the textual language of the 
Statute of Frauds, is deemed to be within the penum-
bra of the Statute'8 policy and thus becomes unenforce-
able like the underlying agreement to which it relates 
and to which the Statute of Frauds applies in terms. 
Simultaneously, however, this Court noted in Lawrence 
v. Chase that even if such would be the rule in a "suit at 
law", a court of equity could provide "remedy against 
the fraud thus attempted." (at 201) Although some au-
thorities hold to the contrary, many others agree with the 
Lawrence v. Chase statement that on principles of equity 
(among which estoppel would be included) a defendant 
may be barred from asserting the policy of the Statute 
of Frauds to deny enforceability to a separate, ancillary 
oral promise, otherwise binding, to sign as a writing an 
agreement which, lacking such signature, the Statute of 
Frauds in terms renders unenforceable. 
This limitation upon the penumbral policy applicabil-
ity of the Statute of Frauds is conceived to be a particu-
larized application of the general equitable principle that 
since it is the purpose of the Statute of Frauds to prevent 
fraud, that Statute cannot be permitted to be itself an 
instrument of fraud. Cf. Dehahn v. Innes, Me., 356 
A.2d 711 (1976); Gosselin VL Better Homes, Inc., Me*, 
256 A.2d 629 (1969). 
Comment f. to § 178 of the Restatement of Contracts 
states this principle in particular relation to the doctrine 
of estoppel, including both estoppel in pais and promis-
sory estoppel, as follows: 
[*1129] "Though there has been no satisfaction of the 
Statute, an estoppel may preclude objection on that 
ground in the same way that objection to the non-
existence of other facts essential for the establishment of 
a right or a defence may be precluded. A misrepresen-
tation that there has been such satisfaction if substantial 
action is taken in reliance on the representation, pre-
cludes proof by the party who made the representation 
that it was false; and a promise to make a memoran-
dum, if similarly relied on, may give rise to an effective 
promissory estoppel if the Statute would otherwise op-
erate to defraud." 
See also Seymour v. Oelrichs, 156 Col. 782,106 P. 88 
(1909); Alaska Airlines v. Stephenson, 15 Alaska 272, 
217 F.2d 295 (9th Cir. 1954); 21 Turtle Creek Square, 
Ltd. v. New York State Teachers' Retirement System, 
432 E2d 64 (5th Cir. 1970), cert. den. 401 U.S. 955, 
91 S. O. 975, 28L.Ea\ 2d 239 (1971). 
This principle, perceived many years ago in the gen-
eralized discussion in Lawrence v. Chase, supra, we 
now reaffirm as the law of Maine. We adopt it as it is 
formulated in Comment f. to § 178 of the Restatement 
of Contracts, above quoted. 
381 A.2d 1123, *1129 
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In further clarification of this exposition of Maine law 
we address specifically the phrase in Comment f., "if the 
Statute would otherwise operate to defraud." This does 
not contemplate that the person who makes a separate 
ancillary promise to sign, or make a sufficient memo-
randum of, an already existing agreement to which the 
Statute of Frauds applies in terms must have made the 
promise with an actual subjective intention to relinquish 
the right to assert the Statute of Frauds or with an ac-
tual intention otherwise to deceive. While the existence 
of such subjective intention would be sufficient to pre-
clude assertion of the Statute of Frauds, other circum-
stances can also be sufficient. The criterion signified 
by the words "if the Statute would otherwise operate 
to defraud" is whether all the particular circumstances 
in which the separate ancillary promise to sign or exe-
cute a sufficient memorandum is made show, objectively, 
that a fraud, or a substantial injustice tantamount to a 
fraud, would be perpetrated upon the promisee were the 
promisor allowed to assert the Statute of Frauds as a bar. 
In the present situation the affidavits sufficiently in-
dicate that the defendant's wife, as a joint tenant with 
defendant of the realty at issue, was told (1) plaintiffs 
were about to make a substantial change in their finan-
cial position in connection with the already existing oral 
agreement for the sale and purchase of the land, (2) be-
fore plaintiffs did this, they wanted to know whether 
defendant would sign the document which plaintiffs had 
already signed. Fully aware of what plaintiffs were seek-
ing, defendant's wife gave exactly the confirmation be-
ing sought, promising that she and her husband would 
sign the purchase and sale agreement as a writing and 
return it to the real estate broker involved in the trans-
action. 
These circumstances give rise to genuine issues of ma-
terial fact concerning whether defendant's wife, by con-
duct attributable also to defendant, actually intended or 
reasonably should have expected that the promise made 
would induce plaintiffs to make a substantial change in 
their financial position, a change which plaintiffs in fact 
made in reliance upon their justifiable belief that the 
absence of a writing was not to be a matter of con-
cern. In sum, the totality of the circumstances depicted 
in the record precipitate general factual issues material to 
whether it would be grossly unjust and, therefore, tanta-
mount to a fraud on the plaintiffs to allow defendant to 
assert the Statute of Frauds, by invoking the penumbral 
policy (rather than the actual terms) of the Statute, to 
bar enforceability of the separate ancillary promise for 
the making of a sufficient writing. 
If, after the requisite evidentiary hearing, it is found 
that on promissory estoppel grounds defendant is barred 
from asserting the Statute of Frauds to deny specific en-
forcement of the binding separate ancillary promise of 
defendant'8 wife, as attributable to defendant, the Court, 
as an incident of the present proceeding, [*1130] could 
order defendant to sign the document which plaintiffs 
had already signed. By defendant's compliance with that 
order, the Statute of Frauds would be rendered inappli-
cable to the principal sale-purchase agreement between 
defendant and plaintiffs, and plaintiffs would be in po-
sition to continue seeking enforcement of it as alleged 
in their complaint. See 21 Turtle Creek Square, Ltd. 
u New Ytfrk State Teachers' Retirement System, supra; 
see also enlightening discussion in Annot. 56A.LR.3d 
1037,1058-1064. n6 
no* WB previously emphasized in delineating the 
precise scope of our decision herein that we do not 
reach, or intimate opinion on, the question whether 
promissory estoppel would enable plaintiffs directly 
to enforce the oral sale-purchase agreement as such, 
notwithstanding that the Statute of Frauds applies in 
terms to that agreement. The Restatement (Second) 
of Contracts § 197 (Tentative Drafts Nos. 1-7,1973) 
has taken the position that: 
"A contract for the transfer of an interest in land may 
be specifically enforced notwithstanding failure to 
comply with the Statute of Frauds if it is established 
that the party seeking enforcement, in reasonable re-
liance on the contract and on the continuing assent of 
the party against whom enforcement is sought, has 
so changed his position that injustice can be avoided 
only by specific enforcement." 
The Comment to § 197 indicates that the sec-
tion restates the "part performance doctrine." The 
Restatement (Second) of Contracts (Tentative Drafts 
Nos. 1-7, 1973) further provides in § 217A: 
"(1) A promise which the promisor should reason-
ably expect to induce action or forbearance on the 
part of the promisee or a third person and which 
does induce the action or forbearance is enforceable 
notwithstanding the Statute of Frauds if injustice can 
be avoided only by enforcement of the promise. The 
remedy granted for breach is to be limited as justice 
requires. 
"(2) In determining whether injustice can be avoided 
only by enforcement of the promise, the following 
circumstances are significant: 
"(a) the availability and adequacy of other remedies, 
particularly cancellation and restitution; 
"(b) the definite and substantial character of the ac-
381 A.2d 1123, *1130 
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tion or forbearance in relation to the remedy sought; 
"(c) the extent to which the action or forbearance 
corroborates evidence of the making and terms of 
the promise, or the making and terms are otherwise 
established by clear and convincing evidence; 
"(d) the reasonableness of the action or forbearance; 
"(e) the extent to which the action or forbearance 
was foreseeable by the promisor." 
See also Comment to said § 217A. 
Estoppel in pais and part performance have been 
invoked in many cases to allow enforceability of a 
contract, despite textual applicability of the Statute 
of Frauds, where there was a misrepresentation of an 
existing fact or a part performance constituted by acts 
specifically referable to such contract. See Green v. 
Jones, 76 Me. 563 (1885); Woodbury v. Gardner, 
77 Me. 68 (1885); McGuire v. Murray, 107 Me. 
108, 77 A. 692 (1910); Berman v. Griggs, 145 Me. 
258, 75 A. 2d 365 (1950); Busque v. Marcou, 147 
Me. 2S9,86A.2d 873 (1952). Yet, at this time 
we refrain from deciding whether we should adopt 
the broad formulation of principle, as including also 
promissory estoppel, contained in the Restatement 
(Second) of Contracts §§ 197 and 217A (Tentative 
Drafts Nos. 1-7, 1973). Indeed, before we could 
so decide, we should be obliged to analyze the pol-
icy considerations seeming to underlie LaFlamme v. 
Hoffman, 148 Me. 444, 95 A. 2d 802 (1953). 
The entry is: 
Appeal sustained; judgment for defendant set aside; 
remanded to the Superior Court for further proceedings 
consistent with the opinion herein. 
DELAHANTY, J., sat at argument and conference but 
did not otherwise participate. 
DUFRESNE, A. R. J., sat at oral argument as Chief 
Justice, but retired prior to the preparation of the opin-
ion. He hasjoined the opinion as Active Retired Justice. 
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OPINION: [*715] OPINION 
Coastal Corporation and its wholly-owned subsidiary, 
ANR Pipe Line Company, appeal from take-nothing 
summary judgments in a suit for breach of an oral con-
tract to buy securities, tortious interference with business 
relations, and fraud. The essential issue is the existence 
of a valid contract. The trial court's judgment is af-
firmed. 
Tecumseh Pipe Line Company owns and operates an 
interstate crude oil pipeline lying between Indiana and 
Ohio. Arco, [*716] Ashland, and Unocal, appellees 
here, own 100 percent of Tecumseh's capital stock: Arco 
and Unocal [**2] own 40 percent each, while Ashland 
owns the remaining 20 percent. The owners decided 
to sell Tecumseh's capital stock in 1987, soliciting bids 
from various companies, including Coastal. Coastal of-
fered the highest bid and presented a draft stock pur-
chase agreement to the owners. The parties began ne-
gotiations. After a negotiating session on August 13, 
1987, the parties had agreed upon several substantive 
changes and reached what they believed to be a "hand-
shake" agreement on the essential and material terms of 
the transaction. The owners agreed to reduce this to 
writing. Coastal contends that the resulting document, 
sent shortly after the August 13th negotiations, "memo-
rialized" the parties' agreement. Coastal presumed to 
have a contract with the owners to purchase 100% of 
their Tecumseh stock. 
This agreement included Coastal's pledge to acquire 
Tecumseh's pipeline as an operating crude oil pipeline, 
and its assumption of responsibility for converting the 
line to natural gas service. Shortly thereafter, Coastal 
began discussing the potential affects of this transaction 
with Laketon Refining Corporation. Laketon's refinery 
was located along the Tecumseh pipeline and was de-
pendent [**3] upon Tecumseh for crude oil. Laketon 
told Coastal that it had a substantial claim against Arco, 
as the current operator of that line, for continued crude 
oil service. Laketon threatened to do everything in its 
power to halt a conversion of the pipeline from a carrier 
of crude oil to natural gas. 
As a result, Coastal informed Arco and the other sell-
ers that it would only proceed with the Tecumseh stock 
sale agreement if the sellers would indemnify Coastal 
for Laketon's claims. Coastal contended that under the 
parties' agreement, it was liable only for the expenses of 
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dealing with the regulatory authorities and participating 
in the necessary litigation to receive permits and permis-
sion to convert the line to, and operate it as, a natural gas 
line. Arco disagreed, stating that under the post-August 
13th agreement, Coastal had agreed to assume all risks 
and liabilities with regard to conversion of the pipeline. 
Arco refused to assume any potential liability incurred 
as a result of Laketon's actions. The pipeline was not 
sold to Coastal. 
Coastal sued Arco, Ashland, and Unocal for breach of 
contract, sued Arco for tortious interference with busi-
ness relations, and sued both Arco [**4] and Tecumseh 
for fraud. Coastal's theory of the case was that a valid 
contract for the sale of the pipeline had been entered into. 
Unocal moved for summary judgment on the grounds 
that it did not breach the purported contract, fully in-
tending at all times to consummate the agreement. The 
trial court granted Unocal's motion. The court then 
broadly entered summary judgment on behalf of Arco, 
Ashland, and Tecumseh. 
By its first point of error, Coastal contends that the 
August 13th agreement between the parties constituted 
a valid, enforceable contract for the sale of Tecumseh's 
stock. Coastal asserts that on August 13th "we came to 
absolute agreement on the essential terms. Vlfe got up 
and shook hands and hugged each other. . . . " The 
parties agreed, among other things, that Coastal would 
pay $ 17.1 million for 100% of lecumseh's stock. The 
parties also negotiated environmental liability, agreeing 
that the owners would maintain possession of a terminal 
that was particularly problematic, that Coastal, rather 
than the owners, would be responsible for converting 
the pipeline from crude oil to natural gas, that Coastal 
would be responsible for finding a solution for the poten-
tial [**5] conflicts with Laketon, and that specified oil 
inventory and working capital adjustments would apply. 
The primary issue is whether an enforceable contract 
exists. Appellees contend that one does not, relying 
upon section 8.319 of the Business and Commerce Code, 
entitled "Statute of Frauds," which provides, in pertinent 
part, 
A contract for the sale of securities is not enforceable 
by way of action or defense unless: 
[•717] (1) there is some writing signed 'by the party 
against whom enforcement is sought . . . sufficient 
to indicate that a contract has been made for sale of a 
stated quantity of described securities at a defined or 
stated price; * * * 
TEX. BUS. & COM. CODE ANN. § 8.319 (Vernon 
1991). 
It is uncontroverted that the subject of this alleged con-
tract is the sale of securities, as that term is defined by 
section 8.102(a) of the Business and Commerce Code. 
The transaction is therefore governed by section 8.319, 
which requires a writing indicating that a contract has 
been made and signed by the party against whom it is 
sought to be enforced. Coastal, although alleging an 
oral contract, relies upon a post-August 13th writing 
that "memorializes" the agreement. That writing [**6] 
contains a provision expressly stating that execution of 
the agreement is required in order for it to be binding 
on the parties. That section provides, 
19. Entire Agreement; Execution Required 
This Agreement and the documents to be delivered 
pursuant hereto supersedes all prior negotiations, con-
stitutes the entire agreement between the parties and can 
be amended only by written agreement signed by the par-
ties. Nothing in this Agreement shall be binding upon 
any of the parties until this Agreement is executed by all 
of the parties by their duly authorized officers. 
Coastal contends that this provision was arbitrarily 
added to the agreement by the owners and was not agreed 
to by Coastal itself; therefore, the provision should not 
be binding on Coastal and should not operate to place 
the agreement outside the statute of frauds. 
Coastal itself, in its May 15th, 1987 letter to the presi-
dent of Tecumseh Pipe Line Co., stated that it offered to 
buy all of the issued and outstanding shares of the capital 
stock of Tecumseh "subject to the negotiation, prepara-
tion and execution of a definitive purchase agreement 
in form and substance satisfactory to the Owners and 
Coastal setting [**7] forth the terms provided herein 
and such further terms and conditions as are reasonable 
and customary in a transaction of the type contemplated 
hereby." Coastal refers repeatedly to the "execution of 
the Purchase Agreement" in its purchase offer. 
Moreover, Coastal asserted below and on appeal that 
the post-August 13th draft at issue memorializes the par-
ties' agreement. When a party relies upon a memoran-
dum of a contract, it cannot disregard unfavorable pro-
visions. See Hall v. Hall, 158 Tex. 95, 308 S. W.2d 12, 
17 (Tex. 1957). Coastal cannot therefore assert reliance 
upon, and the validity of, the document in all respects 
save for the execution requirement. 
Coastal contends in the alternative that TEX. BUS. & 
COM. CODE ANN. § 8.319(4) (Vernon 1991) applies 
to establish this agreement within the statute of frauds. 
Section 8.319(4) provides, 
(4) The party against whom enforcement is sought ad-
mits in his pleading, testimony, or otherwise in court 
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that a contract was made for sale of a stated quantity of 
described securities at a defined or stated price. 
This section requires an admission that a contract was 
made. While all of the parties do concede that [**8] 
they reached agreement on particular issues, it is clear 
that the owners did not consider themselves to have a 
contract. The document memorializing the agreement 
expressly required that it be executed. The owners were 
aware of this; in fact, it is Coastal's contention that the 
owners inserted the execution provision of their own 
accord. Coastal mistakes agreements during the nego-
tiation process with a binding contract. No owner has 
admitted executing a contract with Coastal. 
Coastal failed to raise any evidence to preclude the 
granting of summary judgment in favor of Arco and 
Ashland on the basis of the statute of frauds. Coastal 
was unable to direct this court's attention to any docu-
ment or series of documents, or to any admissions by 
the owners, that showed a final agreement between the 
parties. All documents and admissions referred back to 
[*718] the post-August 13th writing as either a draft or 
a tentative agreement. Necessary exhibits had yet to be 
attached. Moreover, that document contained an execu-
tion provision that was never complied with. Point one 
is overruled. 
By points of error two and three, Coastal contends that 
the doctrine of promissory estoppel precludes appellees 
[**9] from asserting the statute of frauds. In order to 
avoid summary judgment, the burden lay on Coastal to 
present summary judgment proof raising a fact issue on 
its promissory estoppel defense to the statute of frauds. 
"Moore" Burger, Inc. v. Phillips Petroleum Co., 492 
S.W2d 934, 936-37 (Tex. 1972); Cobb v. Vkst Texas 
Microwave Co., 700 S.W.2d 615, 616 (Tex. App.-
Austin 1985, writ ref d n.r.e.). The promissory estoppel 
doctrine provides that when a party makes a promise and 
reasonably expects the promisee to rely on that promise 
by acting or refraining from acting in some manner, in 
order to avoid injustice, the promise is binding against 
thepromissor. "Moore" Burger, 492S.W2dat 938; see 
also Fretz Constr. Co. v. Southern Nat'I Bank, 626 
S.W.2d 478, 480 (Tkx. 1981). 
Coastal contends that it satisfied its burden to raise 
a fact issue with regard to promissory estoppel via the 
affidavit of Mike Morris, Director and Executive Vice 
President of ANR at the time of the August, 1987 nego-
tiations. Morris stated that, 
When we reached agreement on the essential terms 
[*+10] and conditions of the transaction, the represen-
tatives of the Owners and I shook hands. The Owners 
agreed and promised to sign a written agreement fully 
reflecting our handshake deal. 
Promissory estoppel is allowed as an exception to 
the statute of frauds only when the enforcement of the 
statute would plainly amount to fraud. Nagle v. Nagle, 
633 S.W2d 796, 799 (Tex. 1982) (quoting Hooks v. 
Bridgewater, lllTex. 122, 229 S.W 1114 (Hex. 1921)). 
Moreover, in contract cases, the determinative promise 
is limited to the promise to sign a prepared written agree-
ment that complies with the statute of frauds. Nagle, 633 
S.W.24 at 800; "Moore" Burger, 492 S.W.2d at 940; 
Cooper Petroleum Co. v. La Gloria Oil <& Gas Co., 
436 S.W.24 889, 896 (Tkx. 1969). The Texas Supreme 
Court in "Moore" Burger emphasized the limited appli-
cation of promissory estoppel to statute of frauds claims 
in its opinion on rehearing in the case. It then reiterated 
this instruction in Nagle. A complete agreement on the 
terms and wording of the written contract is required 
to permit [**11] the application of promissory estoppel 
to a statute of frauds defense. "Moore" Burger, 492 
S.W.2d at 436; H. Molsen &Co. v. Hicks, 550 S.W2d 
354, 356 (Tex. Civ. App.-El Paso 1977, writ ref d 
n.r.e.); Baddy v. Gray, 497S. W.2d 600, 605 (Tex. Civ. 
App.-Amarillo 1973, writ ref d n.r.e.). 
Promissory estoppel is applied when a party promises 
to sign an existing written contract that would satisfy 
the statute of frauds (but for the lack of a signature). 
When a document remains to be prepared, as in this 
case, all of the terms must ultimately be agreed to in 
writing. H. Molsen, 550 S. W.2d at 356. In H. Molsen, 
the record showed that the parties negotiated and a writ-
ten document was prepared, but changes were yet to be 
made in the document and the sellers' attorney had to 
approve the contract before it could be executed. The 
Court held that although the written document memori-
alizing the agreement was not in evidence, "whatever its 
terms were, there was no meeting of the minds as to the 
final terms and no acceptance by the [sellers] of the writ-
ings. " [**12] Id. at 356 (emphasis added). Promissory 
estoppel was not established to bar the application of the 
statute of frauds in that case. Id. at 356. 
In Southmark Corp. v. Life Investors, Inc., nl the 
Fifth Circuit applied Texas law to a case strikingly simi-
lar to the (meat bar. In that case, a prospective stock pur-
chaser brought suit against the seller of the stock as well 
as the party who ultimately purchased that stock, alleg-
ing, among other things, breach of contract. Southmark, 
the [*719] buyer, contended that it had an oral agree-
ment with Life Investors to purchase some $ 63 million 
worth of stock. Life Investors countered with a statute of 
frauds defense, and Southmark replied that promissory 
estoppel would bar the use of that defense. Southmark 
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introduced the affidavits of two of its vice-presidents, 
who stated that Life representatives told them an agree-
ment had been reached and that Life would execute final 
documents evidencing the agreement. Southmark con-
tended that these affidavits raised a fact issue regarding 
promissory estoppel. 
nl 851 E2d 763 (5th Cir. 1988). 
[**13] 
The Fifth Circuit relied upon Texas decisions such as 
"Moore" Burger, Nagle, and Consolidated Petroleum to 
limit the applicability of promissory estoppel to cases 
in which a party promised to sign a written agreement 
that had already been prepared and that would satisfy the 
statute of frauds. The Court's rationale is particularly 
instructive in this case. The Court found, 
at most the parties contemplated final documents that 
were to be prepared and approved sometime in the fu-
ture. But in a transaction involving the sale of a con-
trolling share of the stock of an ongoing business at a 
purchase price in the tens of millions of dollars . . 
. there is certainly an expectation on both sides that 
documents will be prepared once the parties reach an 
agreement. We cannot say that . . . justice requires 
the enforcement of an oral promise to reduce the agree-
ment to writing or to execute final documents at a later 
time, especially where, as here, it does not appear that 
the parties had even worked out the final details of the 
alleged transaction. 
Southmark, 851 F.2d at 769. The Court found that the 
statute of frauds would be rendered [**14] meaning-
less if promissory estoppel were applied to situations 
in which parties acknowledge agreement and the need 
to convert that agreement into writing, especially when 
the wording of the document has yet to be agreed upon. 
The Court concluded by finding, pursuant to Texas law, 
that proof of either an existing written document, or an 
agreement on the wording of that document, is required 
to raise a fact issue of promissory estoppel. Id. 
As explained by Coastal in its appellate brief, on 
August 13, the parties agreed to such complex mat-
ters as: 1) environmental liability, particularly the own-
ers' retention of an environmentally risky terminal, 2) 
Coastal's responsibility for conversion of the pipeline 
from crude oil to natural gas, 3) Coastal's responsibility 
for dealing with Laketon's reaction to the conversion of 
the crude lines to gas lines, and 4) specified oil inven-
tory adjustments and working capital adjustments. In a 
complex securities purchase agreement, the wording of 
terms such as these is not generally established by mere 
verbal agreement. The written memorial of that August 
13 negotiation was only tentative and the writing was 
a draft. Promissory estoppel cannot [**15] be used to 
avoid the statute of frauds in a case in which the parties 
were clearly still negotiating the final wording of their 
binding contract. Accordingly, because the agreement 
made between Coastal and the owners on August 13, 
1987, was not an agreement regarding either an exist-
ing, already-prepared document, or an agreement on the 
precise wording of that document, Texas jurisprudence 
expressly prohibits the application of promissory estop-
pel to this case. Points two and three are overruled. 
By point of error four, Coastal contends that the trial 
court erred by granting summary judgment in favor of 
Arco on Coastal's tortious interference claim. Coastal 
maintained that Arco's refusal to close the security pur-
chase agreement interfered with Coastal's business re-
lationships and agreements with Unocal and Ashland. 
Arco alleged in its motion for summary judgment that 
because it was a party to the transaction, it could not 
interfere with its own relationship or contract. In the 
alternative, Arco averred that it was privileged to refuse 
Coastal's terms for sale. 
Interference with a prospective contract or business re-
lationship consists of several elements. These include: 
1) a [**16] reasonable probability that the parties would 
have entered into a contractual relationship, 2) an in-
tentional and malicious act [*720] by the defendant that 
prevented the relationship from occurring 3) with the 
purpose of harming the plaintiff, 4) the defendant lacked 
the privilege or justification to do the act, and 5) ac-
tual harm or damage resulted from the defendant's in-
terference. Exxon Corp. v. Alls up, 808 S.W.2d 648, 
659 (Tex. App. -Corpus Christi 1991, writ denied); 
GiUum v. Republic Health Corp., 778 S. W.2d 558, 565 
(Ifex. App. -Dallas 1989, no writ). However, Texas 
Courts have held that one cannot tortiously interfere with 
his own contract. Schoellkopf v. Pledger, 778 S.W.2d 
897, 902 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1989, writ denied); Frost 
Nat'l Bank u Matthews, 713 S.W.ld 365, 369 (Tex. 
App.-Texarkana 1986, writ ref d n.r.e.). "Liability for 
tortious interference is founded only on the acts of an 
interfering third party." Schoellkopf, 778S.W2dat902 
(citing J. Edgar & J. Sales, Texas Torts and Remedies 
§ 46.02[4][e] (1988)). In Matthews, [**17] an oil and 
gas case, the court held that because Matthews and the 
other litigants were all parties to the oil and gas lease 
at issue, Matthews could not have tortiously interfered 
with his own lease contract as alleged. Id. at 369. This 
Court, too, has held that intentional interference with a 
contract requires the act of a third party, not a party to 
the contract Rural De*, Inc. v. Stone, 700 S.W2d 
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661, 667 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi 1985, writ ref d 
n.r.e.). We reasoned that when one of the parties to the 
contract interferes with it, the action is one for breach of 
contract. Stone, 700 S. W2d at 667. Arco, as a party to 
the agreement, could not have tortiously interfered with 
its own agreement. Point of error four is overruled. 
By point of error five, Coastal alleges that Tecumseh 
and Arco committed fraud when inducing Coastal to en-
ter into this contract. 
Coastal bases its entire fraud argument on the pre-
sumption that a contract was created between the par-
ties. However, no binding contract existed. A finding 
of fraud requires proof that a party believed a deceitful 
representation and, relying on it, contracted [**18] or 
acted to its detriment. Thrower v. Brownlee, 12 S.W.2d 
184, 186 (Tex. Comm. App. 1929). 
Where false representations or promises' are made to 
induce another to act, and, before such other does act, he 
learns of the falsity of such representations or promises, 
it cannot of course be said that he relied upon them be-
lieving them to be true, for, knowing their falsity, he has 
not been deceived. 
Thrower, 12 S.W.2d 184 at 186 at 186-87. The Court 
qualified this rule, limiting its application only to cases 
in which the complaining party had not changed its po-
sition for the worse. Ia\ at 187. The rule will not 
be applied when the contract is more than merely ex-
ecutory, that is, when the contract has been partly or 
wholly performed to such an extent that the complain-
ing party could not have fully protected itself. Id. at 
187. Similarly, the Texas Supreme Court has held that 
reliance on a representation that results in entry into 
an obligation is actionable. Trenholm v. Ratcliff, 646 
S.W.2d927f 931 (Tex. 1983). 
Coastal contends that at the [**19] time of the August 
13 agreement, they believed they were obligated to per-
form under the agreement. This subjective feeling of 
obligation is not the type recognized by Texas Courts. At 
the time Coastal learned of Arco's alleged misrepresenta-
tions, no binding agreement existed between the parties 
at that time or at any other; they were still in the process 
of negotiating the final stock purchase agreement That 
agreement had to be executed by the parties in order 
that it have a legally obligatory affect on Coastal. That 
execution never occurred. Therefore, Coastal met with 
Laketon agents of its own accord—it was not required to 
do so under any established contract. Having learned 
of the fraud during those meetings in September; 1987, 
any further actions taken by Coastal in furtherance of 
the agreement were taken with full knowledge of Arco's 
representations. Equally important, those actions, too, 
were not required under any binding contract between 
the parties. Coastal is unable to show that it assumed an 
obligation or entered into more than a mere executory 
contract with Arco in reliance upon Arco's representa-
tions. Moreover, [*721] any refusal to pursue alternative 
acquisitions [**20] cannot be deemed forbearance as a 
result of fraudulent representations. In September; upon 
learning of Laketon's claims, Coastal could well have 
terminated all negotiations with the owners and pursued 
other options. Rather, Coastal chose to continue negoti-
ating with a party it later accused of committing fraud. 
The trial court properly granted summary judgment in 
favor of Arco on Coastal's fraud claim against i t 
Coastal also alleged that Tecumseh committed fraud 
because Arco was Tecumseh's agent, and thefefore if 
the agent committed fraud, then Tecumseh, as its prin-
cipal, was liable for the acts of its agent. Because Arco 
committed no fraudulent acts, any similar claim against 
Tecumseh must fail as well. Point of error five is over-
ruled. 
All issues necessary to the disposition of this appeal 
haven been addressed. See TEX. R. APP. P. 90(a). 
The trial court's judgment is AFFIRMED. 
J. BONNER DORSEY 
Justice 
Opinion ordered delivered and filed 
this the 15th day of April, 1993. 
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[*150] BARFIELD, J. 
Roger Collier appeals from a summary judgment 
against him as plaintiff in a suit for breach of contract 
and unpaid wages, the trial court having determined that 
his claim for money damages is barred by the statute 
of frauds. With regard to the breach of contract claim, 
the record before us demonstrates a factual dispute as to 
whether the agreement at issue is one "that is not to be 
performed within the space of one year from the making 
thereof," so as to make applicable the provision of sec-
tion 72S.01, Florida Statutes, nl that "no action shall be 
brought" unless the agreement is in writing and signed 
by the party to be charged. We therefore reverse the 
summary judgment on the breach of contract claim and 
[**2] remand for further proceedings. 
nl 725.01 Promise to pay another's debt, etc.-
No action shaU be brought whereby to charge any 
executor or administrator upon any special promise 
to answer or pay any debt or damages out of his own 
estate, or whereby to charge the defendant upon any 
special promise to answer for the debt, default or 
miscarriage of another person or to charge any per-
son upon any agreement made upon consideration of 
marriage, or upon any contract for the sale of lands, 
tenements or hereditaments, or of any uncertain in-
terest in or concerning them, or for any lease thereof 
for a period longer than 1 year, or upon any agree-
ment that is not to be performed within the space of 1 
year from the making thereof, or whereby to charge 
any health care provider upon any guarantee, war-
ranty, or assurance as to the results of any medical, 
surgical, or diagnostic procedure performed by any 
physician licensed under chapter 458, osteopath li-
censed under chapter 459, chiropractor licensed un-
der chapter 460, podiatrist licensed under chapter 
461, or dentist licensed under chapter 466, unless the 
agreement or promise upon which such action shaU 
be brought, or some note or memorandum thereof 
shall be in writing and signed by the party to be 
charged therewith or by some other person by him 
thereunto lawfuUy authorized. 
[**3] 
In November 1989, Collier filed an amended com-
plaint against BoUing Brooks, aUeging that the two of 
them had entered into an agreement in January 1986 
for Collier to be general manager of Brooks' business, 
Jones Motor Company, in Graceville. According to the 
allegations of the complaint, the parties agreed that if 
Collier were successful in "reversing the decline" in the 
company's business, he would receive twenty-five per 
cent ownership in the company, and that under his man-
agement business did improve. The complaint further 
alleged that after Collier "had fully performed and suc-
cessfully accomplished the goals specified in the afore-
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mentioned contract," Brooks "refused to transfer any 
ownership whatsoever" to him, and sought damages for 
breach of contract and unpaid wages. 
Brooks filed a motion for summary judgment, al-
leging that Collier was suing the [*151] wrong de-
fendant because his verbal agreement was with Jones 
Motor Company, not with Brooks, and asserting that 
any claims were barred by the Statute of Frauds, sec-
tion 725.01, Florida Statutes. Attached to the motion 
for summary judgment was an affidavit in which Brooks 
swore that Jones Motor Company is a corporation with 
several [**4] stockholders, that Collier was paid $ 450 
per week plus ten per cent of the net profit, and that 
the parties had agreed that after January 1987, if the 
company had profited under Collier's management, he 
would be given the opportunity to purchase capital stock 
from the stockholders, the amount and the price to be 
negotiated at that time. Brooks further swore that at 
no time during Collier's management did the company 
make a profit, and that by the express terms of the agree-
ment, Collier's purchase of stock could not have been 
accomplished within one year. 
Collier filed an affidavit in opposition to the motion, 
stating that in January 1986, "Boiling Brooks personally 
obligated himself to provide delivery of a portion of my 
payment for services rendered, to wit, 25% ownership 
of Jones Motor Company, contingent upon a reversal of 
a decline in business." Collier swore that at the time they 
entered into the agreement, Brooks represented that he 
owned fifty-one per cent of the stock in the company, and 
that the obligations under the contract "could have been, 
and were to have been, performed within one year." 
The depositions of the parties indicated that Brooks 
was president of Jones Motor [**5] Company until the 
assets were sold in May 1989. Brooks testified that in 
January 1986, he and Collier agreed that Collier would 
come to work for the company as general manager, mak-
ing $ 425 per week and ten per cent commission on the 
departments which were making money, and that "after 
a years (sic) employment if he had turned the business 
around and was making money then he would be of-
fered to buy stock in Jones Motor Company, the amount 
and the price to be decided at that time." Brooks testified 
that, at the time of the agreement, he held twenty-five per 
cent of the company stock, A.D. Williams held twenty-
five per cent, and the remainder was owned by several 
relatives. He also testified that the company had been 
losing money for the five years prior to the agreement, 
and that it lost money in each of the ensuing three years. 
Collier testified in his deposition that he was employed 
by Brooks "representing Jones Motor Company," that he 
was paid in cash every week "by Jones Motor Company 
and Boiling Brooks," and that he had a verbal agreement 
with Brooks representing Jones Motor Company. When 
asked about Brooks' affidavit, Collier stated: 
A. Mr. Brooks and I made a deal him representing [**6] 
Jones Motor Company of $ 450 per week plus 10 per-
cent, plus several other things that aren't mentioned in 
this paragraph. I have a disagreement with that para-
graph. 
Q. With what do you disagree in that paragraph? 
A. He offered me 25 percent of the business to come in 
there, he told me I could buy up the other 25 percent 
from Mr. A.D. Williams that he had 25 percent of the 
stock. He also said I could have two demos, and pay 
all my health insurance which I've already beat him in 
court on that. 
Collier testified that he was supposed to get the twenty-
five per cent of the business "within the first year" 
without payment of anything, even if the company lost 
money, and that Brooks told him he owned fifty-one per 
cent of the stock. 
The trial judge issued an order granting the motion for 
summary judgment as to the wage claim, and denying it 
as to the breach of contract claim. Brooks filed an an-
swer denying all the allegations of the complaint except 
that Collier was employed as general manager of Jones 
Motor Company, and raising as affirmative defenses that 
Brooks was not personally liable because the agreement 
was between Collier and Jones Motor Company and that 
the suit [**7] was barred by the statute of frauds. He 
counter-claimed against Collier on behalf of the stock-
holders of the company, alleging that if Collier were 
determined to be entitled to twenty-five per cent of 
the stock, then Collier would be legally obligated for 
twenty-five per cent of the [*152] losses the company 
had sustained since January 1986. 
Collier denied the affirmative defenses and counter-
claim, and filed a motion for judgment on the pleadings 
of the counter-claim. He also filed the affidavit of Bill 
Bell, an employee of Jones Motor Company from July 
1987 to October 1988, who swore that Collier had said 
that he would be part owner of the dealership, and that 
Brooks had confirmed the fact. 
Brooks filed a renewed motion for summary judgment, 
asserting that the only way to transfer an ownership 
interest in a corporation is by the exchange of securi-
ties or capital stock in the corporation, and that section 
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678.319, Florida Statutes, n2 provides that a contract 
for sale of securities is not enforceable unless in writ-
ing. At the hearing on the motion, Collier argued that 
even if the statute of frauds applied, the doctrine of part 
performance took the agreement out of the operation of 
the statute, [**8] citing a decision of the Fourth District 
Court of Appeal, Leavitt v. Garson. n3 Brooks cited 
a federal decision from the Eleventh Circuit Court of 
Appeal, Dwight v. Tobin, n4 for the proposition [*153] 
that under Florida law, the doctrine of part performance 
does not remove a contract from the statute of frauds for 
the purpose of seeking money damages, but would re-
move it in an equitable action for specific performance. 
The trial court's order stated: 
. . . it would appear that the Defendant is entitled to a 
judgment as a matter of law in that Plaintiffs claim is 
barred by the Statute of Frauds. 
Plaintiffs counsel, while not conceding the applica-
bility of Florida Statutes § 678.319, contended that if 
applicable, part or full performance by Plaintiff removed 
the parties' agreement from the Statute of Frauds. 
Assuming for the purpose of the Defendant's motion 
that Plaintiff had fully performed his part of the bargain, 
under Florida law, the doctrine of part performance is not 
available in an action solely for damages at law. Since 
by Plaintiffs Amended Complaint no equitable .relief is 
sought, a judgment for damages is the only relief sought 
and the position of the [*+9] Plaintiff is not well taken. 
See Dwight v. Tobin, 5 FLW Fed. C1818 and the cases 
cited therein. 
We reject the reasoning of the trial court and the ar-
guments of the parties on appeal nS to the extent they 
are predicated on the application of section 678.319 to 
this case, which involves an employment agreement, not 
a contract for the sale of investment securities under 
the Florida version of the Uniform Commercial Code. 
Having extensively reviewed the history of the Statute of 
Frauds from its enactment in England in the seventeenth 
century, including the various forms adopted by the in-
dividual states and the interpretations placed upon them 
by their respective jurisdictions, we find that we must 
reject Collier's arguments to the extent they rely on the 
doctrines of "part performance'' and "full performance" 
as removing the agreement from the operation of section 
725.01, Florida Statutes. n6 
n2 678.319 Statute of frauds.-A contract for the 
sale of securities is not enforceable by way of action 
or defense unless: 
(1) There is some writing signed by the party 
against whom enforcement is sought or by his au-
thorized agent or broker, sufficient to indicate that a 
contract has been made for sale of a stated quantity 
of described securities at a defined or stated price; 
(2) Delivery of a certificated security or transfer 
instruction has been accepted, or transfer of an uncer-
tificated security has been registered and the trans-
feree has failed to send a written objection to the 
issuer within 10 days after 
receipt of the initial transaction statement confirming 
the registration, or payment has been made, but the 
contract is enforceable under this provision only to 
the extent of the delivery, registration, or payment; 
(3) Within a reasonable time a writing in confir-
mation of the sale or purchase and sufficient against 
the sender under subsection (1) has been received by 
the party against whom enforcement is sought and 
he has failed to send written objection to its contents 
within 10 days after its receipt; or 
(4) The party against whom enforcement is sought 
admits in his pleading, testimony, or otherwise in 
court that a contract was made for the sale of a stated 
quantity of described securities at a defined or stated 
price. 
[••10] 
n3 525 So. 2d 108 (Fla. 4th DCA 1988). In 
that case, the court reversed a summary judgment 
for the appellee because it found that there was a 
factual dispute regarding whether the appellee had 
paid the appellant's decedent $ 7000 for 100,000 
shares of stock in AGA of America. The appellee 
had sought specific performance and damages for 
breach of contract and fraud, alleging that the trans-
action was memorialized in a letter attached to the 
complaint. The appellant had denied that there was 
a contract between the parties. The court also re-
versed the denial of the appellant's motion to amend 
its answer to include the affirmative defense of the 
statute of frauds, noting the appellee's contention 
"that since he paid $ 7,000 as consideration for the 
stock, section 678.319 would not have been a valid 
defense to his claim," but observing that "if a trier 
of fact were to determine that appellee did not pay 
the $ 7,000, then section 678.319 would be a valid 
defense." Id. as 111. 
n4 947F.2d 455 (11th Cir. 1991). That case in-
volved in part a suit by one partner against the other 
for breach of a partnership agreement. The district 
court had agreed with the defendant partner that the 
Florida statute of frauds applied to the alleged part-
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nership agreement, but held that the doctrine of part 
performance removed the statute of frauds barrier. 
The Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals found that 
the statute of frauds did apply to the agreement, but 
reversed the district court's ruling that the doctrine 
of part performance removed the contract from the 
operation of the statute of frauds, citing Elsberry v. 
Sexton, 61 Fla. 162, 54 So. 592 (1911), in which 
the Florida Supreme Court unequivocally held that 
part performance is an equitable doctrine and is not 
available in actions for damages at law. 
The court noted that the plaintiff partner had cited 
"a handful of cases in which Florida District Courts 
of Appeal have failed to apply this rule," but stated, 
"we do not believe that these cases signal a change 
in the otherwise settled law of the state." 947E2d 
at 459. It noted that in three of the four cases cited, 
the court "seemed unaware of the equity limitation." 
Id. It pointed out that the fourth case was an action 
brought under the Florida version of the Uniform 
Commercial Code, in which the court specifically 
relied on special provisions for the applicability of 
partial payment in the Florida Uniform Commercial 
Code statute of frauds, and found that the case "in no 
way stands for the more general proposition that par-
tial performance is available in all actions for dam-
ages. "Id. at 60. 
The court observed that other decisions of the 
Florida district courts of appeal "indicate that the 
venerable rule established in Elsberry v. Sexton over 
eighty years ago remains alive and well" and con-
cluded that "until the Florida Supreme Court shows 
some definitive indication that it intends to change 
the rule limiting partial performance to actions in 
equity, we must follow this rule." Id. 
[**H] 
n5 Collier argues that summary judgment was im-
proper because the "well established exception to the 
statute of frauds for contracts in which one party has 
performed" applies to section 678.319, and that the 
trial court's application of an "exception to this ex-
ception" for actions at law as opposed to equity was 
error. He relies on Evans v. Parker, 440 So. 2d 
640 (Fla. 1st DCA 1983), an action for damages in 
which this court held that "it is axiomatic that par-
tial performance of an oral contract removes such 
contract from the statute of frauds." This case was 
discussed in Dwight v. Tobin, where the federal 
court observed: 
While one Florida district court of appeals may have 
neglected to apply the equity rule at the time the 
court decided Evans, see Bertram Yacht Sales, Inc. 
v. West, 209 So. 2d 677 (Fla.Dist.Ct.App. 1968), 
one could hardly say that it was "axiomatic" that par-
tial performance would remove the statute of frauds 
bar to an action at law. It simply appears that this 
point was neither raised nor argued before the court. 
947 E2d at 459-60. Collier contends that the trial 
court erred in ruling that the doctrine of part perfor-
mance is not available in an action solely for dam-
ages, noting the "modern trend to abolish the artifi-
cial distinctions between equity and law to focus on 
the substance of the issue." 
Alternatively, Collier asserts that he fully per-
formed his part of the contract, so that "part perfor-
mance" is not involved here. He argues that section 
678.319 "requires a writing to enforce a contract for 
sale of securities unless there is a written confirma-
tion which is not objected to or payment has been 
made," notes that the statute makes no distinction 
between law and equity, and asserts that he made 
payment for his stock by commencing and maintain-
ing his employment with Jones Motor Company. 
Brooks asserts that Collier's action has always 
been for breach of contract and money damages, and 
that Collier consciously decided not to pursue an eq-
uitable remedy of specific performance. He argues 
that it is clear from Collier's affidavit that delivery 
of part ownership in the business was "contingent 
upon a reversal of a decline in the business," that the 
parties never defined the period of time for which 
this "reversal" was to take place, and that Bell's af-
fidavit makes it clear that the contingencies of the 
verbal agreement had not been fulfilled over a year 
and a half after Collier went to work for the company. 
n6 See footnote 5. 
The English statute enacted in 1676, entitled "An Act 
for the Prevention of Frauds and Perjuries," declared 
that certain types of oral promises or agreements would 
not be enforceable. n7 Included was "any agreement 
that is not to be performed within one year [*154] of the 
making thereof." n8 Most American statutes of frauds 
follow the English statute in enumerating the classes of 
contracts required to be evidenced in writing in order 
to be enforceable, with some variations of wording. n9 
Some jurisdictions tend toward restricting the operation 
of the statute by rigid construction, freely admitting and 
extending exceptions and distinctions supporting the en-
forceability of oral contracts, while other jurisdictions, 
commenting on the beneficial effects of the statute, tend 
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to restrict rather than enlarge the exceptions. nlO In 
Yates v. Ball, 132 Fla. 132, 181 So. 341, 344 (Fla. 
1937), the Florida Supreme Court observed: 
The statute of frauds grew out of a purpose to intercept 
the frequency and success of actions based on nothing 
more than [**13] loose verbal statements or mere innu-
endos. To accomplish this, the statute requires that all 
actions based on agreements for longer than one year 
must depend on a written statement or memorandum, 
signed by the party to be charged. The statute should be 
strictly construed to prevent the fraud it was designed to 
correct, and so long as it can be made to effectuate this 
purpose, courts should be reluctant to take cases from 
its protection. 25 R.CL. 442. 
In determining whether a contract is within this provi-
sion of the statute of frauds, the supreme court held: 
When no time is agreed on for the complete performance 
of the contract, if from the object to be accomplished 
by it and the surrounding circumstances, it clearly ap-
pears that the parties intended that it should extend for 
a longer period than a year, it is within the statute of 
frauds, though it cannot be said that there is any im-
possibility preventing its performance within a year. 25 
R.CL. 458. 
Id. n i l The supreme court found that the agreement at 
issue in that case was by its terms "susceptible of per-
formance within a year, and the evidence shows that it 
was expected to have been performed within that time," 
[**14] so that it was not within the statute of frauds. Id. 
It added: 
Another fact lending support to this view is that the 
contract was fully performed on the part of the plain-
tiff before action was brought. The rule is generally 
approved in this country that the statute of frauds ap-
plies only to contracts not to be performed on either 
side within the year, and has no application to contracts 
which by intent were fully performed within the year on 
one side. If that rule is applied in this case, the plain-
tiff having performed the contract on his part within the 
year, the defendant cannot avail himself of the statute of 
frauds. 
Id. at 345 (cites omitted, emphasis added). nl2 This 
doctrine, which is sometimes labeled "full performance" 
or "complete performance" nl3 was articulated in an 
English case in which the court held enforceable a ten-
ant's promise to pay five pounds for fifteen years, where 
the landlord had promised to spend fifty pounds in im-
provements and did so within a year. 
n7 See 72 Am. Jur. 2d Statute of Frauds § 1, and 
the cases cited therein. 
n8 29 Charles H (1676) Ch 3, § 4. 
[••IS] 
n9 72 Am. Jur. 2d Statute of Frauds § 3. See 
also 3 Samuel Williston, A Treatise on the Law of 
Contracts § 450 (3d ed. 1960). 
nlO Williston, supra, at § 448. See also 2 Arthur 
Linton Corbin, Corbin on Contracts § 275 (1950). 
ni l In Markowitz Bros., Inc. v. John A. \blpe 
Const. Co.,209F.Supp. 339,340(S.D. Fla. 1962), 
the court referred to this statement as a dictum citing 
with approval the "minority rule," which it found to 
be applicable, "in light of the past rulings in Florida 
— and the more persuasive rationale of the minority 
position, especially in this day of negotiations look-
ing to the formation of informal contracts not under 
seal." 
nl2 See also 72 Am. Jur. 2d Statute of Frauds § 
19. 
nl3 "It must be borne in mind that cases involv-
ing complete performance by one party, as well as 
cases of part performance by one or both parties, 
are, strictly speaking, cases of part performance and 
the courts in considering cases of complete perfor-
mance by one party often use the terminology 'part 
performance.'" Annotation, Performance as taking 
contract not to be performed within a year out of the 
statute of frauds, 6A.L.R. 2d 1053,1063 (1949). 
[**16] 
As the contract was entirely executed on one side within 
a year, and as it was the intention of the parties, founded 
on a reasonable expectation, that it should be so, [*155] 
the statute of frauds does not extend to such a case. 
DoneUan v. Read, 3 Barn & Ad 899, 110 Eng Reprint 
330 (1832). 
The doctrine of "part performance" also arose early on 
in Florida, in actions for specific performance of con-
tracts for the conveyance of land or an interest in land, 
based on the conviction that "the statute of frauds should 
not be used as ail instrument of fraud." Chabotv. Winter 
Park Co., 34 Fla. 258,15 So. 756, 759 (Fla. 1894). In 
Malay u Boyett,53Fla. 956, 43 So. 243,24&47 (Fla. 
1907), the Florida Supreme Court adopted the following 
language of the Utah court: 
Courts of equity, in establishing the doctrine invoked by 
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plaintiff, have not by any means intended to annul the 
statute of frauds, but only to prevent its being made the 
means of perpetrating a fraud. In order that a plaintiff 
may be permitted to give evidence of a contract not in 
writing, [**17] and which is in the very teeth of the 
statute and a nullity at law, it is essential that he estab-
lish, by clear and positive proof, acts, and things done 
in pursuance and on account thereof, exclusively refer-
able thereto, and which take it out of the operation of 
the statute. 
In Demps v. Hogan, 57 Fla. 60, 48 So. 998 (Fla. 
1909), the supreme court held: 
Where the owner of land, by himself or through his 
agent, makes a verbal contract of sale of such land to 
another for an agreed price, and puts the vendee in pos-
session, upon compliance with the terms of his contract 
of purchase a court of equity will, in favor of such 
purchaser, enforce specific performance of such con-
tract, notwithstanding the statute of frauds, requiring 
all contracts for the sale of lands, or some memorandum 
thereof, to be in writing and signed by the vendor. 
And in Miller v. Murray, 68 So. 2d 594, 596 (Fla. 
1953), the supreme court stated: 
The governing principles by which part performance 
may remove an oral contract for the sale of land from the 
effect of the Statute of Frauds are also well established. 
In addition to [**18] establishing the fact that an oral 
contract for sale was made, proof must be submitted as 
to the following: payment of all or part of the consider-
ation, whether it be in money or in services; possession 
by the alleged vendee; and the making by the vendee 
of valuable and permanent improvements upon the land 
with the consent of the vendor—or, in the absence of 
improvements, the proof of such facts as would make 
the transaction a fraud upon the purchaser if it were not 
enforced. Battle v. Butler, 138 Fla. 392, 189 So. 846. 
Accord Todd v. Hyzer, 154 Fla. 702, 18 So. 2d 888; 
Purvis v. Malloy, 129 Fla. 191,176 So. 71, 72. 
Unlike the district courts of appeal, some of which have 
attempted to extend this doctrine beyond the circum-
stances under which it arose, the Florida Supreme Court 
has implied the doctrine of part performance only in suits 
involving specific performance of oral contracts for the 
conveyance of land or an interest in land. nl4 Where a 
landowner sought damages for breach of an oral agree-
ment in which the defendant had contracted to buy 500 
standing [**19] trees for $ 1000, then cut 150 of the best 
ones and paid the owner $ 300, but refused to complete 
the agreement, the court held that a sale of standing tim-
ber is a contract concerning an interest in land, within 
the meaning of the statute of frauds, and that 
nl4 Condrey v. Condrey, 92 So. 2d 423 (Fla. 
1957); Cottages, Miami Beach v. VJkgman, 57 So. 
2d 439 (Fla. 1951), reh. denied, 59 So. 2d 528 
(Fla. 1952); Demps v. Hogan, 57 Fla. 60, 48 So. 
998 (Fla. 1909); Malay v. Boyett, 53 Fla. 956, 
43 So. 243 (Fla. 1907). See also Gable v. Miller, 
104 So. 2d 358 (Fla. 1958); Miller v. Murray, 68 
So. 2d 594 (Fla. 1953); Green v. Price, 63 So. 2d 
337 (Fla. 1953); Burton v. Keaton, 60 So. 2d 770 
(Fla. 1952); Dixon v. Clayton, 44 So. 2d 76 (Fla. 
1949);Tbddv. Hyzer, 154Fla. 702, 18So. 2d888 
(Fla. 1944); Battle v. Butler, 138 Fla. 392, 189 
So. 846 (Fla. 1939); Chamberlain v. Chamberlain, 
150 Fla. 21, 155 So. 136 (Fla. 1934); Williams v. 
Bailey, 69 Fla. 225, 67 So. 877 (Fla. 1915). 
[**20] 
Where a contract is for the sale of lands, or any inter-
est therein, and is not in writing, no action at law can 
ever be maintained upon it. Part performance of such a 
contract is a ground for relief in equity only, and there 
on the principle of relieving from fraud. 
[*156] The suit here is nothing more than an action 
at law for the recovery of damages for alleged breach 
of an oral contract for the purchase of an interest in re-
alty, which action is expressly forbidden by our statute 
of frauds. 
Elsberry v. Sexton, 61 Fla. 162, 54 So. 592, 593 
(Fla. 1911) (cites omitted). And in Canell v. Areola 
Housing Corp. ,65 So. 2d 849, 851 (Fla. 1953), which 
involved an oral promise to create an easement that the 
court found "is clearly within the terms of the statute of 
frauds and thus cannot be enforced directly or indirectly" 
and "would amount to an unauthorized reformation of 
the description in the deed," it concluded: 
Since the provision in the statute prohibiting any ac-
tion to be brought on an oral contract within the statute 
includes actions based indirectly on the contract, "an 
action for damages cannot [**21] be maintained on the 
ground of fraud in refusing to perform the contract, even 
though the defendant at the time of the making of the 
oral contract may have had no intention of performing 
it." 25 R.CL. 691. See also Dung v. Parker, 52 N.Y. 
494. Although some courts have reached an opposite 
conclusion, 49 AmJur. p. 841; 23 AmJur. p. 889; 
Anno. 104A.L.& 1420, we think that on the facts of the 
case under consideration the rule quoted above is best 
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calculated to uphold the theory upon which the statute 
of frauds is founded, in accord with the principle that 
so long as the statute can be made to effectuate its pur-
poses, courts should be reluctant to take cases from its 
protection. Yates v. Ball, 132 Fla. 132,181 So. 341. 
We have discovered only two cases in which the Florida 
Supreme Court has addressed the question of whether 
the statute of frauds applied to employment agreements. 
In Grossman u Levy's, 81 So. 2d 752, 753 (Fla. 1955), 
the court held that an oral renewal of an oral one-year 
employment agreement, which commenced on the day 
the renewal [**22] was made, was not within the statute 
of frauds regardless of whether the original contract was 
unenforceable under the statute of frauds, noting: 
Our statute of frauds, unlike the statutes of some states, 
49 AmJur., Statute of Frauds, Sec. 23, does not de-
clare an offending contract to be "void" or "invalid". 
Nor does it merit this construction, in spite of some ca-
sual language in Yates v. Ball, 132 Fla. 132, 181 So. 
341. It merely states, so far as is relevant here, that 
"No action shall be brought whereby * * * to charge 
any person * * * upon any agreement that is not to be 
performed within the space of one year from the mak-
ing thereof." (Italics added.) The statute thus pertains 
exclusively to the remedy. . . . If a contract which 
offends the statute were absolutely void and a nullity, 
it could not be held, as it has long been held by this 
court, that the statute applies only to executory and not 
to executed contracts. McDowell v. Ritter, 153 Fla. 
50, 13 So. 2d 612; Summerall v. Thorns, 3 Fla. 298. 
And the rule of the cases just cited is directly applicable 
here, [**23] because the original contract alleged had 
concededly been executed on both sides. 
In Tanenbaum v. Biscayne Osteopathic Hospital, Inc., 
190 So. 2d 777, 779 (Fla. 1966), the supreme court 
approved the district court's rejection of the doctrine of 
promissory estoppel, nl5 "as a sort of counteraction to 
the legislatively created Statute of Frauds." The supreme 
court cited with approval its holding in Yates v. Ball that 
the statute of frauds should be strictly construed, and the 
district court's observation that great caution should be 
exercised "in the consideration of the advisability of in-
grafting onto the law of this State a provision [*157] 
which may have the effect of nullifying the legislative 
will of the State as expressed by the inactment [sic] of 
the Statute of Frauds * * * ." 
nl5 Estoppel theory has been found to be related 
to the doctrine of part performance. Annotation, 
Action by employee in reliance on employment con-
tract which violates statute of frauds as rendering the 
contract unenforceable, 54 A.L.R. 715, § 3 (1992 
pocket part). 
And in Winters ML Alanco, Inc., 435 So. 2d326, 
331 (Fla. 2d DCA 1983), involving an easement in 
land, the court noted: 
The doctrine of part performance is based not on the 
theory that part performance is a substitute for the 
written evidence required by the Statute of Frauds, 
but on the theory that the defendant should be 
estopped, in view of the part performance in reliance 
on the defendant's inducement or acquiescence, to 
assert the statute as a defense. 
[**24] 
To the extent our sister courts, relying on the law 
of other jurisdictions or the opinions of commentators 
regarding the "modern trend" towards eviscerating the 
statute of frauds, have digressed from the principles 
which were laid down by the Florida Supreme Court in 
the aforementioned cases, we do not find their opinions 
to be persuasive authority. nl6 To the extent opinions 
from this court have digressed from those principles, we 
do not find them to be binding on our decision in this 
case. nl7 As noted in Dwight v. Tobin, recent decisions 
from the Florida district courts of appeal nl8 "indicate 
that the venerable rule established in Elsberry v. Sexton 
over eighty years ago remains alive and well." 947F.2d 
at 460. It was Corbin who explained in his treatise on 
contracts that the course of decisions leading away from 
denying [**25] enforcement of promises that are not to 
be performed within one year is based upon public wel-
fare and policy, not upon reason and logic. If Florida is 
to move toward enforcing oral promises intended to be 
performed beyond one year, or towards compensating 
those who enter into such agreements, it is the proper 
function of the Florida Legislature to announce that pub-
lic policy change, not the function of a district court of 
appeal. While the Florida Supreme Court has occasion-
ally chosen to depart from its own precedent on public 
policy grounds, we note that it frowns on such depar-
tures by lower courts. Hoffman v. Jones, 280 So. 2d 
431 (Fla. 1973). 
190So. 2dat778. 
nl6 See, for example, Goslin v. Racal Data 
Communications, Inc., 468 So. 2d 390 (Fla. 3d 
DCA), rev. denied, 479 So. 2d 117 (Fla. 1985); 
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AV-MED, Inc. v. French, 458 So. 2d 67 (Fla. 3d 
DCA 1984); Hiatt v. \hughn, 430 So. 2d 597 (Fla. 
4th DCA 1983); Dionne v. Columbus Mills, Inc., 
311 So. 2d 681 (Fla. 2d DCA 1975); Miami Beach 
First National Bank v. Shalleck, 182 So. 2d 649 
(Fla. 3d DCA 1966). 
[**26] 
nl7 See, for example, Moneyhun v. Vital 
Industries, Inc., 611 So. 2d 1316 (Fla. 1st DCA 
1993); Elliot v. Timmons, 519 So. 2d 671 (Fla. 1st 
DCA), rev. denied, 525 So. 2d 878 (Fla. 1988); 
Futch v. Head, 511 So. 2d 314 (Ha. 1st DCA), 
rev. denied, Head v. Futch, 518 So. 2d 1275 (Fla. 
1987); Evans v. Parker, 440 So. 2d 640 (Fla. 1st 
DCA 1983); W. & a, Inc. v. Howard Johnson 
Co. ,382 So. 2d 1323 (Fla. 1st DCA), rev. denied, 
Howard Johnson Co. v. W. B. D., Inc., 388 So. 2d 
1114 (Fla. 1980). 
nl8 The Eleventh Circuit cited Winters v. Alanco, 
Inc., Tanenbaum v. Biscayne Osteopathic Hospital, 
Inc., and Williams v. Faile, 118 So. 2d 599 (Fla. 
1st DCA 1960). We also note the cases previously 
cited in this opinion, and the following cases hold-
ing that part performance of a contract for personal 
services is not an exception to the provisions of the 
Statute of Frauds: Miller Construction Co. v. First 
Industrial Technology Corp., 576 So. 2d 748 (Fla. 
3d DCA 1991); Johnson v. Edwards, 569 So. 2d 
928 (Fla. 1st DCA 1990); Tobin & Tobin Insurance 
Agency, Inc. v. Zeskind, 315 So. 2d 518 (Fla. 3d 
DCA 1975); and Rowland v. Ewell, 174 So. 2d 78 
(Fla. 2d DCA 1965). Most recently, in Hospital 
Corporation v. Associates in Adolescent Psychiatry, 
S.C.,605So. 2d556(Fla. 4thDCA 1992), rev. dis-
missed, Associates in Adolescent Psychiatry, S.C. v. 
Hospital Corporation, 626 So. 2d 203 (Fla. 1993), 
the court held that the doctrine of part performance 
does not remove the bar of the statute of frauds from 
actions for damages based upon breach of oral con-
tracts, relying in part on Dwight v. Tobin and distin-
guishing Elliot v. Timmons, Futch v. Head, Evans 
v. Parker, and W.B.D., Inc. v. Howard Johnson 
Co.. 
[**27] 
The parties in this case do not dispute the existence 
of the oral employment agreement, but disagree with re-
gard to some of its terms. They do not dispute that in 
January 1986 they entered into an oral agreement, which 
was not reduced to writing, that Collier would manage 
Jones Motor Company, in which Brooks had an owner-
ship interest, and that Collier would be paid $ 450 per 
week plus ten per cent of the net profit. The evidence 
indicates that the parties also agreed that upon some con-
tingency involving the success of the business (the exact 
nature of which is in dispute), Collier would be entitled 
to some ownership interest in the business (the manner 
of transfer and exact terms of which are also in dispute). 
The parties have taken opposing positions regarding the 
time in which the agreement was to have been performed 
nl9 and summary judgment [*158] is precluded by this 
factual dispute, the resolution of which will determine 
whether section 725.01 bars Collier's damages claim for 
breach of contract. 
nl9 Brooks swore in his affidavit that by the ex-
press terms of the agreement, Collier's purchase of 
stock could not have been accomplished within one 
year. He testified in his deposition that "after a 
years (sic) employment if he had turned the busi-
ness around and was making money then he would 
be offered to buy stock in Jones Motor Company, 
the amount and the price to be decided at that time." 
Collier swore in his affidavit that the obligations un-
der the contract "could have been, and were to have 
been, performed within one year" and testified in his 
deposition that he was supposed to get twenty-five 
per cent of the business "within the first year" from 
Brooks, without payment of anything, even if the 
company lost money. 
[**28] 
On remand, the trial court must determine, "from the 
object to be accomplished" by the agreement and the sur-
rounding circumstances, whether "it clearly appears that 
the parties intended that it should extend for a longer pe-
riod than a year." See Yates v. Ball, 181 So. 2d at 344. 
If the court so finds, it must then determine whether it 
was the intention of the parties that Collier would fully 
perform his part of the agreement within one year; and 
whether Collier did in fact fully perform his part of the 
agreement within one year. If the court does not find 
that the parties intended that Collier would, and also 
that Collier actually did, fully perform his part of the 
agreement within one year, section 725.01 bars any ac-
tion to enforce the agreement. Id. at 345. In light of 
the supreme court's decision in Tanenbaum, we do not 
believe that it would approve extending the application 
of the narrow doctrine of "part performance" to an ac-
tion which does not in any way involve an agreement to 
convey land, and which seeks, not the equitable remedy 
of specific performance of the contract, but the common 
law remedy of damages [**29] for breach of contract. 
n20 
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n20 We note that Collier may alternatively seek 
compensation in quantum meruit for the reasonable 
value of the services he rendered, to the extent he 
has not already been compensated by the salary and 
commissions he received. 
The summary judgment is REVERSED and the cause 
is REMANDED to the trial court for further proceedings 
consistent with this opinion. 
SMITH, J., CONCURS. ERVIN, J., CONCURS AND 
DISSENTS, WITH A WRITTEN OPINION. 
CONCURBY: ERVIN 
DISSENTBY: ERVIN 
DISSENT: ERVIN, J., concurring and dissenting. 
I concur with the majority's decision to reverse and 
remand the summary judgment, but dissent from its in-
terpretation of the full-performance doctrine. The ma-
jority considers the doctrine applies only if the parties 
intended that one party perform the agreement within 
one year, and the party fully performs within such time. 
Its conclusion is contrary to prior authority from this and 
other courts in Florida, which hold that full performance 
by one party removes the contract from the operation of 
the statute of frauds, [**30] without consideration of 
the parties' intent and the length of time before comple-
tion. See, e.g., Moneyhun v. Vital Indus., Inc., 611 
So. 2d 1316, 1319 (Fla. IstDCA 1993); AV-MED, Inc. 
v. French, 458 So. 2d 67, 69 (Fla. 3d DCA 1984); 
Hiatt v. \bughn, 430 So. 2d 597, 598 (Fla. 4th DCA 
1983); \knditti-Siravo v. City of Hollywood, 418 So. 
2d 1251,1253 (Fla. 4th DCA 1982); Gerry v. Antonio, 
409 So. 2d 1181, 1183 (Fla. 4th DCA 1982); Dionne 
v. Columbus Mills, Inc., 311 So. 2d 681, 683 (Fla. 2d 
DCA 1975); Miami Beach First Nat'I Bank v. Shalleck, 
182 So. 2d 649, 651 (Fla. 3d DCA 1966). nl See also 
2 Arthur L. Corbin, Corbin on Contracts § 457 (1950 & 
Supp. 1993) (adhering to the general rule from numer-
ous jurisdictions that full performance beyond one year 
renders the statute of frauds inapplicable). 
nl If the evidence shows that Collier fully per-
formed within one year, the following cases provide 
additional authority for his position: Futch v. Head, 
511 So. 2d 314, 319 (Fla. 1st DCA), review de-
nied, 518 So. 2d 1275 (Fla. 1987); W.RD , Inc. v. 
Howard Johnson Co., 382 So. 2d 1323,1327 (Fla. 
1st DCA), review denied, 388 So. 2d 1114 (Fla. 
1980); Goslin v. Raced Data Communications, Inc., 
468 So. 2d 390,392 (Fla. 3d DCA), review denied, 
479 So. 2d 117 (Fla. 1985). 
[**311 
Because the issue of whether Collier fully performed 
his part of the parties' agreement is a disputed issue of 
material fact, I would simply reverse the summary judg-
ment and remand for further proceedings without any 
directions to the lower court regarding the parties' in-
tent or the length of time required [*159] for Collier to 
perform. In other words, if the evidence discloses that 
Collier fully performed his part of the agreement, the 
existence of evidence showing that the parties did not 
intend that Collier would fully perform the agreement 
within one year, or that the contract was not fully per-
formed within such time is immaterial to his right to 
enforce the terms of the agreement. 
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PRIOR HISTORY: 
Action in the Sherburne County District Court to recover 
for soybeans allegedly sold and delivered to defendants, 
Bruce Mitchell and Mitchell Feed & Seed Company, 
wherein defendant corporation counterclaimed. The 
court, Carroll £. Larson, Judge, ordered summary judg-
ment for plaintiff, and defendants appealed from the 
judgment entered. 
DISPOSITION: Affirmed. 
HEADNOTES: Judgments — summary judgment — 
power of trial court to grant sua sponte. 
1. Trial court has power to grant summary judgment, 
sua sponte, without meeting formal notice requirement 
of Rule 56.03, Rules of Civil Procedure, under certain 
circumstances. 
Statute of frauds — oral agreement for future purchase 
- defenses not available. 
2. Neither promissory nor equitable estoppel is avail-
able under the facts of this case to take the oral agreement 
out of the statute of frauds, Minn. St. 336.2 - 201(1). 
Statute of frauds — oral agreement for future purchase 
— defenses not available. 
3. Both acceptance and receipt of all of the goods 
in question are required under Minn. St. 336.2 — 
201(3)(c) before avoidance of the statute of frauds is 
recognized. 
Appeal and error — failure to make proper record on 
issue - effect. 
4. Where individual defendant failed to make a proper 
record on the question of whether he acted in his indi-
vidual capacity or as corporate agent, he was precluded 
from raising the issue on appeal. 
COUNSEL: Wklsh & Nelson and Jerold Q Nelson, for 
appellants. 
Smith & Pringle and Gary L. Pringle, for respondent. 
JUDGES: Otis, Kelly, and Chanak, JJ., * and considered 
and decided by the court en banc. 
* Acting as Justice of the Supreme Court by ap-
pointment pursuant to Minn. Const, art. 6, § 2, 
and Minn. St. 2.724, subd. 2. 
OPINIONBY: CHANAK 
OPINION: [*276] [**590] Appeal by defendants from 
summary judgment of the District Court, Sherburne 
County, in favor of plaintiff for goods sold and delivered 
and denying recovery on the counterclaim. Ws affirm. 
On November 24, 1972, the parties entered into 
an oral agreement whereby plaintiff contracted to sell, 
and defendants agreed to purchase for future deliv-
ery, certain soybeans for a price of $ 3.50 per bushel. 
Approximately 4,020 bushels were delivered to defen-
dant on May 16 and 17, 1973. The market value of the 
beans had increased to $ 8 or $ 9 per bushel at time of 
delivery, and after delivery continued to rise, reaching 
$ 10 per bushel. 
The parties' disagreement as to the quantity of beans, 
the subject [*277] of the oral contract, culminated in this 
action. Plaintiff claimed that the contract was for 4,000 
bushels of beans, and defendants insisted that plaintiff 
promised to sell a "bin of beans." Under defendants' 
view, plaintiff had failed to deliver approximately 1,000 
to 1,500 bushels of the total beans contracted for and 
remaining in plaintiffs bin. At no stage of the negotia-
tions or agreement was any writing in any form, relating 
to the agreement, executed by either of the parties. 
Plaintiff was never paid for the beans delivered. As 
a consequence, plaintiff sought recovery of the agreed 
price for the number of bushels actually delivered (which 
the parties later stipulated was $ 13,151.73), and defen-
dants counterclaimed for damages resulting from plain-
tiffs failure to deliver the beans remaining in plaintiffs 
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bin after delivery of 4,020 bushels. 
At the pretrial conference on December 27, 1973, the 
trial court raised the issue of the statute of frauds, Minn. 
St. 336.2 — 201, which provides that an agreement for 
the sale of goods of a value of more than $ 500, to 
be enforceable, must be in writing, and so noted in its 
pretrial order of January 2, 1974, but without a final 
determination. 
At the conference in chambers between court and 
counsel, preliminary to the selection of a jury, on the day 
set for trial, January 22, 1974, plaintiff moved to amend 
its reply to defendants' counterclaim by raising the affir-
mative defense of the statute of frauds. At the same time, 
defendants moved to amend their counterclaim to plead 
affirmatively estoppel. Both motions were granted. 
After the court indicated at the latter conference that 
the defendants could not prove their alleged counter-
claim, defendants were then permitted to make an of-
fer of proof as to (1) facts relied upon to prove defen-
dants' version of the verbal agreement and (2) conduct 
or representations of plaintiff which would constitute an 
estoppel. The court then determined that defendants' 
counterclaim was within the statute of frauds and that 
the conduct and representations of the plaintiff, even 
if true, did not constitute an estoppel. Rejected also 
was defendants' contention [*278] that a jury issue arose 
as to whether a "bin of beans" was a commercial unit. 
Defendants had argued that acceptance of part was ac-
ceptance of the entire unit within the meaning of Minn. 
St. 336.2 — 606(2), so as to take the oral agreement out 
of the statute of frauds under § 336.2 - 201(3)(c). 
Having further advised counsel that under Minn. St. 
336.2 - 201(3)(c) the payment for the 4,020 bushels 
was enforceable because [**591] it was in "respect to 
goods * * * which have been received and accepted" 
and therefore not within the statute of frauds, the trial 
court ordered judgment, which is the subject of this ap-
peal, nl 
nl Prior thereto, the parties stipulated that the 
amount of plaintiffs claim was $ 13,151.73. 
Defendants' appeal raises the following issues: (1) 
Whether the trial court exceeded its authority in granting 
what was in effect a summary judgment on its own mo-
tion on the basis of the information disclosed by the in-
terrogatories, depositions, files, pleadings, pretrial con-
ference, and offer of proof preliminary to trial. (2) Did 
the question of whether plaintiff was estopped to raise 
the statute of frauds constitute a genuine issue of ma-
terial fact? (3) Did the question of whether a "bin of 
beans" is a commercial unit within the meaning of the 
Uniform Commercial Code (hereafter UCQ constitute 
a genuine issue of material fact? (4) Did the trial court 
err in entering judgment against Bruce Mitchell individ-
ually? 
Summary Judgment Sua Sponte 
Defendants contend that the trial court exceeded its 
authority because it granted a summary judgment on its 
own motion on the day of trial without notice to the par-
ties. In support of that contention, defendants rely on 
McAllister v. Independent School Dist. No. 306, 276 
Minn. 549,149N.W2d81 (1967). 
WB did hold in McAllister, as defendants contend, 
that under Rule 56.03, Rules of Civil Procedure, n2 the 
stated time of 10 days' [*279] formal notice is manda-
tory, absent a clear waiver by the adversary. The ag-
grieved party there vigorously opposed the motion for 
summary judgment by defendants on two grounds: (1) 
Notice was 5 days short, and (2) plaintiffs had other 
evidence to submit. 
n2 Rule 56.03, Rules of Civil Procedure, provides 
in part: "The motion shall be served at least 10 days 
before the time fixed for the hearing. The adverse 
party prior to the day of hearing may serve opposing 
affidavits. Judgment shall be rendered forthwith if 
the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogato-
ries, and admissions on file, together with the affi-
davits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as 
to any material fact and that either party is entitled 
to a judgment as a matter of law." 
The circumstances which are presented here distin-
guish McAllister v. Independent School Dist. No. 306, 
supra. Significant are the following facts: (1) The pre-
trial conference was held on December 27, 1973, at 
which time the trial court raised the issue of the statute 
of frauds relative to defendants' counterclaim and in-
corporated the issue in its pretrial order of January 2, 
1974, in effect affording written notice of the issue to 
both parties; (2) by the same order, trial by jury was set 
for January 22, 1974, in effect affording defendants a 
20-day opportunity to prepare to meet the issue raised; 
(3) on the day set for trial, at a conference in chambers 
between court and counsel preliminary to selection of a 
jury, the court reviewed its pretrial order, reiterated its 
opinion that the defendants could not pursue their coun-
terclaim because of the statute of frauds, secured agree-
ment of counsel as to the amount of plaintiff s claim, and 
then afforded defendants an opportunity to make their 
offer of proof; (4) defendants availed themselves of that 
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opportunity by attempting to show genuine fact issues as 
to the provisions of the oral agreement and facts relating 
to estoppel and were fully heard as to all the questions in-
volved; (5) the trial judge thereupon ruled that the statute 
of frauds precluded defendants' counterclaim and denied 
estoppel; (6) at the time defendants voiced no objection 
on the record to the procedure employed by the court; 
and (7) no prejudice was shown by defendants by reason 
[*280] of the absence of a formal motion. 
Neither the summary judgment rule nor any other pro-
cedural rule gives the trial court express authority to 
enter a summary judgment on its own motion. The au-
thority is derived from the inherent power [**592] of 
the trial court to dispose summarily of litigation when 
there remains no genuine issue as to any material fact 
and judgment must be ordered for one of the parties as a 
matter of law. The same conditions must exist as would 
justify a summary judgment on motion of a party. Green 
v. Kaesler-Allen Lumber Co. 197 Kan. 788, 420 P. 2d 
1019;Sheildv. Vklch, 4N.J. 563, 73A. 2d536;Roberts 
v. Bray no n, 90 So. 2d 623 (Flo. 1956); Buffington 
v. Continental Cos. Co. 69 KM. 365, 367 P. 2d 539 
(1961). See, also, Rule 16(6), Rules of Civil Procedure. 
Concededly, there were genuine fact issues involved in 
the instant case. But as their resolution would in no way 
affect the application of the rules of law which we adopt 
herein, the trial court properly denied defendants a jury 
trial on those issues. 
In Niazi v. St. Paid Mercury Ins. Co. 265 Minn. 
222,121 N.W.2d 349 (1963), we considered facts anal-
ogous to those in this case. There, plaintiffs had brought 
an action under the medical pay and uninsured motorist 
provisions of an automobile insurance policy. The pol-
icy provisions required that such disputes be arbitrated 
in accordance with the rules of the American Arbitration 
Association. At the pretrial conference, the trial court, 
either on its own motion or upon oral motion of the attor-
ney for the insurer, ordered the proceedings stayed until 
plaintiffs submitted the dispute to arbitration pursuant to 
the policy. No formal application for stay and order for 
arbitration had been made by defense counsel. Plaintiffs 
sought a writ of mandamus from this court alleging that 
the trial court had in effect granted a summary judgment 
on its own motion in a manner not in compliance with 
the rules. 
In denying the application for the writ, we reasoned 
as follows: 
"* * * [T]he trial judge does have power under Rule 
56.04 [*281] to grant summary judgment with respect 
to all or some of the issues raised by the pleadings. 
[Citations omitted.] 
"'Unless the objecting party can show prejudice aris-
ing from the lack of notice * * *, exercising [summary 
judgment] power at pre-trial is sound. Seldom should 
lack of notice prejudice a party, as each party should be 
fully prepared on the facts applicable to the case in order 
to participate in the pre-trial. To compel a 10 day delay 
solely to comply with the notice requirements of Rule 
56.03 would seem ill-advised.' [Citations omitted.]" 
265Minn. 227, 121 N.W2d353. 
Ws hold that under the circumstances of this case the 
trial court properly exercised its power in granting sum-
mary judgment sua sponte. 
Estoppel 
Defendants' offer of proof was that after the oral agree-
ment of November 24, 1972, was negotiated and relying 
on plaintiffs promise to sell defendants all of the beans 
in its bin, defendants entered into a contract with Bunge 
Corporation on the same day to resell 4,000 bushels of 
the beans to Bunge. The resale to Bunge was at a slightly 
higher price and was limited to 4,000 bushels because, 
defendants claim, neither plaintiff nor defendants knew 
exactly how many bushels there were in plaintiffs bin. 
Defendants claim that the general understanding was that 
the bin was about half full and that the full bin would 
hold approximately 12,000 bushels. 
Later that week, defendants claim, plaintiff assured 
defendants that there were from 5,000 to 5,500 bushels 
in the bin, and acting in reliance thereon and upon 
later commitments from several other farmers, defen-
dants on December 6, 1972, again resold another lot 
of 4,000 bushels to Bunge for June delivery. Of that 
total 4,000-bushel lot, defendants relied upon the addi-
tional 1,000 bushels from plaintiff. Defendants'reliance 
upon plaintiffs promise was such that the former made 
no additional hedges against the two future deliveries. 
Defendants argue that [*282] in order to fulfill their two 
contracts with Bunge, it became necessary [*+593] for 
them to deliver 1,000 bushels of expensive beans rather 
than plaintiffs less costly beans and thus defendants in-
curred a loss. Based upon this offer of proof, defendants 
contend that a fact issue of estoppel was for the jury. 
The offer of proof on that issue was clearly one creat-
ing a fact issue. However, the court's denial of estoppel 
would constitute reversible error only if the doctrine of 
estoppel is available to defendants under the statute of 
frauds in the UCC The trial court held that no estop-
pel would follow even if defendants established the facts 
that they offered to prove. 
The statute of frauds provided by the UCC with re-
spect to contracts for the sale of goods in excess of $ 
500 n3 does not expressly state that estoppel will take 
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a contract out of the statute of frauds. Nevertheless, 
the general savings clause of the UCC provides that the 
principles of estoppel, as well as other commonlaw prin-
ciples, will continue to apply unless expressly displaced 
by provisions of the UCC n4 
n3 Minn. St. 336.2 - 201(1) provides in relevant 
part: "(1) Except as otherwise provided in this sec-
tion a contract for the sale of goods for the price of 
$ 500 or more is not enforceable by way of action or 
defense unless there is some writing sufficient to in-
dicate that a contract for sale has been made between 
the parties and signed by the party against whom 
enforcement is sought or by his authorized agent or 
broker." 
n4 Minn. St. 336.1 - 103 provides: "Unless dis-
placed by the particular provisions of this chapter, 
the principles of law and equity, including the law 
merchant and the law relative to capacity to contract, 
principal and agent, estoppel, fraud, misrepresenta-
tion, duress, coercion, mistake, bankruptcy, or other 
validating or invalidating cause shall supplement its 
provisions." (Italics supplied.) 
In arguing that plaintiff should be estopped from as-
serting the statute of frauds, defendants fail to draw a dis-
tinction between equitable estoppel, also referred to as 
estoppel in pais, and promissory estoppel, also referred 
to as quasi contract. Language used by the trial court at 
the time he considered defendants' offer of proof would 
seem to indicate that equitable estoppel was [*283] the 
basis for his holding that the offer of proof did not make 
out the elements of an estoppel. n5 On appeal, how-
ever, defendants have urged us, without specifying either 
promissory or equitable estoppel, to apply the reason-
ing of certain promissory estoppel cases cited by them. 
Thus, it is necessary for us to consider the applicability 
of each of the types of estoppel to the facts of this case. 
n5 The trial court stated: "[A]nd with respect to 
estoppel, I do not think this is a proper case for estop-
pel. Stretch it how you will, I can't bring in the 
elements of fraud, and estoppel is always predicated 
upon some ramification of fraud. I don't believe we 
have it here." 
We note that defendants' offer of proof tended to show 
the elements of promissory — although perhaps not in-
tended — rather than equitable estoppel. The doctrine of 
promissory estoppel is wholly inapplicable here for the 
simple reason that an actual contract existed. 
Promissory estoppel is the name applied to a contract 
implied in law where no contract exists in fact. n6 The 
effect of promissory estoppel is to imply a contract from 
a unilateral or otherwise unenforceable promise coupled 
by detrimental reliance on the part of the promisee. n7 
n6 Its elements are set forth in Restatement, 
Contracts, § 90, as follows: 
"A promise which the promisor should reasonably 
expect to induce action or forbearance of a definite 
and substantial character on the part of the promisee 
and which does induce such action or forbearance is 
binding if injustice can be avoided only by enforce-
ment of the promise." 
nJ Jn Constructors Supply v. Bostrom Sheet Metal 
Vbrks, 291 Minn. 113, 116, 190 N.W 2d 71, 74 
(1971), we quoted Restatement, Contracts, § 90, to 
establish the elements of promissory estoppel and 
characterized the doctrine as "a species of or substi-
tute for consideration" or a "reliance doctrine." 
The Restatement rule is that promissory estoppel will 
defeat the statute of frauds only when the promise re-
lied upon is a [**594] promise to reduce the contract to 
writing. n8 Many of the courts which have considered 
the problem have either expressly adopted [+284] the 
Restatement rule or have simply rejected the view that 
promissory estoppel can remove an oral contract from 
the statute of frauds. n9 The jurisdictions which adopt 
this restrictive view do so because a promissory estoppel 
exception would likely render the statute of frauds nu-
gatory. nlO There is always some degree of reliance on 
an oral contract. Some jurisdictions adopt the slightly 
less restrictive view advocated by Williston and permit 
promissory estoppel where the detrimental reliance is of 
such a character and magnitude that refusal to enforce the 
contract would permit one party to perpetrate a fraud, 
n i l A mere refusal to perform an oral agreement, unac-
companied by unconscionable conduct, however, is not 
such a fraud as will justify disregarding the statute. 3 
Williston, Contracts (3 ed.) § 533A. 
n8 Restatement, Contracts, § 178, comment f. 
n9 See, e.g., Alaska Airlines v. Stephenson, 217 
F. 2d 295 (9 Cir. 1954) (adopts Restatement); Cox 
v. Cox, 292 Ala. 289, 289 So. 2d 609 (1974) (de-
nies estoppel); Sinclair v. Sullivan Chevrolet Co. 
45 IlL App. 2d 10, 195 N.E. 2d 250 (1964) (denies 
estoppel); Polka v. May, 383 Pa. 80,118 A. 2d 154 
(1955) (denies estoppel); cf. Fairway Machine Sales 
Co. u Continental Motors Corp. 40 Mich. App. 
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270, 198N.W 2d 757 (1972). Jurisprudence (5 ed.), § 805, as follows: 
nlO See, e.g., Ozter v. Haines, 411 11L 160, 
103 N.E. 2d 485 (1952); Tiffany, Inc. v. W.M.K. 
Transit Mix, Inc. 16 Ariz, App. 415, 493 P. 2d 
1220 (1972). 
nil "The fraud most commonly treated as taking 
an agreement out of the Statute of Frauds is that 
which consists in setting up the Statute against its 
enforcement after the other party has been induced 
to make expenditures or a change of situation * * *, 
so that the refusal to complete the execution of the 
agreement is not merely a denial of rights which it 
was intended to confer, but the infliction of an unjust 
and unconscionable injury and loss." 3 Williston, 
Contracts (3 ed.) § 533A, p. 798. 
See, e.g., Gem Corrugated Box Corp. v. National 
Kraft Container Corp. 427F. 2d 499 (2 Cir. 1970); 
Oxley v. Ralston Purina Co. 349 F. 2d 328 (6 Cir. 
1965); Irving Tier Co. v. Griffin, 244 Cat App. 2d 
852, 53 Col Rptr. 469 (1966); MoseHan v. Davis 
Canning Co. 229 Col. App. 2d 118, 40 Col, Rptr, 
157(1964). 
We have given careful consideration to the various 
views of the application of promissory estoppel to cases 
involving oral contracts and hold that, under the facts 
of this particular case, [*285] promissory estoppel was 
not available to defendants so as to take the instant oral 
contract out of the statute of frauds set forth in the UCC, 
Minn. St. 336.2 - 201(1). nl2 
nllAlbachtenv. Bradley, 212 Minn. 359,3N.W. 
2d 783 (1942), relied on by defendants, does not 
compel a contrary result. In that case, defendant by 
making false promises intentionally induced plaintiff 
to let the statute of limitations run. Despite a statute 
which provided that a writing was necessary to make 
a novation or a continuing contract that would ex-
tend the statute of limitations, we held that defendant 
was estopped from raising the statute of limitations, 
reasoning that he should not profit from his obvious 
deceit. The case is obviously distinguishable on its 
facts and is of only limited assistance here. 
We next turn to the question of whether the trial court 
was correct in holding that equitable estoppel did not 
take the contract out of the statute of frauds. Equitable 
estoppel is a type of equitable doctrine applicable not 
only to the statute of frauds but also to any of a num-
ber of different claims and defenses. Elements of an 
equitable estoppel are set forth in 3 Pomeroy, Equity 
"* * * 1. There must be conduct — acts, language, or 
i lence -- amounting to a representation or a concealment 
of material facts. 2. These facts must be known to the 
party estopped at the time of his said conduct, or at least 
the circumstances must be such that knowledge of diem 
is necessarily imputed to him. 3. The truth concerning 
these facts must be unknown to the other party claiming 
the benefit of the estoppel, at the time when such con-
duct was done, and at the time when it was acted upon 
by him. 4. The conduct must be done with the inten-
tion, or at least with the expectation, that it [**595] will 
be acted upon by the other party, or under such circum-
stances that it is both natural and probable that it will 
be so acted upon. There are several familiar species in 
which it is simply impossible to ascribe any intention or 
even expectation to the party estopped that his conduct 
will be acted upon by the one who afterwards claims the 
benefit of the [*286] estoppel. 5. The conduct must be 
relied upon by the other party, and, thus relying, he must 
be led to act upon it. 6. He must in fact act upon it in 
such a manner as to change his position for the worse; in 
other words, he must so act that he would suifer a loss if 
he were compelled to surrender or forego or alter what 
he has done by reason of the first party being permitted 
to repudiate his conduct and to assert rights inconsistent 
yvith it " 
From Pomeroy's recitation of the elements, we recog-
nize that equitable estoppel is akin to fraud. It does re-
quire a representation or concealment of material facts. 
WB have previously held that the latter requirement is an 
indispensible element of equitable estoppel. In Bremer 
v. Commissioner of Taxation, 246 Minn. 446, 454, 75 
N.W.2d 470, 475 (1956), we said: 
"4 i i [{is fundamental that estoppel is based upon a 
representation of fact and cannot exist as to an expres-
sion of opinion as distinguished from a representation of 
fm " 
WD agree with the trial court that defendants' offer of 
proof contained no showing or representation or con-
cealment of material facts. Thus, Roberts v. Friedell, 
218 Minn. 88, 15 N.W. 2d 496 (1944), cited by defen-
dants, is of no assistance despite the fact that we there 
held that equitable estoppel would take an oral contract 
out of the statute of frauds. That case, unlike the case 
at bar, involved concealment of material facts. Thus, 
we hold that the doctrine of equitable estoppel was not 
proved by defendants so as to take the oral contract out 
of the UCC statute of frauds, Minn. St. 336.2-201(1). 
Commercial Unit 
Page 8 
304 Minn. 275, *286; 230 N.W.2d 588, **595; LEXSEE 
17 U.CC Rep. Serv. (Callaghan) 16 
Defendants maintain that the trial court erred in not 
permitting the question of whether a "bin of beans" is a 
commercial unit to go to the jury. At the conference pre-
liminary to trial, defendants offered to prove that within 
the relevant market area farmers and grain-elevator op-
erators frequently bought and sold beans by the bin. 
[*287] From that offer of proof, defendants contend 
(1) that a jury issue arose as to whether a bin of beans is a 
commercial unit within the meaning of Minn. St. 336.2 
— 105(6), nl3 and (2) that acceptance of any part of the 
bin by the buyer constitutes acceptance of the entire bin 
within the meaning of Minn. St. 336.2-606(2). nl4 
The question then arises whether defendants' position 
that the oral contract is taken out of the statute of frauds 
by Minn. St. 336.2 - 201(3)(c) nl5 is tenable. 
nl3 Minn. St. 336.2 - 105(6) provides: 
"'Commercial unit' means such a unit of goods as 
by commercial usage is a single whole for purposes 
of sale and division of which materially impairs its 
character or value on the market or in use. A com-
mercial unit may be a single article (as a machine) 
or a set of articles (as a suite of furniture or an as-
sortment of sizes) or a quantity (as a bale, gross, or 
carload) or any other unit treated in use or in the 
relevant market as a single whole." 
nl4 Minn. St. 336.2 - 606(2) provides: 
"Acceptance of a part of any commercial unit is ac-
ceptance of that entire unit." 
nl5Minn. St. 336.2 - 201(3)(c) provides: "A 
contract which does not satisfy the requirements of 
subsection (1) but which is valid in other respects is 
enforceable * * * (c) with respect to goods for which 
payment has been made and accepted or which have 
been received and accepted (section 336.2 — 606)." 
We need not reach that issue since under our reading 
of Minn. St. 336.2 - 201(3)(c) it is necessary that the 
goods "have been received and accepted" before [**596] 
avoidance of the statute of frauds is recognized. See, 
Johnston Jewels, Ltd. v. Leonard, 156 Conn. 75, 239 
A. 2d 500 (1968). The evidence is conclusive that de-
fendants actually received only 4,020 bushels of beans. 
As the partperformance exception to the statute of frauds 
requires that one have received all of the goods for which 
recovery is sought, defendants could not prevail even if 
they could prove that by accepting a part of the bin of 
beans, they accepted the whole. 
Individual Liability 
Wfe reach the issue of whether the trial court erred in 
entering judgment against Bruce Mitchell individually. 
Although the joint answer and counterclaim of the defen-
dants denied that he was [*288] a party to the contract 
and alleged that he was at all relevant times acting as 
agent for the corporate defendant, the agency issue ap-
parently dropped out of the case at the time of die pretrial 
conference. 
Because die issue was not reserved in the pretrial or-
der or at any subsequent time and because there was no 
offer of proof nor any argument regarding that point, 
the record is inadequate to determine on appeal whether 
the agency issue was properly decided or whether there 
was a genuine issue of material fact. Defendant's failure 
to make a proper record precludes him from raising this 
issue on appeal. 
Affirmed. 
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OPINIONBY: S P E N C E R 
OPINION: [*539] [**88] Plaintiff seeks damages for 
the breach of an oral agreement to sell 90,000 bushels 
of corn. The District Court sustained a motion for sum-
mary judgment on the ground that the plaintiff's action 
was barred by the statute of frauds. Plaintiff premises 
this appeal on its theory that fact issues are present which 
are not determinable at a hearing on a motion for sum-
mary judgment. Wfe affirm 
Plaintiff-appellant, Farmland Service Coop, Inc., 
hereinafter referred to as Coop, alleges that Ross Klein, 
acting on behalf of the defendants collectively, agreed 
to sell it 90,000 bushels of corn. The corn was to be 
No. 2 yellow corn and the sale price was $ 1.39 per 
bushel, with delivery during June, July, and August. 
Coop further alleges defendants knew it would rely on 
defendants' agreement and immediately enter into resale 
agreements with others. 
The alleged sale agreement was entirely an oral tele-
phone transaction. No written memorandum of any 
[*540] nature was prepared or signed by the parties. 
Nor was any letter confirming the transaction sent to the 
defendants. The evidence does refer to a letter sent to the 
defendants after the repudiation of the alleged contract. 
That letter, however, while referred to in a deposition, 
was never offered or received in evidence. Defendants 
denied the existence of a contract. In their motion for 
summary judgment defendants contend that became the 
agreement alleged by Coop was an oral agreement for 
the sale of goods for the price of $ 500 or more, the 
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contract, if one existed, was not enforceable due to the 
statute of frauds. 
Uniform Commercial Code, section 2-201, provides 
as follows: "(1) Except as otherwise provided in this 
section a contract for the sale of goods for the price of 
five hundred dollars or more is not enforceable by way 
of action or defense unless there is some writing suffi-
cient to indicate that a contract for sale has been made 
between the parties and signed by the party against whom 
enforcement is sought or by his authorized agent or bro-
ker. A writing is not insufficient because it omits or 
incorrectly states a term agreed upon but the contract is 
not enforceable under this paragraph beyond the quantity 
of goods shown in such writing. 
"(2) Between merchants if within a reasonable time 
a writing in confirmation of the contract and sufficient 
against the sender is received and the party receiving it 
has reason to know its contents, it satisfies the require-
ments of subsection (1) against such party unless written 
notice of objection to its contents is given within ten days 
after it is received. 
"(3) A contract which does not satisfy the requirements 
of subsection (1) but which is valid in other respects is 
enforceable 
"(a) if the goods are to be specially manufactured for 
the buyer and are not suitable for sale to others in the 
ordinary course of the seller's business and the [*541] 
seller, before notice of repudiation is received and under 
circumstances which reasonably indicate that the goods 
are for the buyer, has made either a substantial beginning 
of their manufacture or commitments for their procure-
ment; or 
"(b) if the party against whom enforcement is sought 
admits in his pleading, testimony or otherwise in court 
that a contract [**89] for sale was made, but the con-
tract is not enforceable under this provision beyond the 
quantity of goods admitted; or 
"(c) with respect to goods for which payment has been 
made and accepted or which have been received and ac-
cepted (section 2-606)." 
In support of their motion, defendants offered the de-
positions of Louis, Ross, and Raymond Klein, all of 
whom denied committing any grain to the Coop or the 
existence of any contract with it. Defendants also of-
fered the deposition of Howard Houser, Coop's grain 
division manager, who testified that he was "relatively 
sure" that defendants, after obtaining an offer from the 
Coop, had phoned and accepted an offer of $ 1.39 per 
bushel for 90,000 bushels of corn. To show reliance 
on the sale agreement, Houser also identified exhibit 
1, a confirmation of purchase by Far-Mar-Co., Inc., 
from Farmland Service Coop, Inc., of 102,000 bushels 
of com, dated March 31, 1973. This carries a nota-
tion "Klein Corn, 90000 Bu." He concedes, however, 
that this notation was made by Coop sometime after the 
confirmation form was received by it from Far-Mar-Co. 
Coop produced no evidence in opposition to the mo-
tion for a summary judgment. The District Court sus-
tained the motion " for the reason that the action is barred 
by the Statute of frauds and for that reason no issue 
remains." Coop, which made no showing by affidavit 
or otherwise in opposition to the motion for summary 
judgment, now urges that its cause of action is based on 
promissory estoppel and under that claim defendants' 
defense of the statute of frauds raises many issues of 
[*542] fact, which preclude the sustaining of a summary 
judgment motion. There is no merit to these contentions. 
The burden is upon the party moving for a summary 
judgment to show that no issue of fact exists, and unless 
he can conclusively do so, the motion must be overruled. 
Upon a motion for summary judgment, the court exam-
ines the evidence, not to decide any issue of fact, but to 
discover if any real issue of fact exists. In considering 
a motion for summary judgment, the court views the 
evidence in the light most favorable to the party against 
whom it is directed, giving to that party the benefit of 
all favorable inferences that may be reasonably drawn 
therefrom. SeePfeiferv. Pfeifer (1976), 195 Neb. 369, 
238N. W.2d451. 
Applying these rules, we are at a loss to see what fac-
tual issues Coop believes exist in the record before us. 
The sale was for much more than $ 500. It was not 
in writing. There was no written confirmation of the 
contract. It was not within any of the exceptions enu-
merated in section 2-201(3), U.CC On the record, the 
trial court properly sustained the motion for summary 
judgment. 
Coop urges that equity will not allow the statute of 
frauds to be used as a shield for wrongdoing. In sup-
port of this point, it quotes the following from Hecht 
v. Marsh (1920), 105 Neb. 502, 181 N W 135,17 A. 
L. R. 1: "In Simonton, Jones & Hatcher v. Liverpool, 
London & Globe Ins. Co., 51 Go. 76, the following 
rule is announced: 'Equity will not allow the statute of 
frauds to be used as an instrument of fraud, and will de-
cree specific performance or hold the maker of a parol 
contract estopped from denying it when the other party, 
by virtue of it, and under and in pursuance of it, has so 
far acted as that it would be aiding in a fraud to permit 
the contract to be repudiated. And what equity would 
do, our courts of law, under proper allegations, will also 
do.'" 
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Hecht v. Marsh, supra, involved a sale and exchange 
[*543] of lands. The seller refused to sign the contract 
unless the buyer put up forfeit money as evidence of 
good faith. To induce the seller to waive this require-
ment, the broker orally agreed to waive his commission 
if the transaction was not completed. When the contract 
was not performed, the broker sued for his commission. 
This court held that equity will not allow the statute of 
frauds to be used as an instrument of fraud. Where a 
party to a written contract within the statute of frauds 
induces another to waive some provision [**90] upon 
which he is entitled to insist and thereby change his po-
sition to his disadvantage because of that party's induce-
ment, the inducing party will be estopped to claim that 
such oral modification is invalid because not in writing. 
This, however, is not the situation in the instant case. 
Coop is laboring under a misapprehension. It is clear 
to us that the mere breach or violation of an oral agree-
ment which is specifically covered by the statute of 
frauds by one of the parties thereto or the mere denial 
of an agreement or refusal to perform it is not of itself a 
fraud either in equity or in law for which the court should 
give relief. The mere pleading of reliance on the con-
tract to his detriment should not be sufficient to permit 
a party to assert rights and defenses based on a contract 
barred by the statute of frauds. If he were permitted to 
do so, the statute of frauds would be rendered meaning-
less and nugatory. The mere failure to perform an oral 
contract within the statute where no relation of trust and 
confidence exists does not constitute fraud authorizing 
the right to relief. In Hecht v. Marsh, supra, the broker 
induced the seller to waive specific provisions of a writ-
ten contract on his oral agreement to waive his fee. To 
have permitted the broker to have used the statute on his 
oral inducing agreement would have constituted a fraud 
on the seller. 
The plaintiffs petition is framed on the theory of 
promissory estoppel, which generally is a promise by 
one party upon which another relies to his detriment, 
and [*544] which the promisor should reasonably have 
foreseen would cause the promisee to so rely. It operates 
not in regard to a part or presently existing state of facts 
but rather to a situation which one party promises will 
be true in the future. Unlike equitable estoppel, it gives 
rise to a cause of action for damages. In determining 
whether promissory estoppel establishes a defense to the 
statute of frauds, as contended by Coop, it is necessary 
to analyze the doctrine of promissory estoppel. 
Section 90 of Restatement, Contracts 2d, TenL Di. 
No. 2 (1965), states the doctrine of promissory estoppel 
in the following terms: "A promise which the promisor 
should reasonably expect to induce action or forbear-
ance on the part of the promisee or a third person and 
which does induce such action or forbearance is bind-
ing if injustice can be avoided only by enforcement of 
the promise. The remedy for breach may be limited as 
justice requires." 
Traditionally, the promissory estoppel claim has been 
used to supply the element of consideration where to 
refuse enforcement of a promise unsupported by a con-
sideration would work an injustice to the party who re-
lied to his detriment on the promise. Calamari&Perillo, 
The Law of Contracts, §§ 99 to 105 (1970). W* do not 
have such situation here. 
Wfe note that section 2-201, U.CC, contains no 
promissory estoppel exception to the statute of frauds. 
The statute of frauds is still operative in this jurisdiction. 
It applies to the enforcement of oral contracts except as 
otherwise provided by section 2-201, U.CC The posi-
tion we take is that promissory estoppel usually applies 
only in cases where there is a promise or representation 
as to an intended abandonment by the promisor of a legal 
right which he holds or will hold against the promisee. 
This was the situation present in the Hecht case. This 
also is the interpretation which gives full effect to the 
statute of frauds rather than rendering it nugatory as 
the interpretation urged by Coop would [*545] do. In 
reference to this position, we determine section 90 of 
Restatement, Contracts 2d, Tent. Dr. No. 2 (1965), is 
limited in scope to informal contracts of a unilateral na-
ture and its purpose in such instances is to dispense with 
the requirements of consideration to support the promise 
where it applies. 
The motion for summary judgment was properly sus-
tained. The judgment is affirmed. 
Affirmed. 
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OPINION: [*355] A Buyer of cotton brought this ac-
tion against the Sellers to recover damages arising out 
of the failure of the Sellers to deliver cotton to the Buyer 
as promised orally, and for their failure to keep an oral 
promise to sign and deliver a written contract that would 
comply with the Statute of Frauds providing for the sale 
of the cotton. The trial Court granted the summary judg-
ment of the Defendant-Sellers on the basis of Section 
2.201 of the Texas Business & Commerce Code, Statute 
of Frauds. WB affirm. 
Kenneth Newcomb, as agent for Royce Cooley, who in 
turn was the agent of H. Molsen & Co., Inc., negotiated 
with two farmers, Ernest B. Hicks and Norman Hicks, 
for the sale of their 1973 cotton production on some 
5,000 acres to Molsen. Molsen contends that a writ-
ten agreement was arrived at between Newcomb and the 
Hicks brothers; that the Hicks brothers agreed to sign it 
but never did; and that in reliance on such agreement to 
sign the contract, Molsen hedged its purchase by selling 
an equivalent number of bales for delivery at harvest 
time and suffered monetary damages when the Hicks 
brothers did not sign the contract and subsequently sold 
their cotton to another buyer after the price of cotton had 
gone up. 
The Appellant, Molsen, asserts that the trial Court 
erred in granting the summary judgment as to each of 
the Defendants because there is evidence to raise a fact 
issue as to whether such Defendant is estopped to as-
sert the Statute of Frauds. In upholding the defense of 
the Statute of Frauds, the trial Court specifically states 
in its judgment that it is done on the basis of Section 
2.201, Tex.Bus. & Comm. Code Ann. That Section 
provides that a contract for the sale of goods for the 
price of $500.00 or more is not enforceable unless there 
is some writing sufficient to indicate that a contract for 
sale has been made between the parties and signed by 
the party against whom enforcement is sought There 
is no contract of writing here, but Appellant [*356] al-
leges that the Appellees are precluded from asserting the 
Statute of Frauds by the doctrine of promissory estop-
pel. That doctrine, in summary, may be said to be that 
if a party promises to sign a writing in a situation within 
the Statute of Frauds, and the other party relies on the 
promise to his detriment, the promise may be enforced 
as if the writing had been signed. See "Moore" Burger, 
Inc. u Phillips Petroleum Company, 492 S.W.2d 934 
(Tex. 1972); Cooper Petroleum Company v. LaGloria 
Oil and Gas Company, 436 SM2d 889 (The 1969); 
Comment: Wright, Promissory Estoppel Marches On — 
Mooreburger, 28 Baylor L.Re* 703(1976). 
WB are of the opinion that the application of the doc-
trine to this case must fail for the reason that there was no 
complete agreement ever reached by the parties as to the 
terms of the written contract. The written contract is not 
before us, and there is some indication that it may be lost. 
The finality of such agreement and the terms that were 
agreed upon must be gleaned from the deposition of the 
two Appellees and the agent Newcomb, who negotiated 
with them. In deciding whether or not there is a dis-
puted material fact issue precluding summary judgment, 
evidence favorable to the non-movant will be taken as 
true, and every reasonable inference must be indulged 
in favor of the non-movants and any doubts resolved in 
their favor. Wilcox v. St. Mary's University of San 
Antonio, Inc, 531 S.W.2d589 (Tex. 1975). Reviewing 
the evidence in that light, we conclude that no binding 
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agreement was reached as to a written contract. The 
negotiations were carried on by Newcomb with the two 
Hicks brothers, and, at that time, he filled in blanks on 
a printed form contract. The best of the evidence is that 
there were farms listed, the number of bales or acres 
agreed upon, the price was agreed upon, and these items 
were inserted on the written form; and that neither he 
nor either of the Hicks brothers signed the writing. Mr. 
Newcomb testified several times that the acceptance of 
the contract or their signing of it was dependent on its 
being approved by their attorney, Mr. John Shepherd. 
He said at one point: "I typed up the statement and they 
were to take it to Mr. Shepherd for his approval and for 
him to look over and if it satisfied them, if it satisfied 
Mr. Shepherd, they would accept the contract and sign 
it." And at another point, the question to Mr. Newcomb 
was: "All right. Now, was the agreement made from — 
on that day?" Answer: "Well, it was my understanding 
that it would — if it was approved by their attorney that it 
would be acceptable." When asked what report he made 
to his principal, Mr. Cooley, he said: "That they had 
agreed to accept his offer and that they would sign the 
contract as soon as it was acceptable — as soon — if it was 
a satisfactory contract with their attorney." Additionally, 
there was testimony by Mr. Newcomb that there were 
certain changes to be made in the printed form of the 
contract, and that he never knew whether those changes 
were ever made or not after the contract was taken to 
the attorney. He gave the contract to the Appellees to 
take to their attorney; and in response to a question as to 
whether when they left his office, the Appellees still had 
some question about the contract, he responded: "Yes. 
They were going to satisfy themselves." As indicated, 
the writing prepared by Mr. Newcomb is not in evi-
dence, but we are of the opinion that whatever its terms 
were, there was no meeting of the minds as to the final 
terms and no acceptance by the Appellees of the writings. 
The trial Court properly applied the Statute of Frauds, 
as there was no contract in writing. The judgment of the 
trial Court is affirmed. 
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OPINION: [*124] BRIGHT, Senior Circuit Judge. 
Delaware McDonald's Corp. (McDonald's) appeals 
from a judgment of the United States Magistrate nl find-
ing McDonald's liable to Dr. John A. Mahoney under 
the doctrine of promissory estoppel for failing to ex-
ecute a lease upon a newly purchased building. For 
reversal, McDonald's argues that the magistrate erred 
as follows: (1) in concluding that one Jack Baringer had 
apparent authority to act on behalf of McDonald's, (2) 
in concluding that liability existed under the doctrine of 
promissory estoppel, and (3) in calculating the amount 
of damages. We affirm the determination of liability on 
the basis of promissory estoppel but remand for further 
consideration of the damages. 
nl The Hon. David D. Noce, United States 
Magistrate, presiding by consent of the parties pur-
suant to 28 US.C. § 656Xc)(l). 
I. BACKGROUND. 
Mahoney owned two buildings located at 105 and 
107 North Eighth Street in St. Louis, Missouri. In 
the late fall of 1978, Mahoney had conversations with 
Jack Baringer, a real estate representative in McDonald's 
St. Louis Regional Office, exploring the possibility of 
locating a McDonald's restaurant in Mahoney's build-
ings. In early 1979, Baringer visited the building at 
107 North Eighth Street and indicated McDonald's in-
terest in acquiring a larger store. Mahoney observed that 
the adjoining building at 109 North Eighth, although 
the same size as the 107 building, could be enlarged 
by the construction of an addition. Mahoney suggested 
that he could purchase the 109 building and lease it to 
McDonald's. 
On March 10, 1979, Mahoney and his attorney, 
William Bowles, met Baringer at McDonald's Regional 
Office to discuss a lease on the 109 building. Baringer 
advised Mahoney and Bowles at this meeting that any 
lease would be approved by the St. Louis Regional 
Office and then had to be formally reviewed and ap-
proved at McDonald's Oak Brook, Illinois office. At 
or before this meeting, Mahoney received a speci-
men copy of McDonald's store lease form which gives 
McDonald's a conditional right of cancellation. n2 
n2 If it is determined from the Lessee's inspection 
that the premises cannot be altered or remodeled in 
order for the Lessee to utilize the demised premises 
for a McDonald's Restaurant, or that the premises 
contain frontage, depth, or square footage leas than 
the amount in the building plan, or that the utility 
lines are not adequate, then the Lessee shall have the 
right to notify the Lessor of its intention to cancel 
770 F.2d 123, *124 
Page 34 
LEXSEE 
this Lease, in which event this Lease shall terminate 
without further liability to either party. 
On May 2, 1979, Mahoney executed an earnest money 
contract to purchase the 109 building and land for 
$300,000. The contract permitted Mahoney to termi-
nate the purchase agreement for any reason within sixty 
days and receive a refund of his $1,000 earnest money 
deposit. On May 7, Mahoney and his attorney again met 
with Baringer at McDonald's Regional Office to nego-
tiate several modifications Mahoney wished to make in 
McDonald's form lease. At this meeting, the parties 
agreed to a twenty-year lease, annual rental starting at 
$19,500, and an occupancy date of August 15. Mahoney 
advised Baringer of his sixty-day option contract on the 
109 building. [*125] On May 11, 1979, Mahoney's at-
torney sent a letter to Baringer enclosing a copy of the 
option contract on the 109 building and an addendum to 
McDonald's form lease based on the parties' May 7 ne-
gotiations. In early June, Baringer informed Mahoney 
on at least two occasions that a lease would be forwarded 
as soon as it was typed. 
On June 29, Mahoney had not yet received a lease. 
He called Baringer and advised him that the option on 
the 109 building would end on July 1. Mahoney asked 
Baringer if the parties had a deal and Baringer replied, 
"WB have a deal. Do you want to blow it?" Baringer 
stated that the lease was coming. On July 1, Mahoney 
exercised his option to purchase the 109 building and 
deposited an additional $9,000 earnest money. 
On July 2, Baringer notified Mahoney that the 
lease was ready and Mrs. Mahoney picked it up at 
McDonald's Regional Office. Upon reviewing the 
lease, Mahoney's attorney discovered that the rental 
amount differed from the amount agreed upon at the May 
7 meeting and that McDonald's had typed the lease on 
a different lease form. On July 10, Mahoney contacted 
Baringer and objected to the changes. Baringer agreed 
to increase the rental to the amount agreed upon and to 
retype the lease on the form McDonald's had originally 
supplied. Mahoney agreed to one change in the terms 
of the addenda: Rather than requiring McDonald's to 
pay one-third of the cost for remodeling the facade of 
the 109 building, McDonald's contribution would not 
exceed $10,000. 
Sometime between July 20 and July 25, Baringer for-
warded a corrected lease form to Mahoney. This lease 
was on the form originally furnished to Mahoney, pro-
vided for a rental of $19,500 per year and incorpo-
rated the May 11 addenda verbatim. The only differ-
ence between this lease and the agreement reflected in 
the May 11 letter was a "Work Addendum" added by 
McDonald'8 which limited McDonald's contribution for 
the facade remodeling to $10,000 and which provided 
that McDonald's would install its own entrance doors. 
Mahoney signed the revised lease on July 25 and re-
turned it to McDonald's. He changed the date of oc-
cupancy from August 15 to September 1 and noted on 
McDonald's work addendum that McDonald's would 
provide entrance door frames as well as doors. On July 
31, Mahoney closed the sale on the 109 building. 
In late August 1979, Robert Doran, McDonald's 
senior manager for the St. Louis region, inspected 
the 109 building site and advised Mahoney that the 
site was not acceptable to him. On September 12, 
Mahoney visited McDonald's Regional Office and met 
Webb Blessley, who identified himself as Baringer's su-
pervisor. Blessley stated he was taking over the mat-
ter of leasing the 109 building and informed Mahoney 
that McDonald's was having second thoughts about the 
location. Mahoney talked to Blessley about enlarging 
the 109 building by constructing an addition. In a let-
ter dated October 3, 1979, Mahoney offered to con-
struct an addition and lease McDonald's a total of 5,000 
square feet for $34,000 per year. Mahoney indicated 
that this letter "would serve to waive the August 1979 
lease." This proposal did not satisfy McDonald's and on 
October 12, 1979 Blessley wrote to Mahoney formally 
terminating negotiations and returning the lease which 
Mahoney had signed. 
In March 1980, Mahoney leased the ground floor 
of the 109 building to Greiner's Submarine Sandwich 
Shops, Inc. for five years at $19,200 per year. Greiner's 
terminated its lease on December 31, 1981 by leaving in 
the middle of the night. Mahoney also made several at-
tempts to sell the 109 building as part of a package with 
his buildings at 105 and 107 North Eighth. From March 
1981 to July 1981 he negotiated with Southwestern Bell 
Telephone Company regarding the purchase of the build-
ings for $1,300,000. He then entered an option contract 
with Donn Lipton, giving Lipton the right to purchase 
the three buildings for $1,546,500. Unfortunately for 
Mahoney, neither deal was consummated. In September 
1983, Mahoney's wife [*126] opened a cafe on the 
ground floor of the 109 building. 
Mahoney claimed that he incurred $736,171.82 in 
expenses related to the purchase of the 109 building; 
$300,000 in purchase price debt and $436,171.82 in 
interest, taxes, insurance, etc. Offset against these 
expenses were the fair market value of the building, 
$300,000, plus $107,217.24 in income received. Thus, 
according to Mahoney, the expenses relating to the pur-
chase exceeded the credits by $328,954.58. The magis-
trate adopted these debits and credits in assessing dam-
6 
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ages. 
n. DISCUSSION. 
A. Apparent Authority. 
Before examining the magistrate's application of 
promissory estoppel, we must first decide whether 
McDonald's should be bound by Baringer's statements. 
Under Missouri law, apparent authority exists when a 
principal has created such an appearance of things that it 
causes a third person reasonably and prudently to believe 
that a second person has the power to act as the princi-
pal's agent. Thailv. Industrial Commission, Division of 
Employment Security, 540 S.W2d 179, 181 (Mo. App. 
1976); Dudley v. Dumont, 526 S.W2d 839, 845 (Mo. 
App. 1975); see S.S. Silberblatt, Inc. v. Seaboard 
Surety Co., 417F.U 1043, 1049 (8th Cir. 1969). The 
magistrate concluded that Baringer had apparent author-
ity to act as McDonald's agent because McDonald's had 
placed him in a position where it was reasonable to 
assume that he had authority to negotiate and execute 
leases binding on McDonald's. Mahoney v. Delaware 
McDonald's Corp., No. 80-665 C(4), slip op. at 15 
(E.D. Mo. Oct. 9, 1984). 
McDonald's contends that it was not reasonable for 
Mahoney to assume that Baringer had authority to act 
on behalf of McDonald's. In support of this con-
tention, it points to the magistrate's finding of fact 
no. 8: "Baringer advised [Mahoney] that the lease 
would be approved by the St. Louis Regional Office 
and had to be formally reviewed and executed at 
[McDonald's] Oak Brook, Illinois office." McDonald's 
argues that Mahoney could not have reasonably believed 
that Baringer had authority to bind McDonald's to a lease 
once he knew that the lease was subject to review by the 
Oak Brook office. 
We disagree. In discussing the issue of appar-
ent authority, the magistrate made the following state-
ment: "The undersigned believes that Baringer ad-
vised [Mahoney] that the execution of the lease in Oak 
Brook was a mere formality and that Baringer assured 
[Mahoney] that a lease would be forthcoming." We re-
gard this statement as a finding of fact, even though it 
appears under the heading "CONCLUSIONS OF LAW." 
See Elmore v. United States, 404 F.2d 56, 57 (6th Cir. 
1968); Solway Metal Sales, Ltd. v. Baltimore & Ohio 
Railroad Co., 120 U.S. App. D.C. 183, 344 E2d 568, 
569 (D. C. Cir. 1965). Our review of the record indicates 
that this finding is not clearly erroneous. Accordingly, 
we accept the magistrate's conclusions that "[Mahoney] 
had reason to believe and did believe that Baringer had 
authority to enter binding lease agreements on behalf 
of [McDonald's]." Thus, the magistrate did not err in 
concluding that McDonald's was bound by Baringer's 
representations. 
B. Promissory Estoppel. 
Missouri's courts have stated that there are three ele-
ments to be satisfied before the doctrine of promissory 
estoppel can be invoked: (1) a promise, (2) detrimental 
reliance on the promise, and (3) injustice can be avoided 
only by enforcement of the promise. Mayer v. King 
Cola Mid-America, Inc., 660 S.W.2d 746, 749 (Mo. 
App. 1983); Katz v. Danny Dare, Inc., 610 S. W2d 121, 
124 (Mo. App. 1980). The courts have also quoted fa-
vorably from section 90 of the Restatement of Contracts, 
indicating that the "promise" requirement will only be 
satisfied by a promise which the promisor "should rea-
sonably expect to induce action or forbearance of a defi-
nite and substantial nature." In re Jamison's Estate, 202 
S.W.2d 879, 886 (Mo. 1947); Mayer v. King Cola 
Mid-America, Inc., supra, 660 S. W2d at 749. 
[*127] At trial, Mahoney argued that the elements of 
promissory estoppel were present in this case because 
he had purchased the building in reliance on Baringer's 
promise that the parties had "a deal." The magistrate 
found that Baringer had indeed made the promise and 
that Mahoney had acted in reliance. Accordingly, he 
held McDonald's liable under the doctrine of promis-
sory estoppel. 
McDonald's argues that none of the elements of 
promissory estoppel are satisfied in this case. First, it 
contends that it never promised to lease the 109 building 
from Mahoney. In support of this contention, it states 
that Baringer and Mahoney were still engaged in prelim-
inary negotiations when Mahoney purchased the build-
ing and that Baringer never promised that McDonald's 
would lease the building from Mahoney. 
The magistrate properly rejected McDonald's "nego-
tiation" contention. The only "negotiations" occurred 
when Baringer attempted to alter the terms outlined in 
Mahoney' s attorney' s letter dated May 11,1979 (memo-
rializing the parties' May 7, 1979 agreement), and those 
negotiations resulted in restoration of the agreed upon 
terms. No other changes of any substance were made 
to the parties' original agreement. McDonald's con-
tention that Baringer never made a promise to Mahoney 
is in direct conflict with the magistrate's finding of fact. 
McDonald's attempts to reargue the evidence, but does 
not assert that the finding was clearly erroneous. We 
conclude that the finding is plausible in light of the con-
flicting evidence presented at the trial and, in deference 
to the magistrate's superior position to determine the 
credibility of the witnesses before him, we accept the 
finding. See Anderson v. City of Bessemer City, 470 
U.S. 564, 105 S. a. 1504, 1512, 84 L Ed. 2d 518 
770 R2d 123, *127 
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(1985). Accordingly, we conclude that the first element 
of promissory estoppel is present in this case. 
McDonald's next argues that Mahoney could not have 
reasonably relied on Baringer's statement, "We have a 
deal," because he knew that Baringer did not have the 
authority to commit McDonald's to a lease. This ar-
gument simply repeats McDonald's earlier contention 
that Mahoney knew that all leases had to be reviewed at 
McDonald's Oak Park, Illinois office. We rejected that 
contention in our discussion of apparent authority, and 
we reject it here as well. 
Finally, McDonald's argues that the doctrine of 
promissory estoppel does not apply to this case because 
the claim is barred by the statute of frauds and because 
Mahoney waived the claim in his letter of October 3, 
1979. The magistrate noted that, under Missouri law, 
a court may enforce oral promises otherwise barred by 
the statute of frauds if enforcement is necessary to pre-
vent a deep-seated fraud or equitable wrong. He con-
cluded that barring Mahoney's action in this case would 
result in a deep-seated injustice because Mahoney not 
only lost the promised lease, he also purchased a build-
ing and incurred substantial expenses. WB think this 
is a permissible application of state law and we defer 
to the magistrate's interpretation. The magistrate also 
concluded that Mahoney's letter of October 3, 1979, in 
which he stated, "This letter will also serve to waive 
our previous lease," did not constitute a waiver, because 
waiver is an intentional relinquishment of a known right 
and there was no evidence that Mahoney used the word 
in its legal sense. Ws agree. 
We conclude that the magistrate did not err in apply-
ing the doctrine of promissory estoppel to the facts in 
this case. Mahoney could have allowed his option on 
the subject property to lapse. He acted further and pur-
chased the building only when assured by Baringer that 
"we have a deal." These events, together with the ob-
vious injustice which would result if Mahoney is left 
holding an empty bag, are sufficient to invoke the doc-
trine of promissory estoppel. 
C Damages. 
Under the doctrine of promissory estoppel, damages 
may be measured by the extent of the promisee's re-
liance. Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 90 com-
ment d (1979). In other words, our objective in this 
case is to reimburse Mahoney for the [*128] expenses 
he incurred in reliance on McDonald's promise to lease 
the 109 building. 
Mahoney borrowed the entire $300,000 used to pur-
chase the 109 building. From July 1979 to November 
1983, he claims that he paid $404,342.83 in interest on 
that loan. During this period, he also paid $31,828.99 
for taxes, insurance, etc. on the building. The mag-
istrate concluded that Mahoney was entitled to receive 
100% of these expenses as part of his reliance damages. 
McDonald's contends that the magistrate erred in award-
ing 100% of the expenses. It argues that Mahoney's 
damages should be limited to exclude the amount he 
could have avoided by acting prudently when he learned 
that McDonald's had repudiated the lease. 
Ws think McDonald's contention has merit Under 
section 90 of the Restatement (Second) of Contracts, the 
remedy in promissory estoppel cases "may be limited 
as justice requires." It would be unjust for Mahoney 
to hold the 109 building indefinitely while McDonald's 
paid interest on the purchase price. Instead, Mahoney 
was entitled to a reasonable time to sell the building 
or make an alternative disposition of it. His expenses 
during this time, plus any loss sustained on the dispo-
sition of the building, would constitute his just reliance 
damages. 
The record does not indicate that Mahoney ever made 
any attempt to sell the 109 building after McDonald's 
breached the lease. There is no indication that the build-
ing was not marketable; in fact, the magistrate found 
that it had a fair market value of $300,000. If Mahoney 
could have sold the building for $300,000 in 1979, we 
must conclude that his failure to do so was baaed on his 
decision that he could do better for himself by making 
an alternative disposition of the building. n3 Therefore, 
once Mahoney decided to keep the building, he was no 
longer acting in reliance on McDonald's promise, he 
was acting on the basis of his own decision. 
n3 For example, he might have concluded that 
he could do better by selling the 109 building in 
a "package" with the two contiguous buildings that 
he already owned. In fact, Mahoney has negotiated 
with both Southwestern Bell Telephone Company 
and Donn Lipton regarding a package deal on all 
three buildings. 
In March of 1980, Mahoney decided to lease the 
ground floor of the building to a sandwich shop. This 
occurred five months after McDonald's terminated dis-
cussions and returned the lease documents to Mahoney. 
On the basis of the above analysis, we conclude that 
this lease represented Mahoney's decision to keep the 
property in spite of McDonald's refusal to execute a 
lease. We think that the five months Mahoney actually 
spent in deciding what disposition to make of the build-
ing was a reasonable time under the facts of this case. 
Accordingly, we conclude that Mahoney is entitled to 
770 F.2d 123, *128 
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reimbursement for the interest and other expenses in-
curred prior to March 1980. Subsequent expenses are 
Mahoney's responsibility because they represent a cal-
culated risk on his part to hold on to the building instead 
of selling it outright. 
HI. CONCLUSION. 
We affirm in part and reverse in part and remand for a 
redetermination of damages consistent with this opinion. 
No costs are awarded in this appeal. 
Page 39 
622 N.E.2d 1093 printed in FULL format. 
MCCARTHY, LEBIT, CRYSTAL & HAIMAN CQ, L.P.A., Appellant, v. FIRST UNION 
MANAGEMENT, INC et al., AppeUees 
No. 61868 
Court of Appeals of Ohio, Eighth Appellate District, Cuyahoga County 
87 Ohio App. 3d 613; 622 N.E.2d 1093; 1993 Ohio App. LEXIS 2382 
May 6, 1993, Decided 
PRIOR HISTORY: [**1] 
CHARACTER OF PROCEEDING: Civil appeal from 
Court of Common Pleas. Case No. 186,890 
DISPOSITION: Judgment accordingly. 
COUNSEL: Marshall I. Nurenberg, for appellant. 
James T. Crowley, Keith L. Carson and Kathleen B. 
Df Angelo, for appellees. 
JUDGES: Nugent, Judge. Blackmon, J., concurs. John 
F. Corrigan, P.J., dissents. 
OPINIONBY: NUGENT 
OPINION: [*615] This is an appeal from the Cuyahoga 
County Court of Common Pleas, which granted the mo-
tion for summary judgment filed jointly by defendants-
appellees [*616] First Union Management, Inc. and 
First Union Real Estate Equity and Mortgage Investment 
(collectively, "First Union") against plaintiff-appellant 
McCarthy, Lebit, Crystal & Haiman Co., L.P.A. 
("McCarthy, Lebit"). 
Pertinent to this appeal, McCarthy, Lebit's amended 
complaint asserts claims for relief of, among other 
things, nl breach of contract and promissory estoppel 
(first claim for relief), fraud (third claim for relief) 
and negligent misrepresentation (fourth claim for relief). 
McCarthy, Lebit* s amended complaint generally alleges 
that First Union, the owner and manager of real prop-
erty commonly known as 55 Public Square, Cleveland, 
Ohio (the Illuminating Building), breached an oral lease 
agreement [**2] entered into with McCarthy, Lebit for 
space in the above premises. In separate answers, both 
First Union entities denied that an oral lease agree-
ment had been entered into and raised the defense that 
McCarthy, Lebit's claims were barred by the statute of 
frauds. Additionally, First Union Management asserted 
a counterclaim for unpaid operating expenses, which was 
subsequently dismissed. 
nl McCarthy, Lebit's other claims for relief were 
dismissed at various stages throughout the proceed-
ings. Count two, alleging intentional interference 
with business relationships, was dismissed without 
prejudice by stipulation of the parties. Count five, 
alleging conversion for overcharges, was dismissed 
with prejudice, and count six, alleging mail and wire 
fraud in violation of Sections 1341 and 1962, Title 
18, U.S.Code, was withdrawn. 
On March 25, 1991, First Union moved for sum-
mary judgment on McCarthy, Lebit's remaining claims 
for breach of an oral lease agreement and promissory 
estoppel, fraud and negligent misrepresentation. [**3] 
McCarthy, Lebit duly opposed First Union's motion. 
Evidentiary materials submitted in support of and in op-
position to First Union's motion indicate that McCarthy, 
Lebit occupied space in the Illuminating Building since 
1961. In 1989, McCarthy, Lebit occupied a total of 
9,565 square feet of space under two separate leases, 
both of which were scheduled to expire on November 
1, 1989. Sometime in the spring of 1989, the parties 
entered into negotiations to renew McCarthy, Lebit's 
existing space as well as to occupy space being vacated 
by another tenant ("Sweeney space"). 
McCarthy, Lebit partners Larry Crystal and Irwin 
Haiman were appointed by the law firm to negotiate a 
new lease with First Union for the space then occupied, 
as well as the Sweeney space which the firm intended 
to occupy. In preparation for negotiations, Crystal re-
viewed the existing leases between McCarthy, Lebit and 
First Union, as well as a lease between another tenant, 
represented by Crystal, and First Union. Crystal was 
well aware that each lease contained a legend on its face 
and on the signature page stating that: 
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"This Lease is being forwarded for your approval and 
execution on the understanding that it shall [**4] not be-
come effective until it is accepted by the Landlord and 
its counsel and executed by the Landlord." 
[*617] Crystal, on deposition, stated that the legend 
meant "exactly what it says." 
Subsequently, on April 13, 1988, Crystal and Haiman 
met with Arthur Roth, then an assistant vice president 
of leasing at First Union Management, at the offices of 
McCarthy, Lebit. At that time, Roth was responsible for 
obtaining new tenants and renewing existing tenants in 
the Illuminating Building. At that meeting, Crystal in-
formed Roth that McCarthy, Lebit was interested only in 
a "good deal" because it had received solicitations from 
other nearby buildings seeking tenants. Roth testified 
that First Union wanted McCarthy, Lebit to remain in 
the building because it was a very prestigious law firm 
and had always paid its rent on time. Roth put forth 
two proposals: one was a five-year lease renewal at $ 
13 per square foot with an option for another five years 
at market rates; and the other was a ten-year lease re-
newal with a base rental rate of $ 12.50 per square foot 
for the first five years and $ 13.50 per square foot for 
the second five years. Crystal and Haiman both asserted 
that the [**5] parties agreed to the second option and that 
McCarthy, Lebit would also obtain the adjacent Sweeney 
space at the same rate that Sweeney was paying until his 
lease expired. The Sweeney space would be added into 
the McCarthy, Lebit lease before the date upon which 
Sweeney was to vacate his space. Both parties agreed to 
leave open for further discussion the base year (1987 or 
1988) and denominator (leased space or leasable space) 
to be utilized in connection with the escalation clause in 
any lease that might be entered into. Other provisions 
for the lease would reflect the standard lease employed 
in the past by First Union and other tenants in the build-
ing. At the conclusion of the meeting, Roth indicated to 
both Crystal and Haiman that he would need to discuss 
the deal with his superior at First Union, Dan Nixon. 
Likewise, Crystal and Haiman indicated that they had to 
discuss the proposal with their partners. The three men 
then shook hands to seal the deal. 
Following the meeting, Crystal prepared a memoran-
dum to his partners discussing the offer submitted by 
Roth and discussing the differences between the par-
ties with respect to the base year and leased-vs.-leasable 
space. That [**6] same day, the partners of McCarthy, 
Lebit met to discuss the proposed lease agreement. They 
then prepared a wish list which they hoped to have added 
to the lease. The following day, Haiman and Roth met to 
discuss the wish list. Roth rejected McCarthy, Lebit's 
wish list. Subsequently, Haiman informed Roth that 
McCarthy, Lebit accepted the terms of the agreement 
reached at the April 13, 1988 meeting. Additionally, 
Irwin Haiman averred that he and Roth agreed that the 
base year would be 1988 and that the rent would be de-
termined by calculating on the basis of leasable space as 
opposed to leased space. 
Following this meeting, Roth discussed the entire 
agreement with his supervisor, Dan Nixon, who ap-
proved the deal. Roth then told McCarthy, Lebit that 
the parties had a deal and that he would begin die pa-
perwork. However, the [*618] paperwork could not be 
completed at that time because First Union did not know 
the date upon which the Sweeney space would be avail-
able for McCarthy, Lebit* s occupancy. 
Over the next few months, Haiman repeatedly con-
tacted Roth to determine when a written lease agree-
ment would be prepared. Roth repeatedly indicated that 
a written lease agreement would [**7] be forthcoming 
and that the only reason for the delay was that First 
Union was behind in its paperwork. In reliance upon 
Roth's assurances, McCarthy, Lebit did not look for 
other space. 
As early as July 1989, when George Sirow became 
Roth's supervisor, Roth knew that First Union did not 
intend to honor the agreement reached with McCarthy, 
Lebit and that First Union planned on presenting new 
terms to the lease agreement as well as represent to 
McCarthy, Lebit that Roth did not possess authority to 
bind First Union. However, it was not until August 1989 
that Sirow, First Union's vice-president of operations, 
and Roth requested a meeting with Crystal and Haiman 
to discuss the lease agreement. At this meeting, Sirow, 
for the first time, asserted that Roth lacked authority 
to bind First Union and that the rental price would be 
increased by three dollars per square foot. McCarthy, 
Lebit refused to pay this price, did not sign a lease with 
First Union, and eventually moved their offices from the 
Illuminating Building. 
Finally, Crystal's deposition testimony indicates that 
he and other attorneys at McCarthy, Lebit represented 
other tenants of the Illuminating Building in negotia-
tions [**8] with First Union. On those occasions, the 
person with whom the McCarthy, Lebit attorneys dealt 
was Arthur Roth. Crystal stated that leases orally ne-
gotiated with Roth were honored by First Union. Over 
the years, Roth had developed an expertise in these ne-
gotiations and a reputation that his word could be relied 
upon. 
Based on the foregoing, the trial court granted First 
Union's motion for summary judgment. McCarthy, 
Lebit timely appeals, raising the following assignments 
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of error: 
"I. The court erred in granting summary judgment to 
the defendants by finding that the theory of promissory 
estoppel was not applicable to the evidence. 
"II. The court erred in granting defendants' motion 
for summary judgment by concluding that there was no 
evidence to support a jury finding that the defendants 
were liable for negligent misrepresentation. 
"HI. The court erred in granting defendants' motion 
for summary judgment by finding that a contract was 
not in existence. 
"IV. The court erred in granting defendants' motion 
for summary judgment by finding that any oral agree-
ment on the facts of this case was unenforceable under the 
statute of frauds (Ohio Revised Code Sections 1335.04, 
1335.05)." 
[*619][**9]I 
McCarthy, Lebit's first, third and fourth assignments 
of error are interrelated and will, therefore, be consid-
ered jointly. Collectively, McCarthy, Lebit argues the 
trial court erred in granting First Union's motion for 
summary judgment. In its first assignment of error, 
McCarthy, Lebit contends that a material issue of fact 
exists on its separate claim for relief based on promis-
sory estoppel. In its third and fourth assignments of 
error, McCarthy, Lebit argues that a material issue of 
fact exists as to whether an oral lease agreement was 
established under the facts of the present case and that 
such agreement was not barred by the statute of frauds 
under the doctrine of promissory estoppel. 
A court reviewing the granting of a summary judg-
ment must follow the standard set forth in Civ.R. 56(C). 
Stegawskiv. Cleveland Anesthesia Group, Inc. (1987), 
370hioApp.3d 78,523N.E.2d902. Civ.R. 56(C) pro-
vides that before summary judgment can be granted, it 
must be determined that "(1) [n]o genuine issue as to 
any material fact remains to be litigated; (2) the moving 
party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law; and (3) it 
appears from [**10] the evidence that reasonable minds 
can come to but one conclusion, and viewing such evi-
dence most strongly in favor of the party against whom 
the motion for summary judgment is made, that conclu-
sion is adverse to that party." Temple v. Vkan United, 
Inc. (1977), 50 Ohio St.2d 317, 327, 4 0.0.3d 466, 
472,364N.E.2d267,274. 
In Viock v. Stowe-Vtoodward Co. (1983), 13 Ohio 
App.3d 7, 14-15, 13 OBR 8, 16, 467 N.E.2d 1378, 
1386, the court held in pertinent part that: 
"Wfe recognize that summary judgment, pursuant to 
Civ.R. 56, is a salutary procedure in the administration 
of justice. It is also, however, a procedure which should 
be used cautiously and with the utmost care so that a lit-
igant's right to a trial, wherein the evidentiary portion 
of the litigant's case is presented and developed, is not 
usurped in the presence of conflicting facts and infer-
ences. * * * It is settled law that '[t]he inferences to 
be drawn from the underlying facts contained in the af-
fidavits and other exhibits must be viewed in the light 
most favorable to the party opposing the motion * * 
[**11] *' which party in the instant case is appellant. 
Hounshellv. American States Ins. Co. (1981), 67 Ohio 
St.2d427, 433[21 0.0.3d 267, 271, 424 N.E.2d3U, 
314]; see Far Eastern Textile, Ltd. v. City National 
Bank & Trust Co. (S.D.Ohio 1977), 430 ESupp. 193, 
196. It is imperative to remember that the purpose of 
summary judgment is not to try issues of fact, but rather 
to determine whether triable issues of fact exist" 
The first issue presented by McCarthy, Lebit's ap-
peal is whether a material issue of fact exists concerning 
McCarthy, Lebit's claim that the parties reached an oral 
lease agreement. If this court should find that McCarthy, 
Lebit failed to raise a material issue of fact regarding the 
existence of an oral lease [*620] agreement, then the is-
sue of the applicability of the statute of frauds barring 
enforcement of said oral lease agreement would be ren-
dered moot. Moreover, McCarthy, Lebit's claim based 
on promissory estoppel would also be rendered moot 
since McCarthy, Lebit's complaint alleges that it detri-
mentally relied upon the alleged oral lease "to forebear 
accepting any [**12] other offers to lease space." Given 
the allegations and posture of the present cause of action, 
it becomes apparent that McCarthy, Lebit's reliance on 
the doctrine of promissory estoppel is stated as a shield 
to bar First Union from raising the statute of frauds. n2 
n2 In McCarthy, Lebit's first assignment of er-
ror, McCarthy, Lebit argues that it asserted a sep-
arate claim for relief based on promissory estop-
pel in count one of its complaint. However, in its 
brief in opposition to First Union's motion for sum-
mary judgment filed with the trial court, McCarthy, 
Lebit states: "Plaintiff has pled two separate and 
distinct claims for relief — one in oral contract 
supported by promissory estoppel; and one in tort 
for the negligent misrepresentations of defendants." 
Accordingly, McCarthy, Lebit failed to raise a sep-
arate claim for relief for promissory estoppel with 
the trial court. It is a well established principle of 
law in Ohio that a party cannot raise new issues for 
the first time on appeal. Addyston Village School 
Dist. Bd. ofEdn. v. Nolte Tillar Bros. Constr. 
Co. (1943), 71 Ohio App. 469, 26 OO 379, 49 
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N.E.2d99; State Planters Bank <ScThust Co. v. Fifty-
Third Union Trust Co. (1937), 56 Ohio App. 309, 
9 O. O. 29?\ 10 N.E.2d 935; Killer v. Shaw (1932), 
45 Ohio App. 303, 187 N.E. 130. In any event, 
this court concludes, infra, that a separate claim for 
relief based on promissory estoppel is barred by the 
statute of frauds. 
[**13] 
In its legal sense, the word "contract" includes every 
description of agreement or obligation, whether verbal 
or written, whereby one party becomes bound to another 
to pay a sum of money or to perform or omit to do a 
certain act. Terex Corp. v. Grim Voiding Co. (1989), 
58 Ohio App.3d 80, 568 N.E.2d 739, paragraph one of 
the syllabus. An enforceable contract may be created 
where there is an offer by one side, acceptance on the 
part of the other, and a meeting of the minds as to the 
essential terms of the agreement. 17 Ohio Jurisprudence 
3d (1980), Contracts, Section 17. An essential element 
needed to form a contract is that the parties must have a 
distinct and common intention which is communicated 
by each party to the other. Noroski v. Fallet (1982), 2 
Ohio SUd 77, 2 OBR 632, 442 N.E.2d 1302; Vbbash 
Elevator Co. v. First Natl. Bank (1872), 23 Ohio St. 
311. If the minds of the parties have not met, no con-
tract is formed. Noroski, supra, 2 Ohio St. 3d at 79,2 
OBR at 633, 442 N.E.2d at 1304. [**14] 
A contract is binding and enforceable if it encompasses 
the essential terms of the agreement. Mr. Mark Corp. 
v. Rush, Inc. (1983), 11 Ohio App. 3d 167, 11 OBR 
259, 464 N.E. 2d 586. Minor terms left unresolved do 
not vitiate an agreement if essential terms have been in-
corporated into the agreement. Id. 
This court has previously noted, in Mr. Mark Corp., 
supra, at 169, 11 OBR at 261, 464 N.E.2d at 589-590, 
that the modern view of contractual certainty is well ex-
pressed in Restatement of the Law 2d, Contracts (1981) 
92, Section 33: 
[*621] "(1) Even though a manifestation of intention 
is intended to be understood as an offer, it cannot be 
accepted so as to form a contract unless the terms of the 
contract are reasonably certain. 
"(2) The terms of a contract are reasonably certain if 
they provide a basis for determining the existence of a 
breach and for giving an appropriate remedy. 
"(3) The fact that one or more terms of a proposed 
bargain are left open or uncertain may show that a mani-
festation of intention is not intended to be understood as 
an offer or as [**15] an acceptance." See, also, Corbin 
on Contracts (1963), Section 95. 
Comment a to Section 33 of the Restatement adds: 
"[T]he actions of the parties may show conclusively 
that they have intended to conclude a binding agreement, 
even though one or more terms are missing or are left 
to be agreed upon. In such cases courts endeavor, if 
possible, to attach a sufficiently definite "v^nmg to the 
bargain. 
"An offer which appears to be indefinite may be given 
precision by usage or trade or by course of dealing be-
tween the parties. Terms may be supplied by factual 
implication, and in recurring situations the law often 
supplies a term in the absence of agreement to the con-
trary. * * * Where the parties have intended to conclude 
a bargain, uncertainty as to incidental or collateral mat-
ters is seldom fatal to the existence of the contract." 
Comment f to Section 33 notes at 95: 
"The more important the uncertainty, the stronger the 
indication is that the parties do not intend to be bound; 
minor items are more likely to be left to the option of one 
of the parties or to what is customary or reasonable." 
Further, with respect to the authority of an agent to 
bind his principal to a lease agreement, [**16] we note 
that: 
"The issue here is not actual authority, but, rather, ap-
parent authority or agency by estoppel. The terms are 
equivalent and based upon the same elements. Logsdon 
u ABCO Construction Co. (1956), 103 Ohio App. 233 
[3 aa2d289,141 N.E.2d216J. In Logsdon, the court 
defined apparent authority as follows: 
"'"This authority to act as agent may be conferred if 
the principal affirmatively or intentionally, or by lack of 
ordinary care, causes or allows third persons to act on an 
apparent agency. It is essential that two important facts 
be clearly established: (1) That the principal held the 
agent out to the public as possessing sufficient authority 
to embrace the particular act in question, or knowingly 
permitted him to act as having such authority, and (2) 
that the person dealing with the agent knew of die facts 
and acting in good faith had reason to believe [*622] 
and did believe that the agent possessed the necessary 
authority. * * *"' Id. at 241-242 [3 0.0.2dat 293-294, 
141 N.E.2d at 223]." Ammerman v. Avis Rent A Car 
System (1982), 7 Ohio App. 3d 338, 340-341, 7 OBR 
436, 438-439, 455 N.E.2d 1041, 1044-1045. [**!7] 
In the present case, the record reveals that McCarthy, 
Lebit partners Crystal and Haiman met with First 
Union's vice-president of leasing, Arthur Roth, to ne-
gotiate a lease renewal. Roth put forth two lease propos-
als. Roth, Crystal and Haiman all agreed that McCarthy, 
Lebit accepted the second option for a ten-year lease re-
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newal with a base rent of $ 12.50 per square foot for 
the first five years and $ 13.50 per square foot for the 
second five years. Crystal and Haiman both also as-
serted that McCarthy, Lebit would occupy the Sweeney 
space at the same rate Sweeney was paying until his 
lease expired. The Sweeney space would be added into 
the McCarthy, Lebit lease before the date upon which 
Sweeney was to vacate his space. Other provisions of 
the lease would reflect the standard lease used by First 
Union. Although the base year and denominator were 
left for further discussion and the parties indicated that 
approval of their respective partners and/or supervisors 
was necessary, the three men shook hands to seal the 
deal. The next day, Haiman presented Roth with a wish 
list, which Roth rejected. Haiman then informed Roth 
that McCarthy, Lebit accepted the terms of the agreement 
[**18] reached on April 13, 1988. Haiman, further, 
averred that an agreement was reached that the base year 
would be 1988 and that the rent would be determined by 
calculating on the basis of leasable space as opposed to 
leased space. In addition, Roth testified that he believed 
the parties had reached an agreement. Finally, Roth 
made numerous assurances to Haiman that he would be-
gin the paperwork on the agreement and that a written 
lease agreement would be forthcoming. These contin-
uous assurances by Roth signified Roth's authoritative 
position in these negotiations as well as emphasizing that 
the agreement was completed. 
First Union argues that at least three essential and ma-
terial terms of the alleged oral lease agreement were left 
unresolved. Consequently, First Union argues there was 
no meeting of the minds to form an oral lease agreement. 
Initially, First Union argues that there was no agreement 
as to which portion of the Sweeney space McCarthy, 
Lebit was to rent or a date upon which McCarthy, Lebit 
could occupy said space. However, an examination of 
the record reveals that McCarthy, Lebit raised a material 
issue of fact regarding the essential elements of the agree-
ment. The affidavit [**19] of Irwin Haiman indicates 
that McCarthy, Lebit was to lease that portion of the 
space which included Sweeney's office and a conference 
room. Moreover, the deposition testimony of Arthur 
Roth reveals that the lease renewal was to take effect in 
November 1989 and that the Sweeney space would be 
added into the McCarthy, Lebit lease before the [*623] 
date when Sweeney was to vacate his space. Finally, 
First Union argues that the parties never agreed upon a 
lease year or a denominator for calculating leasing obli-
gations. However, Haiman's affidavit asserts that the 
parties agreed that the rental rate would be calculated on 
a 1988 base year and it would be based on leasable (as 
opposed to leased) space. Accordingly, we conclude that 
the evidentiary materials presented by McCarthy, Lebit 
are sufficient to raise a material issue of fact regarding 
whether an oral lease agreement was entered. Wing v. 
Anchor Media, Ltd. of Texas (1991), 59 Ohio St.3d 108, 
570 N.E.2d 1095. McCarthy, Lebit's third assignment 
of error is therefore sustained. 
Having determined that McCarthy, Lebit raised a 
material issue of fact regarding the existence of an 
[*+20] oral lease agreement, this court must next de-
cide whether, under the present circumstances, Ohio's 
statute of fraud bars recovery. Ohio has two relevant 
statutes of frauds. R.C 1335.05 provides in pertinent 
part: 
"No action shall be brought whereby to charge the 
defendant, * * * upon a contract of sale of lands, ten-
ements, or hereditaments, or interest in or concerning 
them, * * * unless the agreement upon which such action 
is brought, or some memorandum or note thereof, is in 
writing and signed by the party to be charged therewith 
or some other person thereunto by him or her lawfully 
authorized." 
More specifically, R.C 1335.04 provides: 
"No lease, estate, or interest, either of freehold or 
term of years, or any uncertain interest of, in, or out of 
lands, tenements, or hereditaments, shall be assigned or 
granted except by deed, or note in writing, signed by 
the party assigning or granting it, or his agent thereunto 
lawfully authorized, by writing, or by act and operation 
of law." 
It is well established in Ohio that courts of equity 
may bar application of the statute of frauds. For in-
stance, an oral lease will be taken out of the statute of 
frauds by partial performance. Egner v. Egner (1985), 
24 Ohio App.3d 171, 24 OBR 261, 493 N.E2d 999; 
[**21] Cuvier Press Club v. Fourth & Race St. Assoc. 
(1981), 1 OhioApp.3d30,1 OBR 150, 439N.EL2d443. 
Further, the statute of frauds may not be interposed in 
furtherance of fraud. Manifold v. Schuster (1990), 67 
Ohio App.3d 251, 254, 586 N.E.2d 1142, 1144. The 
above exceptions to application of the statute of frauds 
exist in recognition that the historical purpose behind 
the statute is to prevent the furtherance of fraud. See, 
e.g., Manifold, supra; Ayres v. Cook (1942), 140 Ohio 
St. 281, 23 O.O. 491, 43 N.E.2d 287; Wilbur v. Paine 
(1824), 1 Ohio St. 251; Ardinger v. Bell (App. 1934), 
17 Ohio Law Abs. 438; and TUscarawas S. &L Co. v. 
Jarvis (App. 1931), 11 Ohio Law Abs. 357. 
To defeat application of the above statutes, McCarthy, 
Lebit argues that the doctrine of promissory estoppel, 
as a separate and distinct claim for relief, is not [*624] 
barred by the statute of frauds (first [**22] assignment 
of error). Additionally, McCarthy, Lebit argues that the 
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doctrine of promissory estoppel, in appropriate circum-
stances, may estop the opposing party from using the 
statute to vitiate an otherwise enforceable oral contract 
(fourth assignment of error). 
In Ohio, the doctrine of promissory estoppel has been 
adopted as it is stated in the Restatement of the Law 2d, 
Contracts (1973), Section 90, which provides: 
"A promise which the promisor should reasonably 
expect to induce action or forbearance on the part of 
the promisee or a third person and which does in-
duce such action or forbearance is binding if injustice 
can be avoided only by enforcement of the promise." 
McCroskeyv. State(1983),80hioSt.3d29,80BR339, 
456 N.E.2d 1204; Talley v. Teamsters Local No. 377 
(1976), 48 Ohio St.2d 142, 2 0.0.3d 297, 357N.E.2d 
44. The doctrine of promissory estoppel is also recog-
nized as an exception to the employment-at-will doctrine 
in employment contract disputes providing for a sepa-
rate claim for relief and recovery. Wing, supra; [**23] 
Helmick v. Cincinnati Vbrd Processing, Inc. (1989), 
45 Ohio St.3d 131, 543 N.E.2d 1212; Mers v. Dispatch 
Printing Co. (1985), 19 Ohio St. 3d 100, 19 OBR 261, 
483 N.E.2d 150. 
Promissory estoppel may also be used as an equitable 
doctrine which may be asserted as a separate cause of ac-
tion based upon a promise which has induced reliance. 
R. Renaissance, Inc. v. Rohm <fe Haas Co. (S.D.Ohio 
1987), 674F.Supp. 591 (applying Ohio law); and Allen 
v. MCI Telecommunications Corp. (N.D.Ohio 1988), 
707ESupp. 309 (applying Ohio law). 
First Union relies on Seale v. Citizens S. <fc L. Assn. 
(C.A.6, 1986), 806 F.2d 99 (applying Ohio law) for 
the proposition that the doctrine of promissory estoppel 
cannot be used to take a claim for an oral agreement 
to purchase or lease real estate outside the reach of the 
statute of frauds. In Seale, the Sixth Circuit Court of 
Appeals noted that: 
"Real estate transactions are usually formal undertak-
ings involving significant sums of money. Because they 
have the potential [**24] to affect the actions and inter-
ests of third parties, these transactions need to be made 
public. The statute of frauds is thus necessary: 
" 'to ensure that transactions involving a transfer of re-
alty interests are commemorated with sufficient solem-
nity. A signed writing provides greater assurance that 
the parties and the public can reliably know when such a 
transaction occurs. It supports the public policy favoring 
clarity in determining real estate interests and discour-
ages indefinite or fraudulent claims about such inter-
ests.1 North Coast Cookies, Inc. v. Sweet Temptations, 
Inc., 16 Ohio App.3d 342, 348 [16 OBR 391, 397], 476 
N.E.2d388 [395] (1984)." Seale, supra, ax 104. 
[*625] The Seale court, after placing considerable em-
phasis on the fact that the Ohio Supreme Court had not 
given a strong indication of its position on the issue, held 
that the oral agreement to repurchase the subject real es-
tate was not enforceable because it violated the statute 
of frauds. Id. at 104. Accord Sandusky Hous. Trust 
Ltd. Partnership v. Bouman Group (June 30, [**25] 
1992), Franklin App. No. 91AP-1249, unreported, 
1992 WL 158460; TransOhio Sav. Bank v. Jones (Feb. 
12, 1992), Lorain App. No. 91CA005128, unreported, 
1992 WL 25705; Nethero v. Poulson (Aug. 7, 1990), 
Wkyne App. No. 2634, unreported, 1991 WL 150982; 
and Leesburg Fed. S. &L. v. Dunlap (Mac 28,1988), 
Highland App. No. 658, unreported, 1988 WL 35791; 
N. Canton Ctr., Inc. v. Fleming Cos., Inc. (June 19, 
1993), Stark App. No. CA-8995, unreported, 1993 WL 
35566. 
However, the Seale court recognized that a number 
of courts have permitted promissory estoppel in statutes 
of frauds cases while an apparently equal number of 
courts have rejected it. Seale, supra, 806 E2d at 103, 
citing Promissory Estoppel as Basis for Avoidance of 
Statute of Frauds (1974 & Supp.1986), 56 AJJL3d 
1037. Moreover, at least one Ohio court of appeals 
has recognized that a party may rebut or overcome the 
statute of frauds (R.C 1335.05) by using the doctrine 
of promissory estoppel. Gathagan v. Firestone lire & 
Rubber Co. (1985), 23 Ohio App.3d 16, 23 OBR 49, 
490 N.E.2d 923; [*+26] see, also, Knowles v. Beverly 
Ann, Inc. (Aug. 25, 1975), Geauga App. No. 619, un-
reported (suggesting that estoppel may take an oral mod-
ification of lease agreement out of the statute of frauds). 
In Gathagan, the plaintiff brought a cause of action al-
leging breach of an alleged oral employment contract. 
He was awarded $ 46,870 after a jury trial. Both parties 
appealed. The Court of Appeals for Summit County re-
versed the trial court holding that the trial court should 
have given jury instructions on the statute of frauds (R.G 
1335.05) and on plaintiffs promissory estoppel defease 
to the statute of frauds. The Gathagan court carefully 
examined Ohio case law and case law from other juris-
dictions to hold that the doctrine of promissory estoppel 
may bar the statute of frauds as a defense to an oral em-
ployment contract that would otherwise fall within the 
statute. Id., 23 Ohio App.3d at 18, 23 OBR at 51, 490 
N.E.2dat925. 
Courts outside Ohio have also recognized that in 
appropriate circumstances, the doctrine of promiaaory 
estoppel can bar a statute of frauds defense to an action 
based on an oral lease agreement. [*+27] In Mauala 
* UilfordMgt. Corp. (S.D.N.Y. 1983), 559F.Supp. 
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1000, a United States district court held that a gen-
uine issue of fact existed to deny defendants' motion 
for summary judgment on plaintiffs claim for breach 
of an agreement to enter into a lease on the ground that 
there was a disputed issue of fact with respect to whether 
defendants should be estopped from asserting the statute 
of frauds defense. The court noted that "[amplication of 
[the equitable doctrine of promissory estoppel] is war-
ranted only [*626] where there is (i) a fraudulent oral 
promise by the defendant; (ii) upon which the plaintiff 
relies; (iii) by engaging in acts which are 'unequivocally 
referable' to the oral promise; (iv) resulting in substan-
tial injury * * *." Id. at 1004. The court concluded 
"that there are disputed issues of fact with respect to, 
inter alia, whether defendants falsely and fraudulently 
represented to plaintiffs that they would deliver a lease 
for apartment 12A (or whether defendants fraudulently 
concealed from plaintiffs the fact that the lease had not 
been approved) and whether plaintiffs suffered substan-
tial [**28] injury by relying on this allegedly fraudulent 
representation." Id. Similarly, in the present case, we 
believe there is a material issue of fact with respect to 
whether First Union falsely represented to McCarthy, 
Lebit that they would deliver a written lease (or whether 
First Union negligently concealed from McCarthy, Lebit 
the fact that the lease had not been approved by George 
Sirow) and whether McCarthy, Lebit suffered substantial 
injury by relying on the negligent misrepresentations. 
In Nicol v. Nelson (Colo.App. 1989), 776 P.2d 1144, 
the Colorado Court of Appeals held that the plaintiffs 
were entitled to injunctive relief, enjoining defendant 
from developing real estate, on their claim based on 
promissory estoppel and that the defendant was barred 
by said doctrine from raising a statute of frauds defense. 
In Nicol, the trial court found that plaintiffs purchased 
their lots only after receiving assurances from the de-
fendant that the adjoining tract of land would remain 
undeveloped space and that if defendant acquired said 
land, he would not develop it. After the defendant 
took steps to develop the property, plaintiffs brought 
suit seeking [**29] injunctive relief. The court in Nicol 
noted that the doctrine of promissory estoppel, as stated 
in the Restatement of the Law 2d, Contracts, (1973), 
Section 90(i), is designed to assure fairness in business 
relationships by protecting one who relies to his detri-
ment on the promise of another. Id. at 1146. See, also, 
Dunn v. Dunn (1975), 24 N.C.App. 713, 212 S.E.2d 
407 (holding that under the instant circumstances, the 
defendants were equitably estopped to plead the statute 
of frauds in defense of plaintiffs action to specifically 
enforce an oral contract to reconvey land). 
Finally, we note that some courts hold that the doctrine 
of promissory estoppel may be used to preclude the de-
fense of statute of frauds, but only when there has been 
(1) a misrepresentation that the statute's requirements 
have been complied with or (2) a promise to make a 
memorandum of the agreement. See Johnson v. Gilbert 
(App. 1980), 127 Ariz, 410, 414, 621 P. 2d 916, 920; 
Tiffany, Inc. v. W.M.K. Transit Mix, Inc. (1972), 16 
Ariz.App. 415, 493 P.2d 1220; [**30] 21 TUrtle Creek 
Square, Ltd. v. New York State Teachers' Retirement 
Sys. (C.A.5,1970), 432 F.2d 64; "Moore" Burger, Inc. 
* Phillips Petroleum Co. (Tex. 1972), 492 S.WU934. 
Courts which generally adopt this approach recognize 
the restrictions placed on [*627] the doctrine of promis-
sory estoppel as stated in the Restatement of Contracts 
2d (1932), Section 178, Comment f, which provides in 
pertinent part: 
"Though there has been no satisfaction of the Statute, 
an estoppel may preclude objection on that ground * * 
*. A misrepresentation that there has been such satisfac-
tion if substantial action is taken in reliance on the rep-
resentation, precludes proof by the party who made the 
representation that it was false; and a promise to make a 
memorandum, if similarly relied on, may give rise to an 
effective promissory estoppel if the Statute would oth-
erwise operate to defraud." See "Moore" Burger, supra; 
Rockland Industries, Inc. u Frank Kasmir Assoc. 
(N.D.Tex.1979), 470F.Supp. 1176; e.g., John K Pelt 
Co., Inc. v. Am. Cos. Co. of Reading (Tex. App. 1974), 
513 S.W.2d 128,131; [**31] Johnson, supra, 127Ariz, 
at 414, 621 P.2dat 920. "This approach has been praised 
as providing 'a reasonable balance between the two doc-
trines — encouraging businessmen to reduce their agree-
ments to writing while mitigating the harsh effects which 
unswerving adherence to the Statute of Frauds might 
produce.'" Id., 127Ariz, at414, 621 P.2dat920. 
Based on the foregoing analysis, this court adopts the 
approach taken by those courts which hold that the doc-
trine of promissory estoppel may be used to preclude 
a defense of statute of frauds, but only when there has 
been (1) a misrepresentation that the statute's require-
ments have been complied with or (2) a promise to make 
a memorandum of the agreement. This approach ad-
heres to the equitable doctrine of promissory estoppel 
as adopted by the Ohio Supreme Court and stated in 
Restatement 2d of Contracts, Section 90. Additionally, 
it promotes a balanced approach to encouraging those 
in business to reduce their agreements to writing and 
thereby adhering to the policy considerations behind the 
statute of frauds while at the same time providing [**32] 
a mitigating effect to the harsh application of the statute 
of frauds and assures fairness in business relationships 
by protecting one who relies to his detriment on the 
promise of another. 
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Under the unique circumstances in the present case, 
we conclude that McCarthy, Lebit raised a material is-
sue of fact regarding whether the doctrine of promissory 
estoppel precludes First Union from raising the defense 
of the statute of frauds. We have previously concluded 
that a material issue of fact exists as to whether an oral 
lease agreement exists. We, now, conclude that a ma-
terial issue of fact exists as to whether First Union, 
through its agent, Arthur Roth, promised that a writ-
ten lease agreement would be forthcoming. The record 
reveals that following the April 13, 1988 meeting, Irwin 
Haiman repeatedly contacted Arthur Roth to determine 
when a written lease agreement would be prepared. Both 
Haiman and Crystal averred that Roth repeatedly indi-
cated that a written lease agreement would be forthcom-
ing. Accordingly, a material issue [*628] of fact exists 
regarding whether First Union, through its agent Roth, 
reasonably should have expected McCarthy, Lebit to for-
bear action in reliance [**33] on Roth's representation 
that a written lease agreement would be forthcoming. 
Moreover, the instant misrepresentation goes to the issue 
of whether the statute would be complied with and that 
a memorandum, i.e., a written lease, would be made. 
Finally, the record indicates that through past dealings a 
unique relationship had developed between the attorneys 
at McCarthy, Lebit and Arthur Roth. Crystal's deposi-
tion testimony indicates that the attorneys at McCarthy, 
Lebit had dealt with Roth in the past and that leases 
negotiated with Roth were honored by First Union and 
reduced to writing. The issue of whether McCarthy, 
Lebit* s reliance is sufficient to estop First Union from 
using the statute of frauds as defense to McCarthy, 
Lebit's claim based on an oral lease agreement is a ques-
tion of fact to be decided by the trier of fact. Gaihagan, 
supra, paragraph three of the syllabus. 
McCarthy, Lebit's first, third and fourth assignments 
of error are accordingly sustained, and this cause is re-
manded to the trial court for a jury determination as to 
whether the doctrine of promissory estoppel bars First 
Union from asserting [**34] the defense of the statute 
of frauds on McCarthy, Lebit's claim for breach of an 
alleged oral lease agreement. McCarthy, Lebit's first as-
signment of error, is overruled but only to the extent that 
it asserts a separate claim for relief based on promissory 
estoppel. 
n 
In McCarthy, Lebit's second assignment of error, 
McCarthy, Lebit argues the trial court erred in grant-
ing First Union's motion for summary judgment on its 
claim for negligent misrepresentation. 
The elements of negligent misrepresentation were ar-
ticulated by the Ohio Supreme Court in Haddon View 
Invest. Co. v. Coopers <&. Lybrand (1982), 70 Ohio 
St.2dl54, 156, 24 0.0.3d 268, 269, 436 N.E.2d 212, 
214, as follows: 
"3 Restatement of Torts 2d, 126-127, Section 552, 
provides in relevant part: 
"*(1) One who * * * supplies false information for 
the guidance of others in their business transactions, is 
subject to liability for pecuniary loss caused to them by 
their justifiable reliance upon the information, if he fails 
to exercise reasonable care or competence in obtaining 
or communicating the information. 
•'(2) * * * [T]he liability stated in Subsection (1) is 
limited [**35] to loss suffered 
"'(a) by the person or one of a limited group of persons 
for whose benefit and guidance he intends to supply the 
information or knows that the recipient intends to supply 
it; and 
[*629] "(b) through reliance upon it in a transaction 
that he intends the information to influence or knows 
that the recipient so intends or in a substantially similar 
transaction.'" 
McCarthy, Lebit contends that the evidentiary mate-
rial submitted in opposition to First Union's motion for 
summary judgment raises a material issue of fact on each 
element of the tort of negligent misrepresentation. First 
Union, however, contends that Section 552 does not ap-
ply in the present case since McCarthy, Lebit's claim for 
relief is an attempt to obtain the benefit of the bargain 
which is expressly precluded by Section 552B, which 
states: 
"(1) The damages recoverable for a negligent misrep-
resentation are those necessary to compensate the plain-
tiff for the pecuniary loss to him of which the misrepre-
sentation is a legal cause, including: 
"(a) the difference between the value of what he has 
received in the transaction and its purchase price or other 
value given for it; and 
"(b) pecuniary loss suffered [**36] otherwise as a con-
sequence of the plaintiffs reliance upon the misrepresen-
tation. 
"(2) The damages recoverable for a negligent misrep-
resentation do not include the benefit of the plaintiffs 
contract with the defendant." 
First Union further contends that the reason for the ex-
clusion of damages based on the benefit of the bargain is 
because the claim for negligent misrepresentation is to 
provide a remedy to third parties to a contract between a 
professional (such as an architectural firm as in Haddon 
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View, supra) and a client where the professional fails 
to exercise ordinary care in performing his duties to his 
client. 
First Union's arguments are not persuasive in this re-
gard. First, a reading of the allegations in McCarthy, 
Lebit's complaint does not support the argument that 
McCarthy, Lebit seeks the benefit of the bargain. 
Specifically, McCarthy, Lebit alleged that due to the 
negligent misrepresentations of First Union through its 
agent Roth, McCarthy, Lebit was induced to "fore-
bear the opportunity to lease other space in other build-
ings," thereby incurring "substantial damages." Indeed, 
McCarthy, Lebit presented the [**37] affidavit of Steven 
W. Joseph, which indicated that comparable commercial 
space was available in the Public Square and surround-
ing regions at a rate of $ 1.50 to $ 2 less per square 
foot than what they are presently paying. It is not the 
benefit of the bargain with First Union which is the mea-
sure of damages sought in the instant complaint. Rather, 
damages are to be measured by comparing their current 
monthly rental obligations with those which they might 
have been obligated to pay under a lease in another com-
parable building which they could have leased but for 
their reliance on Roth's representations that a written 
lease agreement was forthcoming to [*630] confirm this 
oral agreement. This distinction between its rental obli-
gations currently incurred and those which it could have 
entered into, while similar to damages representing the 
benefit of the bargain pursuant to the anticipated lease 
with First Union, are distinct from the benefit of the 
bargain allegedly entered into with First Union and rep-
resent a pecuniary loss which McCarthy, Lebit allegedly 
incurred. 
The distinction between what damages constitute 
recoverable "pecuniary damages" and nonrecoverable 
"benefit-of-the-bargain" [**38] damages is not an easy 
one. The issue of damages in a negligent misrepresenta-
tion claim was discussed by the Ohio Supreme Court in 
Floor Craft Floor Covering, Inc. v. Parma Community 
Gen. Hosp. Assn. (1990), 54 Ohio St.3dl, 560N.E.2d 
206, wherein the court precluded "economic damages" 
in an action brought by a contractor against an architec-
tural firm which was allegedly negligent in drafting plans 
and specifications in a construction project absent privity 
of contract between the plaintiff/contractor and defen-
dant/architectural firm. In holding that 3 Restatement 
of the Law 2d, Torts (1977) 126-127, Section 552 did 
not provide recovery for economic damages suffered by 
third parties not in privity with design professionals, the 
court explained: 
"'The law of torts is well equipped to offer redress 
for losses suffered by reason of a "breach of some duty 
imposed by law to protect the broad interests of social 
policy." [Citations omitted]. Tort law is not designed, 
however, to compensate parties for losses suffered as a 
result of a breach of duties assumed only by agreement. 
That type of compensation necessitates an analysis of the 
damages [**39] which were within the contemplation of 
the parties when framing their agreement. It remains the 
particular province of the law of contracts. * * * 
" 'The controlling policy consideration underlying tort 
law is the safety of persons and property — the protec-
tion of persons and property from losses resulting from 
injury. The controlling policy consideration underly-
ing the law of contracts is the protection of expectations 
bargained for. If that distinction is kept in mind, the 
damages claimed in a particular case may more readily 
be classified between claims for injuries to persons or 
property on the one hand and economic losses on the 
other.' 
"Therefore, applying the Restatement in this context 
will encompass liability that is otherwise best suited for 
contract negotiation and assignment." Floor Craft Floor 
Covering, supra, 54 Ohio St. 3d at 7, 560 N.K2d at 
211. 
In Floor Craft, plaintiffs specifically contracted with 
the hospital to hold the architects harmless for economic 
damages arising from the architects' plans and specifica-
tions. Moreover, the architects' contract with the hos-
pital contained several provisions to shield the [**40] 
architects from liability from the contractors. [*631] 
Accordingly, application of the economic loss rule in 
Floor Craft was required to hold the parties to their con-
tract. At at 7, 560N.E.2dat211. 
Adoption of the "economic loss" rule in Floor Craft 
does not necessarily preclude recovery in the instant case 
since Section 552 specifically provides that damages for 
"pecuniary loss" are recoverable for negligent misrepre-
sentations made by those who have a pecuniary interest 
in a transaction. Aside from Floor Craft, no further 
Ohio cases discuss the applicable damages recoverable 
in a negligent misrepresentation claim. However; cases 
outside Ohio appear to adopt two separate theories of 
recovery. Courts which apply the economic loss rule 
to preclude recovery in a misrepresentation claim do so 
in a very narrow context. These courts hold thM the 
economic loss rule does not apply (1) where one inten-
tionally makes false representations, and (2) where one 
in the business of supplying information for the guid-
ance of others makes negligent representations. See 
Moorman Mfg. Co. v. NatL Tank Co. (1982), 91 
IH2d 69, 61 IHDec. 746, 435 N.E.2d 443. [**41] 
With respect to the second exception, such persons usu-
ally include attorneys, abstractors of title, surveyors, in-
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spectors of good, operators of ticker services, and banks 
dealing with non-depositors' checks. Falco Linings, 
Inc. v. Pavex, Inc. (M.D.Pa.1990), 755 F.Supp. 
1269. See, also, Delman v. Cleveland Hts. (1989), 41 
Ohio StJd 1,534 N.E.2d835 (negligent misrepresenta-
tion claim rejected as to municipality and its employees 
in conducting point of sale inspections of real estate); 
Floor Craft, supra (discussing architect's liability for 
negligent misrepresentation); Haddon View, supra (dis-
cussing accountant's liability for negligent misrepresen-
tation); Harrell v. Crystal (1992), 81 Ohio App.3d515, 
611 N.E.2d 908 (attorneys); Perpetual Fed. S. & L. 
Assn. v. Porter & Peck, Inc. (1992), 80 Ohio App. 3d 
569, 609 N.E.2d 1324 (real estate appraisers); see, e.g., 
Doe v. Blue Cross/Blue Shield of Ohio (1992), 71 Ohio 
App.3d369, 607N.E.2d492; [**42] ZissBros. Constr. 
Co. v. TransOhio Sav. Bank (June 20, 1991), Cuyahoga 
App. No. 58787, unreported, 1991WL 118058 (reject-
ing claim against bank for allegedly failing to properly 
qualify purchasers of a home); Goens v. Torco Cos. 
(Jan. 22, 1990), Butler App. No. CA89-06-092, un-
reported, 1990 WL 4259 (termite inspectors); Kilburn 
ML Becker (1990), 60 Ohio App.3d 144, 573 N.E.2d 
1226 (insurance agent); and see, e.g., Dayton-V&dther 
Corp. v. Kelly (1987), 42 OhioApp.3d 184,537N.E.2d 
682. The second exception was even rnore narrowly con-
strued in Hi-Grade Cleaners, Inc. v. Am. Permac, Inc. 
(N.D.RU982), 561 F.Supp. 643, where the court held 
that "tort claims based upon negligent misrepresentation 
are limited to those in the business of selling information 
which their customers might rely upon in taking some 
additional action.m Id. at 644. See, also, Palco Linings, 
Inc., supra, 755 F.Supp. 1269, for a discussion of the 
economic loss rule. 
[*632] However, those courts which apply the eco-
nomic [**43] loss rule to bar recovery in tort claims 
for negligent misrepresentation fail to take into account 
the express wording of Section 552, which provides that 
"one who, * * * in any other transaction in which he 
has a pecuniary interest, supplies false information for 
the guidance of others in their business transactions, is 
subject to liability for pecuniary loss caused to them by 
their justifiable reliance upon the information * * *." The 
above strict and narrow interpretation of the tort of neg-
ligent misrepresentation fails to take into account those 
circumstances where the supplier of false information 
has a pecuniary interest in the transaction at hand and 
also fails to realize that "pecuniary loss" is by its very 
definition "economic loss." See Black's Law Dictionary 
(6 Ed. 1990) 1131; see, also, Harrell, supra, 81 Ohio 
App. 3d at 523, 611N.E.2dat 913, recognizing recovery 
for pecuniary damages. 
Other jurisdictions dealing with cases more on point 
to the present case adopt a rule allowing for "out-of-
pocket" losses, but precluding recovery for damages rep-
resenting the benefit-of-the-bargain pursuant to Section 
552B. See Frame v. Boatmen's Bank of Concord Village 
(Mo.App. 1989), 782 S. W.2d 117; [**44] First Interstate 
Bank of Gallup v. Foutz (1988), 107 N.M. 749, 764 
P.2d 1307; Anzalone v. Strand (1982), 14 Mass.App. 
45, 436 N.E.2d 960; Onita Pacific v. Trustees of 
Bronson (1990), 104 Ore.App. 696, 803 P. 2d 756; 
Coastal (Bermuda) Ltd. v. E.W Saybolt <fc Co., Inc. 
(C.A.5, 1987), 826 F.2d 424; Mammas v. Oro Mdley 
Townhouses, Inc. (App.1981), 131 Ariz. 121, 638Rid 
1367. 
In Frame, supra, the Missouri Court of Appeals re-
versed a summary judgment entered in favor of the de-
fendants upon plaintiffs claim for negligent misrepre-
sentation based on facts very similar to those in the 
present case. In Frame, the plaintiff entered into a 
sales contract for the purchase of a bowling alley. The 
contract was contingent upon plaintiffs obtaining fi-
nancing* Plaintiff met with the vice-president of the 
Boatmen's Bank, Mark Murray, who informed plamtiff 
that Boatmen's was willing to lend eighty percent of the 
appraised value or the sales price, whichever was lower. 
Because [**45] the appraisal was not to be completed 
until after the financing contingency date set forth in the 
purchase agreement, plaintiff contacted Murray and in-
formed Murray that he was risking $ 20,000 in earnest 
money and requested assurances that Boatmen's would 
loan him the money. According to plaintiff, Murray 
responded affirmatively. However, Boatmen's later re-
jected plaintiffs loan application, and plaintiff lost $ 
5,000 earnest money. The trial court entered summary 
judgment in favor of the defendants, and the court of 
appeals reversed, finding that plaintiff raised a material 
issue of fact on his negligent misrepresentation claim. 
The court applied Restatement of the Law 2d, Torts, 
Section 552(1) as a prima facie case of negligent mis-
representation. The court recognized that the Boatmen's 
Bank is in the business of [*633] making loans, and 
its vice-president supplied plaintiff with loan informa-
tion. Boatmen's pecuniary interest was self-evident. 
Moreover, the court wrote "in making the statement 
that the loan would be forthcoming, Murray intention-
ally provided that information to appellant [plaintiff] 
for guidance, knowing that appellant would rely upon 
Murray's statement [**46] in deciding whether to re-
move the financing contingency. The financing con-
tingency was removed and appellant suffered a pecu-
niary loss by having his earnest money forfeited." Id., 
782 S.W2d at 122. The court also rejected defendant's 
claim that plaintiff could not have justifiably relied upon 
Murray' s oral representation that the loan was fortbcom-
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ing because the oral loan agreement was unenforceable 
pursuant to the statute of frauds. The court rejected this 
argument, noting that the reasonableness of plaintiffs 
reliance is normally a question of fact for the jury. Id. 
as 123-124. 
In the present case, it is undisputed that First Union is 
in the business of renting commercial real estate and that 
its agent, Arthur Roth, supplied McCarthy, Lebit with 
false information. Moreover, First Union's pecuniary 
interest in the above transaction is self-evident. Further, 
it is our opinion that a material issue of fact exists with 
respect to whether Roth's representations that the paper-
work was being completed and a written lease agreement 
was forthcoming was made knowing that McCarthy, 
Lebit would rely upon it in deciding to [**47] forgo 
the opportunity to pursue other leasing options. Finally, 
whether McCarthy, Lebit justifiably relied upon Roth's 
representations should also be left for the jury's deter-
mination. Gathagan, supra, at paragraph three of the 
syllabus. 
The issue of damages was further explored by the ap-
pellate court in Frame v. Boatmen's Bank of Concord 
Village (Mo.App.1992), 824 S.W.2d 491 ("Frame IT). 
On remand, the trial court awarded plaintiff $ 4,300, 
representing plaintiffs lost earnest money deposit paid 
to the prospective seller of the bowling alley. Frame 
appealed, urging he was entitled to recover lost profits. 
The court of appeals rejected Frame's argument, citing 
to the Restatement of the Law 2d, Torts, Section 5S2B, 
as prohibiting "benefit-of-the-bargain" damages. The 
court in Frame II limited Frame to consequential dam-
ages as represented by his lost earnest deposit money. 
Id. at 495-497. 
In the present case, McCarthy, Lebit's damages, as 
alleged in its complaint, are limited to its forbearance 
of pursuing other leasing opportunities in other office 
[**48] buildings. While the difference between these 
damages and damages based upon the benefit of the bar-
gain allegedly entered into with First Union may be 
slight, there still exists a distinction as previously ex-
plained, and these differences should not prevent re-
covery in the present case if a jury determines that 
McCarthy, Lebit has proven its claim for negligent mis-
representation. 
[*634] Accordingly, this court rejects First Union's 
argument that McCarthy, Lebit is precluded from recov-
ery under Section 552B based on the contention that its 
claim is really a claim for benefit-of-the-bargain dam-
ages. 
First Union's second argument that Section 552 al-
lows recovery only for third parties is also without merit. 
While the Ohio Supreme Court has addressed the issue 
of a defendant's liability to a third party for negligent 
misrepresentations, see Haddon View, Floor Craft and 
Delman, supra, it has never limited a negligent misrep-
resentation claim to third parties only. In fact, Section 
552, itself, does not limit its application to third parties. 
Rather, it states "one who * * * supplies false information 
for the guidance of others in [**49] their business trans-
actions, is subject to liability for pecuniary loss caused 
to them by their justifiable reliance upon the informa-
tion + * *." Thus, while Section 552 can be applied to 
third parties, it is clearly not limited to third parties. 
Finally, the cases previously cited apply Section 552 to 
parties directly related to each other pursuant to contract 
negotiations. 
Accordingly, this court finds that a material issue of 
fact exists as to McCarthy, Lebit's claim for negligent 
misrepresentation. McCarthy, Lebit's second assign-
ment of error is well taken. 
The judgment of the trial court is reversed, and this 
cause is remanded to the trial court on McCarthy, Lebit's 
second, third and fourth assignments of error. On re-
mand, McCarthy, Lebit must show by a preponderance 
of the evidence that an oral lease agreement was entered 
into. In addition, McCarthy, Lebit must demonstrate 
by a preponderance of the evidence that the doctrine of 
promissory estoppel bars application of the statute of 
frauds. McCarthy, Lebit's claim for negligent misrep-
resentation is limited to "out-of-pocket" losses. Finally, 
to the extent that McCarthy, Lebit may recover dam-
ages under its claim for breach [**50] of an oral lease 
agreement, such damages cannot be duplicative of those 
damages recoverable under its negligent misrepresenta-
tion claim. 
Judgment accordingly. 
Blackmon, J., concurs. 
John F. Corrigan, P.J., dissents. 
DISSENT-BY: CORRIGAN 
DISSENT: John F. Corrigan, Presiding Judge, dissent-
ing. 
I respectfully dissent from the judgment rendered by 
the majority. 
With respect to the firm's breach of contract claim, 
it must be noted that the parties' oral agreement may 
constitute an express agreement. Lucas v. Costantini 
(1983), 13 Ohio App. 3d 367, 368, 13 OBR 449, 450, 
469 N.E.2d 927, 928. An express contract, unlike an 
implied contract, connotes a formal exchange of [*635] 
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promises when the parties have communicated in some 
manner the terms to which they agree to be bound. Id, 
at 369, 13 OBR at 451, 469 N.E.2d at 929. However, 
the court will give effect to the manifest intent of the 
parties where there is clear evidence demonstrating that 
the parties did not intend to be bound by the terms of an 
agreement until formalized on a written document and 
signed by both. Richard A. Berjian, D. O., Inc. v. Ohio 
Bell Tel. Co. (1978), 54 Ohio St.2dl47,151, 8 0.0.3d 
149, 151, 375N.E.2d410, 413. [**51] 
Further, with respect to the authority of an agent to 
bind his principal to a lease agreement, it is essential 
that two facts be clearly established: 
"(1) that the principal held the agent out to the public 
as possessing sufficient authority to embrace the partic-
ular act in question, or knowingly permitted him to act 
as having such authority, and (2) that the person deal-
ing with the agent knew of the facts and acting in good 
faith had reason to believe and did believe that the agent 
possessed the necessary authority. * * *" Ammerman 
v. Aids Rent A Car System (1982), 7 Ohio App. 3d 338, 
340-341, 70BR436,438-439, 455N.E.2d 1041,1045. 
In this case, the majority asserts that Crystal's de-
position demonstrates that Roth orally negotiated leases 
which were honored by First Union and that Roth devel-
oped "expertise" and "a reputation that his word would 
be relied upon." Crystal's actual statements, however 
indicate that Crystal was familiar with the legend on 
First Union's proposed leases which indicated that the 
lease was not effective until accepted and executed by 
the landlord, and he continued to negotiate changes on 
behalf [**52] of the tenant even after a written, proposed 
lease was submitted to him. In addition, when Crystal 
and Haiman left the meeting at issue here, they stated 
that they needed to review the plan with their partners, 
and that it was subject to the partners' approval. Crystal 
likewise admitted that Roth indicated that he had to dis-
cuss some of the points with his superiors and that First 
Union's attorneys were to prepare a written lease for the 
parties. 
Haiman* s affidavit similarly acknowledges that he pre-
sented the substance of the terms announced by Roth to 
his partners for their agreement and that the parties in-
tended that a written lease was to be prepared. 
Finally, Roth stated that as a "disclaimer," he told 
Crystal and Haiman that the deal had to be approved by 
his superiors, and that there were in fact three separate 
entities which had to approve the deal in writing on a 
lease deal sheet. 
Thus, oral leases were clearly not negotiated and nei-
ther Roth nor Crystal and Haiman could bind the parties 
absent approval from their principals. Accordingly, I 
would find that the firm's claim that it had an oral con-
tract is unsupportable as the firm and First Union clearly 
did not intend to [**53] be bound until a written lease 
was prepared and executed. Moreover, Roth lacked ac-
tual and apparent [*636] authority to bind First Union 
as he told Crystal and Haiman that he needed his supe-
riors' approval and they therefore could not reasonably 
believe that Roth could bind First Union on the basis of 
his word alone. 
Moreover, where the evidence is uncontroverted that 
no written lease, or memorandum thereof was ever exe-
cuted, any oral agreement by the parties is properly held 
unenforceable. Manifold v. Schuster (1990), 67 Ohio 
App.3d 251, 254, 586N.E.2d 1142, 1144. 
A lease will be taken out of the statute of frauds by 
partial performance. See, e.g., Delfino v. Paul Davies 
Chevrolet, Inc. (1965), 2 Ohio St. 2d 282, 286, 31 
O0.2d557, 559, 209 N.E.2d 194,197, and the statute 
of frauds may not be interposed in furtherance of fraud. 
Marion Credit Assn. v. Cochran (1988), 40 Ohio St.3d 
265, 533 N.E.2d 325, paragraph two of the syllabus. 
The firm also cites authority for the proposition that, 
in an employment context, promissory [**54] estoppel 
may be assorted in opposition to the defense that a con-
tract is unenforceable pursuant to the statute of frauds. 
See, e.g., Gathagan v, Firestone Tire A Rubber Co. 
(1985), 23 Ohio App.3d 16, 18, 23 OBR 49, 51, 490 
N.E.2d 923, 925. Estoppel was rejected as a bar to the 
statute of frauds in cases involving real estate, however, 
in Leesburg Fed. S. & L. v. Dunlap (Mar. 28, 1988), 
Highland App. No. 658, unreported, 1988 WL 35791. 
The court stated: 
"In Seale v. Citizens Savings and Loan Assn. (C.A. 
6,1986), 806E2d99,102-104, the court held the doc-
trine of promissory estoppel should not apply to statute 
of frauds cases involving real estate. The court, not-
ing the Gathagan case involved an alleged employment 
contract, conjectured that our state courts would not al-
low promissory estoppel to defeat the statute of frauds 
in cases involving real estate: 
"'WB do not find this Court of Appeals decision to be 
persuasive authority for the proposition that the Supreme 
Court of Ohio would allow promissory estoppel to de-
feat the statute of frauds in a real estate context, however. 
[*+55] Gathagan involved a breach of an oral contract 
for employment for two years. Ws are not convinced 
that the Ohio courts would treat employment contracts 
and real estate transactions as co-extensive, since the 
latter implicate interests that are generally regarded as 
more deserving of protection. 
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 'Real estate transactions are usually formal undertak-
ings involving significant sums of money.' 
"The Seale court further wrote: 
"'If a court allows parol evidence of an unwritten con-
tract, it can never be certain that it is not perpetuating 
rather than preventing a fraud. Had the agreement been 
reduced to writing, however, there would be little op-
portunity for fraud or mistake to arise.1 
[*637] "We agree with the reasoning of the Seale court 
and we decline to apply the Gathagan case to cases in-
volving real estate. Accordingly, we find no issue of 
fact concerning whether appellee should be equitably 
estopped from asserting the statute of frauds in the case 
at bar." 
I would apply the rationale set forth in Seale v. 
Citizens S. & L. Assn., supra, expressly adopted by 
the Highland County Court of Appeals, and would not 
allow the promissory [**56] estoppel claim to defeat 
application of the statute of frauds. 
Finally, as to the claim for negligent misrepresenta-
tion, I would conclude that, assuming such a claim may 
defeat application of the defense of the statute of frauds 
in a case such as this where a written lease is contem-
plated, the firm presented no evidence that anyone at 
First Union ever represented that Roth could bind First 
Union by an oral statement. Moreover, even assuming 
such a representation had been made, since the parties 
contemplated execution of a written lease and further ne-
gotiations, the firm could not justifiably rely upon such 
representation. 
I would therefore overrule each of the assigned errors 
and affirm the judgment rendered below. 
Page 53 
851 R2d 763 printed in FULL format. 
SOUTHMARK CORPORATION, Plaintiff-AppeUant, v. LIFE INVESTORS, INC, and USUCO 
Corporation, Defendants-Appellees 
No. 87-1353 
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT 
851 F.2d 763; 1988 U.S. App. LEXIS 11067; 7 U.CCR. Serv. 2d(Callaghan) 529 
August 11, 1988 
SUBSEQUENT HISTORY: As amended August 11, 
1988. 
PRIOR HISTORY: 
[**1] Appeal from the United States District Court for 
the Northern District of Texas. 
DISPOSITION: Modified and Affirmed. 
COUNSEL: Jackson, Walker, Winstead, Cantwell & 
Miller, Dallas, Texas, Jack Pew, Jr., Charles L. 
Babcock, Attorneys, for Appellant. 
David Klingsberg, Kaye, Scholer, New York, New 
"fork, Mark R. Weiss, Hughes & Luce, Dallas, Texas, 
Eric R. Cromartie, Attorneys, for Appellees, (Life). 
Fried, Frank, Harris, Shriver & Jacobson, New \brk, 
New York, Robert E. Gerber, Rain, Harrell, Emery, 
Young & Doke, Dallas, Texas, Morris Harrell, Timothy 
W. Mountz, Attorney, for Appellees, (USUCO). 
JUDGES: Garwood and Jones, Circuit Judges, and 
Black, * District Judge. 
* District Judge of the Southern District of Texas, 
sitting by designation. 
OPINIONBY: GARWOOD 
OPINION: [*764] GARWOOD, Circuit Judge: 
In this Texas diversity case, plaintiff-appellant 
Southmark Corporation (Southmark) appeals the district 
court's summary judgment that Southmark take nothing 
against defendant-appellee Life Investors, Inc. (Life) 
and its dismissal of Southmark's suit against USUCO 
Corporation (USUCO). WB affirm in all respects, ex-
cept that the wording of the judgment of dismissal of 
the action against USUCO is modified to reflect that it 
is a dismissal for lack of in personam jurisdiction. [**2] 
Facts and Proceedings Below 
Prior to the transactions that gave rise to this suit, Life 
nl and General George Olmsted (Olmsted) of Arizona 
owned a controlling share of stock in International 
Bank (IB), an Arizona corporation. Olmsted owned 
approximately forty-one percent of the outstanding IB 
stock and Ufe owned approximately twenty-two per-
cent. In November 1984, Ufe and Olmsted signed a 
Memorandum of Understanding in which Life agreed 
that if it wished to sell its IB stock, it would first offer 
the stock to Olmsted. n2 Olmsted would then have thirty 
[•765] days in which to accept the offer. If Olmsted did 
not accept, Ufe would then have ninety days in which 
to sell the stock to any third party at a price equal to or 
higher than the price offered to Olmsted. 
nl Ufe is an insurance holding company organized 
and existing under the laws of Iowa. Approximately 
eighty-one percent of Ufe's stock is owned indi-
rectly by AEGON, a holding company organized 
and existing under the laws of The Netherlands. 
AEGON holds the Ufe stock through two wholly 
owned subsidiaries, AGO International B.V. of The 
Netherlands, and Fiago, Inc., a corporation orga-
nized and existing under the laws of New York, Until 
October 10, 1985, Ufe and AEGON together owned 
797,774 shares of common stock and 4,187,676 
shares of Class A common stock of IB. In this ap-
peal, Ufe need not be differentiated from AEGON, 
and for the sake of simplicity we will refer to both 
Ufe and AEGON as "Ufe." 
[**3] 
n2 The Memorandum of Understanding agreement 
states in relevant part: 
"1. George Olmsted ("General Olmsted") hereby 
giants Aegon, N.V. and Ufe Investors, Inc. 
('Aegon') a right of first offer on his shares of 
International Bank, and Aegon hereby grants a aim-
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newal with a base rent of $ 12.50 per square foot for 
the first five years and $ 13.50 per square foot for the 
second five years. Crystal and Haiman both also as-
serted that McCarthy, Lebit would occupy the Sweeney 
space at the same rate Sweeney was paying until his 
lease expired. The Sweeney space would be added into 
the McCarthy, Lebit lease before the date upon which 
Sweeney was to vacate his space. Other provisions of 
the lease would reflect the standard lease used by First 
Union. Although the base year and denominator were 
left for further discussion and the parties indicated that 
approval of their respective partners and/or supervisors 
was necessary, the three men shook hands to seal the 
deal. The next day, Haiman presented Roth with a wish 
list, which Roth rejected. Haiman then informed Roth 
that McCarthy, Lebit accepted the terms of the agreement 
[**18] reached on April 13, 1988. Haiman, further, 
averred that an agreement was reached that the base year 
would be 1988 and that the rent would be determined by 
calculating on the basis of leasable space as opposed to 
leased space. In addition, Roth testified that he believed 
the parties had reached an agreement. Finally, Roth 
made numerous assurances to Haiman that he would be-
gin the paperwork on the agreement and that a written 
lease agreement would be forthcoming. These contin-
uous assurances by Roth signified Roth's authoritative 
position in these negotiations as well as emphasizing that 
the agreement was completed. 
First Union argues that at least three essential and ma-
terial terms of the alleged oral lease agreement were left 
unresolved. Consequently, First Union argues there was 
no meeting of the minds to form an oral lease agreement. 
Initially, First Union argues that there was no agreement 
as to which portion of the Sweeney space McCarthy, 
Lebit was to rent or a date upon which McCarthy, Lebit 
could occupy said space. However, an examination of 
the record reveals that McCarthy, Lebit raised a material 
issue of fact regarding the essential elements of the agree-
ment. The affidavit [**19] of Irwin Haiman indicates 
that McCarthy, Lebit was to lease that portion of the 
space which included Sweeney's office and a conference 
room. Moreover, the deposition testimony of Arthur 
Roth reveals that the lease renewal was to take effect in 
November 1989 and that the Sweeney space would be 
added into the McCarthy, Lebit lease before the [*623] 
date when Sweeney was to vacate his space. Finally, 
First Union argues that the parties never agreed upon a 
lease year or a denominator for calculating leasing obli-
gations. However, Haiman's affidavit asserts that the 
parties agreed that the rental rate would be calculated on 
a 1988 base year and it would be based on leasable (as 
opposed to leased) space. Accordingly, we conclude that 
the evidentiary materials presented by McCarthy, Lebit 
are sufficient to raise a material issue of fact regarding 
whether an oral lease agreement was entered. Wing v. 
Anchor Media, Ua\ of Texas (1991), 59 Ohio St.3dl08, 
570 N.E.2d 1095. McCarthy, Lebifs third assignment 
of error is therefore sustained. 
Having determined that McCarthy, Lebit raised a 
material issue of fact regarding the existence of an 
[**20] oral lease agreement, this court must next de-
cide whether, under the present circumstances, Ohio's 
statute of fraud bars recovery. Ohio has two relevant 
statutes of frauds. R.C 1335.05 provides in pertinent 
part: 
"No action shall be brought whereby to charge the 
defendant, * * * upon a contract of sale of lands, ten-
ements, or hereditaments, or interest in or concerning 
them, * * * unless the agreement upon which such action 
is brought, or some memorandum or note thereof, is in 
writing and signed by the party to be charged therewith 
or some other person thereunto by him or her lawfully 
authorized." 
More specifically, R.C 1335.04 provides: 
"No lease, estate, or interest, either of freehold or 
term of years, or any uncertain interest of, in, or out of 
lands, tenements, or hereditaments, shall be assigned or 
granted except by deed, or note in writing, signed by 
the party assigning or granting it, or his agent thereunto 
lawfully authorized, by writing, or by act and operation 
of law." 
It is well established in Ohio that courts of equity 
may bar application of the statute of frauds. For in-
stance, an oral lease will be taken out of the statute of 
frauds by partial performance. Egner v. Egner (1985), 
24 Ohio App.3d 171, 24 OBR 261, 493 N.K2J 999; 
[ •^l ] Cuvier Press Club v. Fourth & Race St. Assoc. 
(1981), 1 OhioApp.3d30,1 OBR 150, 439N.E.24443. 
Further, the statute of frauds may not be interposed in 
furtherance of fraud. Manifold v. Schuster (1990), 67 
Ohio App.3d 251, 254, 586 N.E.2d 1142, 1144. The 
above exceptions to application of the statute of frauds 
exist in recognition that the historical purpose behind 
the statute is to prevent the furtherance of fraud. See, 
e.g., Manifold, supra; Ayres v. Cook (1942), 140 Ohio 
St. 281, 23 0.0. 491, 43 N.E.2d 287; Wilbur v. Paine 
(1824), 1 Ohio St. 251; Ardinger v. Bell (App. 1934), 
17 Ohio Law Abs. 438; and Tuscarawas S. &L.Co. v. 
Jarvis (App. 1931), 11 Ohio Law Abs. 357. 
To defeat application of the above statutes, McCarthy, 
Lebit argues that the doctrine of promissory estoppel, 
as a separate and distinct claim for relief, is not [*624] 
barred by the statute of frauds (first [**22] assignment 
of error). Additionally, McCarthy, Lebit argues that the 
Page 55 
851 F.2d 763, *765; 1988 U.S. App. LEXIS 11067, **6; LEXSEE 
7 U.CCR. Serv. 2d(Callaghan) 529 
produced two documents [*766] signed by Life's repre-
sentatives. One document was the 1984 Memorandum 
of Understanding in which Life agreed to give Olmsted 
a right of first offer on Life's shares of IB stock. The 
other document was the May 1985 letter in which Life in-
formed Olmsted that it had received an unsolicited offer 
for the IB shares and that it wished to sell those shares at 
a specified price. According to Southmark, these docu-
ments, taken together, satisfy the statute of frauds by in-
dicating that Life and Southmark had in fact entered into 
a contract for the sale of the IB securities. Southmark ar-
gued alternatively that Life should be estopped from as-
serting a statute of frauds defense because Life promised 
to execute final documents setting forth the terms of its 
alleged oral agreement with Southmark. With regard to 
USLICO's motion to dismiss, Southmark argued that its 
proof established that Texas courts had both specific and 
general jurisdiction over USLICQ 
The district court rejected Southmark's contentions 
and granted Life's motion for summary judgment as well 
as USLICO's motion to dismiss. The district court found 
that the [**7] two documents produced by Southmark 
failed to satisfy the statute of frauds because neither doc-
ument specifically referred to Southmark. Citing Cohen 
v. McCutchin, 565 S.W2d 230 (Tex. 1978), the court 
stated that a writing sufficient to meet the standards of 
a statute of frauds must be signed by the person to be 
charged and it must identify the other party to the trans-
action. Although Life's representatives signed the doc-
uments in question, neither document specifically men-
tions Southmark. 
The court also found that Southmark's promissory 
estoppel claim was meritless because the evidence pro-
duced by Southmark did not raise a factual issue as 
to whether Life promised to sign a written contract. 
Relying on Nagle v. Nagle, 633 S. W2d 796 (Tex. 1982), 
the district court explained that a promise to prepare a 
written contract is not sufficient to overcome the statute 
of frauds under the doctrine of promissory estoppel; 
instead, there must be a showing that the defendant 
promised to sign a particular written agreement. 
Finally, the district court found that USLICO's con-
tacts with Texas were not sufficient to establish in per-
sonam jurisdiction and granted USLICO's motion to dis-
miss [**8] on this basis. However, the district court's 
final judgment ordered that Southmark take nothing 
against either defendant, thus in form being on the mer-
its in favor of USLICO as well as Life. This appeal 
followed. 
Discussion 
The issues raised on appeal are whether the district 
court properly granted Life's motion for summary judg-
ment based on the statute of frauds defense, and whether 
the district court properly granted USLICO's motion to 
dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction. Wfe shall ad-
dress these issues in turn. 
L The Statute of Frauds Defense 
The parties in this case agree that the alleged contract 
between Life and Southmark falls within the provisions 
ofTex.Bus. & Com. Code Ann. §8.319. The question 
is whether the two documents produced by Southmark 
together satisfy the requirements of section 8.319. After 
reviewing the documents, we agree with the district 
court's conclusion that they do not. 
Section 8.319 specifically provides that a contract for 
the sale of securities is unenforceable unless there is some 
writing signed by the party against whom enforcement 
is sought "sufficient to indicate that a contract has been 
made" for the sale of a stated quantity of described [**9] 
securities at a stated price. Tex.Bus. & Com.Code Ann. 
§ 8.319(1) (emphasis added). The documents produced 
by Southmark, taken alone or read together, do not suffi-
ciently indicate that a contract for the sale of the IB secu-
rities had in fact been made. Indeed, the Memorandum 
of Understanding merely provides that if Life wishes to 
sell the IB stock, it will notify Olmsted and give him an 
opportunity to purchase the same. The Memorandum of 
Understanding then states that if Olmsted chooses not 
to buy the shares, Life will be free [*767] to seO the 
shares to any third party. Nothing in the Memorandum 
of Understanding indicates that life must enter into a 
firm agreement with a prospective buyer before notify-
ing Olmsted, nor does anything in it indicate that an offer 
for the shares must exist before Life can notify Olmsted 
of its desire to sell. n5 Furthermore, assuming a third 
party has made an offer, nothing in the Memorandum of 
Understanding indicates that Life must sell the shares to 
that third party in the event Olmsted chooses not to buy 
the shares within the prescribed time. 
n5 Southmark argues that the undisputed testimony 
of its president and chairman reflects that he was 
told by Life's executive vice president that under the 
Memorandum of Understanding, Life was to notify 
Olmsted of its desire to sell only if Life had a "bona 
fide agreement" for the sale of the shares and not just 
an offer. Thus, according to Southmark, the fact that 
Life notified Olmsted of its desire to sell is itself an 
indication that life had a firm agreement for the sale 
of the IB securities. However, to satisfy the statute 
of frauds, a writing must be complete in itself so 
that the contract can be ascertained from the writ-
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1000, a United States district court held that a gen-
uine issue of fact existed to deny defendants' motion 
for summary judgment on plaintiffs claim for breach 
of an agreement to enter into a lease on the ground that 
there was a disputed issue of fact with respect to whether 
defendants should be estopped from asserting the statute 
of frauds defense. The court noted that "[amplication of 
[the equitable doctrine of promissory estoppel] is war-
ranted only [*626] where there is (i) a fraudulent oral 
promise by the defendant; (ii) upon which the plaintiff 
relies; (iii) by engaging in acts which are 'unequivocally 
referable' to the oral promise; (iv) resulting in substan-
tial injury * * *." Id. at 1004. The court concluded 
"that there are disputed issues of fact with respect to, 
inter alia, whether defendants falsely and fraudulently 
represented to plaintiffs that they would deliver a lease 
for apartment 12A (or whether defendants fraudulently 
concealed from plaintiffs the fact that the lease had not 
been approved) and whether plaintiffs suffered substan-
tial [**28] injury by relying on this allegedly fraudulent 
representation." Id. Similarly, in the present case, we 
believe there is a material issue of fact with respect to 
whether First Union falsely represented to McCarthy, 
Lebit that they would deliver a written lease (or whether 
First Union negligently concealed from McCarthy, Lebit 
the fact that the lease had not been approved by George 
Sirow) and whether McCarthy, Lebit suffered substantial 
injury by relying on the negligent misrepresentations. 
In Nicol v. Nelson (Coh.App.1989), 776 P.2d 1144, 
the Colorado Court of Appeals held that the plaintiffs 
were entitled to injunctive relief, enjoining defendant 
from developing real estate, on their claim based on 
promissory estoppel and that the defendant was barred 
by said doctrine from raising a statute of frauds defense. 
In Nicol, the trial court found that plaintiffs purchased 
their lots only after receiving assurances from the de-
fendant that the adjoining tract of land would remain 
undeveloped space and that if defendant acquired said 
land, he would not develop it. After the defendant 
took steps to develop the property, plaintiffs brought 
suit seeking [**29] injunctive relief. The court in Nicol 
noted that the doctrine of promissory estoppel, as stated 
in the Restatement of the Law 2d, Contracts, (1973), 
Section 90(i), is designed to assure fairness in business 
relationships by protecting one who relies to his detri-
ment on the promise of another. Id. at 1146. See, also, 
Dunn v. Dunn (1975), 24 N.C.App. 713, 212 S.E.2d 
407 (holding that under the instant circumstances, the 
defendants were equitably estopped to plead the statute 
of frauds in defense of plaintiffs action to specifically 
enforce an oral contract to reconvey land). 
Finally, we note that some courts hold that the doctrine 
of promissory estoppel may be used to preclude the de-
fense of statute of frauds, but only when there has been 
(1) a misrepresentation that the statute's requirements 
have been complied with or (2) a promise to make a 
memorandum of the agreement. See Johnson v. Gilbert 
(App.1980), 127 Ariz. 410, 414, 621 P.2d 916, 920; 
Tiffany, Inc. v. W.M.K. Transit Mix, Inc. (1972), 16 
Ariz.App. 415, 493 P.2d 1220; [**30] 21 JUrtle Creek 
Square, Ltd. XL New York State Teachers' Retirement 
Sys. (C.A.5,1970), 432F.2d 64; "Moore" Burger, Inc. 
\t Phillips Petroleum Co. (Tex. 1972), 492 S.W2d934. 
Courts which generally adopt this approach recognize 
the restrictions placed on [*627] the doctrine of promis-
sory estoppel as stated in the Restatement of Contracts 
2d (1932), Section 178, Comment f, which provides in 
pertinent part: 
"Though there has been no satisfaction of the Statute, 
an estoppel may preclude objection on that ground * * 
*. A misrepresentation that there has been such satisfac-
tion if substantial action is taken in reliance on the rep-
resentation, precludes proof by the party who made the 
representation that it was false; and a promise to make a 
memorandum, if similarly relied on, may give rise to an 
effective promissory estoppel if the Statute would oth-
erwise operate to defraud." See "Moore" Burger, supra; 
Rockland Industries, Inc. u Frank Kasmir Assoc. 
(N.D.Tex.1979), 470 F.Supp. 1176; e.g., John H. Pelt 
Co., Inc. v, Am. Cos. Co. of Reading (Tex. App. 1974), 
513 S.W.2d 128,131; [**31] Johnson, supra, 127Ariz, 
at 414, 621 P. 2d at 920. "This approach has been praised 
as providing 'a reasonable balance between the two doc-
trines — encouraging businessmen to reduce their agree-
ments to writing while mitigating the harsh effects which 
unswerving adherence to the Statute of Frauds might 
produce." Id., 127Ariz, at 414, 621 P.2dat 920. 
Based on the foregoing analysis, this court adopts the 
approach taken by those courts which hold that the doc-
trine of promissory estoppel may be used to preclude 
a defense of statute of frauds, but only when there has 
been (1) a misrepresentation that the statute's require-
ments have been complied with or (2) a promise to make 
a memorandum of the agreement. This approach ad-
heres to the equitable doctrine of promissory estoppel 
as adopted by the Ohio Supreme Court and staled in 
Restatement 2d of Contracts, Section 90. Additionally, 
it promotes a balanced approach to encouraging those 
in business to reduce their agreements to writing and 
thereby adhering to the policy considerations behind the 
statute of frauds while at the same time providing [**32] 
a mitigating effect to the harsh application of the statute 
of frauds and assures fairness in business relationships 
by protecting one who relies to his detriment on the 
promise of another. 
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Since we have determined that the two documents fail to 
indicate that a contract has been made, as specifically re-
quired by section 8.319, we need not determine whether 
the documents must also identify the party seeking en-
forcement. 
II. Promissory Estoppel 
Southmark alternatively argues that if the documents 
it produced do not satisfy the requirements of section 
8.319, nevertheless Life should be estopped from as-
serting a statute of frauds defense. Citing "Moore" 
Burger, Inc. v. Phillips Petroleum Co., 492 S.W2d 
934, 938 (Tex. 1972), Southmark argues that the doc-
trine of promissory estoppel removes a contract from 
the statute of frauds if the plaintiff establishes that: (1) 
the defendant promised to sign an instrument complying 
with the statute of frauds; (2) the defendant should have 
realized his promise would cause injury to the plaintiff; 
(3) such injury occurred; and (4) injustice will result if 
the promise is not enforced. In the present case, [**14] 
Southmark contends that the last three elements are self-
evident. With regard to the first element, Southmark 
points to the affidavit of Thomas Walker (Walker), a 
Southmark vice president, who stated that Life's repre-
sentatives promised in an April 1985 Atlanta, Georgia 
meeting "that an agreement had been reached and that 
they (Life's representatives) would execute final docu-
ments consummating that agreement." Southmark also 
points to the affidavit of Jerome Levy (Levy), another 
Southmark vice president, who stated that on July 19, 
1985 he was told by a representative of Life "that the 
purpose of the meeting" scheduled for July 24, 1985 in 
New York "was to resolve the final points of discussion 
and put the contract in a form to be executed that week" 
and that 
"during the April-July, 1985 period, there were sev-
eral conversations between Art Christoffersen [of Life] 
and myself pertaining to the fact that there was a firm 
agreement between the parties and that the only items 
necessary to close the transaction were execution of the 
documents and the requisite regulatory approvals." 
These affidavits, according to Southmark at least raise 
a fact issue regarding Life's promise to sign [**15] an 
instrument complying with section 8.319. n8 We dis-
agree. 
n8 As mentioned, the district court rejected this 
argument stating that under Texas law the party to 
be charged must have promised to sign the written 
agreement. According to the district court, "the af-
fidavits submitted by Plaintiff do not clearly state 
that Life ever promised to sign any particular agree-
ment." 
In further support of its promissory argument, 
Southmark cites Cobb v. Vkst Texas Microwave Co., 
700 S.W.2d 615 (Tex. App. - Austin 1985, writ ref d 
n.r.e.). In that case, the trial court entered a summary 
judgment in favor of the defendants on the ground that 
the oral lease that the plaintiff sought to enforce was 
barred under the statute of frauds. The appellate court 
reversed, stating that on the promissory estoppel issue 
the plaintiff had adduced some proof raising a fact issue 
that the defendants had promised to sign an instrument 
complying with the statute of frauds. In particular, the 
plaintiff had adduced: (1) his own affidavit in which 
he stated that the defendants had promised to reduce the 
oral agreement to a written lease; and (2) a letter from 
one of the [*769] defendants to the plaintiff in which the 
[**16] defendant stated that "we will enter into a mu-
tually agreeable lease arrangement, which you, in your 
most expedient manner, will execute as soon as possi-
ble." Id. at 616-17. 
Given the facts here, however, we think the district 
court correctly rejected Southmaik's promissory estop-
pel theory. In "Moore" Burger, the court held that an 
oral promise to sign a written agreement that complies 
with the statute of frauds is enforceable and sufficient to 
overcome a statute of frauds defense if: (1) the promisor 
should have reasonably expected that the promise would 
induce the promisee to take action that would lead to 
definite and substantial injury; (2) the promise did in-
duce the promisee to take such action leading to injury; 
and (3) enforcement of the promise is the only means 
of avoiding injustice to the promisee. "Moore" Burger, 
492 S. W.2d at 938. In "Moore" Burger, the determina-
tive promise was a promise to sign a written agreement 
that had already been prepared and that did in fact com-
ply with the statute of frauds. See id. at 938, 940. 
n9 Thus, in Consolidated Petroleum Indus, v. Jacobs, 
648 S.W.2d 363 (Tex.App. - Eastland 1983, writ ref d 
n.r.e.), which involved [**17] an oral agreement that 
was subject to the provisions of section 8.319, the court 
held that the doctrine of promissory estoppel does not 
apply where there is no proof of a promise to sign a 
written contract that had been prepared and that would 
satisfy the requirement of the statute of frauds. Id. at 
367. 
ti9lnNaglev. Nagle,633S.W2d796fTex. 1982), 
the Texas Supreme Court made it clear that "Moore" 
Burger had thus limited the promissory estoppel ex-
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View, supra) and a client where the professional fails 
to exercise ordinary care in performing his duties to his 
client. 
First Union's arguments are not persuasive in this re-
gard. First, a reading of the allegations in McCarthy, 
Lebit's complaint does not support the argument that 
McCarthy, Lebit seeks the benefit of the bargain. 
Specifically, McCarthy, Lebit alleged that due to the 
negligent misrepresentations of First Union through its 
agent Roth, McCarthy, Lebit was induced to "fore-
bear the opportunity to lease other space in other build-
ings," thereby incurring "substantial damages." Indeed, 
McCarthy, Lebit presented the [**37] affidavit of Steven 
W. Joseph, which indicated that comparable commercial 
space was available in the Public Square and surround-
ing regions at a rate of $ 1.50 to $ 2 less per square 
foot than what they are presently paying. It is not the 
benefit of the bargain with First Union which is the mea-
sure of damages sought in the instant complaint. Rather, 
damages are to be measured by comparing their current 
monthly rental obligations with those which they might 
have been obligated to pay under a lease in another com-
parable building which they could have leased but for 
their reliance on Roth's representations that a written 
lease agreement was forthcoming to [*630] confirm this 
oral agreement. This distinction between its rental obli-
gations currently incurred and those which it could have 
entered into, while similar to damages representing the 
benefit of the bargain pursuant to the anticipated lease 
with First Union, are distinct from the benefit of the 
bargain allegedly entered into with First Union and rep-
resent a pecuniary loss which McCarthy, Lebit allegedly 
incurred. 
The distinction between what damages constitute 
recoverable "pecuniary damages" and nonrecoverable 
"benefit-of-the-bargain" [**38] damages is not an easy 
one. The issue of damages in a negligent misrepresenta-
tion claim was discussed by the Ohio Supreme Court in 
Floor Craft Floor Covering, Inc. v. Forma Community 
Gen. Hosp. Assn. (1990), 54 Ohio SUd 1,560N.E.2d 
206, wherein the court precluded "economic damages" 
in an action brought by a contractor against an architec-
tural firm which was allegedly negligent in drafting plans 
and specifications in a construction project absent privity 
of contract between the plaintiff/contractor and defen-
dant/architectural firm. In holding that 3 Restatement 
of the Law 2d, Torts (1977) 126-127, Section 552 did 
not provide recovery for economic damages suffered by 
third parties not in privity with design professionals, the 
court explained: 
"'The law of torts is well equipped to offer redress 
for losses suffered by reason of a "breach of some duty 
imposed by law to protect the broad interests of social 
policy." [Citations omitted]. Tort law is not designed, 
however, to compensate parties for losses suffered as a 
result of a breach of duties assumed only by agreement. 
That type of compensation necessitates an analysis of the 
damages [**39] which were within the contemplation of 
the parties when framing their agreement. It remains the 
particular province of the law of contracts. * * * 
"'The controlling policy consideration underlying tort 
law is the safety of persons and property — the protec-
tion of persons and property from losses resulting from 
injury. The controlling policy consideration underly-
ing the law of contracts is the protection of expectations 
bargained for. If that distinction is kept in mind, the 
damages claimed in a particular case may more readily 
be classified between claims for injuries to persons or 
property on the one hand and economic losses on the 
other.' 
"Therefore, applying the Restatement in this context 
will encompass liability that is otherwise best suited for 
contract negotiation and assignment." Floor Craft Floor 
Covering, supra, 54 Ohio St. 3d at 7, 560 N.E.2d at 
211. 
In Floor Craft, plaintiffs specifically contracted with 
the hospital to hold the architects harmless for economic 
damages arising from the architects' plans and specifica-
tions. Moreover, the architects' contract with die hos-
pital contained several provisions to shield the [**40] 
architects from liability from the contractors. [*631] 
Accordingly, application of the economic loss rale in 
Floor Craft was required to hold the parties to their con-
tract. Id. at 7, 560N.E.2dat2U. 
Adoption of the "economic loss" rule in Floor Craft 
does not necessarily preclude recover in the instant case 
since Section 552 specifically provides that damages for 
"pecuniary loss" are recoverable for negligent misrepre-
sentations made by those who have a pecuniary interest 
in a transaction. Aside from Floor Craft, no further 
Ohio cases discuss the applicable damages recoverable 
in a negligent misrepresentation claim. However cases 
outside Ohio appear to adopt two separate theories of 
recovery. Courts which apply the economic lots rule 
to preclude recovery in a misrepresentation claim do so 
in a very narrow context. These courts hold that the 
economic loss rule does not apply (1) where one inten-
tionally makes false representations, and (2) where one 
in the business of supplying information for the guid-
ance of others makes negligent representations. See 
Moorman Mfg. Co. v. NatL Tank Co. (1982), 91 
IH2d 69, 61 IlLDec. 746, 435 N.E.2d 443. [**41] 
With respect to the second exception, such persons usu-
ally include attorneys, abstractors of title, surveyofa, in-
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of any oral promise by Life to subsequently reduce the 
agreement to a writing to be agreed on and executed, 
Life cannot have reasonably expected that the promise 
so shown would induce Southmark to action leading to 
its definite and substantial injury. 
ni l Both Levy and Walker stated in their affi-
davits that in June 1985 Southmark understood that 
Olmsted would not be able to consummate an agree-
ment with Life. This information apparently came 
from Charles Roth, the securities broker who ini-
tially advised Southmark of the possibility of acquir-
ing Life's IB shares. However, Levy indicated that 
at the end of June Olmsted was given an extension of 
time to locate the requisite funding for the proposed 
stock purchase. 
Arthur Christoffersen, the executive vice president 
of Life, stated in his affidavit that on July 22, 1985 
counsel for IB told Life's counsel that the problems 
with Olmsted were resolved and that Olmsted was 
assigning his contract to purchase the IB stock to 
USUCQ Christoffersen notified Southmark of this 
development the same day. Nothing in the affidavits 
of Southmark's officers indicates that Southmark was 
notified of Olmsted's status prior to that date. In 
fact, Southmark suggests in its brief on appeal that it 
was not officially informed of Olmsted's status until 
August 9, 1985, when the president of IB notified 
Southmark that Olmsted was not going to purchase 
the IB securities. In any event, nothing in the record 
indicates that either party knew prior to July 22,1985 
that Olmsted would definitely be unable to purchase 
the securities. 
[**2H 
Neither Cobb nor any other case cited by Southmark 
compels the conclusion that Southmark's estoppel the-
ory precluded summary judgment for Life. In Cobb, the 
defendant at least provided a written acknowledgement 
of the oral lease agreement as well as of the agreement 
to execute a document embodying it. Pursuant to the 
agreement and in reliance on the defendant's promises, 
the plaintiff spent $ 312,237 renovating the lease space. 
Because the renovations were part of the agreement, 
the defendant certainly should have expected that its 
promises would induce the plaintiff to undertake his con-
tractual obligations by making the renovations. Under 
these circumstances, it seems clear [*771] that an in-
justice would occur unless the defendant were estopped 
from asserting a statute of frauds defense. 
In the present case, however, there was neither a writ-
ten acknowledgement of the alleged oral sales agree-
ment nor of any agreement to execute final documents 
embodying the agreement already made. Moreover, 
Southmark had not performed under the alleged agree-
ment, nl2 nor had it made actual expenditures or bind-
ing commitments with third parties in reliance on Life's 
promises. Instead, Southmark claims [**22] only that 
it lost potential profits from business opportunities it 
passed up, largely if not wholly while it was uncer-
tain whether Olmsted would purchase the shares. These 
circumstances are thus markedly different from those 
presented in Cobb. Indeed, the factors creating the po-
tential for injustice in Cobb and similar cases, nl3 viz., 
the promisee's partial performance and actual expendi-
tures or binding commitments made in reliance upon a 
promise that could be expected to induce the promisee 
to take such action, are simply not present in the case at 
hand. Texas courts have made it clear that promissory 
estoppel should be invoked only when the circumstances 
are so egregious as to render it inequitable for the court 
to apply the statute of frauds, see Reynolds v. Stevens, 
659 K2d 44, 45 (5th Cir.1981), but in this case we can-
not say that such circumstances exist. 
nl2 Although Texas courts have held that full or 
partial performance of an oral agreement by one 
party may preclude invocation of the statute of frauds 
by the other, there are cases in which the court re-
fused to enforce the oral agreement even where the 
plaintiff had performed. See, e.g., Mercer v. C.A. 
Roberts Co., 570 F.2d 1232,1237 (5th Cir. 1978). 
[**23J 
nl3 Other cases in which the court found that 
the doctrine of promissory estoppel may be prop-
erly asserted are similarly distinguishable from the 
present case. In Computer Sys. of Am., Inc. v. 
International Business Mach. Corp., 795 E2d 1086 
(1st Cir. 1986) (applying Texas law), for example, 
there was evidence of an existing document that con-
finned the parties' lease agreement and the general 
terms thereof, and there was evidence of a written 
promise to sign a more comprehensive and formal 
agreement at a later time. See id, as 1087,1093-94. 
Moreover, in reliance on the defendant's promises, 
the plaintiff had already modified the leased equip-
ment to meet the defendant's particular needs and 
had undertaken steps to facilitate the installation of 
the equipment at the defendant's facilities. Id. at 
1088. 
Likewise, inMagcobarN. Am. v. Grasso Oilfield 
Sent, Inc., 736 S.W2d 787 (Tex.App. - Corpus 
Christi 1987, dismissed as moot), another case in-
volving an alleged lease agreement, there was evi-
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ing because the oral loan agreement was unenforceable 
pursuant to the statute of frauds. The court rejected this 
argument, noting that the reasonableness of plaintiffs 
reliance is normally a question of fact for the jury. Id. 
at 123-124. 
In the present case, it is undisputed that First Union is 
in the business of renting commercial real estate and that 
its agent, Arthur Roth, supplied McCarthy, Lebit with 
false information. Moreover, First Union's pecuniary 
interest in the above transaction is self-evident. Further, 
it is our opinion that a material issue of fact exists with 
respect to whether Roth's representations that the paper-
work was being completed and a written lease agreement 
was forthcoming was made knowing that McCarthy, 
Lebit would rely upon it in deciding to [**47] forgo 
the opportunity to pursue other leasing options. Finally, 
whether McCarthy, Lebit justifiably relied upon Roth's 
representations should also be left for the jury's deter-
mination. Gathagan, supra, at paragraph three of the 
syllabus. 
The issue of damages was further explored by the ap-
pellate court in Frame v. Boatmen's Bank of Concord 
Village (Mo.App. 1992), 824 S.W.2d 491 ("Frame IT). 
On remand, the trial court awarded plaintiff $ 4,300, 
representing plaintiffs lost earnest money deposit paid 
to the prospective seller of the bowling alley. Frame 
appealed, urging he was entitled to recover lost profits. 
The court of appeals rejected Frame's argument, citing 
to the Restatement of the Law 2d, Torts, Section 552B, 
as prohibiting "benefit-of-the-bargain" damages. The 
court in Frame II limited Frame to consequential dam-
ages as represented by his lost earnest deposit money. 
Id. at 495-497. 
In the present case, McCarthy, Lebit's damages, as 
alleged in its complaint, are limited to its forbearance 
of pursuing other leasing opportunities in other office 
[**48] buildings. While the difference between these 
damages and damages based upon the benefit of the bar-
gain allegedly entered into with First Union may be 
slight, there still exists a distinction as previously ex-
plained, and these differences should not prevent re-
covery in the present case if a jury determines that 
McCarthy, Lebit has proven its claim for negligent mis-
representation. 
[*634] Accordingly, this court rejects First Union's 
argument that McCarthy, Lebit is precluded from recov-
ery under Section 552B based on the contention that its 
claim is really a claim for benefit-of-the-bargain dam-
ages. 
First Union's second argument that Section 552 al-
lows recovery only for third parties is also without merit. 
While the Ohio Supreme Court has addressed the issue 
of a defendant's liability to a third party for negligent 
misrepresentations, see Haddon View, Floor Craft and 
Delman, supra, it has never limited a negligent misrep-
resentation claim to third parties only. In fact, Section 
552, itself, does not limit its application to third parties. 
Rather, it states "one who * * * supplies false information 
for the guidance of others in [**49] their business trans-
actions, is subject to liability for pecuniary loss caused 
to them by their justifiable reliance upon the informa-
tion * * *." Thus, while Section 552 can be applied to 
third parties, it is clearly not limited to third parties. 
Finally, the cases previously cited apply Section 552 to 
parties directly related to each other pursuant to contract 
negotiations. 
Accordingly, this court finds that a material issue of 
fact exists as to McCarthy, Lebit's claim for negligent 
misrepresentation. McCarthy, Lebit's second assign-
ment of error is well taken. 
The judgment of the trial court is reversed, and this 
cause is remanded to the trial court on McCarthy; Lebit's 
second, third and fourth assignments of error. On re-
mand, McCarthy, Lebit must show by a preponderance 
of the evidence that an oral lease agreement waa entered 
into. In addition, McCarthy, Lebit must demonstrate 
by a preponderance of the evidence that the doctrine of 
promissory estoppel bars application of the statute of 
frauds. McCarthy, Lebit's claim for negligent misrep-
resentation is limited to "out-of-pocket" losses. Finally, 
to the extent that McCarthy, Lebit may recover dam-
ages under its claim for breach [**50] of an oral lease 
agreement, such damages cannot be duplicative of those 
damages recoverable under its negligent misrepresenta-
tion claim. 
Judgment accordingly. 
Blackmon, J., concurs. 
John F. Corrigan, P.J., dissents. 
DISSENTBY: CORRIGAN 
DISSENT: John F. Corrigan, Presiding Judge, dissent-
ing. 
I respectfully dissent from the judgment rendered by 
the majority. 
With respect to the firm's breach of contract claim, 
it must be noted that the parties' oral agreement may 
constitute an express agreement. Lucas v. Costantini 
(1983), 13 Ohio App. 3d 367, 368, 13 OBR 449, 450, 
469 N.E.2d 927, 928. An express contract, unlike an 
implied contract, connotes a formal exchange of [*635] 
Page 61 
851 F.2d 763, *772; 1988 U.S. App. LEXIS 11067, **26; LEXSEE 
7 U.CCR. Serv. 2d(Callaghan) 529 
Nacionales de Colombia, 638 S.W.2d 870, 872 
(Tex.1982), rev'd on other grounds, 466 U.S. 408, 
104 S. Ct. 1868,80 L. Ed. 2d 404 (1984) (interpret-
ing Tex.Rev.Civ.Stat.Ann. art. 2031b, which has 
since been recodified at Tex.Civ.Prac. & Rem.Code 
Ann. §§ 17.04l-.045), the principal question here is 
whether the assertion of jurisdiction over USLICO 
by the district court is constitutionally permissible. 
[**27] 
In Odder, the Supreme Court held that when an alleged 
tort-feasor's intentional actions are expressly aimed at 
the forum state, and the tort-feasor knows that the brunt 
of the injury will be felt by a particular resident in the 
forum, the tort-feasor must reasonably anticipate being 
haled into court there to answer for its tortious actions. 
Id. 104 S. Ct. as 1487. This holds true even if the 
tort-feasor's conduct occurs in a state other than the fo-
rum state. Id. at 1488. But in the present case, there is 
no evidence that USLICO expressly aimed its allegedly 
tortious activities at Texas, nor is there evidence that 
USLICO knew the brunt of Southmark's injury would 
be felt there. 
Indeed, the oral agreement with which USLICO al-
legedly interfered was apparently negotiated and made 
in Atlanta and/or New York, and there is no evidence 
that the agreement was made or to be performed in 
Texas or governed by Texas law. nl6 Life, the other 
party to the purported [+773] agreement, is not a res-
ident of Texas, nor is Olmsted. The company whose 
stock Southmark wished to purchase and that USLICO 
did purchase was not a Texas corporation and it did not, 
so far as the record shows, do any business [**28] in 
Texas. Nor is there evidence that the stock was located 
or purchased in Texas. Southmark itself is incorporated 
in Georgia, and USLICO is a Virginia company domi-
ciled in Washington, D.C 
nl6 Southmark also relies on Union Carbide Corp. 
v. UGI Corp., 731 F.2d 1186 (5th Cir. 1984), in 
support of its specific jurisdiction argument. In that 
case, however, the contract with which the defendant 
tortiously interfered was a contract that was being 
performed in the forum. Moreover, the defendant 
interfered with that contract by entering into another 
contract, also to be performed in the forum, with one 
of the parties to the original agreement. Under these 
circumstances, which are not present in the case at 
hand, it is far more likely that the defendant will an-
ticipate being haled into court in the forum to answer 
for its tortious activities. 
In short, nothing in the record indicates that USLICO 
expressly aimed its allegedly tortious activities at Texas, 
or that Texas is even the focal point of USLICO's tor-
tious conduct. nl7 Moreover, it is not even clear that 
Southmark would feel the brunt of its injury in Texas. 
While it may be true that USLICO agreed to buy the 
stock knowing that [**29] Southmark has its principal 
place of business in Texas, and that Southmark is there-
fore a Texas resident for jurisdictional purposes, we do 
not think this fact standing alone would cause USLICO 
to anticipate being haled into a Texas court to answer for 
its conduct. See Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz. 471 
US. 462, 105 S. Ct. 2174, 2183, 85 L. Ed. 2d 528 
(1985) (noting that the mere foreseeability of causing 
injury in another state is not a "sufficient benchmark" 
for exercising personal jurisdiction). Indeed, under the 
circumstances, the fact that Southmark has its principal 
place of business in Texas is, as the district court put it, 
a mere fortuity. Cf. Patterson v. Dietze, Inc., 764E2d 
1145, 1147 (5th Cir. 1985) (where defendant's contact 
with the forum rests solely on "the mere fortuity that the 
plaintiff happens to be a resident of the forum," doe pro-
cess requirements are not satisfied). We therefore reject 
Southmark's specific jurisdiction argument 
nl7 Southmark has argued that personal jurisdic-
tion over USLICO exists because USLICO availed 
itself of the protection of Texas laws by selling se-
curities in Texas to finance the purchase of the IB 
shares. However, the securities in question were ac-
tually offered by an underwriter after Southmark had 
already filed this suit. 
[**30] 
Having concluded that specific jurisdiction is lacking, 
we now consider whether Southmark has established that 
general jurisdiction exists. To do so we must examine 
the nature of USLICO's contacts with Texas to deter-
mine whether they constitute the kind of continuous and 
systematic contacts required to satisfy due process. 
USLICO asserts, and Southmark does not dispute, that 
USLICO has no offices or real property in Texas; it has 
no address, bank account, or telephone listing in Texas; 
it does not recruit or maintain employees in Texas; it 
has never performed services or paid taxes in Texas; 
and it does not regularly advertise or send personnel to 
Texas on USLICO business. Nonetheless, Southmark 
contends that USLICO's subsidiaries that do business in 
Texas are alter egos or agents of USLICO and that the 
general jurisdiction that Texas courts have over the sub-
sidiaries may be imputed to USLICO We do not agree. 
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"'Real estate transactions are usually formal undertak-
ings involving significant sums of money.' 
"The Seale court further wrote: 
" 'If a court allows parol evidence of an unwritten con-
tract, it can never be certain that it is not perpetuating 
rather than preventing a fraud. Had the agreement been 
reduced to writing, however, there would be little op-
portunity for fraud or mistake to arise.' 
[*637] "We agree with the reasoning of the Seale court 
and we decline to apply the Gathagan case to cases in-
volving real estate. Accordingly, we find no issue of 
fact concerning whether appellee should be equitably 
estopped from asserting the statute of frauds in the case 
at bar." 
I would apply the rationale set forth in Seale v. 
Citizens S. & L. Assn., supra, expressly adopted by 
the Highland County Court of Appeals, and would not 
allow the promissory [**56] estoppel claim to defeat 
application of the statute of frauds. 
Finally, as to the claim for negligent misrepresenta-
tion, I would conclude that, assuming such a claim may 
defeat application of the defense of the statute of frauds 
in a case such as this where a written lease is contem-
plated, the firm presented no evidence that anyone at 
First Union ever represented that Roth could bind First 
Union by an oral statement. Moreover, even assuming 
such a representation had been made, since die parties 
contemplated execution of a written lease and further ne-
gotiations, the firm could not justifiably rely upon such 
representation. 
I would therefore overrule each of the assigned errors 
and affirm the judgment rendered below. 
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DISPOSITION: [*1] Judgment vacated. Case remanded 
with direction to enter judgment for the defendant. 
Because of the novel question presented, no costs are 
awarded to either party. 
COUNSEL: Attorney for the Plaintiff: Lawrence 
Winger, Esq. (orally), Herbert H.Bennett & Associates, 
P.A., 121 Middle St., Suite 300, Portland, Maine 04101 
Attorneys for the Defendant: Robert J. Piampiano, Esq. 
(orally), William McKinley, Esq., RICHARDSON & 
TROUBH, 465 Congress St., P.Q Box 9732, Portland, 
Maine 04104 
JUDGES: Before ROBERTS, WATHEN, GLASSMAN, 
CLIFFORD, COLLINS and BRODY*, JJ. 
* Brody J. sat at oral argument and participated in 
the initial conference but resigned before this opinion 
was adopted. 
OPINIONBY: ROBERTS 
OPINION: ROBERTS, J. 
Emery-Waterhouse Co. appeals from a judgment 
of the Superior Court (Cumberland County, Lipez, J.) 
awarding damages to Timothy B. Stearns for breach 
of an oral contract to employ Stearns for a definite 
term greater than one year. The court held Emery-
Waterhouse estopped to assert its defense under the 
statute of frauds, 33 M.R.S.A. §51(5)(1988), by the ex-
tent of Steam's detrimental reliance on the oral contract. 
Because Stearns did not produce clear and convincing ev-
idence of fraud on the [*2] part of his employer, we hold 
that enforcement of the oral contract was barred by the 
statute of frauds. Accordingly, we vacate the judgment. 
Emery-Waterhouse is a Portland hardware whole-
saler that also franchises "Trustworthy" hardware stores 
throughout the Northeast and owns several such stores. 
In December, 1984 the Employer's president, Charles 
Hildreth, met with Timothy Stearns in Massachusetts to 
discuss hiring him to run the Employer's retail stores. 
Stearns was managing a Sears-Roebuck & Company 
store in Massachusetts, had done retail marketing for 
Sears for twenty seven years, and was then fifty years 
old. He was earning approximately $ 99,000 per year, 
owned his home in Massachusetts, and also owned prop-
erty in Maine. Stearns had some dissatisfactions with 
Sears but was concerned about retaining his Sean job 
security and was aware that his age would make it hard 
to find another marketing job. After the initial meeting 
Stearns came to Maine, inspected some stores, and met 
with Hildreth in Portland. The substance of this second 
meeting was disputed, but the jury found that Hildreth 
gave Stearns an oral contract of employment to age fifty 
five at a guaranteed salary [*3] of $ 85,000 per year. 
This contract was never reduced to writing. 
Stearns resigned from Sears, moved to Maine, and be-
came Emery-Witerhouse's director of retail sales. His 
employer retained Stearns in this position at $ 85,000 
for nearly two years. In December, 1986 Hildreth ad-
vised Stearns that he was being removed, but Stearns 
was given a different job as the national accounts man-
ager the next day. Stearns remained in this new position 
at an annual salary of $ 68,000 for six months. Hildreth 
then succeeded in his efforts to acquire a national mar-
keting firm, eliminated Stearns's position as a result, 
and terminated his employment before he reached age 
fifty five. Stearns eventually filed a complaint in the 
Superior Court for breach of contract. The court de-
nied summary judgment based on the possibility that 
the employer might be estopped to assert its defense 
under the statute of frauds by Stearns's detrimental re-
liance. At trial the court held that such an estoppel ap-
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plied. The jury established the oral contract and breach 
by special findings and the court assigned damages in 
equity pursuant to Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 
139. Following the denial of its post [*4] trial motions 
Emery-Waterhouse brought this appeal. 
The appeal presents a question of first impression in 
Maine: whether an employee may avoid the statute of 
frauds based solely upon his detrimental reliance on an 
employer's oral promise of continued employment, nl 
Other jurisdictions have divided on this question. n2 
Some have permitted avoidance based on theories of 
promissory estoppel, Mcintosh v. Murphy, 469 R2d 
177, 181 (Haw. 1970), equitable estoppel, Pursell v. 
Vhlverine-Pentronix, Inc., 205N. W.2d504, 506 (Mich. 
Ct. App. 1973), or part performance, Stevens v. Good 
Samaritan Hosp. and Medical Center, 504 R2d 749, 
752 (Or. 1972). Others have rejected such an avoidance 
as contrary to the policy of the statute, Tannenbaum v. 
Biscayne Osteopathic Hosp., 173 So. 2d 492, 495 (Flo. 
1965), or as unsupported by sufficient evidence to ver-
ify the oral promise, Hudson v. \knture Industries, Inc., 
252 S.E.2d 606,608 (Go. 1979). Steams contends that 
our case law permits him to avoid the statute of frauds 
under the promissory estoppel theory of section 139 of 
the Restatement (Second) [*5] of Contracts. n3 We dis-
agree. 
nl It is undisputed that the oral contract with 
Stearns, if any, was for a period longer than one 
year and therefore was within the statute of frauds. 
n2 See Annotation, "Action By Employee 
In Reliance On Employment Contract Which 
Violates Statute Of Frauds As Rendering Contract 
Enforceable," 54A.L.R.3d 715 at §§ 11-13 (1974); 
3 S. Williston, A Treatise on the Law of Contracts 
§ 533A (3d ed. 1960); 2 A. Corbin, Corbin on 
Contracts § 459 (1950 & Supp. 1990). 
n3 Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 139(1) 
provides as follows: 
(1) A promise which the promisor should reason-
ably expect to induce action or forbearance on the 
part of the promisee or a third person and which 
does induce the action or forbearance is enforceable 
notwithstanding the Statute of Frauds if injustice can 
be avoided only by enforcement of the promise. The 
remedy granted for breach is to be limited as justice 
requires. 
In Chapman v. Bomann, 381 A. 2d 1123, [*6] (Me. 
1978), we adopted promissory estoppel as a substitute 
for consideration, Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 
90, but did not decide whether it would permit a di-
rect avoidance of the statute of frauds. Id. § 139. n4 
Chapman involved an oral promise to make a writing 
satisfying the statute of frauds that was ancillary to a 
contract for the sale of land. Wfe considered whether this 
ancillary promise could be enforced under the equitable 
principle that the statute of frauds may not itself become 
an instrument of fraud. Focusing on the conduct of the 
defendant, we concluded that an actual, subjective in-
tention to deceive can estop the operation of the statute. 
In addition, an oral, ancillary promise may be enforced 
if the circumstances show objectively that "a fraud, or a 
substantial injustice tantamount to a fraud" would result 
from strict application of the statute. Chapman, 381 
A.2dat 1123. Thus, although we invoked the rubric of 
promissory estoppel, our decision in Chapman actually 
applied an equitable estoppel and extended it only to an 
ancillary promise to make a writing. See 381 A.2d at 
1130 n. 6. 
n4 At the time of our decision in Chapman the 
language to be incorporated in section 139 was con-
tained in Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 217A 
(Tentative Draft No. 4, 1968). See Chapman, 381 
A.2datU30n.6. 
[*7] 
Wfe affirm that equitable estoppel, based upon a 
promisor's fraudulent conduct, can avoid application of 
the statute of frauds and that this principle applies to 
a fraudulent promise of employment. But we decline 
Stearns's invitation to accept promissory estoppel as per-
mitting avoidance of the statute in employment contracts 
that require longer than one year to perform. Although 
section 139 of the Restatement may promote justice in 
other situations, in the employment context it contra-
venes the policy of the Statute to prevent fraud. It is 
too easy for a disgruntled former employee to allege re-
liance on a promise, but difficult factually to distinguish 
such reliance from the ordinary preparations that attend 
any new employment. Thus, such pre-employment ac-
tions of reliance do not properly serve the evidentiary 
function of the writing required by the statute. An em-
ployee who establishes an employer's fraudulent conduct 
by clear and convincing evidence may recover damages 
for deceit, Boivin v. Jones & Vining, Inc., 578 A.2d 
187,189 (Me. 1990), or may avoid the statute of frauds 
and recover under an oral contract. The policy of the 
statute commands, however, [*8] that the focus remain 
upon the employer's conduct rather than upon the em-
ployee's reliance. 
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For similar reasons we reject the part performance 
doctrine as an avenue for avoidance of the statute of 
frauds in the employment context. We have recognized 
in other circumstances that a promisor's acceptance of 
partial performance may estop a defense under the statute 
on the ground of equitable fraud. Northeast Inv. Co. v. 
Leisure Living Communities, Inc., 351 A. 2d 845, 855 
(Me. 1976); McGuire v. Murray, 107 Me. 108,115 
(1910). Under this doctrine, too, our focus has been 
upon the conduct of the promisor. Moreover, an em-
ployee's preparations to begin a new assignment gener-
ally convey no direct benefit to an employer so it is par-
ticularly inappropriate to remove from an employer the 
protections of the statute. An employee can recover for 
services actually performed in quantum meruit. But to 
enforce a multi-year employment contract an employee 
must produce a writing that satisfies the statute of frauds 
or must prove fraud on the part of the employer. 
Stearns has neither alleged nor proved fraud on the 
part of Emery-Waterhouse. Stearns does not [*9J dis-
pute that he was adequately compensated for the time 
that he actually worked. We conclude that his action for 
breach of contract is barred by the statute of frauds. Our 
holding renders it unnecessary to address the employer's 
other contentions on appeal. 
The entry is: 
Judgment vacated. 
Case remanded with direction to enter judgment for 
the defendant. Because of the novel question presented, 
no costs are awarded to either party. 
All concurring. 
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OPINIONBY: PER CURIAM 
OPINION: [*1560] John Varhol appeals from a jury ver-
dict that awarded him what he considers to be grossly 
inadequate damages. Not surprisingly, Varhol's mam 
contention on appeal is that the damage award was too 
low. Preserving that issue for appeal, however, required 
Varhol to file a timely new trial motion m the district 
court. Hahn v. Becker, 588 E2d 768, 772 (7th Cir. 
1979). Unfortunately Varhol served his new trial mo-
tion well after the ten-day limit Fed.R.Civ.P. 59 allows. 
Whether Varhors motion was timely, and thus whether 
\fcrhol has preserved his damages issue for appeal, de-
pends on the status of Eady v. Foerder, 381 R2d 980 
(7th Cir. 1967), which held that m certain "unique cir-
cumstances" a district court may dispose of an otherwise 
untimely new trial motion on the merits. 
The case was originally argued before a three-judge 
panel. The full court plus Senior Judge Eschbach [**3] 
reheard the case en banc to consider whether to overrule 
Eady. The court as constituted is evenly divided. Six 
judges (Judges Cummings, Posner, Coffey, Easterbrook, 
Manion, and Eschbach) voted to overrule Eady. Six 
judges (Chief Judge Bauer and Judges Wbod, Cudahy, 
Flaum, Ripple, and Kanne) voted not to overrule Eady. 
Since a majority of the court as constituted did not vote 
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to overrule Eady, it remains as the law of this circuit. 
Despite not overruling Eady, the court unanimously 
voted to affirm the district court on all issues, including 
damages. Those judges who voted to overrule Eady 
would affirm the amount of damages on procedural 
grounds, not reaching the issue on the merits because of 
Varhol's failure to file a timely new trial motion. Those 
judges who voted not to overrule Eady would hold on the 
merits that the district court did not abuse its discretion 
by not awarding Varhol a new trial on damages. 
The court's opinion discusses those issues on which 
all judges have agreed. The question of whether to over-
rule Eady is discussed in separate concurring opinions. 
* The Illinois State Bar Association and Appellate 
Lawyers Association, the Federal Bar Association, 
the Wisconsin Porcelain Retirement Participants, 
the Chicago Council of Lawyers, and the Seventh 
Circuit Bar Association filed briefs as amici curiae 
on the question of whether to overrule Eady. Wfe 
thank these groups for their participation in this case. 
[**4] 
I. 
John Varhol worked as a chief of on-board services 
for the National Railroad Passenger Corporation (more 
commonly known as Amtrak, the name by which we 
will refer to it). Varhol's job required him to ride 
on Amtrak's trains during their scheduled runs. On 
November 12, 1983, the train on which Varhol was 
working derailed near Jefferson, Texas. The car in 
which Varhol had been riding remained upright, but 
Varhol was thrown to his hands and knees. He picked 
himself up, checked various cars, and went outside to 
help remove passengers from the train. A short time 
after the accident, while still helping to remove pas-
sengers, Varhol slipped on some rocks near the track, 
again falling on his hands and knees. Varhol rode a 
train home to Chicago the next day, working along the 
way; he never worked again (for Amtrak and as far as 
we know for anyone else). 
According to Varhol, the derailment caused him severe 
injuries that prevented him from returning to work, and 
caused him great pain and suffering. Varhol sued Amtrak 
under the Federal Employers Liability Act (FELA), 45 
U.S.C. §§ 51 -60. Amtrak admitted that its negligence 
caused the derailment, so the only issue at trial was dam-
ages. [**5] The problem for Varhol in proving damages 
was that he had had Multiple Sclerosis (MS) for ten to 
twenty years before the derailment. Varhol claimed that 
the derailment had made his MS worse; Amtrak con-
tended that Varhol's condition after the derailment re-
sulted [*1561] from the natural progression of his MS, 
and that the derailment had nothing to do with exacerbat-
ing his MS. Varhol alleged that he suffered injuries apart 
from the exacerbation of his MS, but the evidence was 
such that a reasonable jury could have believed that other 
than a few scrapes and bruises he received in his falls, 
the bulk of Varhol's damages (for example, his physical 
ills and inability to return to work) were caused by his 
MS. Thus, the central issue at trial was whether, and to 
what extent, the derailment exacerbated Varhol's MS. 
After both sides presented conflicting testimony on the 
medical issues, the trial judge submitted the case to the 
jury. Among the instructions the judge gave was a se-
ries of interrogatories concerning the extent to which the 
derailment aggravated Varhol's MS. Those interrogato-
ries required the jury to determine, if it could, 'what 
percentage of [Varhol's] present condition was caused 
by [**6] the injuries he suffered as a result of the train 
derailment. . .," and then asked the jury if it took that 
"percentage into consideration in reducing the amount 
of damages that you have awarded" to Varhol. The jury 
found that the derailment caused one percent of Varhol's 
condition, and awarded him $ 237.00 in damages. 
After the jury announced its verdict, the district judge 
told Varhol's lawyers that they could take twenty-one 
days to file any post-trial motions, including a motion 
for a new trial. Twenty-one days later, Varhol filed his 
motion for new trial. Not surprisingly, Varhol's mo-
tion contended that a new trial was necessary because 
the jury's verdict was grossly inadequate. Varhol also 
challenged the trial judge's decision to submit the spe-
cial interrogatories on aggravation to the jury, and the 
judge's decision not to admit his medical bills into evi-
dence. The trial judge denied Varhol's motion, \farhol 
appeals both the denial of his motion and the underlying 
judgment. 
n. 
The sequence of events in the district court raises a 
question as to our appellate jurisdiction. Varhol did not 
file his notice of appeal until after the district court de-
nied his new trial motion - [**7] fifty-nine days after 
the clerk entered judgment on the jury's verdict See 
Fed.R.Civ.P. 58. Amtrak is not an agency of the United 
States, so Fed.R. App.P. 4(a) required Varhol to file his 
notice of appeal "within 30 days after the date of the 
entry of judgment." The Supreme Court and this court 
have repeatedly emphasized that a timely notice of ap-
peal is "mandatory and jurisdictional." E.g., Griggs v. 
Provident Consumer Discount Co., 459 U.S. 56, 61, 74 
L. Ed. 2d 225, 103 S. O. 400 (1982) (per curiam); 
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Browder v. Director, Department of Corrections, 434 
US. 257, 264, 54L. Ed. 2d521, 98S. Ct. 556(1978); 
Parke-Chapley Constr. Co. v. Cherrington, 865 E2d 
907, 908-09 (7th Cir. 1989); cf., Sonicraft, Inc. v. 
NLRB, 814 E2d 385 (7th Cir. 1987). This means what 
it says: if an appellant does not file his notice of appeal 
on time, we cannot hear his appeal. 
If a party files a timely motion for a new trial un-
der Fed.R.Civ.P. 59(a), the time for filing a notice of 
appeal from the underlying judgment does not begin to 
run until the district court enters judgment denying the 
motion. Fed.R.App.P. 4(a)(4). But Varhol's new trial 
motion was not timely, even though he filed his motion 
within the twenty-one days the district court gave him. 
Rule [**8] 59(b) provides that "[a] motion for a new 
trial shall be served not later than 10 days after the entry 
of the judgment." Rule 6(b) provides that a district court 
may not extend the time for filing any Rule 59 motion. 
Since the trial judge could not extend the time to file 
the new trial motion, Varhol's new trial motion was un-
timely and, according to Rule 4(a)(4), should not have 
tolled the time for filing his notice of appeal. 
There is, however, a narrow exception to the general 
rule prohibiting an untimely appeal. This exception, 
known as the "unique circumstances" doctrine, orig-
inated in Harris Truck Lines, Inc. v. Cherry Meat 
Packers, Inc., 371 US. 215, 9 L. Ed. 2d 261, 83 
S. Ct. 283 (1962) (per curiam). In Harris, the dis-
trict court, acting before the 30-day appeal period had 
ended, granted [*1562] the losing party's motion un-
der then-Fed.R.Civ.P. 73(a) to extend the time to file 
its notice of appeal. (Fed.R.Civ.P. 4(a)(5) now pro-
vides for motions to extend the time to file a notice of 
appeal; we will discuss Rule 4(a)(5) in more detail be-
low.) This court dismissed the appeal, finding that the 
circumstances the district court relied upon to grant the 
extension did not constitute "excusable neglect," as the 
rule [**9] required. The Supreme Court reversed, hold-
ing that if a party relies on a district court's extension of 
time to file a notice of appeal, and delays an appeal, the 
court of appeals should not dismiss the appeal because 
it disagrees with the district court's finding of excusable 
neglect. Id. at 217. If the decision to grant an exten-
sion is open to second-guessing by the appellate court, 
the only way a party could protect itself would be to 
file an appeal within thirty days of the judgment; but 
the extension of time was supposed to allow the party 
to defer the decision to appeal. The Supreme Court rea-
soned that this obvious dilemma presented such "unique 
circumstances" that this court should not have disturbed 
the district court's decision to grant the extension. Id. 
The Court extended the "unique circumstances" doc-
trine in Thompson v. INS, 375 US. 384, 11 L. Ed. 
2d 404, 84 S. Ct. 397 (1964). In Thompson, a party 
served a motion for a new trial twelve days after entry 
of judgment. The district court assured the party that 
his motion was timely, and went on to decide the motion 
on the merits. By the time the district court decided the 
motion, the time to appeal the underlying judgment had 
run. The party [**10] filed a late appeal, which this 
court dismissed. The Supreme Court relied on Harris 
to again reverse, holding that when a party performs 
"an act which, if properly done, postponed the deadline 
for filing an appeal," and the party relied on the district 
court's conclusion that the act had been properly done, 
the appeal is timely if filed within the mistaken new 
deadline. Id. at 387. Later in the same term, the Court 
relied on Thompson to summarily reverse another court 
of appeals' dismissal of an untimely appeal. Wblfeohn 
v. Hankin, 376 US. 203, 11 L. Ed. 2d 636, 84 S. Ct. 
699 (1964). 
This court has applied the unique circumstance* doc-
trine a number of times; indeed, we have remarked that 
the doctrine is "particularly well established" in this cir-
cuit. Bernstein v. Lind-Wildock & Co., 738E2dl79, 
182 (7th Cir. 1984). For cases invoking the doctrine 
to save otherwise untimely appeals, see, e.g., idL at 
182-83, Textor v. Board of Regents, 711 F.2d 1387, 
1390-91 (7th Cir. 1983), and the cases Textor citea. The 
unique circumstances doctrine as applied in Thompson 
has been criticized and its continuing vitality questioned. 
See Parkc-Chapley, 865 E2d at 913 n. 6; Sonicrafi v. 
/**;;;NLRB, 814F.2d 385, 387(7th Cir. 1987); Smith 
u Evans, 853F.2dl55,160-61 (3d Cir. 1988); set MIBO 
Houston v. Lack, 487U.S. 266,282,101L. Ed. 2d245, 
108 S. Ct. 2379 (1988) (Justice Scalia, joined by Chief 
Justice Rehnquist, and Justices O'Connor and Kennedy, 
dissenting). But we are bound to follow Thompson un-
less we are "almost certain that the [Supreme Court] 
would repudiate" it if given the chance. See Olson 
u Paine, Wsbber, Jackson & Curtis, Inc., 806 F.2d 
731, 734 (7th Cir. 1986). Despite the questions as 
to Thompson's continuing vitality, we will not specu-
late as to Thompson's demise. Such speculation would 
be especially inappropriate given that the very term af-
ter Lack, a unanimous Court rejected a unique circum-
stances argument by distinguishing rather than overrul-
ing Thompson. See Osterneck v. Ernst & Whinney, 489 
US. 169, 109 S. Ct. 987, 992-93, 103 L. Ed. 2d 146 
(1989). While this is not conclusive proof that a Court 
majority would not overrule Thompson if necessary to 
decide a case, the fact that the Court in Osterneck chose 
not to overrule Thompson makes it overly bold for us 
to repudiate Thompson. Therefore, until the Supreme 
Court says otherwise, Thompson and the unique [**12] 
Page 71 
909 F.2d 1557, *1562; 1990 U.S. App. LEXIS 13944, **12; LEXSEE 
17 Fed. R. Serv. 3d (Callaghan) 1 
circumstances doctrine it pronounced remain good law, 
and we will continue to follow it, as we must. Cf. Kraus 
v. Consolidated Rail Corp., 899 K2d 1360,1362-65 (3d 
Cir. 1990). 
[*1563] That Thompson is still good law does not nec-
essarily mean that it applies in this case. In Osterneck, 
the Supreme Court held that the unique circumstances 
doctrine will excuse an untimely notice of appeal when 
"a party has performed an act which, if properly done, 
would postpone the deadline for filing his appeal and 
has received specific assurance by a judicial officer that 
this act has been properly done." 109 S. Ct. at 993. 
In Green v. Bisby, 869 F.2d 1070 (7th Cir. 1989), we 
held, based on Osterneck, that the unique circumstances 
doctrine did not save an untimely notice of appeal where 
the court entered a minute order extending the time to 
file a Rule 59 motion and the appellant, apparently re-
lying on that order, filed an untimely Rule 59 motion. 
Id. at 1072. We reasoned in Green that the unique cir-
cumstances doctrine did not apply because the entry of 
the minute order was "not an act of affirmative repre-
sentation by a judicial officer [that the act was properly 
done] as contemplated [**13] by Osterneck." Id, 
It is difficult to distinguish this case from Green. It 
is true that in this case, the district court told Varhol in 
open court he could have 21 days to file any Rule 59 
motions. But it hardly seems that reliance on a judge's 
spoken order in open court is any more reasonable than 
reliance on the court's written orders. It is also true that 
in Green a magistrate rather than the district court judge 
who ultimately decided the case entered the order ex-
tending the time to file the Rule 59 motion. See id. But 
a magistrate is a judicial officer, and there is nothing 
in Green to suggest that the magistrate was not prop-
erly empowered under 28 U.S.C. § 636(b) to consider 
matters relating to post-trial motions. 
Wfe do not have to decide whether Green controls 
this case, however, because there is an alternative ba-
sis for appellate jurisdiction. After the thirty days 
for appeal had run, Varhol recognized his jurisdictional 
problem and filed a timely motion under Fed.R.App.P. 
4(a)(5) to extend the time to appeal. Rule 4(a)(5) al-
lows such extensions after the original thirty-day pe-
riod has ended if the court finds that the failure to file 
a timely notice [**14] of appeal resulted from "excus-
able neglect." See Lorenzen v. Employees Retirement 
Plan of Sperry <ft Hutchinson, 896 F.2d 228, 231-32 
(7th Cir. 1990); Parke-Chapley, 865 E2d at 909-11; 
Redfield v. Continental Cos. Co., 818 F.2d 596, 601 
(7th Cir. 1987). The trial judge found that Varhol's 
failure to file a timely notice of appeal resulted from his 
reliance on the extension of time to file the new trial 
motion and the consideration of that motion on the mer-
its. The judge found this to be excusable neglect, and 
granted Varhol more time to file his notice of appeal. 
One might reasonably wonder how Varhol's reliance 
could be "excusable." After all, Rules 59 and 6(b), and 
Fed.R.App.P. 4(a)(4) lead clearly to the conclusion that 
an untimely Rule 59 motion will not toll the time to 
appeal no matter what the district court may say or 
do. Surely a lawyer practicing in federal court ought 
to know the federal rules. Cf. United States v. Beacon 
Bay Enterprises Inc., 840 F.2d 921 (Temp. Emer. Ct. 
App. 1988). Attorney unfamiliarity with or misunder-
standing of the federal rules, except in rare instances, is 
generally not excusable neglect under Rule 4(aX5). See 
Parke-Chapley, [++15] 865 F2d at 912-13. 
Still, the trial judge did find excusable neglect in this 
case, and we generally give deference to that finding. 
See Redfield, 818 F.2d at 602; see also Lorenzen, 896 
Kid at 232-33. Amtrak has not challenged that finding. 
Moreover, this court relied on the fact that the district 
court had granted Varhol's Rule 4(a)(5) motion in deny-
ing Amtrak's motion to dismiss this appeal, \fahol v. 
National Railroad Passenger Corp., No. 88-2207 (7th 
Cir. Aug. 8, 1988) (unpublished order). And despite 
the rules' clarity, it is at least arguable that reliance on 
a trial judge's extension of time to file a Rule 59 mo-
tion and subsequent consideration of that motion on the 
merits could constitute excusable neglect: it is under-
standable that litigants would put great stock in what 
federal judges say about procedural matters (even if what 
the federal judges say may turn out to be wrong). The 
circumstances in this case are [*1564] similar to those 
in Feeder Line Towing Serv., Inc. v. Toledo, Peoria 
& Vkstern RR Co., 539 F.2d 1107 (7th Cir. 1976). In 
Feeder Line, an appellant in an admiralty case did not file 
its notice of appeal within Rule 4(a) 's thirty-day limit. 
The [**16] appellant's counsel thought that 28 ULS.C. § 
2107, which provided a sixty-day appeal period in admi-
ralty cases, controlled; counsel failed to recognize that 
under 28 U.S.C. § 2072, Rule 4(a)'s thirty-day limit, 
which was inconsistent with § 2107's sixty-day limit, 
controlled. Id. at 1108 The district court found that 
this was excusable neglect, and granted an extension of 
time to file a notice of appeal. We upheld this deter-
mination because counsel's error was not the result of 
irresponsibility but a good faith, though erroneous, in-
terpretation of two provisions of law. Id. at 1109. This 
was so even though § 2072 states, on its face, that "all 
laws in conflict with [the federal] rules shall be of no fur-
ther force or effect after such rules have taken effect." 
The real question here is not whether we would have 
found Varhol' s reliance to be excusable neglect but rather 
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whether we should second-guess the trial judge's deci-
sion that it was. In this case, we think not. We are not 
saying that we will not overturn a district court's finding 
of excusable neglect where the party's excuse is so far 
afield (for example, counsel simply forgetting on day 
thirty to file the notice) that [**17] granting the exten-
sion would be a patent abuse of discretion. (Compare 
the discussion inLorenzen, 896 E 2d at 232-33, concern-
ing the types of mistakes that may warrant lenity under 
Rule 4(a)(5).) Allowing extension on frivolous grounds 
would turn Rule 4(a)(5) into a device to convert auto-
matically the thirty-day appeal period into a sixty-day 
period, something the rule was not meant to be. See 
In re O.P.M. Leasing Sendees, 769 E2d 911, 917 (2d 
Cir. 1985) (Friendly, J.). Nor are we saying that the 
district court would have abused its discretion if it had 
found that Varhors reliance was not excusable neglect. 
See Lorenzen, 896 E2d at 233. But because it is at 
least arguable that Varhol's actions could constitute ex-
cusable neglect, Amtrak has not challenged the district 
court's finding that it was, and an earlier ruling of this 
court has implicitly improved that finding, we will not 
second-guess the district court's finding of excusable ne-
glect in this case. Since the district court did not abuse 
its discretion in granting Varhol an extension of time to 
file his appeal, and Varhol filed his appeal within the 
extended time granted, we have jurisdiction over this 
appeal [**18] even if Thompson's unique circumstances 
doctrine does not apply here. 
m. 
On the merits, Varhol raises several issues besides the 
amount of damages. Varhol first complains that it was 
error for the district court to submit to the jury the spe-
cial interrogatories concerning aggravation of his pre-
existing MS. As we have noted, those interrogatories 
essentially told the jury to determine what portion of 
Varhol's condition, as it existed at the time of trial, re-
sulted from the derailment, and, if it could determine that 
portion, to take it into account in determining damages. 
Varhol complains that the interrogatory was inconsistent 
with the aggravation instruction the court gave the jury 
(which was, with slight modifications, a Fifth Circuit 
pattern instruction); according to Varhol, that instruc-
tion did not allow the jury to apportion damages for the 
aggravation of his MS between aggravation caused and 
not caused by the derailment. Varhol also complains 
that the interrogatory failed to instruct the jury that it 
could award damages resulting from the derailment (for 
example, pain and suffering from his injuries suffered in 
the derailment, emotional distress from the derailment, 
and [**19] the effects of a head injury he allegedly suf-
fered in the derailment) separately from the aggravation 
of his MS. As a result of this omission, Varhol claims 
that the interrogatory unduly focused the jury's attention 
CHI aggravation, and confused the jury by essentially in-
structing the jurors that damages from aggravation of the 
MS were the only damages they could award. 
District courts have broad discretion under 
Fed.R.Civ.P. 49(b) to submit special interrogatories 
[*1565] to juries. SeeElston v. Morgan, 440E2d47, 
49 (7th Cir. 1971). We find no abuse of discretion 
here. Vkrhol's contention that the aggravation 
instruction did not allow apportionment is hollow. 
That instruction read, in part: "If you find thai mere 
was such an aggravation, you should determine what 
portion of plaintiffs present condition resulted from 
the aggravation and make allowance in your verdict 
only for the aggravation." This clearly told the jury that 
it was to award damages to Varhol for his MS condition 
only to the extent his condition was aggravated by 
the derailment; in short, it told the jury to apportion. 
The special interrogatories led the jury, in an orderly 
way, through this apportionment process, [*+20] and 
allowed die court and parties to decipher the jury's 
thinking on that issue. 
Vbrhoi's arguments about juror confusion and overem-
phasis on aggravation damages are equally unconvinc-
ing. Nothing in the special interrogatory told the jurors 
that aggravation was the only damage component they 
could award and the trial judge fully instructed the jury 
on every element of damages Varhol claimed. The dis-
trict court also instructed the jury to follow all his in-
structions, and not to single any out as more important 
than the others. Moreover, at the instruction conference 
the judge directed Varhol's lawyers to draft the inter-
rogatories. If his lawyers were concerned about the in-
terrogatories possibly disregarding other damages, they 
should have drafted the interrogatories to get around 
that problem. But the interrogatories, as Varhol's coun-
sel submitted them, did not include any warning to the 
jurors not to disregard other damages, and \fahol's 
lawyers did not mention this possible problem to the 
judge. At all events, we think the instructions as a whole 
fully and fairly informed the jury about Varhol's damage 
theories. If any problem did exist with jury confusion or 
overemphasis on [**21] aggravation, however, Varhol's 
lawyers took no steps to avoid these problems at trial, 
so he cannot complain about them on appeal. 
Varhol next raises a series of alleged errors by the 
trial judge in admitting and refusing to admit certain 
evidence. Varhol first contends that the judge erred by 
refusing to admit Varhol's bills for medical expenses in-
curred before trial. All these bills had been paid by 
Travelers Insurance Group Policy GA-23000, a policy 
for which Amtrak, not Varhol, paid the premiums. The 
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trial judge found that because the bills had been paid 
by this policy, Varhol could not recover those expenses; 
therefore, the judge ruled that evidence of the amounts 
was inadmissible because the amounts were irrelevant 
and because of the possibility that the jury might misuse 
the amounts in calculating damages (for example, by de-
ciding that trebling the bills would be a good way to fix 
damages). 
Varhol does not contend that he was entitled to collect 
the medical expenses paid by the Travelers' policy, so we 
assume, without deciding, that he was not. nl Varhol 
insists only that even if he could not recover the paid 
medical expenses, the district court should have admit-
ted the bills, [**22] amounts and all, because they were 
necessary to assess the full extent of his injuries. 
nl Section 5 of FELA, 45 U.S.C. § 55, provides 
that an employer "may set off . . . any sum it has 
contributed or paid to any insurance, . . . that may 
have been paid to the injured employee . . . on 
account of the injury. . . . " Despite the language 
"any sum it has contributed or paid to any insur-
ance" (emphasis added), most courts have followed 
the lead of Judge Friendly's concurrence in Blake v. 
Delaware &. Hudson Ry Co., 484 Eld 204, 207 
(2d Cir. 1973) and have held that an employer is 
entitled to set off the entire amount of benefits paid 
by a policy it pays for if the collective bargaining 
agreement between the employer and the employee's 
union expressly provides that the purpose of the pol-
icy is to indemnify the employer against FELA li-
ability rather than serve as a wage equivalent for 
the employees. See, e.g., Folkestad v. Burlington 
Northern, Inc., 813 F.2d 1377, 1382-83 (9th Cir. 
1987); Mead v. National R.R. Passenger Corp., 
676F.Supp. 92,94-95 (D.Md. 1987). The relevant 
collective bargaining agreement in this case provides 
that the policy is not a wage equivalent. Thus, under 
Judge Friendly (s reasoning, setoff would have been 
proper. Compare Mead, supra, which found setoff 
proper for Amtrak under the same policy. 
[**23] 
[*1566] The district court did not abuse its discre-
tion in refusing to admit the bills. We agree that since 
Varhol could not recover the expenses reflected in those 
bills, the amounts of those expenses bore little, if any, 
relevance to this case. See Francis v. National R.R. 
Passenger Corp., 661F Supp. 244, 245 (D.Md. 1987). 
Even if the amounts were somehow relevant, the district 
court did not abuse its discretion in finding the possibil-
ity of jury confusion, misuse, and double-recovery out-
weighed the bills* probative value. Fed.R.Evid. 403. 
This is especially so since several witnesses, lay and ex-
pert, testified concerning the extent of Varhol's injuries. 
Varhol next contends that the district court erred by 
refusing to admit his tendered Exhibit 23. Exhibit 23 
was a 1971 letter from a doctor at the Mayo Clinic to 
Varhol. During discovery, Varhol had given Amtrak a 
number of documents from the Mayo Clinic; by mistake, 
he did not include Exhibit 23 among them. When Varhol 
tried to introduce the letter, Amtrak objected, claiming 
surprise because it had never seen the letter. The district 
court excluded the letter for this reason. Varhol offers no 
authority for his argument that the court [*+24] should 
have admitted the letter, so we could hold that he has 
waived this issue. See Fed.R.App.R 28(aX4); Beard 
v. Whitley County REMC, 840 F.2d 405, 408 (7th Cir. 
1988). But in any event, we see no abuse of discretion 
in refusing to admit a document that a party never sub-
mitted to his opponent before trial (even if by mistake), 
despite a discovery request by the opponent. 
Varhors third alleged evidentiary error was the dis-
trict court's decision to allow Robert Fitzgerald, an 
Amtrak employee, to testify in Amtrak's case about mat-
ters beyond authenticating documents. Varhol claims he 
was surprised by Fitzgerald's testimony because Amtrak 
did not list Fitzgerald in the pretrial order; instead, 
Amtrak stated only that it would call a "Representative 
of National Railroad Passenger Corp." Again, \fcrhol 
has cited no authority to support his argument But, 
in any event, Varhol's claim of surprise rings false. 
While Fitzgerald did not merely authenticate records, 
all his testimony concerned records that Amtrak had 
given Varhol in discovery. Moreover, Varhol himself 
had called Fitzgerald as a witness for the same reason 
Amtrak did — to authenticate and explain Varhors em-
ployment records. [**25] We find no abuse of discretion 
in allowing Fitzgerald to do the same thing for Amtrak. 
Varhol's final evidentiary challenge is his most sub-
stantial. Over Varhol's objection, the trial judge allowed 
Amtrak- to cross-examine Varhol about a suspension from 
work he had received for purchasing stolen train tickets 
from his boss. The district court allowed the cross-
examination under Fed.R.Evid. 608(b), which allows a 
questioner cross-examining a witness to attack the wit-
ness's credibility by inquiring into specific instances of 
misconduct by the witness that are "probative of truth-
fulness or untruthfulness." 
Amtrak's counsel asked Varhol the following ques-
tions during cross-examination: 
Q. Mr. Varhol, were you not suspended for 45 days 
on March 13, 1981? 
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A. Yes, I was. (Burger, J.). In addition, such acts 
Q. For the purchase and use of stolen Burlington 
Northern commuter tickets . . .? 
A. Yes. 
Q. And did you not admit to your guilt, agree to the 
suspension, and make restitution for the stolen tickets 
you had purchased and used? 
A. Yes. 
Although Varhol testified on redirect that he did not 
know the tickets were stolen when he bought them, we 
think the questions and answers about the incident fairly 
raise the inference that [**26] Varhol knowingly bought 
and used stolen tickets. The fact that Varhol admitted 
"guilt" and paid restitution so indicates: why admit guilt 
or pay restitution if you are not guilty of anything? The 
jury did not have to draw this inference (and for all we 
know, it may not have), but it could have. The question, 
therefore, is whether Varhol's alleged conduct — buy-
ing and using stolen tickets — [*1567] was probative of 
Varhol's "character for truthfulness or untruthfulness." 
Varhol insists that Rule 608(b) only allows question-
ing about acts that involve fraud or deceit — for ex-
ample, perjury, subornation of perjury, false statement, 
embezzlement, and false pretenses. See United States v. 
Amahia, 825 F.2d 177, 181 (8th Cir. 1987). Our own 
cases, however, do not use language that cabins cross-
examination under Rule 608(b) in this way. See, e.g., 
United States v. Holt, 817F.2d 1264,1272-73 (7th Cir. 
1987); Simmons, Inc. v. Pinkerton's, Inc., 762 E2d 
591, 605 (7th Cir. 1985); United States v. CovelU, 738 
F.2d 847, 856 (7th Cir. 1984). But the fact that none of 
these cases has specifically limited Rule 608(b) question-
ing to acts that involve fraud or deceit is not very helpful 
[**27] to us here because these cases all involved ques-
tioning about acts that involved some element of deceit 
or false statement. 
The reason for allowing cross-examination under Rule 
608(b) is to allow a party to attempt to cast doubt on a 
witness's reliability for telling the truth. Acts involv-
ing fraud or deceit clearly raise such doubt, while certain 
acts, such as murder, assault, or battery normally do not. 
But stealing and receiving stolen goods fall into a gray 
area. Stealing does not necessarily involve false state-
ments or deceit, so it does not necessarily go directly to 
a witness's propensity to lie. But people generally re-
gard acts such as stealing (and receiving and using stolen 
property) as acts that "reflectQ adversely on a man's hon-
esty and integrity." Gordon v. United States, 127 U.S. 
App. D.C. 343, 383 F.2d 936, 940 (D.C. Cir. 1967) 
"do disclose a disregard for the rights of others which 
might reasonably be expected to express itself in giving 
false testimony whenever it would be to the advantage of 
the witness. If the witness had no compunctions against 
stealing another's property . . . it is hard to see why he 
would hesitate to obtain an advantage [**28] for himself 
or [a] friend in trial by giving false testimony." 
David W. Louisell and Christopner B. Mueller, 3 
Federal Evidence § 305, at 226 (1979) (quoting Ladd, 
Credibility Tests - Current Trends, 89 U. Fa. L. Rev. 
166,180 (1940)). As a practical matter, it is difficult to 
distinguish between untruthfulness and dishonesty. See 
id. 
The question whether to allow questioning about acts 
such as receiving and using stolen property under Rule 
608(b) is a close one. But we think that the connection 
between such acts and honesty and integrity, and be-
tween honesty and integrity and credibility, is sufficient 
to allow admission, subject to the district court judge's 
sound exercise of discretion. In this case, Varhol's cred-
ibility was a key issue. The stolen ticket evidence did 
arguably reflect upon his honesty, and Varhol's counsel 
had the opportunity to minimize any adverse inference 
on redirect examination. Therefore, we do not think 
it was an abuse of discretion to allow Amtrak to attack 
Vunol's credibility by cross-examining Varhol about the 
stolen tickets. 
There is one further complication here, though: the 
trial judge never told the jury that it was to consider 
the evidence [*+29] about the stolen tickets only in de-
termining Varhol's credibility. Varhol insists that we 
must reverse because of the district court's failure to 
give a limiting instruction. Varhol, however, has not 
preserved this issue. At the time Amtrak asked the 
questions, Varhol's lawyers stood silent and mentioned 
nothing about a limiting instruction. In fact, at a side-
bar immediately before Amtrak asked the questions (a 
particularly appropriate time to remind the judge about 
a limiting instruction), Varhol's counsel did not mention 
a limiting instruction. 
It is true, as Varhol notes, that his counsel did ask 
the district judge several times during trial for a limiting 
instruction, and that the judge stated that he would give 
one. But all these requests came during arguments on 
\ferhol's motion in limine, long before Amtrak actually 
asked the questions. We do not know the reason for 
\ferhol's counsel's failure to speak up at the moment of 
truth: it could have been a tactical decision not to draw 
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any more attention to the issue; it also could have been 
an oversight. Whatever the reason, counsel's [*1568] 
failure to speak up when the judge let the questioning in 
without giving a limiting instruction has [**30] waived 
the issue. If Varhol wanted a limiting instruction, he 
should have reminded the judge at the proper time to 
give one. 
IV. 
For the reasons stated above, we affirm the district 
court's judgment. 
AFFIRMED. 
CONCURBY: FLAUM; MANION 
CONCUR: Flaum, Circuit Judge, joined by Bauer, 
Chief Judge, Wood, Jr., Cudahy, Ripple and Kanne, 
Circuit Judges, concurring. 
John Varhol won a jury verdict against Amtrak for $ 
237. Immediately after the court discharged the jury, 
counsel for Varhol informed the district judge that he 
wished to file a post-trial motion for a new trial. With 
no objection from Amtrak, the court gave him 21 days. 
The next day, the court entered the jury verdict. On the 
twenty-first day, Varhol filed a motion for a new trial in 
accordance with the court's order. 
In its reply, Amtrak responded with Rules 59(b) and 
6(b). Rule 59(b) provides 10 days for motions for new 
trials and Rule 6(b) prohibits the district court from ex-
tending that time. Under these rules, the motion was not 
timely despite the court's purported extension of time. 
At the hearing on the motion, the court stated to Varhol's 
counsel that "to the extent you find yourself in a prob-
lem, it certainly is my fault, not yours. [**31] . . . I 
certainly did not intend to have you lose any appellate 
right by giving you twenty-one days within which to file 
post-trial motions." 
Varhol's counsel was an experienced state trial lawyer. 
In Illinois state court, the trial judge can extend the time 
for a motion for a new trial. 110 III.Stat. para. 2-
1202(b). Varhol's counsel should have refamiliarized 
himself with the Federal Rules before the trial, but when 
the court granted 21 days to file the motion without 
objection from opposing counsel, Varhol relied on the 
judge's knowledge of the Rules. Varhol's counsel made 
an error, but it was a human error and not a procedurally 
fatal error. An experienced district court also made the 
error. 
Our decision in Eady v. Foerder, 381 E2d 980 (7th 
Cir. 1967), was designed to deal with this precise situ-
ation. "Eady holds that when a judge extends the time 
within which to file an application for a new trial, and 
counsel relies to his detriment on that extension, the 
'unique circumstances' of this reliance allow the court 
to dispose of the motion before it." Bailey v. Sharp, 782 
E2d 1366, 1368 (7th Cir. 1986) (per curiam). If Eady 
is good law, then the trial court could [**32] hear the 
motion for a new trial and we can consider the merits of 
Varhol's damages arguments. 
Eady has survived twenty-three years virtually without 
criticism except from those who would overrule it today. 
It has been favorably commented upon by scholars and 
was approved by this Court only four years ago. Bailey, 
782 E2dat 1368. It is consistent with the Federal Rules, 
Supreme Court precedent, and the principles of justice. 
Logic and the principles of stare decisis demand that we 
not overrule it and we do not. Eady remains the law of 
this Circuit and, therefore, we can reach the merits of 
Varhol's damages claim. 
At first glance, Eady seems to conflict with the plain 
language of the Rules. Rule 6 flatly prohibits exten-
sions of the 10-day time period to file a motion for a 
new trial. Textile Banking Co. v. Rentschler, 657 E2d 
844, 849 (7th Cir. 1981). This rule is, in some sense, 
jurisdictional, in that it places a limit on the district 
court's power to entertain a motion for a new trial. See, 
e.g., Branion v. Gramty, 855 E2d 1256, 1259 (7th 
Cir. 1988). On this basis, Judge Manion and die judges 
who join him would overrule Eady. He reasons that the 
[*+33] district court has no power to hear the motion; 
Eady, he concludes, impermissibly allows the court to 
do so. 
But Judge Manion's syllogism does not lead to his 
conclusion. He claims that: (1) the district court was 
without power to extend the time; thus (2) the motion 
for the new trial was untimely and outside the [*1569] 
court's jurisdiction; and, therefore, (3) the court did 
not have the authority to consider the motion. Step 
(3), however, is not compelled by steps (1) and (2). 
Consider the same syllogism applied to personal juris-
diction: the court has no power under the Constitution 
over certain individuals; proceedings over those individ-
uals are outside the court's jurisdiction; so the court can 
never hold proceedings where those individuals are sub-
ject to the power of the court. That conclusion is simply 
not correct: Under the Constitution, courts may lack 
jurisdiction over certain individuals, and they may lack 
die power to extend their jurisdiction affirmatively to 
those people, but, under certain circumstances, they are 
permitted to hear cases involving those individuals. See 
Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(h)(1). Judge Manion's logic leads 
to a similarly erroneous conclusion when applied [**34] 
to statutes of limitation. Like Rule 59(b), courts are 
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not free to extend statutes of limitation, but, in certain 
circumstances, they can hear cases where the complaint 
was filed after the statutory deadline. See Fed. R. Civ. 
P. 8(c); see also Roe v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 132 
F.2d 829, 832 (7th Cir. 1943); American Nat'I Bank v. 
FDIC, 710 E2d 1528,1537 (1 lth Cir. 1983). 
With subject matter jurisdiction, of course, the lim-
its on power are absolute. If there is no subject matter 
jurisdiction, nothing the parties do can give the court 
power to hear the case. Subject matter jurisdiction is 
not, however, necessarily the appropriate approach to 
the 10-day time deadline of Rule 59(b). Subject matter 
jurisdiction is controlled by a statute explicitly labeled 
as such. 28 U.S.C. § 1330 et seq. Neither Rule 59 nor 
Rule 6 are styled as jurisdictional. Moreover, subject 
matter jurisdiction is informed by concerns for feder-
alism. No such concern is present here. And Judge 
Manion offers no good reason for treating the time limit 
of Rule 59(b) like subject matter jurisdiction, nl The 
Rules say nothing on their face about the nature of the 
jurisdictional restriction of the Rule 59(b) [**35] time 
limit other than that the district court may not extend 
it. Had Congress intended the 10-day time period to be 
interpreted like subject matter jurisdiction, it could have 
said so; yet it was silent. Rule 59(b) can be followed to 
its letter, read as jurisdictional, and yet be treated like 
personal jurisdiction. 
nl Judge Manion urges that his reading of Rules 
6 and 59 does not depend on treating them as sub-
ject matter jurisdiction. Judge Manion infra at p. 
1573. He advances the notion that his suggested re-
sult "flows naturally" from a reading of the Rules. I 
must take exception with this conclusion. As a logi-
cal matter, there is no reason that the time deadlines 
of Rule 6 and 59 should not be read like statutes of 
limitations, personal jurisdiction, subject matter ju-
risdiction, or anywhere in between. None of these 
approaches and their resultant consequences "flow 
naturally" from a reading of the Rules; they are all 
policy choices that must be informed by the struc-
ture, purposes, and history of the Rules. 
Given [**36] that the nature of the jurisdictional dead-
line of Rule 59(b) can logically fall anywhere on this 
continuum, I believe there are good reasons for affirm-
ing Eady *s interpretation. Rule 1 requires that the Rules 
"be construed to secure the just, speedy, and inexpen-
sive determination of every action." Fed. R. Civ. P. 
1. As Professors Wright and Miller have noted, Eady 
is consistent with this mandate because it serves these 
interests. See 4A Wright & Miller, Federal Practice and 
Procedure $ 1168, at 504-05 (2d ed. 1987). 
Justice is served by applying Eady to the present case. 
Varhol was informed by the judge that the time deadline 
could be extended and he relied on the deadline in good 
faith. Amtrak did not raise any objection at the time. If 
Amtrak was as uninformed as Varhol, then the incentive 
for knowing the Rules to which Judge Manion alludes 
is not created by giving Amtrak the benefit of both par-
ties1 mistake. Alternatively, Amtrak knew the rules all 
along, and attempted to gain an advantage by keeping 
silent while 'Varhol erroneously relied on the judge and 
then springing the deadline on him once it was past. 
"The Federal Rules [however,] reject the approach that 
[**37] pleading is a game of skill in which one misstep 
by counsel may be decisive to the outcome and accept 
the principle that the purpose of pleading is to facili-
tate a proper decision on the merits." [*1570] Conley v. 
Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 48, 78S. Ct.99,2L.Ed. 2d80 
(1957). Justice is served by allowing Varhol to proceed 
with his motion; he relied in good faith on a statement 
of the district judge. 
Moreover, Eady is consistent with the history of the 
Federal Rules. As one noted scholar and jurist has noted, 
"the advent of the Federal Rules swung the courthouse 
door open. They permitted the full development of pub-
lic law cases and the prompt consideration of the merits. 
Parties could no longer rely on clever maneuvers, but 
were required to make their best cases on the merits 
and face a dispositive ruling or a trial." Wrinstem, After 
Fifty Yean of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure: Are 
the Barriers to Justice Being Raised?, 137 U RL L 
REV. 1901, 1920 (1989); see also Conley, 355 US. as 
48. When enacting the Rules, " the rulemakers wanted to 
escape the rigidities and technicalities that had attended 
the development of procedural codes. . . ."Shapiro, 
Federal Rule 16: A Look at the Theory and [**38] 
Practice of Rulemaking, 137 U. PA. L. REV, 1969,1975 
(1989); see also Burbank, The Rules Enabling Act of 
1934, 130 U PA. L. REV. 1015 (1982); Subrin, How 
Equity Conquered Common Law: The Federal Rules of 
Civil Procedure in Historical Perspective, 135 U.PA.L. 
REV 909 (1987). Eady fulfills this promise: it avoids an 
overly rigid interpretation of the Rules and encourages 
courts to reach the merits of the dispute. 
Eady takes a middle course between treating the time 
deadlines like personal jurisdictional limits and subject 
matter jurisdictional limits on power. n2 Unlike per-
sonal jurisdiction or statutes of limitation, Eady does 
not allow parties or the district judge to waive the time 
deadlines voluntarily. This middle course provides an 
appropriate balance between the institutional concerns 
of finality and uniformity and the concern for individual 
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justice in a given case. The courts as a whoie have an in-
terest in finality of judgments beyond that of the individ-
ual parties and the parties should not be able to subvert 
this. Moreover, justice is achieved through the even-
handed application of the Rules. See Pavelic & LeFlore 
v. Marvel Entertainment Corp., [**39] 493 U.S. 120, 
110 S. Ct. 456, 107 L. Ed. 2d 438 (1989); Hallstrom 
v. Tillamook County, 493 U.S. 20, 110 S. Ct. 304, 
311, 107 L. Ed. 2d 237 (1989); Browder v. Director, 
Dept. of Corrections, 434 U.S. 257, 54L.Ea\ 2d 521, 
98 S. a. 556 (1978). By refusing to permit parties to 
waive the 10-day time limit voluntarily, Eady comports 
with these principles. Yet, neither uniformity nor the 
institutional interest in finality compel a subject matter 
jurisdiction-like approach to the Rules. Cf. Zipes v. 
Trans VbrldAirlines, Inc., 455 U.S. 385, 71 L. Ed. 2d 
234, 102 S. Ct. 1127(1982). 
By not treating the time deadline like subject matter 
jurisdiction, Eady is able to provide justice in a lim-
ited set of cases to individuals whose potentially valid 
substantive claims would be barred by an unyielding in-
terpretation of the procedural rules. Eady, therefore, 
provides an equitable balance between possible applica-
tions of Rule 6. 
n2 It is argued that the approach of this concur-
rence might require the overruling of Bailey because 
Bailey takes a subject matter jurisdictional approach. 
Judge Manion infra at p. 1573, n. 1. (Needless 
to say, with an evenly divided Court, Bailey, like 
Eady, cannot be overruled.) This suggestion is hard 
to fathom as what is advocated herein is the reaf-
firmance of Bailey. Moreover, while advancing new 
and hopefully compelling reasons for upholding both 
Bailey and Eady, nothing in the proffered logic con-
tradicts those cases. Bailey contains dicta to the ef-
fect that once the 10-day time period of Rule 59(b) 
expires, recourse lies in appeal, but it then goes on 
to reaffirm the Eady exception to this broad state-
ment. By taking this middle ground, Bailey does 
not approach the Rules as if they stated limits on 
subject matter jurisdiction. Even if it were the case 
that the quoted sentences are inconsistent with the 
approach of this concurrence (which they are not), 
the sections of Bailey quoted by Judge Manion are 
dicta and are not contained in the section of Bailey 
discussing Eady. It appears a stretch, at the least, to 
suggest that a decision is overruled because the un-
derlying logic of a subsequent case conflicts (which 
it does not) with a possible interpretation of two sen-
tences of dicta in the prior decision. 
[**40] 
Moreover, Eady is consistent with the manner in which 
the Supreme Court has interpreted time deadlines under 
the Rides. [*1571] Primarily, Eady is in accord with the 
mandate that we read the rules for their plain meaning. 
Pavelic, 110 S. Ct. at 460. Rule 59(b) on its face is 
nothing more than a limitation period. It "sets a def-
inite point in time when litigation shall be at an end." 
Browder, 434 U.S. at 264. Neither Rule 59(b) nor Rule 
6(b) say anything about waiver on their face. Eady, 
therefore, does not conflict with the plain wv^nmg of 
the Rules. 
Eady is also consistent with Thompson v. INS, 375 
US. 384, 11 L. Ed. 2d404,84S. a. 397(1964) mi 
Harris Lines v. Cherry Meat Packers, Inc., 371 U.S. 
215, 9L.Ed. 2d 261, 83 S. a. 283 (1962). Vft rec-
ognized in Amax Coal v. Director, OWCP, US. Dept. 
of Labor, 892 E2d 578 (7th Cir. 1989), that Eady "de-
rive[d] from the analogous decisions in Harris Lines and 
Thompson where the Supreme Court recognized an equi-
table exception to the requirement that notices of appeal 
be filed on rime — when counsel relies on the trial court's 
assurance that the time to file the notice of appeal has 
been extended, either by its discretionary power to do so 
under FRCP 59(a) [**41] or by erroneously attempting 
to extend the time for filing post-trial motions which toll 
the time for filing notice of appeal." Id. at 581 n. 5 (ci-
tations omitted). I agree with Judge Manion that Eady 
is not compelled by Thompson, but I believe that it is 
consistent with it. Bom cases recognize room for equity 
in the Rules where a party relies on a representation by 
the district judge. Thompson excuses precisely the same 
mistake as Eady: a mutual mistake by the district court 
and the parties about the power of the court to extend 
the time for a Rule 59 motion. Moreover, Thompson 
confirms that the time periods in the Rules should not 
be interpreted like the rules governing subject matter 
jurisdiction. 
Judge Manion attempts to distinguish Thompson by 
noting that in Thompson a mechanism exists for achiev-
ing the outcome that the district court was trying to 
reach, so where the district judge could have reached 
the same end by a proper procedure, we should not pe-
nalize the parties where it did so through an improper 
procedure. This argument proves too much, however, 
as Judge Manion himself points out that the trial judge 
could have created a de facto [**42] 21-day filing dead-
line in our case by simply withholding the formal en-
try of judgement for 11 days. There is, therefore, a 
nvyfrnnism for achieving the same end. Judge Manion 
also attempts to distinguish Thompson by stating that 
Thompson merely covers cases of mutual mistake by 
the district court and the parties, but that in our situ-
ation, there should be no mutual mistakes because the 
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district court has no power to hear an untimely motion. 
Yet Thompson involves the same mistake as Eady. The 
mistake in Thompson cannot be excusable and the mis-
take in Eady inexcusable. The only difference between 
the cases is that they deal with the effects of the same 
mistake on different courts. Yet I discern no principled 
reason for guarding the jurisdiction of trial courts more 
jealously than that of appellate courts. 
Eady has also stood the test of time. It has survived 
over twenty years of trouble-free life. Judge Manion's 
rationales for rejecting Eady existed in 1967 when the 
case was decided and no new or compelling reasons have 
been advanced for discarding it at this date. n3 Judicial 
restraint counsels [*1572] that absent new reasons, we 
not reach out to overrule old [**43] precedent. 
n3 Judge Manion is correct that I am offering new 
reasons for upholding Eady. Judge Manion infra 
at p. 1576. The fact that a decision has become 
stronger over time once we have had an opportunity 
to evaluate it is, however, an argument for uphold-
ing the decision, not reversing it. My point about 
stare decisis is that Judge Manion offers no new rea-
sons for overruling Eady and, as the judge wish-
ing to change the law, he should shoulder that bur-
den. Respectfully, I can find nothing in his concur-
ring opinion advancing a reason that was not present 
when Eady was decided (such as an amendment to the 
Rules or the Supreme Court overruling Thompson) 
and, therefore, I believe that the burden is not car-
ried. 
Moreover, Eady is not inconsistent with Hulson v. 
Atchison, Topeka & Santa FeRy Co., 289F.2d 726 
(1961) and Nugent v. Yellow Cab Co., 295 F.2d 794 
(1961). Both those cases hold that district courts 
cannot extend time under Rule 59(b). Eady holds 
that when the district court inadvertently does so and 
counsel relies on the court to its detriment, equity 
demands that we allow the court to hear the Rule 
59 motion. I believe that these decisions are con-
sistent in the same way that Eady is consistent with 
a strict reading of Rules 6 and 59, as outlined in 
my opinion. At most, Eady creates an exception to 
the rule in those cases, not a wholesale overruling, 
which is the course Judge Manion would take today. 
Moreover, even if Eady overruled those cases, the 
fact that this Court once overruled a decision is not 
grounds for displacing the principle of stare decisis, 
the mandate that we leave decisions in place absent 
new and compelling reasons for overruling them. 
Finally, Eady does not stand alone. See Bailey, 
782 F.2d at 1368, Amax Coal, 892 E2d at 581 n. 
5, Mayer v. Angelica, 790 E2d 1315, 1338 (7th 
Cir. 1986), cert, denied, 479 U.S. 1037, 93 L. 
Ed. 2d 843, 107 S. Ct. 891 (1987), and Farisie v. 
Greer, 705 E2d 882, 898 (7th Cir. 1983) (en banc) 
(Swygert, J., concurring), for cases citing Eady with 
approval. The Third Circuit has adopted a simi-
lar rule in the context of motions for a reduction 
of sentence. See Government of the Virgin Islands 
v. Gereau, 603 E2d 438, 442 (3d Cir. 1979) (per 
curiam) (motion for reduction of sentence filed be-
yond the 120-day deadline can be considered if the 
parties relied on the district court). Noted scholars 
have commented favorably on Eady. See, e.g., 4A 
Wright & Miller, Federal Practice and Procedure § 
1168, at 504-05 (2d ed. 1987). That we have not 
had to invoke Eady between 1967 and today stands 
t&Rtaynp*\t only to the apparent competence of the dis-
trict courts in complying with Rule 6, and is not an 
implied criticism of Eady. 
[**44] 
In sum, Eady is consistent with a plain reading of the 
Rules, including Rule 1, which, like Rule 6(b), is an act 
of Congress which we cannot ignore. It is supported by 
Supreme Court precedent, the history of the Rules, and 
the principles of stare decisis. Eady, therefore, remains 
the law of this Circuit. 
Under Eady, we can reach the merits of VarhoTs ap-
peal on the denial of the motion for a new trial. An 
order denying a motion for a new trial is committed to 
the sound discretion of the district court and, on review, 
the district court will not be overturned "except where 
exceptional circumstances show a clear abuse of discre-
tion. " Forrester v. White, 846 E2d 29 (7th Or. 1988). 
In determining whether to grant a new trial, the district 
court must decide if the verdict is against the manifest 
weight of the evidence. Id. 
The district court denied the motion because it found 
that the evidence established that Varhors injuries were 
due to the normal symptoms and progression of mul-
tiple sclerosis. The same injuries Varhoi claims were 
the result of the accident — leg problems, dizziness, 
and headaches — could have been symptoms of multi-
ple sclerosis which Varhoi [**45] contracted in 1960. 
The jury was entitled to consider the probability that 
Varhoi's injuries resulted from a pre-existing disease. 
See Abemathy v. Superior Hardwoods, Inc., 704 E2d 
963, 973 (7th Cir. 1983). Given the mitigating evi-
dence, I cannot say that the jury's verdict was against 
the manifest weight of the evidence. I conclude, there-
fore, that the district court's decision not to grant a new 
trial should be affirmed. 
Page 79 
909 R2d 1557, *1572; 1990 U.S. App. LEXIS 13944, **45; LEXSEE 
17 Fed. R. Serv. 3d (Callaghan) 1 
MANION, Circuit Judge, joined by CUMMINGS, 
POSNER, COFFEY, and EASTERBROOK, Circuit 
Judges, and ESCHBACH, Senior Circuit Judge, con-
curring. 
The main question we face in this case is whether the 
district court properly considered the merits of Varhol's 
new trial motion. The answer, based strictly on the 
Federal Rules, would appear to be a simple, and re-
sounding, "No!". Rule 59 allows only ten days to serve 
a new trial motion. Rule 6(b) forbids district courts from 
extending that time, so any extension does not make an 
otherwise untimely motion timely. Textile Banking Co. 
v. Rentschler, 657 E2d 844, 849 (7th Cir. 1981). Wfe 
have repeatedly held that district courts have no power 
to grant untimely Rule 59 motions. E.g., Branion v. 
Gramfy, 855 F.2d 1256, 1259 (7th Cir. 1988); Bailey 
v. Sharp, 782 E2d 1366, 1369 (7th Cir. 1986); Car 
Carriers, Inc. v. Ford Motor Co., 745 F.2d 1101,1112 
[**46] (7th Cir. 1984); Hulson v. Atchison, Topeka & 
Santa Fe Ry Co., 289 F.2d 726, 729 (7th Cir. 1961). 
Accord Beliz v. W.H. McLeod & Sons Packing Co., 
765 F.2d 1317, 1325 (5th Cir. 1985). Since Varhol's 
new trial motion was untimely (despite the trial judge's 
purported extension of time to file it), it would appear 
the district court had no power to, and should not have, 
considered the motion on its merits. If the trial judge 
did not have the [*1573] power to consider the merits of 
Varhol's new trial motion, we must affirm that decision 
without reaching the merits; if the district court could 
not properly grant the motion, it could not have been 
error to deny it. As a practical consequence, this means 
Varhol will have forfeited his opportunity for review of 
the amount of damages because a timely motion for new 
trial is necessary to preserve that issue for appeal. Hahn 
v. Becker, 588 F.2d 768, 772 (7th Cir. 1979). 
This reasoning, however, runs head-on into this 
court's decision in Eady v. Foerder, 381 F.2d 980 (7th 
Cir. 1967). In Eady, the district court told counsel for 
the losing party that he could have thirty days to file 
any post-trial motions. Counsel, relying on this [**47] 
statement, filed a Rule 59 motion 28 days after entry 
of judgment. The district court granted the motion. On 
appeal, the appellant argued that the district court had no 
power to grant the motion because it was untimely. Id. 
at 980-81. We rejected this argument, relying on Harris 
and Wolfsohn (and thus, impliedly, on Thompson, the 
case on which Wolfsohn relied) to hold that where a dis-
trict court extends the ten-day period to file a new trial 
motion, and a party relies on that extension in filing an 
untimely motion, the unique circumstances of that re-
liance allow the district court to consider the motion's 
merits. Id. at 981. We have since interpreted Eady to 
apply only where a party actually relies on the exten-
sion; that is, where the party is not aware that the court 
cannot extend the time to file the motion. See Bailey, 
782 F.2d at 1368-69. Amtrak does not contend that 
Varhol's attorneys were aware that the trial judge could 
not extend the time for filing his new trial motion, and 
thus we assume that they did actually rely on the dis-
trict court's extension. Therefore, the circumstances in 
this case fall squarely into Eady's judge-made exception 
[**48] to Rule 59*s time limit. 
Whether or not we consider Varhol's damages argu-
ment on the merits depends on whether Eady should 
remain the law in this circuit. It should not. There are 
powerful reasons to overrule Eady, the most important 
being that Eady is inconsistent with the federal rules. In 
Favelic & LeFlore v. Marvel Entertainment Corp., 493 
U.S. 120, 110 S. Ct. 456, 107 L. Ed. 2d 438 (1989), 
the Supreme Court recently reiterated that courts are to 
give the federal rules their "plain meaning." Id. 110 
S. Ct. at 458. As we have seen, Rules 59 and 6 are 
as plain as can be: Rule 59 gives a litigant ten days to 
serve post-trial motions, and Rule 6 denies the district 
court the authority to extend that time limit. 
It follows from this that the district court may not rule 
on an untimely Rule 59 motion. The assertion that Rules 
59 and 6 do not explicidy spell out the consequences of 
a late motion, and that we should thus treat Rule 59's 
deadline not as a requirement for subject matter jurisdic-
tion but rather as akin to a requirement of personal juris-
diction or a statute of limitations (both of which can be 
waived) does not change this result. The problem is that 
Eady allows - in fact, depends on — the district [**49] 
court extending the time to file a Rule 59 motion, which 
is exactly what Rule 6 expressly prohibits. The rules' 
drafters did not have to spell out the consequences of a 
late-filed Rule 59 motion; those consequences flow nat-
urally from Rule 6's prohibition of extension of time to 
file Rule 59 motions. Even Professors Wright and Miller 
admit that "an intelligent reading of the rules [makes] it 
quite clear that the district court has no authority. . . to 
entertain a new trial motion [served] more than ten days 
following entry of judgment. . . ." 4A Charles Alan 
Wright & Arthur Miller, Federal Practice and Procedure 
§ 1168, at 506 (2d ed. 1987). nl 
nl My position that we should overrule Eady does 
not depend on calling Rules 6 and 59 rules of sub-
ject matter jurisdiction (in the strict sense). In any 
event, it is too late in the day to question the "ju-
risdictional" nature of the time limits in Rules 6 and 
59. In Bailey, this court issued a writ of mandamus 
ordering a district court to vacate an order granting 
a new trial because the movant in district court had 
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served his new trial motion after the ten-day limit 
set by Rules 59 and 6 had expired. See 782 E2d at 
1369. The premise on which we granted the writ was 
that the district court lacked jurisdiction to grant a 
new trial because the new trial motion was untimely. 
See id at 1367, 1369. Bailey made the jurisdic-
tional nature of Rules 6 and 59, and the nature of the 
"jurisdiction" of which it spoke, abundantly clear: 
Rules 6 and 59 allocate decision-making authority 
between the district court and the court of appeals. 
Once the time prescribed for a motion lapses, the 
parties' recourse lies in appeal rather than continued 
importuning of the district judge. 
Id. at 1368. Language speaking about the alloca-
tion of decision-making authority between trial and 
appellate courts is the language of subject matter ju-
risdiction. The approach Judge Flaum' s concurrence 
takes would at least require us to question if not over-
rule Bailey, a decision on which his concurrence re-
lies. 
[**50] 
[*1574] Whether Rules 59 and 6 limit a court's subject 
matter jurisdiction, strictly speaking, is not important. 
What is important is that the rules set limits, and that 
those limits lead to the conclusion that district courts 
may not decide untimely Rule 59 motions. The real is-
sue here is whether the federal rules, as written, bind 
the federal courts. On this issue, the Supreme Court has 
recently and emphatically spoken: in applying the fed-
eral rules, our task is to apply the rules' text as we find 
it, not to change it or attempt to improve it. See Pavelic 
& LeFlore, 110 S. Ct. at 460. Appeals to Rule 1 and 
"the interest of justice" do not excuse us from heeding 
this command. The problem with relying on Rule 1 is 
that Rule 1 is a rule of construction. Eady, however, 
did not construe the rules; it ignored them. The panel 
in Eady did not mention Rule 1, or even attempt to re-
late its holding to the text of any federal rules. Rules 
of construction such as Rule 1 are necessary to interpret 
unclear statutes. Rules 59 and 6, however, do not re-
quire a rule of construction to aid in their interpretation. 
Rule 1 just does not apply to this case, and we ought 
not use that rule as a warrant [**51] to bend the other 
rules any time an arguably harsh result may offend our 
sense of "justice." Cf. Schiavone v. Fortune, 477 U.S. 
21, 27-32, 91 L. Ed. 2d 18, 106 S. Ct. 2379 (1986) 
(rejecting arguments based on Rule 1 and the truisms 
that pleading is not a "game of skill" and that courts are 
not to avoid decisions on the merits because of "mere 
technicalities," because in interpreting a clear rule "the 
choice . . . is between recognizing or ignoring what 
the Rule provides in plain language."). 
If district courts really need a mechanism to extend 
the time for filing post-trial motions after entering a 
judgment, it is up to the Supreme Court and Congress, 
through the procedure established by the Rules Enabling 
Act, 28 U.S.C. § 2072, to provide that mechanism. n2 
The judiciary and Congress "have established a long tra-
dition of shared responsibility" in regulating practice and 
procedure in the federal courts, a tradition "embodied 
principally . . . in the Rules Enabling Act" The Act 
"was designed to foster a uniform system of procedure 
throughout the federal system. . . . " See G. Heileman 
Brewing Co. v. Joseph Oat Corp., 871 Eld 648, 665 
(7th Cir. 1989) (Ripple, J., dissenting). Though local 
courts may supplement [**52] the federal rules, that sup-
plementation may not conflict with the rules. See id.; 
Fed.R.Civ.R 83. Courts of appeals and district courts 
have no power to change the federal rules on their own 
and upset the uniform procedural system Congress and 
the Supreme Court have established. By ignoring the 
clear text of Rules 59 and 6 — in effect, amending those 
rules — Eady subverts the relationship between the judi-
ciary and Congress in regulating practice and procedure 
in the federal courts embodied in the Rules Enabling 
Act. 
n2 In any event, such a change is probably not nec-
essary. A judge who wants to give the parties more 
than ten days to file post-trial motions can easily do 
that by postponing the formal entry of judgment by 
any amount of time necessary. See Fed.R.Civ.R 58. 
So, Eady not only created an unauthorized exception 
to the rules' time limits; it also created an unneces-
sary one. 
Eady's inconsistency with the federal rules, and the 
damage Eady does to the rulemaking process established 
by Congress [**53] and the judiciary are themselves 
compelling reasons to overrule Eady. But there are other 
reasons as well. Eady, as we interpreted it in Bailey v. 
Sharp, 782 E2d 1366 (7th Cir. 1986), applies only to 
lawyers who have never heard of the case and are igno-
rant of the rules prohibiting extensions of time to file 
post-trial motions. [*1575] See id. at 1368-69. Eady 
requires actual reliance on the district judge's misstate-
ment; a lawyer who discovers Eady or reads the federal 
rules cannot actually rely on the misstatement because he 
knows (or should know) the judge is wrong. Eady thus 
rewards the uninformed (or those who pretend to be). 
Not knowing the rules, however, is something to be de-
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terred, not promoted. Certainly, uninformed attorneys 
do not benefit litigants or the court system. n3 
n3 While Eady supposedly states an "equitable" 
exception to the rules, it is puzzling why this equi-
table exception should apply here but not in Bailey. 
Bailey was a much more compelling case. In 
Bailey, the lawyer relying on Eady did what a good 
lawyer should do: he researched the law regarding 
time limits on post-trial motions and found Eady. 
Unfortunately, he misread Eady as saying that a 
district court can generally hear untimely motions, 
rather than as stating an equitable exception to the 
rules. (This is the inevitable result of Eady's mud-
dying the waters; the rules themselves are clear, and 
had the lawyer in Bailey had only the rules before 
him he could only have concluded the district court's 
extension of time was improper.) See Bailey, 782 
E2d at 1368. In this case, Varhol's lawyer took 
the judge's word without doing his homework. It 
seems odd (and far from "equitable") to penalize 
the litigant whose lawyer actually did his homework 
(but made an honest mistake in misreading what he 
found) while not penalizing the litigant whose lawyer 
failed to do what he should have done — research the 
problem. For an "equitable" exception, Eady hardly 
seems to apply equitably. 
Moreover, the fact that Amtrak's counsel may have 
been uninformed, or may even have kept silent to 
spring a procedural trap does not, as Judge Flaum's 
concurrence implies, excuse Varhol's lawyer's fail-
ure to know the rules. Even in procedural matters, 
two wrongs do not make a right. 
[**54] 
Moreover, since application of Eady turns on a 
lawyer's knowledge of the law, the district court's juris-
diction over a post-trial motion could turn on a detailed 
factual inquiry into counsel's knowledge, thought pro-
cesses, and even honesty (is the lawyer really unaware, 
or is he just pretending?). Rules 59 and 6 are clear and 
simple, as they should be. Courts and litigants can know 
what is properly before a court without bogging down in 
procedural minutiae. Detailed factual inquiries into an 
attorney's state of mind such as Eady may require, be-
sides being unseemly, disrupt that clarity and simplicity. 
See Bailey, 782 E2d ax 1373 (concurring opinion). 
If the Supreme Court's unique circumstances cases 
compelled the result in Eady, we would be bound to 
uphold Eady despite the reasons for overruling it. But 
Harris and Thompson do not compel Eady, and proba-
bly do not even support it. Harris and Thompson both 
depended on the fact that certain things that occur in the 
district court may extend the time for filing a notice of 
appeal. The question in those cases was how a mutual 
mistake between the judge and the parties about the ex-
istence of that time [**55] extending act — in Harris, 
a possibly erroneous finding of excusable neglect and 
extension of time to appeal before the original appeal 
period had run, and in Thompson an erroneous exten-
sion of time to file a Rule 59 motion — would affect 
the appeal. See Bailey, 782 E2d at 1369-70 (concurring 
opinion). The Court in Harris and Thompson merely 
held, in effect, that courts of appeals should not penal-
ize litigants when such mutual mistakes occur. 
There is no rule allowing district court judges to ex-
tend the time to file post-trial motions, and Rule 6 
flatly prohibits extensions. There can be no mutual 
mistake about how an erroneous extension would af-
fect the court's ability to hear a post-trial motion: the 
district court has no power to hear an untimely mo-
tion. Thompson stands for the proposition that a dis-
trict court'8 mistake, where a mechanism exists for ex-
tending the time to appeal, should not deprive the court 
of appeals of jurisdiction. Eady, however, allows the 
district court to expand its own power to hear a post-
trial motion beyond the limits the federal rules set and 
in the face of a rule that expressly disallows such ex-
tensions. Nothing in [**56] Thompson or Harris (or 
any other Supreme Court case we know of) suggests 
that courts should be able to expand their own power 
simply by asserting that power. Indeed, far from be-
ing compelled by any Supreme Court precedent, Eady 
is contrary to a number of recent Court cases holding 
that courts are to apply the federal rules as [*1576] writ-
ten, and emphasizing the importance of strictly enforc-
ing Congressionally-mandated procedural requirements, 
even if the result seems somewhat arbitrary or even un-
fair. See, e.g., Pavelic, 493 U.S. 120, 110 S. O. 456, 
107 L. Ed. 2d 438; Hallstrom v. Tillamook County, 
493 US. 20, 110 S. Ct. 304, 311, 107L. Ed. 2d 237 
(1989) ("In the long run, experience teaches that strict 
adherence to the procedural requirements specified by 
the legislature is the best guarantee of even-handed ad-
ministration of the law."); Torres v. Oakland Scavenger 
Co.,487U.S.312,101LEd 2d285,108S. Ct. 2405 
(1988) (Fed.R.App.P. 3(c) requires each party appeal-
ing a judgment be named in notice of appeal; appellate 
court has no jurisdiction over appeal against parties not 
named); Schiavone, 477 U.S. at 27-32; Baldwin County 
Welcome Center v. Brown, 466 U.S. 147,152, 80L. Ed. 
2d 196,104 S. Ct. 1723 (1984) (judges may not disre-
gard procedural requirements "out of a vague sympathy 
[**57] for particular litigants"). 
The Second Circuit has recognized that Thompson 
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does not support Eady's holding. In Long Island Radio 
Co. v. NLRB, 841 E2d 474, 478-79 (2d Cir. 1988), 
the court rejected an argument, based on Thompson's 
unique circumstances doctrine, that the National Labor 
Relations Board had jurisdiction to consider an untimely 
attorney's fee application because the Board had mistak-
enly granted an extension of time to file the applica-
tion. The Second Circuit declined to extend Thompson, 
reasoning that "there was no suggestion in Thompson 
that the district court, in misstating the timeliness of the 
new-trial motion, had succeeded in enlarging its own 
jurisdiction to entertain that motion." Id. at 478-79. 
The Second Circuit cited not Eady, but the concurrence 
in Bailey (which criticized and urged overruling Eady), 
and the Second Circuit analysis effectively repudiated 
Eady. Thus, Eady puts us in conflict with another cir-
cuit. 
Since Eady is inconsistent with the federal rules and 
not compelled by any Supreme Court precedent, the only 
reason left for not overruling it is stare decisis, or as our 
colleagues put it, "the [**58] test of time." But stare 
decisis does not compel us to uphold Eady merely be-
cause it has been around a long time. Judge Flaum's 
concurrence in this case is the first attempt by any judge 
in this (or any other) circuit to attempt to supply a prin-
cipled basis for Eady's holding. Eady itself offered no 
rationale for its holding other than citations to Harris 
and Wolfsohn. The panel in Eady completely ignored 
the federal rules (around which any discussion of the 
problem faced in Eady and here must turn), and railed 
to present or analyze any arguments for or against its 
holding. Eady also ignored two earlier decisions from 
this court, Hulson v. Atchison, Topeka & Santa Fe Ry 
Co., 289 F.2d 726 (1961), and Nugent v. Yellow Cab 
Co., 295 F.2d 794 (1961), both of which held that dis-
trict courts had no power to rule on untimely Rule 59 
motions despite the fact that the district courts in those 
cases had expressly extended the time for filing those 
motions. Given that no basis for Eady's holding has 
ever been advanced in this circuit until today, it is at 
best creative to suggest that stare decisis compels us to 
uphold Eady because "the rationales [**59] for reject-
ing Eady existed in 1967 when the case was decided." 
It is also ironic to rely on stare decisis, given Eady's 
treatment (or, more accurately, nontreatment) of Hulson 
and Nugent, which only six years earlier had rejected 
the very approach Eady took. What happened to stare 
decisis then? 
As for the "test of time": Despite having more than 
twenty years to pick up support, no other case, in this 
circuit or other circuits, has followed Eady. (There is 
a passing reference to Eady in Mayer v. Angelica, 790 
F.2d 1315, 1338 (7th Cir. 1988), that could be read 
as approving Eady, but Mayer specifically bypassed the 
procedural problem so its reference to Eady is dictum.) 
See Bailey, 782 F.2d at 1370 (concurring opinion); 4A 
Wright & Miller, supra, § 1168, at 505 (stating that "no 
other circuit has followed the result in Eady," a state-
ment that the 1990 pocket part does not retract, and 
that our colleagues' concurrence [*1577] does not chal-
lenge). n4 In fact, as we have seen, the Second Circuit 
has (at least implicitly) rejected Eady and adopted the 
approach of the Bailey concurrence (which was also the 
approach of Hulson [**60] and Nugent, the two cases 
from this circuit Eady ignored). It is just incorrect to 
say that Eady has "stood the test of time"; if anything, 
Eady's failure to attract support from other courts in-
dicates that it has flunked that test and is ripe to be 
overruled. Preserving Eady places us on the wrong side 
of an intercircuit conflict, a conflict the Supreme Court 
would certainly resolve against us given Eady's incon-
sistency with the federal rules and the Court's insistence 
that we apply those rules as written. This court should 
overrule Eady and affirm the district court's decision not 
to order a new trial on damages based on Varhoi's failure 
to file a timely new trial motion to properly preserve the 
damages issue. 
n4 It is true that the Third Circuit has adopted a 
rule similar to the rule created in Eady in the con-
text of motions for sentence reduction under the pre-
1987 amendment version of Fed.R.Crim.P. 35. See 
Virgin Islands v. Gereau, 603 F.2d 438, 442 (3d Cir. 
1979). But Gereau, like Eady, offered no rationale 
for its holding other than citation to the Supreme 
Court's unique circumstances cases, which were no 
more applicable to the situation in Gereau than they 
were to the situation in Eady. More importantly, 
the Third Circuit has recently questioned the viabil-
ity of the unique circumstances doctrine, and in that 
discussion also questioned Gereau's viability. See 
Kraus v. Consolidated Rail Corp., 899 F.2d 1360, 
1364-65 (3d Cir. 1990). In Kraus, the Third Circuit 
"assumed arguendo" that it could apply the unique 
circumstances doctrine, but stated that it would "nar-
rowly construed and sparingly apply the 'unique cir-
cumstances' exception to time requirements." Id. 
at 1365 (citation omitted). Given Kraus, one may 
seriously question whether the Third Circuit would 
continue following its holding in Gereau, a holding 
that Judge Flaum's concurrence implicitly acknowl-
edges, concurring opinion at 1568, is not compelled 
by the Supreme Court's unique circumstances cases. 
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